


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THE
ETYMOLOGY AND SYNTAX
OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE

EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED.

BY THE REV. ALEX. CROMBIE,

LL.D., F.R.S., M.A.S.L., AND F.Z.S.

THE THIRD EDITION,

CORRECTED AND ENLARGED.

LONDON.

PRINTED FOR JOHN TAYLOR,

Bookseller and Publisher to the University of London,

30, UPPER GOWER-STREET.

1830

LONDON:
PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.

890
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1830

P R E F A C E

TO

THE SECOND EDITION.

THE success, with which the principles of any art or science are investigated, is generally proportioned to the number of those, whose labours are directed to its cultivation and improvement. Inquiry is necessarily the parent of knowledge; error itself, proceeding from discussion, leads ultimately to the establishment of truth.

Were we to estimate our progress in the knowledge of English grammar from the number of works already published on the subject, we should perhaps be prompted to infer, that in a field so circumscribed, and at the same time so often and so ably explored, no object worthy of notice could have escaped attention. And yet in this, as

in every other art or science, strict examination will convince us, that, though much may have been accomplished, still much remains, to stimulate the industry, and exercise the ingenuity, of future inquirers. The author indeed is fully persuaded, that it is impossible to examine the English language with any degree of critical accuracy, and not perceive, that its syntactical principles especially are yet but imperfectly illustrated, and that there are many of its idioms, which have entirely eluded the attention of our grammarians. That these defects are all supplied by the present work, the author is far from having the vanity to believe. That he has examined a few peculiarities, and elucidated some principles, which have escaped the observation of other grammarians, he trusts the intelligent reader will remark.

The Treatise, the second edition of which now solicits the notice of the public, is intended chiefly for the improvement of those, who have made some advancement in classic literature. That an acquaintance with Greek and Latin facilitates the acquisition of every other language, and that by a knowledge of

these the classical scholar is therefore materially assisted in attaining a critical acquaintance with his native tongue, it would argue extreme perversity to deny. But that an extensive knowledge of Greek and Latin is often associated with an imperfect and superficial acquaintance with the principles of the English language is a fact, which experience demonstrates, and it would not be difficult to explain. To make any tolerable progress in a classical course, without acquiring a general knowledge of English grammar, is indeed impossible; yet to finish that course, without any correct acquaintance with the mechanism of the English language, or any critical knowledge of its principles, is an occurrence neither singular nor surprising. No language whatever can be critically learned, but by careful study of its general structure, and peculiar principles. To assist the classical scholar in attaining a correct acquaintance with English grammar, is the chief, though not the sole end, for which the present Treatise was composed. That it is, in some degree, calculated to answer this purpose, the author, from its reception, is willing to believe.

His obligations to his predecessors in the same department of literature, he feels it his duty to acknowledge. He trusts at the same time, that the intelligent reader will perceive, that he has neither copied with servility, nor implicitly adopted the opinions of others; but has, in every question, exercised his own judgment, in observance of that respect, which all men owe to truth, and consistently, he hopes, with that deference, which is confessedly due to transcendent talents.

The Treatise, he believes, contains some original observations. That all of these deserve to be honoured with a favourable verdict in the court of Criticism, he has neither the presumption to insinuate, nor the vanity to suppose. If they be found subservient to the elucidation of any controverted point, be the ultimate decision what it may, the author will attain his aim.


The work having been composed amidst the solitudes and distractions of a laborious profession, the author has reason to apprehend, that some verbal inaccuracies may

have escaped his attention. But, in whatever other respects the diction may be faulty, he trusts at least, that it is not chargeable with obscurity ; and that he may be able to say, in the humble language of the poet,

——— “ Ergo, fungar vice cotis, acutum
Reddere quæ ferrum valet exsors ipsa secandi.”

Hor. Art. Poet.

Greenwich,
3d July, 1809.



PREFACE

TO

THE THIRD EDITION.

THE following work, which has been for some time out of print, having been favoured with the gratifying approbation of the Rev. Professor Dale, and selected by that learned and worthy preceptor, as one of the text books for the class of English literature in the University of London, a new edition has become necessary. The author's time and attention having been recently devoted to another publication, which was not completed until it became indispensable that this volume should be sent to press, the only additions here introduced are such as occurred to the author while the work was proceeding through the hands of the printer. They will be found, however, to be in number not inconsiderable; and it is hoped, that in quality they will be thought not unworthy

of the student's attention. They consist chiefly of examples of solecism and impropriety, accompanied with such critical remarks as these errors have suggested, and such illustrations as they seemed to require. This mode of enlargement the author has preferred, persuaded of the truth of Dr. Lowth's observation, that one of the most successful methods of conveying instruction is, "to teach what is right, by showing what is wrong."

York Terrace, Regent's Park,
28th Sept. 1829.

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 ERRATA.

- Page 252, line 13, *after than, insert a.*
 274, — 17, *for son, read sun.*
 284, — 1, *after of, insert his.*
 284, — 29, *for participle's, read participles.*

ETYMOLOGY AND SYNTAX

OF THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

INTRODUCTION.

LANGUAGE consists of intelligible signs, and is the medium by which the mind communicates its thoughts. It is either articulate or inarticulate; artificial or natural. The former is peculiar to man; the latter is common to all animals. By inarticulate language, we mean those instinctive sounds, or cries, by which the several tribes of inferior creatures are enabled to express their sensations and desires. By articulate language is understood a system of expression, composed of simple sounds, differently modified by the organs of speech, and variously combined.

Man, like every other animal, has a natural language intelligible to all of his own species. This language, however, is extremely defective, being confined entirely to the general expression of joy; grief, fear, and the other passions or emotions of the mind; it is, therefore, wholly inadequate to the purposes of

rational intercourse, and the infinitely diversified ideas of an intelligent being. Hence arises the necessity of an artificial or articulate language; a necessity coeval with the existence of man in his rudest state, increasing also with the enlargement of his ideas, and the improvement of his mind. Man, therefore, was formed capable of speech. Nature has furnished him with the necessary organs, and with ingenuity to render them subservient to his purposes. And though at first his vocabulary was doubtless scanty, as his wants were simple, and his exigencies few, his language and his intellect would naturally keep pace. As the latter improved, the former would be enlarged.

Oral language, we have reason to suppose, continued long to be the only medium by which knowledge could be imparted, or social intercourse maintained. But, in the progress of science, various methods were devised for attaining a more permanent and more extensive vehicle of thought. Of these, the earliest were, as some think, picture-writing and hieroglyphics. Visible objects and external events were delineated by pictures, while immaterial things were emblematically expressed by figures representative of such physical objects as bore some conceived analogy or resemblance to the thing to be expressed. These figures or devices were termed hieroglyphics *. It is obvious, however, that this

* Beattie seems to think that the antediluvians had an alphabet, and that hieroglyphical was posterior to alphabetical writing.

medium of communication must not only have embarrassed by its obscurity, but must have also been extremely deficient in variety of expression.

At length oral language, by an effort of ingenuity, which must ever command admiration, was resolved into its simple or elementary sounds, and these were characterized by appropriate symbols *. Words, the

“The wisdom and simple manners of the first men,” says he, “would incline me to think, that they must have had an alphabet ; for hieroglyphic characters imply quaintness and witticism.” In this reasoning I cannot concur. Alphabetic writing is indeed simple, when known ; so also are most inventions. But, simple and easy as it appears to us, we have only to examine the art itself, to be fully convinced, that science, genius, and industry, must have been combined in inventing it. Nay, the learned author himself acknowledges, “that though of easy acquisition to us, it is in itself neither easy nor obvious.” He even admits, “that alphabetical writing must be so remote from the conceptions of those who never heard of it, that without divine aid it would seem to be unsearchable and impossible.” I observe also that in passing from picture-writing to hieroglyphical expression, and in transferring the signs of physical to intellectual and invisible objects, fanciful conceits would naturally take place. It is true also that the manners of the antediluvians were simple ; but it is not from prudence nor simplicity of manners, but from human genius, gradually improved, that we are to expect inventions, which require the greatest efforts of the human mind.

* Cicero regards the invention of alphabetic writing as an evidence of the celestial character of the soul ; and many have ascribed its origin to the inspiration of the Deity. To resort to supernatural causes, to account for the production of any rare or striking event, is repugnant to the principles of true philosophy. And how wonderful soever the art of alphabetic writing may appear, there can be no necessity for referring its introduction to divine inspiration, if the inventive powers of man be not demonstrably unequal to the task. Picture-writing is generally believed to have been the earliest mode of recording events, or

signs of thought, came thus to be represented by letters, or characters arbitrarily formed, to signify the different sounds of which the words were severally composed. The simplest elementary part of written language is, therefore, a letter; and the elements or letters into which the words of any language may be analysed, form the necessary alphabet of that language.

In the English alphabet are twenty-six letters.

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z.

a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z.

Of these there are six vowels, or letters, which by themselves make every one a perfect sound. The remaining twenty are called consonants, or letters, which cannot be sounded without a vowel.

This alphabet is both redundant and defective.

communicating information by permanent signs. This was probably succeeded by hieroglyphical characters. How these pictures and hieroglyphical devices would, either through negligence or a desire to abbreviate, gradually vary their form, and lose their resemblance to the objects which they represented, may be easily conceived. Hence that association, which existed between the sign and the thing signified, being founded in resemblance, would in process of time be entirely dissolved. This having taken place, hieroglyphical characters would naturally be converted into a mere verbal denotation, representative of words and not of things. Hence, as Goguet in his work, *De l'Origine des Loix*, &c. reasonably conjectures, would arise by a partial and easy analysis, a syllabic mode of denotation, which would naturally introduce a literal alphabet. This conjecture must seem highly probable, when it is considered, that both a verbal and syllabic mode of notation are still practised by some Eastern nations.

It is redundant: for of the vowels, the letters *i* and *y* are in sound the same: one of them therefore is unnecessary. Of the consonants, the articulator *c* having sometimes the sound of *k*, and sometimes of *s*, one of these must be unnecessary. *Q*, having in all cases the sound of *k*, may likewise be deemed superfluous. *W* appears to me in every respect the same with the vowel *u* (*oo*), and is therefore super-numerary*. The double consonant *x* might be denoted by the combination of its component letters, *gs* or *ks*.

It is to be observed also, that *g*, when it has the soft sound, is a double consonant, and performs the same office as the letter *j*; each having a sound compounded of the sounds of *d* and the French *j*. Thus, *g* in *general* has the same sound as *j* in *join*. *J*, however, is not, as some have supposed, resolvable into two letters, for we have no character to express the simple sound of the French *j*, of which, with the consonant *d*, the sound of the English *j* is compounded. To resolve it into *dg*, as some have done, is therefore an error; as the soft *g*, without the aid of the other consonant, is precisely identical, in respect to sound, with the consonant *j*. The letter *h* is no consonant; it is merely the note of aspiration.

Our alphabet is likewise defective. There are

* I am aware, that in considering the letters *y* and *w* to be the same with *i* and *u* (*oo*), I maintain an opinion, the truth of which has been disputed. The reasons, however, which have been assigned for rejecting it do not appear to me satisfactory.

nine simple vowel sounds, for which we have only six characters, two of which, as it has been already observed, perform the same office. The simple vowel sounds are heard in these words,

Hall, hat, hate, met, mete, fin, hop, hope, but, full.

Some of these characters occasionally perform the office of diphthongs. Thus, in the word *fine*, the vowel *i* has the diphthongal sound of the letters *á è*, as these are pronounced in French; and the vowel *u* frequently represents the diphthong *eu* (e-oo) as fume (fe-oom).

There are, besides, four different consonants for which we have no proper letters; namely, the initial consonant in the word *thin*, the initial consonant in *then*, the sibilating sound of *sh*, and the final consonant (marked *ng*), as in the word *sing*.

Consonants are generally divided into mutes and semi-vowels. The mutes are those which entirely, and at once, obstruct the sound of the vowel, and prevent its continuation. These are called perfect mutes. Those which do not suddenly obstruct it are called imperfect mutes.

Semi-vowels are those consonants which do not entirely obstruct the voice; but whose sounds may be continued at pleasure, thus partaking of the nature of vowels.

The nature of these consonants I proceed briefly to explain.

A vowel sound may be continued at pleasure, or it

may be terminated, either by discontinuing the vocal effort, in which case it is not articulated by any consonant, as in pronouncing the vowel *o* ; or by changing the conformation of the mouth, or relative position of the organs of speech, so that the vowel sound is lost by articulation, as in pronouncing the syllable *or*. It is to be observed also, that a vowel may be articulated, not only by being terminated by a consonant, as in the example now given, but likewise by introducing the sound with that position of the organs, by which it had, in the former case, been terminated, as in pronouncing the syllable *ro*.

In pronouncing the consonants, there are five distinguishable positions of the organs*. The first is the application of the lips to each other, so as to close the mouth. Thus are formed the consonants *p*, *b*, and *m*.

In the second position, the under lip is applied to the fore teeth of the upper jaw ; and in this manner we pronounce the consonants *f* and *v*.

The third position is, when the tongue is applied to the fore teeth ; and thus we pronounce *th*.

In the fourth position we apply the fore part of the tongue to the fore part of the palate, and by this application we pronounce the letters *t*, *d*, *s*, *z*, *r*, *l*, *n*.

The fifth position is, when the middle part of the tongue is applied to the palate, and thus we pronounce *k*, the hard sound of *g* (as in *ga*), *sh*, *j*, and *ng*.

* The mouth is not the proper organ for producing sound ; but merely the organ for modulating and articulating the specific sounds.

In the first position we have three letters, of which the most simple, and indeed the only articulator, being absolutely mute, is *p*. In the formation of this letter, nothing is required but the sudden closing of the mouth, and stopping the vowel sound; or the sound may be articulated by the sudden opening of the lips, in order to emit the compressed sound of the vowel.

Now, if instead of simply expressing the vowel sound by opening the lips, in saying for example *pa*, we shall begin to form a guttural sound, the position being still preserved; then, on opening the lips, we shall pronounce the syllable *ba*. The guttural sound is produced by a compression of the larynx, or wind-pipe; and is that kind of murmur, as Bishop Wilkins expresses it, which is heard in the throat, before the breath is emitted with the vocal sound. *B*, therefore, though justly considered as a mute, is not a perfect mute.

The mouth being kept in the same position, and the breath being emitted through the nostrils, the letter *m* is produced.

In the first position, therefore, we have a perfect mute *p*, having no audible sound; a labial and liquid consonant *m*, capable of a continued sound; and between these two extremes we have the letter *b*, somewhat audible, though different from any vocal sound.

Here then are three things to be distinguished. 1st, The perfect mute, having no sound of any kind. 2dly, The perfect consonant, having not only a pro-

per, but continued sound : and 3dly, Between these extremes we find the letter *b*, having a proper sound, but so limited, that, in respect to the perfect consonant, it may be termed a mute, and in relation to the perfect mute may be properly termed imperfect.

In the second position, we have the letters *f* and *v*, neither of which are perfect mutes. The letter *f* is formed by having the aspiration not altogether interrupted, but emitted forcibly between the fore teeth and under lip. This is the simple articulation in this position. If to this we join the guttural sound, we shall have the letter *v*, a letter standing in nearly the same relation to *f*, as *b* and *m*, in the first position, stand to *p*. The only difference between *f* and *v* is, that, in the former, the compression of the teeth and under lip is not so strong as in the latter; and that the former is produced by the breath only, and the latter by the voice and breath combined.

The consonant *f*, therefore, though not a mute like *p*, in having the breath absolutely confined, may notwithstanding be considered as such, consistently with that principle, by which a mute is understood to be an aspiration without guttural sound.

Agreeably to the distinction already made, *v* may be termed a perfect consonant, and *f* an imperfect one, having no proper sound, though audible. Thus we have four distinctions in our consonantal alphabet, namely, of perfect and imperfect consonants; perfect and imperfect mutes: thus,

p is a perfect mute, having no sound.

b an imperfect mute, having proper sound, but limited.

m a perfect consonant, having sound, and continued.

f an imperfect consonant, having no sound, but audible.

In the third position we have *th* as heard in the words *then* and *thin*, formed by placing the tip of the tongue between the teeth, and pressing it against the upper teeth. The only difference between these articulations is, that, like *f* and *v*, the one is formed by the breath only, and the other by the breath and voice together*.

Here also may be distinguished the perfect and the imperfect consonant; for the *th* in *thin* has no sound, but is audible, whereas the *th* in *this*, *there*, has a sound, and that continued†.

In the fourth position there are several consonants formed.

1st, If the breath be stopped, by applying the fore part of the tongue forcibly to that part of the palate which is contiguous to the fore teeth, we produce the perfect mute *t*, having neither aspiration nor guttural sound. By accompanying this operation of the tongue and palate with the guttural sound, we shall pronounce the letter *d*, which, like *b* of the first position, may be considered as a mute, though not perfect. For in pronouncing *ed*, the tongue at first gently

* The sound of *th* in *thin*, is usually marked with a stroke through the *h*, to distinguish it from its other sound: thus, *thick*. This distinction is by some writers reversed.

† Hutton's Investigation of the Principles of Knowledge, vol. ii. p. 688.

touches the gum, and is gradually pressed closer, till the sound is obstructed; whereas in pronouncing *et*, the tongue is at once pressed so close, that the sound is instantly intercepted.

2dly, If the tip of the tongue be turned up towards the upper gum, so as not to touch it, and thus the breath be cut by the sharp point of the tongue passing through the narrow chink left between that and the gum, we pronounce the sibilating sound of *s*. If we accompany this operation with a guttural sound, as in *b*, *v*, and *th* in *then*, we shall pronounce the letter *z*; the same difference subsisting between *s* and *z* as between *f* and *v*, *p* and *b*, *t* and *th*.

3dly, If we make the tip of the tongue vibrate rapidly between the upper and lower jaw, so as not to touch the latter, and the former but gently, we shall pronounce the letter *r*. The more closely and forcibly the tongue vibrates against the upper jaw, the stronger will the sound be rendered. It is formed about the same distance from the teeth as the letter *d*, or rather somewhat behind it.

4thly, If the end of the tongue be gently applied to the fore part of the palate, a little behind the seat of the letter *d*, and somewhat before the place of *r*, and the voice be suffered to glide gently over the sides of the tongue, we shall pronounce the letter *l*. Here the breadth of the tongue is contracted, and a space left for the breath to pass from the upper to the under part of the tongue, in forming this the most vocal of all the consonants.

5thly, If the aspirating passage, in the formation

of the preceding consonant, be stopped, by extending the tongue to its natural breadth, so as to intercept the voice, and prevent its exit by the mouth, the breath emitted through the nose will give the letter *n*.

In the fifth position, namely, when we apply the middle or back part of the tongue to the palate, we have the consonants *k*, *g*, *sh*, *j*, and *ng*.

If the middle of the tongue be raised, so as to press closely against the roof of the mouth, and intercept the voice at once, we pronounce the letter *k* (*ek*). If the tongue be not so closely applied at first, and the sound be allowed to continue a little, we have the letter *g* (*eg*). Thus *ek* and *eg* bear the same analogy to each other, as *et* and *ed* of the fourth position. If the tongue be protruded towards the teeth, so as not to touch them, and be kept in a position somewhat flatter than in pronouncing the letter *s*, the voice and breath passing over it through a wider chink, we shall have the sound of *esh*.

If we apply the tongue to the palate as in pronouncing *sh*, but a little more forcibly, and accompanying it with the guttural sound, we shall have the sound of the French *j*. Thus *j* is in this position analogous to the letters *b*, *v*, *th* in the first, second, and third positions, and is a simple consonant: *j* in English is a double consonant, compounded of *d* and the French *j*, as in join.

If we raise the middle of the tongue to the palate gently, so as to permit part of the voice to issue through the mouth, forcing the remainder back through the nose, keeping at the same time the tongue in the same

position as in pronouncing *eg*, we shall have the articulating sound of *ing*, for which we have no simple character.

The only remaining letter *h* is the note of aspiration, formed in various positions, according to the vowel with which it is combined.

The characters of the several letters may be seen in the following table :

Perfect Mutes.	Sounded, or imperfect.	Imperfect Consonants.	Perfect.
P	B		
			M
		F	V
		th	th the
T	D		
		S	Z
			R
			L
			N
K	G		
		Sh	J French
			ng

What effect the compression of the larynx has in articulation may be seen by comparing these pairs of consonants :

With compression.	Without compression.
B	P
G	K
D	T
Z	S
Th	Th
V	F
J	Sh

These, as Mr. Tooke observes, differ, each from its partner, by a certain unnoticed and almost imperceptible motion or compression of or near the larynx. This compression, he remarks, the Welsh never use. For instead of

I vow by God, that Jenkin is a wizard ;
they say,

I fow by Cot, that Shenkin iss a wisart.

The consonants have been distributed into different classes, according to the organs chiefly employed in their formation.

The Labial are	eb, ep, ef, ev.
Dental	ed, et, eth, eth.
Palatal	eg, ek, el, er, ess, esh, ez, ej.
Nasal	em, en, ing.

The association of two vowels, whether the sound of each be heard or not, is called a diphthong, and the concurrence of three is called a triphthong.

Of diphthongs there are twenty, viz. *ai, au, ea, ee, ei, eo, eu, ie, oa, oo, ui, ay, ey, uy, oi, oy, ou, aw, ew,*

ow. Of the diphthongs seventeen have a sound purely monophthongal; hence they have been called improper diphthongs. It would be idle to dispute the propriety of a term almost universally adopted; but to call that a diphthong whose sound is monophthongal is an abuse of language, and creates confusion. The only proper diphthongs in our language are *eu*, *oi*, *ou*, in which each vowel is distinctly heard, forming together one syllable. The triphthongs are three, *eau*, *ieu*, *iew*. Of these, the first *eau* is sometimes pronounced *eu*, as in *beauty*, sometimes *o*, as in *beau*; the other two have the diphthongal sound of *eu*.

PART I.

ETYMOLOGY.

OF WORDS IN GENERAL, AND THE PARTS OF SPEECH.

A WORD, in oral language, is either a significant simple sound, or a significant combination of sounds. In written language, it may be defined to be a simple character, or combination of characters, expressive of significant sound, simple or compound.

A word of one syllable is called a monosyllable; of two syllables, a dissyllable; a word of three syllables, a trisyllable; and a word of more than three syllables is called a polysyllable. The last term, however, is frequently applied to words exceeding two syllables.

Words are either derivative or primitive.

A primitive is that which is formed from no other word, being itself a root, whence others spring, as *angel*, *spirit*, *school*.

A derivative is that which is derived from some other word, as *angelic*, *spiritual*, *scholar*.

A compound is a word made up of two or more words, as *archangel*, *spiritless*, *schoolman*.

In examining the character of words as significant of ideas, we find them reducible into classes, or denominations, according to the offices which they severally perform. These classes are generally called parts of speech; and how many of these belong to language has been long a question among philosophers and grammarians. Some have reckoned two, some three, and others four; while the generality have affirmed, that there are not fewer than eight, nine, or ten*. This strange diversity of opinion has partly arisen from a propensity to judge of the character of words more from their form, which is a most fallacious criterion, than from their import or signification. One thing appears certain, how much soever the subject may have been obscured by scholastic refinements, that to assign names to objects of thought, and to express their properties and qualities, are the only indispensable requisites in language. If this be admitted, it follows, that the noun and the verb are the only parts of speech which are essentially necessary; the former being the name of the thing of which we speak, and the latter verb (or *the word*, by

* Plato and Aristotle, when they treat of propositions, considered the noun and the verb as the only essential parts of speech; these, without the aid of any other word, being capable of forming a sentence. Hence they were called *τα ἐμψυχότατα μέρη τῆς λόγου*, "the most animated parts of speech." The latter of these philosophers, in his Poetics, admits four, adding to the noun and the verb the article and the conjunction. The elder Stoics made five, dividing the noun into proper and appellative.

way of eminence) expressing what we think of it*. All other sorts of words must be regarded as subsidiaries, convenient perhaps for the more easy communication of thought, but by no means indispensably requisite.

Had we a distinct name for every individual object of sensation or thought, language would then be composed purely of proper names, and thus become too great a load for any memory to retain. Language, therefore, must be composed of general signs, that it may be remembered; and as all our sensations and perceptions are of single objects, it must also be capable of denoting individuals. Now, whatever mode be adopted to render general terms significant of individual objects, or whatever auxiliaries be employed for this purpose, the general term, with its individuating word, must be regarded as a substitute for the proper name. Thus, *man* is a general term to denote the whole of a species; if I say, *the man*, *this man*, *that man*, it is obvious that the words *the*, *this*, and *that*, termed definitives, serve, with the general term, as a substitute for the proper name of the individual.

* Noun, Nomen de quo loquimur.

Verb, Verbum seu quod loquimur.—*Quint. lib. i. 4.*

Horace has been thought by some to countenance this doctrine, when he says,

“Donec verba, quibus voces sensusq; notarent,
Nominaque invenere.”—*Lib. i. Sat. 3.*

Hence it is evident, that those words which are termed definitives, how useful soever, cannot be regarded as indispensable.

The pronoun is clearly a substitute for the noun ; it cannot therefore be deemed essential. The adjective expressing merely the property or quality *in concreto*, without affirmation, may be dispensed with ; the connexion of a substance with a quality or property being expressible by the noun and the verb. Thus, “a good man” is equivalent to “a man *of, with, or join, goodness.*” Adverbs, which have been termed attributives of the second order, are nothing but abbreviations, as, *here* for *in this place*, *bravely* for *brave like*. These, therefore, cannot be considered as essentials in language. In the same manner it might be shown, that all parts of speech, noun and verb excepted, are either substitutes or abbreviations, convenient indeed, but not indispensably requisite. But, as there will be occasion to illustrate this theory, when the generally received parts of speech are severally examined, it is unnecessary to enlarge on the subject at present.

Though the essential parts of speech in every language are only two, the noun and the verb ; yet, as there is in all languages a number of words, not strictly reducible to either of these primary divisions, it has been usual with grammarians to arrange words into a variety of different classes. This distribution is partly arbitrary, there being no definite or universally received principle, by which to determine, what

discriminative circumstances are sufficient to entitle any species of words to the distinction of a separate order. Hence grammarians are not agreed concerning the number of these subordinate classes. But, into whatever number of denominations they may be distributed, it should be always remembered, that the only necessary parts of speech are noun and verb; every other species of words being admitted solely for despatch or ornament. The parts of speech in English may be reckoned ten, Noun, Article, Pronoun, Adjective, Verb, Participle, Adverb, Preposition, Conjunction, Interjection.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE NOUN.

SECTION I.

NOUN (Nomen) is that part of speech which expresses the subject of discourse, or which is the name of the thing spoken of, as, *table, house, river*.

Of Nouns there are two kinds, proper and appellative.

A proper noun, or name, is the name of an individual, as *Alexander, London, Vesuvius*.

An appellative, or common noun, expresses a genus, or class of things, and is common or applicable to every individual of that class.

Nouns or Substantives (for these terms are equivalent) have also been divided into natural, artificial, and abstract. Of the first class, *man, horse, tree*, are examples. The names of things of our own formation are termed artificial substantives, as, *watch, house, ship*. The names of qualities or properties, conceived as existing by themselves, or separated from the substances to which they belong, are called abstract nouns; while Adjectives, expressing these qualities as con-

joined with their subjects, are called concretes. *Hard*, for example, is termed the concrete, *hardness* the abstract.

Nouns have also been considered as denoting genera, species, and individuals. Thus *man* is a generic term, *an Englishman* a special term, and *George* an individual. Appellative nouns being employed to denote genera or species, and these orders comprising each many individuals, hence arises that accident of a common noun, called Number, by which we signify, whether one or more individuals of any genus or species be intended.

In English there are two numbers, the singular and the plural. The singular, expressing only one of a class or genus, is the noun in its simple form, as, *river*; the plural, denoting more than one, is generally formed by adding the letter *s* to the singular, as, *rivers* *. To this rule, however, there are many exceptions.

Nouns ending in *ch*, *sh*, *ss*, or *x*, form their plural by adding the syllable *es* to the singular number, as, *church*, *churches*. *Ch* hard takes *s* for the plural

* The plural number, and the genitive singular, seem to have been originally formed, by adding *er* to the nominative singular, as *you*, *you-er*, *your*; *they*, *they-er*, *their*; *we*, *we-er*, *our*. This termination was afterwards changed into *en*, and then into *es* or *s*. Thus we have still in provincial usage, though now almost entirely obsolete, *childer* for the plural of *child*, and the double plural in *child-er-en*, *children*, with the double genitive in *west-er-en*, *western*.

termination, and not *es*, as, *patriarch*, *patriarchs*; *distich*, *distichs*.

Nouns ending in *f* or *fe*, make their plural by changing *f* or *fe* into *ves*, as, *calf*, *calves*; *knife*, *knives*. Except *hoof*, *roof*, *grief*, *dwarf*, *mischief*, *handkerchief*, *relief*, *muff*, *ruff*, *cuff*, *snuff*, *stuff*, *puff*, *cliff*, *skiff*, with a few others, which in the formation of their plurals follow the general rule.

Nouns in *o* impure form their plural by adding *es*, as, *hero*, *heroes*; *echo*, *echoes*: those which end in *o* pure by adding *s*, as, *folio*, *folios*.

Some nouns have their plural in *en*, thus following the Teutonic termination, as, *ox*, *oxen*; *man*, *men*.

Some are entirely anomalous, as, *die*, *dice*; *penny*, *pence*; *goose*, *geese*; *sow*, *swine*; and *brother* makes *brethren**, when denoting persons of the same society or profession. *Die*, a stamp for coining, makes *dies* in the plural.

Index makes in the plural *indexes*, when it expresses a table of contents, and *indices*, when it denotes the exponent of an algebraic quantity.

Some are used alike in both numbers, as, *hose*†, *deer*, *sheep*, these being either singular or plural.

Nouns expressive of whatever nature or art has made double or plural have no singular, as, *bowels*, *lungs*, *scissors*, *ashes*, *bellows*.

* *Brethren*, in scripture, is used for *brothers*.

† The obsolete plural occurs in the Bible. "These men were bound in their hosen and hats.—*Dan.* iii. 21.

Nouns ending in *y* impure form their plural by changing *y* into *ies*, as, *quality*, *qualities*.

Nouns purely Latin, Greek, Hebrew, French, &c. retain their original plurals.

	<i>Sing.</i>	<i>Pl.</i>
<i>Lat.</i>	Arcanum	Arcana
<i>Fr.</i>	Beau	Beaux
<i>Lat.</i>	Erratum	Errata
<i>Fr.</i>	Monsieur	Messieurs, Messrs
<i>Heb.</i>	Cherub	Cherubim
<i>Heb.</i>	Seraph	Seraphim
<i>Lat.</i>	Magus	Magi
<i>Gr.</i>	Phenomenon	Phenomena
<i>Lat.</i>	Stratum	Strata
<i>Gr.</i>	Automaton	Automata
<i>Lat.</i>	Vortex	Vortices
<i>Lat.</i>	Radius	Radii
<i>Lat.</i>	Genus	Genera
<i>Gr.</i>	Crisis	Crises
<i>Gr.</i>	Emphasis	Emphases
<i>Gr.</i>	Hypothesis	Hypotheses
<i>Lat.</i>	Genius	Genii,

when denoting aerial spirits; but when signifying *men of genius*, or employed to express the plural of that combination of mental qualities, which constitutes genius, it follows the general rule.

A proper name has a plural number when it becomes the name of more individuals than one, as, *the*

two Scipios; the twelve Cæsars. It is to be observed, however, that it ceases then to be, strictly speaking, a proper name.

Some nouns have no plural. 1st. Those, which denote things measured or weighed, unless when they express varieties, as, *sugar, sugars; wheat, wheats; oil, oils; wine, wines.* Here, not numbers of individuals, but different species or classes, are signified. In this sense, the nouns are used plurally.

2d. Names of abstract, and also of moral qualities, as, *hardness, softness, prudence, envy, benevolence,* have no plural. It is to be observed, however, that several nouns of this class ending in *y*, when they do not express the quality or property in the abstract, but either its varieties, or its manifestations, are used plurally. Thus we say, *levities, affinities, gravities, &c.* There may be different degrees, and different exhibitions of the quality, but not a plurality.

Where displays of the mental quality are to be expressed, it is better in all cases to employ a periphrasis. Thus, instead of using with Hume (vol. vii. p. 411) the plural, *insolences*, the expression, *acts of insolence*, would be preferable.

Some of those words which have no singular termination are names of sciences, as, *mathematics, metaphysics, politics, ethics, pneumatics, &c.*

Of these, the term *ethics* is, I believe, considered as either singular or plural.

Mathematics is generally construed as plural;

sometimes, however, we find it as singular. “It is a great pity,” says Locke (vol. iii. p. 427, 8vo. 1794), “Aristotle had not understood mathematics, as well as Mr. Newton, and made use of *it* in natural philosophy.”

“But when mathematics,” says Mr. Harris, “instead of being applied to this excellent purpose, *are* used not to exemplify logic, but to supply its place, no wonder, if logic pass into contempt.”

Bacon improperly uses the word as singular and plural in the same sentence. “If a child,” says he, “be bird-witted, that is, hath not the faculty of attention, the mathematics *giveth* a remedy thereunto; for in *them*, if the wit be caught away but a moment, one is new to begin.” He likewise frequently gives to some names of sciences a singular termination; and Beattie, with a few others, have, in some instances, followed his example.

“Thus far we have argued for the sake of argument, and opposed *metaphysic* to metaphysic.”—*Essay on Truth*.

“See physic beg the Stagyrite’s defence,
See metaphysic call for aid on sense.”—*Pope*.

This usage, however, is not general.

Metaphysics is used both as a singular and plural noun.

“Metaphysics *has* been defined, by a writer deeply read in the ancient philosophy, ‘The science of the

principles and causes of all things existing.”—*Encyc. Brit.* Here the word is used as singular; as likewise in the following example:

“Metaphysics *has* been represented by painters and sculptors as a woman crowned and blindfolded, holding a sceptre in her hand, and having at her feet an hour glass and a globe.”

“Metaphysics *is* that science, in which are understood the principles of other sciences.”—*Hutton*.

In the following examples it is construed as a plural noun.

“Metaphysics *tend* only to benight the understanding in a cloud of its own making.”—*Knox*.

“Here, indeed, lies the justest and most plausible objection against a considerable part of metaphysics, that *they* are not properly a science.”—*Hume*.

The latter of these usages is the more common, and more agreeable to analogy. The same observation is applicable to the terms *politics*, *optics*, *pneumatics*, and other similar names of sciences.

“But in order to prove more fully that politics *admit* of general truths.”—*Hume*.

Here the term is used as plural.

Folk and *folks* are used indiscriminately; but the plural termination is here superfluous, the word *folk* implying plurality.

Means is used both as a singular and plural noun. Lowth recommends the latter usage only, and admits *mean* as the singular of *means*. But notwithstanding the authority of Hooker, Sidney, and Shakspeare,

for the expressions *this mean*, *that mean*, &c. and the recommendation they receive from analogy, custom has so long decided in favour of *means*, repudiating the singular termination, that it may seem, perhaps, idle, as well as fastidious, to propose its dismissal.

It is likewise observable, that the singular form of this noun is not to be found in our version of the Bible; a circumstance which clearly shows, that the translators preferred the plural termination.

That the noun *means* has been used as a substantive singular by some of our best writers, it would be easy to prove by numberless examples. Let a few suffice.

“By *this* means it became every man’s interest, as well as his duty, to prevent all crimes.”—*Temple*, vol. iii. p. 133.

“And by *this* means I should not doubt.”—*Wilkins’s real Character*.

“He by *that* means preserves his superiority.”—*Addison*.

“By *this* means alone the greatest obstacles will vanish.”—*Pope*.

“By *this* means there was nothing left to the parliament of Ireland.”—*Blackstone*, vol. i. p. 102.

“Faith is not only *a* means of obeying, but a principal act of obedience.”—*Young*.

“*Every* means was lawful for the public safety.”—*Gibbon*.

That this word is also used as plural, the most in-

attentive English reader must have frequently observed.

As a general rule for the use of it, as either singular or plural, it might render the construction less vague, and the expression therefore less ambiguous, were we to employ it as singular, when the mediation or instrumentality of one thing is implied, and as plural, when two or more mediating causes are referred to.

“He was careful to observe what means *were* employed by his adversaries to counteract his schemes.” Here *means* is properly joined with a plural verb, several methods of counteraction being signified.

“The king consented, and by *this* means all hope of success was lost.” Here only one mediating circumstance is implied, and the noun is therefore used as singular.

While, for the sake of perspicuity, we offer this general rule, we cannot but remark, that though the term *mean* is, at present, by general usage, confined to the expression of “a middle between two extremes,” we are inclined to concur with the learned Dr. Lowth, and to recommend a more extended use of the noun singular. *A means* is a form of expression which, though not wholly unsupported by analogy, is yet so repugnant to the general idiom of our language, and seems so ill adapted to denote the operation of a single cause, that we should be pleased

to see it dismissed from use. If we say, "This was *one of the means* which he employed to effect his purpose," analogy and metaphysical propriety concur in recommending *a mean*, or *one mean*, as preferable to *a means*. *News*, *alms*, *riches*, *pains*, have been used as either singular or plural; but we never say, "one of the news," "one of the alms," "one of the riches," "one of the pains," as we say "one of the means;" we may, therefore, be justified, notwithstanding the authority of general usage, in pronouncing "a means" a palpable anomaly.

News is likewise construed sometimes as a singular, and sometimes as a plural noun. The former usage, however, is far the more general.

"A general joy at *this* glad news appeared."
—*Cowley*.

"No news so bad as *this* at home."—*Shakspeare*,
Richard III.

"The amazing news of Charles at once *was* spread."—*Dryden*.

"The king was employed in his usual exercise of besieging castles, when the news *was* brought of Henry's arrival."—*Swift*.

"The only news you can expect from me *is* news from heaven."—*Gay*.

"*This* is all the news talked of."—*Pope*.

Swift, Pope, Gay, with most other classic writers of that age, seem to have uniformly used it as singular.

A few examples occur of a plural usage.

“When Rhea heard *these* news.”—*Raleigh, Hist. World.*

“*Are* there any news of his intimate friend?”—*Smollett.*

“News *were* brought to the queen.”—*Hume.*

The same rule as that just now recommended in regard to the noun *means* might perhaps be useful here also, namely, to consider the word as singular when only one article of intelligence is communicated, and as plural when several new things are reported.

Pains is considered as either singular or plural, some of our best writers using it in either way. This word is evidently of French extraction, being the same with *peine*, pains or trouble, and was originally used in a singular form thus, “Which may it please your highness to take the *payne* for to write.”—*Wolsey’s letter to Henry VIII.* It seems probable, that this word, after it assumed a plural form, was more frequently used as a singular than as a plural noun. Modern usage, however, seems to incline the other way. A celebrated grammarian, indeed, has pronounced this noun to be in all cases plural; but this assertion might be proved erroneous by numberless examples*.

“The pains they had taken *was* very great.”—*Clarendon.*

“Great pains *has* been taken.”—*Pope.*

* Baker inclines also to this usage in preference to the other; but does not affirm it to be a plural noun.

“No pains *is* taken.”—*Pope*.

In addition to these authorities in favour of a singular usage, it may be observed, that the word *much*, a term of quantity, not of number, is frequently joined with it, as,

“I found much art and pains employed.”—*Middleton*.

“He will assemble materials with much pains.”—*Bolingbroke on History*.

The word *much* is never joined to a plural noun; *much labours*, *much papers*, would be insufferable*.

Riches is generally now considered as a plural noun; though it was formerly used either as singular or plural. This substantive seems to have been nothing but the French word *richesse*; and therefore no more a plural than *gentleness*, *distresse*, and many others of the same kind. In this form we find it in Chaucer:

“But for ye spoken of swiche gentlenesse,
As is descended out of old richesse.
And he that ones to love doeth his homage,
Full often times dere bought is the richesse.”

Accordingly he gives it a plural termination, and uses it as a plural word.

“Thou has dronke so much hony of swete temporal riches, and delices, and honours of this world.”

It seems evident, then, that this word was originally construed as a substantive singular, and even

* *Much* is sometimes joined with collective nouns; but these denote number in the aggregate; thus, *much company*.

admitted a plural form. The orthography varying, and the noun singular assuming a plural termination, it came in time to be considered by some as a noun plural.

In our translation of the Bible, it is construed sometimes as a singular, but generally as a plural noun.

“ In one hour is so great riches come to nought.”
—*Bible*.

“ Riches take to themselves wings, and fly away.”
—*Ibid*.

Modern usage, in like manner, inclines to the plural construction; there are a few authorities however on the other side, as,

“ *Was* ever riches gotten by your golden mediocrities?”—*Cowley*.

“ The envy and jealousy which great riches *is* always attended with.”—*Moyle*.

Alms was also originally a noun singular, being a contraction of the old Norman French *almesse*, the plural of which was *almesses*.

“ This almesse shouldst thou do of thy proper things.”—*Chaucer*.

“ These ben generally the almesses and workes of charity.”—*Ibid*.

Johnson says this word has no singular. It was, in truth, at first a noun singular, and afterwards, by contraction, receiving a plural form, it came to be considered by some as a noun plural. Johnson would have had equal, nay, perhaps, better authority for

saying, that this word has no plural. Our translators of the Bible seem to have considered it as singular. "To ask *an* alms," "to give *much* alms," and other similar phraseologies, occur in scripture. Nay, Johnson himself has cited two authorities, in which the indefinite article is prefixed to it.

" ——— My arm'd knees,
Which bow'd but in my stirrup, bend like his
That hath received *an* alms."—*Shakspeare*.

"The poor beggar hath a just demand of *an* alms from the rich man."—*Swift*.

Lowth objected to the phraseology, *a means*, for this reason, that *means*, being a plural noun, cannot admit the indefinite article, or name of unity. The objection would be conclusive, if the expressions *this means*, *that means* did not oppose the learned author's opinion, that *means* is a noun plural. To the substantive *alms*, as represented by Johnson to have no singular, the objection is applicable.

Thanks is considered to be a plural noun, though denoting only one expression of gratitude. It occurs in Scripture as a substantive singular. "What thank have ye?"

It has been observed, that many of those words which have no singular denote things consisting of two parts, and therefore have a plural termination. Hence the word *pair* is used with many of them, as, "*a pair of bellows, a pair of scissors, a pair of colours, a pair of drawers.*"

SECTION II.

Of Genders.

WE not only observe a plurality of substances, or of things of the same sort, whence arises the distinction of number; but we distinguish also another character of some substances, which we call sex. Every substance is either male or female, or neither the one nor the other. In English, all male animals are considered as masculine; all female animals as feminine; and all things inanimate, or destitute of sex, are termed neuter, as belonging neither to the male nor the female sex. In this distribution we follow the order of nature; and our language is, in this respect, both simple and animated.

The difference of sex is, in some cases, expressed by different words, as,

<i>Masc.</i>	<i>Fem.</i>
Boy	Girl
Buck	Doe
Bull	Cow
Bullock	Heifer
Boar	Sow
Drake	Duck
Friar	Nun
Gaffer	Gammer
Gander	Goose

<i>Masc.</i>		<i>Fem.</i>
Gelding	}	Mare
Horse		
Milter		Spawner
Nephew		Niece
Ram		Ewe
Sloven		Slut
Stag		Hind
Widower		Widow
Wizard		Witch.

Sometimes the female is distinguished by the termination *ess* or *ix*.

<i>Masc.</i>	<i>Fem.</i>
Abbot	Abbess
Actor	Actress
Adulterer	Adulteress
Ambassador	Ambadressess
Arbiter	Arbitress
Author	Authoress
Baron	Baroness
Chanter	Chantress
Count	Countess
Deacon	Deaconess
Duke	Duchess
Elector	Electress
Emperor	Empress
Governor	Governess
Heir	Heiress
Hunter	Huntress

<i>Mas.</i>	<i>Fem.</i>
Jew	Jewess
Lion	Lioness
Marquis	Marchioness
Master	Mistress
Patron	Patroness
Prince	Princess
Peer	Peeress
Prior	Prioress
Poet	Poetess
Prophet	Prophetess
Shepherd	Shepherdess
Sorcerer	Sorceress
Traitor	Traitress
Tutor	Tutress
Tiger	Tigress
Viscount	Viscountess.

There are a few whose feminine ends in *ix*, viz.

<i>Mas.</i>	<i>Fem.</i>
Administrator	Administratrix
Executor	Executrix
Testator	Testatrix
Director	Directrix.

Where there is but one word to express both sexes, we add another word to distinguish the sex; as, *he-goat*, *she-goat*; *man-servant*, *maid-servant*; *cock-sparrow*, *hen-sparrow*.

It has been already observed, that all things destitute of sex are in English considered as of the neuter

gender ; and, when we speak with logical accuracy, we follow this rule. Sometimes, however, by a figure in rhetoric called personification, we assign sex to things inanimate. Thus, instead of "virtue is *its* own reward," we sometimes say, "virtue is *her* own reward ;" instead of "*it* (the sun) rises," we say, "*he* rises ;" instead of "*it* (death) advances with hasty steps," we say, "*he* advances."

This figurative mode of expression, by which we give life and sex to things inanimate, and embody abstract qualities, forms a singular and striking beauty in our language, rendering it in this respect superior to the languages of Greece and Rome, neither of which admitted this animated phraseology*.

When we say,

"The sun *his* orient beams had shed,"

the expression possesses infinitely more vivacity than

"The sun *its* orient beams had shed." Aug 12

In assigning sex to things inanimate, it has been supposed that we have been guided by certain characters or qualities in the inanimate objects, as bearing some resemblance to the distinctive or characteristic qualities of male and female animals. Thus, it has been said, that those inanimate substances, or abstract qualities, which are characterized by the attributes of giving or imparting, or which convey an idea of great strength, firmness, or energy,

* The gender of *mors*, *virtus*, *sol*, *θανατος*, *αρετη*, *ηλιος*, was unalterably fixed.

are masculine; and that those, on the contrary, which are distinguished by the properties of receiving, containing, and producing, or which convey an idea of weakness or timidity, having more of a passive than active nature, are feminine. Hence it has been observed, that the *sun*, *death*, *time*, the names also of great rivers and mountains, are considered as masculine; and that the *moon*, a *ship*, the *sea*, *virtue*, in all its species, are considered as feminine. Of these and such speculations it may be truly said, as the learned author of them remarks himself, that they are at best but ingenious conjectures. They certainly will not bear to be rigorously examined; for there are not any two languages which harmonize in this respect, assigning the same sex to the same inanimate objects, nor any one language, in which this theory is supported by fact *. Hence it is evident, that neither reason nor nature has any share in the regulation of this matter; and that, in assigning sex to inanimate things, the determination is purely fanciful. In Greek, *death* is masculine; in Latin, feminine. In those languages the *sun* is masculine; in the Gothic, German, Anglo-Saxon, and some other northern languages, it is feminine; in Russian it is neuter. In several of the languages of Asia, the *sun* is feminine. According to our northern mythology, the sun was the wife of Tuisco. The Romans con-

* It seems, however, to be more applicable to the English language than to any other, with which I am acquainted.

sidered the winds as masculine; the Hebrews, says Caramuel, represented them as nymphs. In the Hebrew language, however, they were of the masculine gender, as were also the *sun* and *death*. In short, we know not any two languages which accord in this respect, or any one language in which sex is assigned to things inanimate, according to any consistent or determinate rule.

In speaking of animals, whose sex is not known to us, or not regarded, we assign to them gender either masculine or feminine, according, as it would appear, to the characteristic properties of the animal itself. In speaking, for example, of the horse, a creature distinguished by usefulness and a certain generosity of nature, unless we be acquainted with the sex and wish to discriminate, we always speak of this quadruped as of the male sex; thus,

“While winter’s shivering snow affects the horse

With frost, and makes *him* an uneasy course.”—*Creech*.

In speaking of a hare, an animal noted for timidity, we assign to it, if we give it sex, the feminine gender; thus, “the hare is so timorous a creature that *she* continually listens after every noise, and will run a long way on the least suspicion of danger, so that *she* always eats in terror.”

The elephant is generally considered as of the masculine gender, an animal distinguished not only by great strength, and superiority of size, but also by sagacity, docility, and fortitude.

“The elephant has joints, but not for courtesy;
His legs are for necessity, not flexure.”—*Shakspeare*.

To a cat we almost always assign the female sex; to a dog, on the contrary, or one of the canine species, we attribute the masculine gender.

“A cat, as *she* beholds the light, draws the ball of *her* eye small and long.”—*Peacham on Drawing*.

“The dog is a domestic animal remarkably various in *his* species.”

It would be easy to illustrate, by more examples, this ascription of either male or female sex to animals, when we speak of them in the species, or are not acquainted with the sex of the individual; but these now adduced will, I presume, be sufficient.

By what principle this phraseology is dictated, or whether it be merely casual or arbitrary in its origin, it would be of no utility at present to inquire. It may be necessary, however, to remark that, when speaking of animals, particularly those of inferior size, we frequently consider them as devoid of sex. “*It* is a bold and daring creature,” says a certain writer, speaking of a cat, “and also cruel to *its* enemy; and never gives over, till *it* has destroyed it, if possible. *It* is also watchful, dexterous, swift, and pliable.”

Before I dismiss this subject, I would request the reader's attention to an idiom, which seems to have escaped the notice of our grammarians. It frequently happens, as I have already observed, that our language furnishes two distinct terms for the male and the female, as, *shepherd*, *shepherdess*. It is to be ob-

served, however, that the masculine term has a general meaning, expressing both male and female, and is always employed, when the office, occupation, profession, &c. and not the sex of the individual is chiefly to be expressed; and that the feminine term is used in those cases only, when discrimination of sex is indispensably necessary. This may be illustrated by the following examples. If I say, "The poets of this age are distinguished more by correctness of taste, than sublimity of conception," I clearly include in the term *poet*, both male and female writers of poetry. If I say, "She is the best poetess in this country," I assign her the superiority over those only of her own sex. If I say, "She is the best poet in this country," I pronounce her superior to all other writers of poetry, both male and female. "Spinning," says Lord Kames, in his Sketches, "is a female occupation, and must have had a female inventor." If he had said "a female inventress," the expression would have been pleonastic. If he had said "must have had an inventress," he would not have sufficiently contrasted the male and the female; he would have merely predicated the necessity of an inventress. He, therefore, properly adopts the term *inventor* as applicable to each of the sexes, limiting it to the female by the appropriate term*. When

* These observations will sufficiently explain the reason why we cannot concur with Dr. Johnson in thinking that there is "an impropriety in the termination," when we say of a woman, "She is a philosopher." The female termination in such examples is not wanted; it would be pleonastic and improper. The meaning is, "She is a person given to the study of nature." If we had

distinction of sex is necessary for the sake of perspicuity, or where the sex, rather than the general idea implied by the term, is the primary object, the feminine noun must be employed to express the female; thus, "I hear that some *authoresses* are engaged in this work."—*Political Register*. Here the feminine term is indispensable *. This subject will be resumed in "the Critical Remarks and Illustrations."

been speaking of a lady devoted to philosophy, and had occasion afterwards to mention her by an appellative, we should feel the want of the appropriate termination; and instead of saying "the philosopher," we should wish, for the sake of discrimination, to be able to say, "the philosophress," or to employ some equally distinctive term. In the example adduced by the learned lexicographer, the female termination is superfluous; and would intimate a distinction of philosophic character, instead of a distinction of sex, the latter being denoted by the female pronoun.

* We remark, in some instances, a similar phraseology in Greek and Latin. *Θεός* and *θεα*, *deus* and *dea*, are contradistinguished as in English, *god* and *goddess*; the former of each pair strictly denoting the male, and the latter the female. But the former, we find, has a generical meaning, expressing "a deity," whether male or female; and is frequently used when the female is designed, if divinity in the abstract be the primary idea, without regard to the sex, thus,

"————— τόν δ' ἐξήρπαξ' Ἀφροδίτην,
 'Ρεῖα μάλ' ὤσε θεός."—*Hom. Il.* 3. 380.

Here the term *θεός* is applied to Venus, the character of divinity, and not the distinction of sex, being the chief object of the poet's attention. *Θεός* is, therefore, to be considered as either masculine or feminine.

"Ἀλλὰ μ' ἂ Διός γ' ἀλκίμα θεός."—*Soph. Aj.* 401.

"Μῆτε τις ἔν θήλεια θεός."—*Hom. Il.* Θ. 7.

"Descendo, ac ducente deo, flammam inter et hostes
 Expedior."—*Virg. Æn.* 2. 632.

Here, also, *deo* is applied to Venus, as likewise in the following passage, "*deum esse indignam credidi*."—*Plaut. Pœn.* 2. 1. 10.

SECTION III.

Of Cases.

THE third accident of a noun is case (*casus*, or fall), so called, because ancient grammarians, “it is said,” represented the cases as declining or falling from the nominative, which was represented by a perpendicular, and thence called *Casus rectus*, or upright case, while the others were named *Casus obliqui*, or oblique cases. The cases, in the languages of Greece and Rome, were formed by varying the termination; and were intended to express a few of the most obvious and common relations.

In English there are only three cases, nominative, genitive, and objective, or accusative case. In substantives the nominative case and the objective have, like neuter nouns in Greek and Latin, the same form, being distinguishable from each other by nothing but their place; thus,

Nom.	Obj.
<i>Achilles slew Hector,</i>	
	<i>Hector slew Achilles,</i>

where the meaning is reversed by the interchange of the nouns, the nominative or agent being known by its being placed before the verb; and the subject of

the action by its following it. Pronouns have three cases, that is, two inflexions from the nominative, as, *I, mine, me; thou, thine, thee.*

The genitive in English, by some called the possessive case, is formed by adding to the nominative the letter *s*, with an apostrophe before it, as, *king, king's*. It expresses a variety of relations, and was hence called by the Greeks the general case*. The relation which it most commonly denotes is that of property or possession, as, *the king's crown*; and is, in general, the same with that which is denoted by the word *of*, as, *the crown of the king, the rage of the tyrant, the death of the prince*, equivalent to *the king's crown, the tyrant's rage, the prince's death.*

The nature of the relation which the genitive expresses must, in some instances, be collected from the scope of the context; for, in English, as in most other languages, this case frequently involves an ambiguity. When I say, "neither life nor death shall separate us from the love of God," it may mean, either from the love which we owe to God, or the love which he bears to us; for "God's love" may denote either the relation which the affection bears to its subject, or that which it bears to its object. If the latter be the meaning intended, the ambiguity may be prevented by saying, "love to God."

An ambiguity likewise arises from it, as expressing

* ΠΡΩΤΗΣ ΓΕΝΕΚΗΣ: general case. It has been supposed by some that the Latins, mistaking the import of the Greek term, called this the genitive case.—See *Encyc. Brit. Art. Grammar.*

either the relation of the effect to its cause, or that of the accident to its subject. "A little after the reformation of Luther," says Swift. This may import either the change produced by Luther, or a change produced in him. The latter indeed is properly the meaning, though not that which was intended by the author. He should have said, "the reformation by Luther." It is clear, therefore, that the relation expressed by the genitive is not uniformly the same, that the phrase may be interpreted either in an active or passive sense *, and that the real import must be collected, not from the expression, but the context.

Mr. Harris has said, that the genitive is formed to express all relations commencing from itself, and offers the analysis of this case in all modern languages as a proof. That it expresses more than this, both in English and Latin, and that it denotes relations, not only commencing from itself, but likewise directed to itself, the examples already quoted are sufficient to prove. Nay, were it necessary, it would be easy to demonstrate, that this ambiguity in the use of the genitive is not confined to these two languages, but is found in Greek, Hebrew, Italian,

* *Amor Dei* denotes either *amor quo Deus amat*, or *quo Deus amatur*. *Reformatio Lutheri*, either *qua reformavit*, or *qua reformatus est*. *Injuria patris*, *desiderium amici*, with many other examples which might be produced, have either an active or passive sense. ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ, אהבת יהוה, l'amore de Dio, l'amour de Dieu, severally involve the same ambiguity with "the love of God."

and, I believe, in all the modern languages of Europe.

Concerning the origin of the English genitive, grammarians and critics are not agreed. That the cases, or nominal inflexions, in all languages were originally formed by annexing to the noun in its simple form a word significant of the relation intended, is a doctrine, which, I conceive, is not only approved by reason, but also attested by fact. That any people, indeed, in framing their language, should affix to their nouns insignificant terminations, for the purpose of expressing any relation, is a theory extremely improbable. Numerous as the inflexions are in the Greek and Latin languages, I am persuaded that, were we sufficiently acquainted with their original structure, we should find that all these terminations were at first words significant, subjoined to the *radix*, and afterwards abbreviated. This opinion is corroborated by the structure of the Hebrew, and some other oriental languages, whose affixes and prefixes, in the formation of their cases and conjugation of their verbs, we can still ascertain.

Now, the English genitive being formed by annexing to the nominative the letter *s*, with an apostrophe, several critics, among whom is Mr. Addison, deliver it as their opinion, that this termination is a contraction for the possessive pronoun *his*. This opinion appears to be countenanced by the examples which occur in the Bible, and Book of Common-Prayer, in which, instead of the English genitive, we

find the nominative with the possessive pronoun masculine of the third person; thus, "for Christ his sake," "Asa his heart was perfect." Dr. Lowth considers these expressions as errors either of the printers or the authors. That they are not typographical mistakes I am fully persuaded. They occur in the books now mentioned, and also in the works of Bacon, Donne, and many other writers, much too frequently to admit this supposition. If errors therefore, they are errors not of the printers, but of the authors themselves.

To evince the incorrectness of this phraseology, and to show that Addison's opinion is erroneous, Dr. Lowth observes that, though we can resolve "the king's crown" into "the king his crown," we cannot resolve "the queen's crown" into "the queen her crown," or "the children's bread" into "the children his bread." This fact, he observes, ought to have demonstrated to Mr. Addison the incorrectness of his opinion. Lowth, therefore, refers the English to the Saxon genitive for its real origin, and observes, that its derivation from that genitive decides the question*. Hickes, in his *Thesaurus*, had previously delivered the same opinion. Speaking of the Anglo-Saxon genitive in *es*, he observes, "Inde in

* Of the six declensions, to one or other of which the learned Dr. Hickes conceives the inflexion of almost all the Saxon nouns may be reduced, three form their genitive in *es*, as, *word*, *wordes*; *smith*, *smithes*. In the Mæsothotic, a kindred language, the genitive ends in *s*, some nouns having *is*, some *ns*, and others *as*, as, *fan*, *fanins*; *faukagagja*, *faukagagjis*.

nostratium sermone nominum substantivorum genitivus singularis, et nominativus pluralis exeunt in *es*, vel *s*." From the introduction of the Saxons into this island, to the Norman conquest, the Saxon genitive was in universal use. From the latter period to the time of Henry II. (1170), though the English language underwent some alterations, we still find the Saxon genitive. Thus in a poem, entitled "The Life of St. Margaret," in the Normanno-Saxon dialect, we find the following among other examples, "christes angles," and the pronoun *hyr* (his) spelled *is*; thus, "Theodosius was *is* name."—See *Hickes, Thes.* vol. i. p. 226.

Webster has asserted that, in the age of Edward the Confessor (1050), he does not find the Saxon genitive; and as a proof that the pronoun *his* was used instead of the Saxon termination, he quotes a passage from a charter of Edward the Confessor, where the words "bissop his land" occur, which he conceives to be equivalent to "bishop's land." Now, had he read but a small part of that charter, he would have found the Saxon genitive; and what he imagines to be equivalent to the English genitive is neither that case, nor synonymous with it. The passage runs thus: "And ich ke þe eu þat Alfred havet iseld Gise bissop his land at Llyton;" the meaning of which is, "Know that Alfred hath sold to Bishop Gise his land at Lutton." In the time of Richard II. (1385) we find Trevisa and Chaucer using the Saxon genitive. Thus, in Trevisa's trans-

lation of the Athanasian creed, we find among other examples, "Godes sight."

In Gavin Douglas, who lived in the beginning of the sixteenth century, we find *is* instead of *es*, thus, *faderis hands*.

In the time of Henry the Eighth we find, in the works of Sir. T. More, both the Saxon and the English genitive; and in a letter, written in 1559, by Maitland of Lethington, the English genitive frequently occurs. Had this genitive, then, been an abbreviation for the noun and the pronoun *his*, the use of the words separately would have preceded their abbreviated form in composition. This, however, was not the case.

To form the genitive plural, we annex the apostrophe without the letter *s*, as *eagles' wings*, that is, *the wings of eagles*. The genitive singular of nouns terminating in *s*, is formed in the same manner, as, *righteousness' sake*, or, *the sake of righteousness*.

I finish this article with observing, that there are in English a few diminutive nouns, so called from their expressing a small one of the kind. Some of these end in *kin*, from a Dutch and Teutonic word signifying a *child*, as, *manikin*, a little man, *lambkin*, *pipkin*, *thomkin*. Proper names ending in *kin* belonged originally to this class of diminutives, as, *Wilkin*, Willielmulus; *Halkin*, *Hawkin*, Henriculus; *Tomkin*, Thomulus; *Simkin*, *Peterkin*, &c.

Some diminutives end in *ock*, as, *hill*, *hillock*; *bull*,

bullock ; some in *el*, as, *pike*, *pickrel* ; *cock*, *cockrel* ; *sack*, *satchel* ; some in *ing*, as, *goose*, *gosling*. These seem to be the only legitimate ones, as properly belonging to our language. The rest are derived from Latin, French, Italian, and have various terminations.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE ARTICLE.

LANGUAGE is chiefly composed of general terms, most substantives being the names of *genera* or species. When we find a number of substances resembling one another in their principal and most obvious qualities, we refer them to one species, to which we assign a name common to every individual of that species. In like manner, when we find several of these species, resembling one another in their chief properties, we refer them to a higher order, to which also we assign a common and more general name than that, which was affixed to the inferior class. Thus we assign the general name *man* to the human species, as possessing a common form, and distinguished by the common attributes of life, reason, and speech. If we consider man as possessed of life only, we perceive a resemblance in this respect between him and other beings. To this higher class or genus, the characteristic attribute of which is vitality, we affix the more generic name of animal*.

* It must be obvious, that the terms general and universal belong not to real existences, but are merely denominations, the result of intellect, generalising a number of individuals under one head.

Hence, when we use an appellative or common noun, it denotes the genus or class collectively, of which it is the name, as,

“The proper study of mankind is man,” *i. e.* not one man, not many men, but all men.

“Metal is specifically heavier than water,” *i. e.* not this or that metal, but all metals.

But, though our words are general, all our perceptions are individual, having single existences for their objects. It is often necessary, however, to express two, three, or more of these individual existences; and hence arises the use of that species of words which have been called numerals, that is, words denoting number. To signify unity or one of a class, our forefathers employed *ae* or *ane*, as, *ae man*, *ane ox*. When unity, or the number one, as opposed to two or more, was to be expressed, the emphasis would naturally be laid on the word significant of unity; and when unity was not so much the object as the species or kind, the term expressive of unity would naturally be unemphatical; and hence *ae*, by celerity of pronunciation, would become *a*, and *ane* be shortened into *an*. These words *a* and *an* are now termed indefinite articles; it is clear, however, that they are truly numerals, belonging to the same class with two, three, four, &c.; or, perhaps more properly, these numerals may be considered as abbreviations, for the repeated expression of the term *one*. By whatever name these terms *a*, *an*, may be designed, it seems evident that they were originally

synonymous with the name of unity, or rather themselves names of unity, emphasis only distinguishing, whether unity or the species were chiefly intended. Hence *a* and *an* cannot be joined with a plural noun.

Some grammarians, indeed, have asserted that in every example where *a* or *an* occurs, the term *one* may be substituted in its stead, without in the least degree injuring the sense. As far as the primary idea denoted by these words is concerned, this opinion is doubtless incontrovertible, for they each express unity; but with regard to the secondary or implied ideas, which these terms convey, the difference is obvious. An example will illustrate this: If I say, "Will one man be able to carry this burden so far?" I evidently oppose one to more; and the answer might be, "No; but two men will." Let us substitute the term *a*, and say, "Will a man be able to carry this burden?" Is the idea nowise changed by this alteration? I apprehend it is; for the answer might naturally be, "No; but a horse will." I have here substituted *a*, for *one*; the converse will equally show that the terms are by no means mutually convertible, or strictly synonymous. If, instead of saying "A horse, a horse, a kingdom for a horse," I should say "One horse, one horse, one kingdom for one horse," the sentiment, I conceive, would not be strictly the same. In both expressions the species is named, and in both one of that species is demanded; but with this difference, that in the former the name of the species is the emphatic word, and it opposes

that species to every other; in the latter, unity of object seems the leading idea, "one kingdom for one horse." In this respect, our language appears to me to have a decided superiority over those languages, where one word performs the office of what we term an article, and at the same time denotes the idea of unity. *Donnez moi un livre* means either "give me one book," *i. e.* not two or more books; or "give me a book," that is, "a book, not something else; a book, not a pen," for example.

I acknowledge that, in oral language, emphasis may serve to discriminate the sentiments, and prevent ambiguity. But emphasis is addressed to the ear only, not to the eye; it can, therefore, be of no service in written language. It is true also, that by attending to the context error may often be avoided; but let it be remembered, as Quintilian observes*,

* Non ut intelligere possit, sed ne omnino possit non intelligere curandum.—*Inst. lib. viii. cap. 4.*

I am inclined to think that our language possesses a superiority in this respect over the Greek itself. *Εγενετο ανθρωπος απεσταλμενος παρα θε Θεου* may signify either "man in the species, or an individual, was sent from God." The author of the article Grammar, in the *Encyc. Brit.* observes, "that the word *ανθρωπος* is here restricted to an individual by its concord with the verb and the participle." If he mean by this that the term must be significant of only one individual (and I can annex no other interpretation to his words), because a singular verb and participle singular are joined with it, he errs egregiously. Numberless examples might be produced to evince the contrary. Job, v. 7. *ανθρωπος γεννᾶται κοπω*, "man (mankind) is born unto trouble:" where the subject is joined to a verb singular, Psal. xlix. 12. *ανθρωπος εν τιμη ων θ συνηκε*, "man being in honour abideth not."

that language should be, not such as the reader may understand if he will take the trouble to examine it carefully, but such as he cannot even without effort fail to comprehend. When it is asserted, therefore, that *one* may in every case be substituted for *a*, without in the least degree injuring the expression, the position appears to me erroneous and false. Whatever creates ambiguity, whether with respect to the primary or secondary ideas annexed to words, in some degree, without question, violates the sense.

It seems, therefore, undeniable that the word *a*, termed the indefinite article, was originally identical with the name of unity, expressing either one of any species, as opposed to more of that species, or one of this kind, as opposed to one of that. Whether the distinction of its noting one or unity, with less emphasis than the appropriate name of unity, should entitle it to be referred to a different class of words from the numeral *one*, and called an article, it is unimportant to inquire. To me, however, I must acknowledge the distinctive name of article assigned to this word appears to be useless. Were emphasis to be admitted as the principle of classification (and I see no other distinction between *a* and *one*), the parts of speech might be multiplied beyond number.

Besides the words *a* and *an*, termed indefinite

Here also *man* for *mankind* is joined with a participle and verb singular. And here it may be pertinently asked, would not the term *one* for *a* in the first example somewhat alter the meaning, and convey an idea different from that intended by the evangelist?

articles, as not defining which of the species is signified, we have also another word, *the*, named the definite article, because it is said to point out the individual object. This word, I doubt not, proceeded from the word *this* or *that*, much in the same manner as *a* and *an* from *ae* and *ane*. To what class of words *this* and *that* should be referred has been a subject of controversy*. That they are not pronouns, as some have asserted, seems abundantly evident; for they never represent a noun. By some they have been called definitives; and, though this designation be not strictly consonant with their import, it is perhaps the least exceptionable. When opposed to each other, they appear to be reducible to that species of words termed adjectives of order; the only difference between them and ordinal numerals being this, that the former express the arrangement in relation to two objects, the latter in relation to a series. *This* means "the nearer," "the latter," or "the second;" *that*, "the more remote," "the former,"

* They are the Saxon words *this* or *thes*, "hic," hæc, "hoc," *that* or *thæt*, "ille," illa, "illud," which were frequently used by the Saxons for what we term the definite article, as, *send us on thas swyn*, "send us into the swine." Mark, v. 21. *tha eodon tha unclænan gastas on tha swyn*, "then the unclean spirits entered into the swine."

The Saxon definitives are *se*, *seo*, *thæt*, for the three genders severally; and *tha* in the plural, expressing *the* or *those*, as, *thæt gode sæd*, the good seed. *Thæt* is also joined to masculine and feminine nouns, as, *thæt wif*, the woman; *thæt folc*, the people. *Thæ* (pronounced *they*) still obtains in Scotland, as, "thæ men" for "these men."

or "the first." Their office, in general, seems to be emphatically to individuate some particular object, whose character was either previously known, or is then described; hence they have also been named demonstratives. Under which of the generally received parts of speech they should be comprehended it may be difficult to determine. As, like simple attributives, they accord with nouns, frequently denoting the accident of place, they may be grammatically referred to the class of adjectives. Their import will appear from a few examples:

"That kind being, who is a father to the fatherless, will recompense thee for this."

Here a species is referred to, distinguished by benevolence. Of this species one individual is emphatically particularized: "That kind being." Who? his distinctive character follows, "is a father to the fatherless." The concluding word, *this*, points to something previously described.

" ————— "Twas idly done
To tell him of another world; for wits
Knew better; and the only good on earth
Was pleasure; not to follow *that* was sin."

Here the word *that* refers with emphasis to a thing previously specified, namely, pleasure.

"It is no uncommon thing to find a man who laughs at every thing sacred, yet is a slave to superstitious fears. I would not be that man, were a crown to tempt me." Here one indefinitely of a species is mentioned, *a man*. The subject is after-

wards limited by description to one of a certain character, "who laughs at things sacred, and is a slave to superstitious fears." The word *that* selects and demonstrates the person thus described. The word *the* has nearly the same import; but is less emphatical. It seems to bear the same analogy to *that* which *a* does to *one*. Hence in many cases they may be used indifferently.

"Happy the man whose cautious feet shun the broad way that sinners go."

Here, "happy that man" would express the same idea. The Latins accordingly employed the demonstrative word *ille*; *beatus ille*, "happy the man."

What then is the difference between *the* and *that*? To ascertain this, let us inquire, in what cases *the* is employed, and whether *that* can be substituted in its stead.

The word *the* is employed,

1st, When we express an object of eminence or notoriety, or the only one of a kind, in which we are interested, as, "the king," when we mean "the king of England." "He was concerned in bringing about the revolution," when we mean the revolution in this country. "Virgil copied the Grecian bard," or "Homer." "I am going to the city," when I mean "London." In none of these cases can we substitute *that* for *the*, without laying a particular emphasis on the subject, and implying that its character is there described in contradistinction to some other of the

same species. Thus, "he was concerned in that revolution, which was accomplished by the English barons." "He copied that Grecian bard, who disputes the claim of antiquity with Homer."

2dly, We employ it in expressing objects of repeated perception, or subjects of previous conversation. I borrow an example from Harris. If I see, for the first time, a man with a long beard, I say, "there goes a man with a long beard." If I see him again, I say, "there goes the man with the long beard." Were the word *that* substituted for *the*, the same observation would be applicable as in the preceding examples.

3dly, Mr. Harris has said, that the article *a* is used to express objects of primary perception, and *the* employed to denote those only of secondary perception. This opinion is controverted by the author of the article Grammar in the Encyclopedia Britannica, Ed. 3d, who gives the following example to disprove its truth. "I am in company, and finding the room warm, I say to the servant, request *the* gentleman in the window seat (to whom I am an entire stranger) to draw down the sash." The example is apposite, and is sufficient to overturn the hypothesis of Mr. Harris. There can be no question but *the* is frequently employed to denote objects of primary perception; and merely particularize, by some discriminating circumstance, an individual whose character, person, or distinctive qualities, were previously un-

known. In the example now quoted, *that* may be substituted for *the*, if we say, "who is in the window seat?"

4thly, The definite article is used to distinguish the explicative from the determinative sense. In the former case it is rarely employed; in the latter it should never be omitted, unless when something still more definite supplies its place. "Man, who is born of a woman, is of few days and full of trouble." Here the relative clause is explicative, and not restrictive; all men being "born of a woman:" the definite article therefore is not employed. "The man" would imply that all men are not thus born; and would confine the predicating clause to those who are. In the latter sense, *that* may, without any alteration in the phraseology, be substituted for the article; for *the man*, and *that man*, are in this instance equivalent.

5thly, The definite article is often used to denote the measure of excess. "The more you study, the more learned you will become:" that is, "by how much the more you study, by so much the more learned you will become." "The wiser, the better," "that (by that) wiser, that (by that) better." There also *that* and *the* may be considered as equivalent; and the Latins accordingly said "eo melior."

From the preceding examples and observations it must appear, that the definite article, and the word *that*, though not strictly synonymous, are words nearly of the same import. Their difference seems to be,

1st, That the article *the*, like *a*, must have a sub-

stantive conjoined with it; whereas *that*, like *one*, may have it understood. Speaking of books, I may select one and say, "give me *that*," but not "give me *the*;" "give me *one*," but not "give me *a*." Here the analogy holds between *a* and *one*, *the* and *that*.

2dly, As the difference between *a* and *one* seems to be, that *one* denotes unity in contradistinction to more, with greater emphasis than *a*, so the distinction in general between *the* and *that* is, that the latter marks the object more emphatically than the former, being indirectly opposed to *this*. I cannot say, "there goes that man with that long beard," without implying a contrast with "this man with this long beard," the word *that* being always emphatical and discriminative.

The opinion here offered, respecting these words, receives some corroboration from the following circumstances: 7 2/9/33/DS

In Latin *ille* frequently supplies the place of our definite article. "Thou art the man." *Tu es ille (iste) homo*.

The *le* in French is clearly a derivative from *ille*, of which the former syllable *il* expresses *he*, and the latter denotes *that* unemphatically, serving as the definite article. From the same source also proceed the Italian articles *il*, *lo*, *la*.

In Hebrew, in like manner, our definite article is expressed by the prefix of the pronoun *ille*; thus, *aretz terra*, "earth*;" *haretz, illa seu hæc terra*,

* הארץ, ארץ.

“the earth,” the letter *he* abbreviated from *hou*, *ille*, expressing *the*;—* *ashri haish*, *beatus ille vir*, “happy the man,” or “that man,” the *he* in like manner signifying *the* or *that*.

It appears to me then, that as *ae*, *ane*, when not opposed to *more*, and therefore unemphatical, by celerity of pronunciation were changed into *a*, *an*; so *that*, when not opposed to *this*, or when it was unemphatical, was shortened to *the*. Hence, the words termed articles seem to be the name of unity, and the demonstrative word *that* abbreviated.

Besides the words *a*, *an*, *the*, there are others which may be considered as reducible to the same class with these; such as *this*, *that*, *any*, *other*, *some*, *all*, *one*, *none*. *This* and *that* I have already considered. That they are not pronouns is evident, for they are never used as the representatives of a noun, and always require to be associated with a substantive. If ever they appear without this accompaniment, it will invariably be found that the expression is elliptical, some substantive or other being necessarily understood. If I say “this was a noble action.” This what? “This action.” “This is true virtue.” This what? “This practice,” “this habit,” “this temper.” To what class of words I conceive them to belong has been already mentioned.

One is a word significant of unity, and cannot, without manifest impropriety, be called a pronominal

adjective ; unless, by an abuse of all language, we be disposed to name *two*, *three*, *four*, pronominal adjectives.

Some is reducible to the same class, denoting an indefinite, but comparatively to *many*, a small number.

Many, *few*, *several*, are words of the same order, significant of number indefinitely.

None, or *not one*, implies the negation of all number, exclusive even of unity itself.

Other, which is improperly considered by some as a pronoun, is the Saxon *oðer* coming from *oððe*. The Arabic *ahd*, the Hebrew *had*, or *ahad*, the Saxon *oððe*, the Teutonic *odo*, and the Swedish *udda*, with our English word *odd*, seem all to have sprung from the same origin, the etymon expressing “one separately,” or “one by itself,” answering nearly to the Latin *singulus*. The English word *odd* plainly indicates its affinity to these words. We say, “He is an odd character,” or “singular character.” “He had some odd ones,” that is, “some separate from the rest,” not paired, or connected with them, “single*.”

“As he in soueraine dignity is odde,
So will he in loue no parting felowes have.”

Sir T. More's Works.

* Horne Tooke appears to me to have erred in deriving *odd* from *ow'd*. His words are these: “*Odd* is the participle *ow'd*. Thus, when we are counting by couples or pairs, we say, ‘one pair,’ ‘two pairs,’ &c. and ‘one *ow'd*,’ ‘two *ow'd*,’ to make up another pair. It has the same meaning when we say, ‘an odd man,’ ‘an odd action,’ it still relates to pairing; and we

The same idea of singularity and separation is expressed by *other* ; which is now generally used as a comparative, and followed by *than*.

Other is sometimes used substantively, and has then a plural number, as, "Let others serve whom they will : as for me and my house, we will serve the Lord." The word *one* has a plural number when an assemblage of units is expressed, not in the aggregate, but individually ; and then it is used as a substantive, as, "I saw a great many fine ones." It is also used indefinitely, in the same sense with the French *on*, as, "one would imagine these to be expressions of a man blessed with ease."—*Atterbury*. And, in using it in this sense, it may be observed, in passing, that an error is often committed, by employing the personal pronouns as referring to *one* ; thus, "one is apt to exaggerate his own injuries," instead of "one's own injuries." It is sometimes, though rarely, used as referring to a plural noun. "The Romans and the Carthaginians now took the field ;

mean 'without a fellow,' 'unmatched.'" Now, I must own, this appears to me a very odd explanation ; for, in my apprehension, it leads to a conclusion, the very reverse of that, which the author intends. The term *odd* is applied to the one which stands by itself, and not to that which is absent, or *ow'd*, to complete the pair. If I say, "there are three pairs, and an odd one," the word *odd* refers to the single one, over and above the three pairs, and not to the one which is wanting ; yet, Mr. Tooke refers it to the latter. His explanation seems at once unnatural and absurd. Had he substituted, according to his own etymology, *add* for *and*, saying, "three pairs, add an *ow'd* one," he must, I think, have perceived its inaccuracy. It is the *odd* and *present one*, of which the singularity is predicated, and not the *absent* or *ow'd one*.

the one ambitious of conquest, and the others in self-defence." This mode of expression is objectionable. We should rather say, "the former" and "the latter."

Any, an, a, one, seem all to be nearly equivalent words, and derived from one origin, I mean from *ane*, the name of unity. Hence *a*, or *an*, and *any*, are frequently synonymous. "A considerate man would have acted differently;" that is, "any considerate man." Hence also, like *one*, it is opposed to *none*, as, "have you a book (any book) which you can lend me?" "None; my books are in the country; nor, if they were here, have I any (or one) which would suit you." From expressing *one* indefinitely, like *a* or *an*, it came, by an easy and natural transition, to denote "*whatever it be*," "*what you please*." "Give me one (ane), any, no matter which." In this sense it corresponds to the Latin *quavis* or *quilibet** in affirmative sentences; whereas, in interrogative or negative sentences, it corresponds to *quisquam*, *quispian*, or *ullus*. The preceding observations it may be useful to recapitulate.

Nouns are names of genera, and not of individuals; our perceptions are, on the contrary, all individual, not general. Hence, to denote one or more individuals

* "*Quavis seu quilibet affirmat; quisquàm, quispian ullus aut negat aut interrogat*," are the words of an ancient grammarian. It is observable also, that in Latin, *ullus*, any, is a diminutive from *unus*, one; as *any* in English is from *ane*, the name of unity, as formerly used.

of a species, numerals, or words significant of number, were invented. Some express a precise number, as, *one, two, three*; others number indefinitely, as, *some, few, many, several*. Our perceptions being all individual, and one being the basis of all number, the term significant of unity must frequently recur in expressing our sentiments. To denote this idea our forefathers employed *ae, ane*. In the progress of language, where unity was not to be expressed, as opposed to two or more, the terms, thus becoming unemphatical, would naturally be abbreviated into *a, an*. These latter, therefore, are the offspring of the names of unity, and belong to the class of words named cardinal numerals. To what part of speech these are reducible (if they can be reduced to any) it is difficult to determine. In some languages they have the form of adjectives; but, if their meaning be considered, it is clear that they have no claim to this appellation, as they express no accident, quality, or property whatever. In fact, they appear to be a species of words totally different in character from any of the parts of speech generally received; all of them, except the first of the series, being abbreviations for the name of unity repeated.

It being necessary not only to express an individual indefinitely of any species, but also to specify and select some particular one, which at first would probably be done by pointing to the object, if in sight, the words *this* and *that*, hence called demonstratives, were employed; the one to express the nearer, the

other the more distant object. From one of these proceeded the word *the*, having the same relation to its original as *a* or *an* has to the name of unity. Hence the words synonymous with *this* and *that*, in those languages which have no definite article, are frequently employed to supply its place.

The use of these terms being to express any individual whatever of a class, and likewise some certain or particular object; we have also the words *few*, *some*, *many*, *several*, to denote a number indefinitely, and the cardinal numerals *two*, *three*, *four*, &c. a precise number of individuals.

CHAPTER III.

OF PRONOUNS.

WHETHER we speak of things present, or of things absent, of ourselves, or of others, and to whomsoever we address our discourse, the repetition of the names of those persons or things would not only be tiresome, but also sometimes productive of ambiguity. Besides, the name of the person addressed may be unknown to the speaker, and the name of the speaker may be unknown to the person addressed. Hence appears the utility of pronouns, words, as the etymology of the term denotes, supplying the place of nouns. They have therefore been denominated by some grammarians, nouns of the second order.

When the person who addresses speaks of himself, the pronoun *I*, called the pronoun of the first person, is employed instead of the name of the speaker, as, "The Lord said to Moses, *I* (the Lord) am the God of Abraham."

When the person addressed is the subject of discourse, the pronoun *thou*, called the pronoun of the second person, is used instead of his name, as, "Nathan said unto David, *thou* (David) art the man."

When neither the person who speaks, nor the person addressed, but some other person or thing is

the subject of discourse, we employ the pronouns of the third person, namely, *he*, *she*, *it*; as, “ When Jesus saw the multitude, *he* (Jesus) had compassion on them.”

I have said that pronouns are employed to prevent the tiresome repetition of names. It is not, however, to be hence inferred, that even the repetition of the name would, in all cases, answer the same purpose, or denote the subject with the same precision as the pronoun. For, as there is hardly any name, strictly speaking, proper or peculiar to one individual, the employment of a name, belonging to more persons than one, would not so clearly specify or individuate the object as the appropriate pronoun. Hence it would often be necessary to subjoin to the name some distinctive circumstances, to discriminate the person intended from others of that name; or the speaker would be obliged to point to the individual, if he happened to be present. Nay, though the person or subject designed might be thus sufficiently ascertained, it is easy to see that the phraseology would have nothing of that simplicity and energy which accompany the pronoun. If, in the first example, instead of saying, “ I am the God,” we should say, “ The Lord is the God;” or in the second, instead of “ Thou art the man,” “ David is the man,” the energy of the expression would be entirely destroyed. If any person, speaking of himself, should distinguish himself from others of the same name, by subjoining the necessary discriminating circumstances, so as to

leave no doubt in the mind of the hearer, it is obvious that this phraseology would not only be inelegant, but also feeble and unimpressive. To be convinced of the truth of this observation, it is only necessary to compare the exanimate, stiff, and frequently obscure diction of a common card, with the freedom, perspicuity, and vivacity of a letter.

Pronouns may be divided into substantive and adjective, personal and impersonal, relative and interrogative. The personal substantive pronouns are *I, thou, he, she*. The impersonal substantive pronoun is *it*.

The personal substantive pronouns have three cases, and are thus declined:

First Person, Masc. and Fem.

	<i>Sing.</i>	<i>Plur.</i>
<i>Nom.</i>	I *	We
<i>Gen.</i>	Mine	Ours
<i>Obj.</i>	Me	Us

* In Anglo-Saxon *ic*, in German *ich*, in Greek *εγω*, in Latin *ego*. Mr. Webb delivered it as his opinion, that the pronoun of the first person was derived from the Hebrew *ech* or *ach*, *one*, used by *apocope* for *achad* or *ahad*; he added “oned” or “united.” It is doubtless true, that *ech* occurs in one or two passages for *one*: see Ezek. xviii. 10. and Ps. xlix. 8.; in which latter passage it is rendered in our translation, *brother*, and by R. Jonah, *one*; but we apprehend that this fact will by no means justify his conclusion. And as he considered that the pronoun of the first person radically denoted *one*, he imagined that the pronoun of the second person came from the numeral *duo*, *du*, *tu*, *thu*. Now, it must be granted that there is an obvious resemblance between *ic* and *ech*, and also between *duo*, *tu*, and *thu*; but were we to draw

Second Person, Masc. and Fem.

	<i>Sing.</i>	<i>Plur.</i>
<i>Nom.</i>	Thou *	Ye or you
<i>Gen.</i>	Thine	Yours
<i>Obj.</i>	Thee	You.

*Third Person.**Masc.*

<i>Nom.</i>	He †	They
<i>Gen.</i>	His	Theirs
<i>Obj.</i>	Him	Them.

Fem.

<i>Nom.</i>	She ‡	They
<i>Gen.</i>	Hers	Theirs
<i>Obj.</i>	Her	Them.

any conclusion from this similarity, it would be the reverse of that which the author has deduced. It seems quite preposterous to suppose, that the necessity for expressing a number would present itself, before that of discriminating between the person speaking and the person addressed. The rude savage could not converse with his fellow without some sign of this distinction; and if visible signs (as is probable) would be first adopted, we may reasonably presume, on several grounds, that these would soon give place to audible expressions.

The pronoun *ic* is in Saxon declined thus :

<i>Sing. Nom.</i>	<i>Ic</i>	<i>Gen. Min</i>	<i>Dat. Me</i>	<i>Acc. Me</i>
<i>Plur. Nom.</i>	<i>We</i>	<i>Gen. Ure</i>	<i>Dat. Us</i>	<i>Acc. Us.</i>

* The pronoun of the second person is thus declined :

<i>Sing. Nom.</i>	<i>Thu</i>	<i>Gen. Thin</i>	<i>Dat. The</i>	<i>Acc. The</i>
<i>Plur. Nom.</i>	<i>Ge (hard)</i>	<i>Gen. Eower</i>	<i>Dat. and</i>	<i>Acc. Eow.</i>

† The Anglo-Saxon *he* is declined thus :

<i>Sing. Nom.</i>	<i>He</i>	<i>Gen. His</i>	<i>Dat. and Acc. Him.</i>
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‡ <i>Sing. Nom.</i>	<i>Heo</i>	<i>Gen. Hire</i>	<i>Dat. Hire</i>	<i>Acc. Hi.</i>
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Third Person.

Neuter.

Impersonal.

	<i>Sing.</i>	<i>Plur.</i>
<i>Nom.</i>	It*	They†
<i>Gen.</i>	Its	Theirs
<i>Obj.</i>	It	Them.

My, thy, our, your, their, being the representatives of nouns, have the essential character of pronouns. Thus, when Decius says to Cato, "Cæsar is well acquainted with your virtues," the pronoun is employed as a substitute for *Cato's*. As they express not only the subject, but also the relation of property or possession, they are by some grammarians considered to be the genitives of their respective substantive pronouns. In usage, however, they are distinguished from the English genitive by their incapacity to stand alone. Thus we say, "It is the king's," "It is yours;" but we cannot say "It is your," the presence of a noun being necessary to the last expression. They are, therefore, more correctly named pronominal adjectives. For the purpose of denoting emphatically the relation of possession or property, the word *own* is frequently joined to them, as, *my own, thy own, our own*. And to mark the person with emphasis, they are compounded with the word *self*; in Saxon, *sylf*; from the Gothic *silba, ipse*: thus,

* This pronoun is from the Anglo-Saxon *hyt* or *hit*, "it" or "that."

† In Anglo-Saxon *hi*, in Teutonic *dic*.

myself, thyself; ourselves, yourselves. Theirselves is now obsolete, *themselves* being used in its stead.

The pronouns of the first and second persons are either masculine or feminine. The reason is, says Mr. Harris, because the sex of the speaker and of the person addressed is generally obvious. This explanation, which has been adopted by most grammarians, appears to me unsatisfactory and erroneous. Others have said that the pronouns of the first and second persons have no distinction of sex, because all distinction of this kind is foreign to the intention of the speaker, who, when he uses the pronoun *I*, means the person who speaks, be it man or woman; and when he employs the pronoun *thou*, means the person addressed, without any regard to the sex of the individual. This matter seems sufficiently plain. Language, to be useful, must be perspicuous and intelligible, exhibiting the subject and its attributes with clearness and precision. If it should be asked why the pronoun of the third person has three varieties, Mr. Harris would answer, "to mark the sex." If it were inquired whence arises the necessity of marking the sex, he would answer, and very justly, "in order to ascertain the subject of discourse." It is obvious, therefore, that to note the sex is not the primary object, and that the principal aim of the speaker is to discriminate and mark the subject. The pronouns of the first and second persons have no variety of form significant of sex, because the speaker and the person addressed are evident without

it. Mr. Harris, therefore, should have said that the pronouns in question have no distinction of gender, not because the *sex* of the speaker and of the person addressed, but because the *persons* themselves are in general obvious without the aid of sexual designation. The intention of the speaker is not to denote the sex, but the person spoken of, whether male or female; to ascertain which person, if absent, the discrimination of sex is generally necessary. The sex, therefore, enters not as an essential, but as an explanatory circumstance; not as the subject of discourse, but to distinguish the subject. Where the person is present and is either the speaker or the person addressed, discrimination of sex becomes unnecessary, the pronoun itself marking the individuals. When the person or subject of discourse is absent, the distinction of sex serves frequently to determine the subject. Hence the pronoun of the third person has three varieties, *he* for the masculine, *she* for the feminine, and *it* for the neuter.

The four personal pronouns, *I*, *thou*, *he*, and *she*, have three cases, viz. the nominative or leading case, expressing the principal subject, and preceding the verb; the genitive case, whose form and office have been already defined; and the objective, accusative, or following case (for it has obtained these three names), expressing the object to which the energy is directed, or the subject acted upon. This case follows the verb.

Mine, thine, hers, theirs, his, yours, ours, are truly pronouns in the possessive or genitive case. Johnson has indeed said that *my* and *mine* are words precisely synonymous, *my*, according to him, being used before a consonant, and *mine* before a vowel; as, *my sword, mine arm*. It is doubtless true that *mine* and *thine* are sometimes used as *my* and *thy*, which are not substantive pronouns but pronominal adjectives; but that they are not precisely synonymous or mutually convertible, is obvious; for *my* and *thy* cannot be used for *mine* and *thine*, though *mine* and *thine*, as has been observed, may be used for *my* and *thy*. Example: "Whose book is this?" I cannot answer, "it is my," but "it is mine." We may indeed say "it is my book;" but the addition of the substantive is necessary.

As *my* and *mine*, *thy* and *thine*, *our* and *ours*, *your* and *yours*, *their* and *theirs*, are not mutually convertible, they cannot be regarded as synonymous each with its fellow.

This and *that*, which have improperly been referred by some to the class of pronouns, have been considered already. The former makes in the plural *these*, the latter *those*.

The relative pronouns, so called because they directly relate or refer to a substantive preceding, which is therefore termed *the antecedent*, are, *who*, *which*, *that*.

The pronoun *who* is of the masculine or feminine

gender, referring to persons, male or female. The pronoun *which* is neuter. *That* is common to the three genders.

	<i>Sing. and Plur.</i>	<i>Sing. and Plur.</i>
<i>Nom.</i>	Who *	Which
<i>Gen.</i>	Whose	Whose
<i>Obj.</i>	Whom	Which.

Lowth, and several other grammarians, have asserted, that the pronoun *which* admits no variation. Numberless examples, however, from the best authors might be cited to disprove this assertion. Shakespeare occasionally uses *whose* as the genitive of *which*; and, since his time, writers of the highest eminence have employed it in the same manner.

“ Of man’s first disobedience, and the fruit
Of that forbidden tree, *whose* mortal taste.”—*Milton*.

“ The lights and shades, *whose* well accorded strife
Gives all the strength and colour of our life.”—*Pope*.

“ A true critic is like a dog at a feast, *whose* thoughts and stomach are wholly set on what the guests fling away.”—*Swift*.

This usage is favourable to conciseness, and can very seldom create ambiguity. Where obscurity indeed is apprehended, the periphrasis, *of which*, should be adopted. I have, therefore, given *whose* as the

* In Anglo-Saxon, *hwa*, *hua*; *Gen.* *hwæs*; *Dat.* *hwam*; *Acc.* *hwæne*, *hwone*. Also *hwile*, whence, says Hickes, proceeded *which*, the letter *l* being elided.

genitive of *which*; not only because this usage is sanctioned by classical authority, but likewise, because the other form, *of which*, is frequently awkward and inelegant.

Who is applied to persons, that is, to animals distinguished by rationality, or represented as possessing it.

“The man who has no music in himself.”—*Shakspeare*.

The antecedent *man*, being a person, is followed by *who*.

“A stag, who came to drink at a river, seeing his own image in the clear stream, said thus to himself.”

Here the stag is represented as possessing reason and speech, and therefore the pronoun *who* is employed. In mythological writings in general, such as the Fables of Æsop, inferior animals are very properly denoted by the personal relative.

Which is applied to things inanimate, and creatures either devoid of all indications of rationality, or represented as such. “The city, which Romulus built, was called Rome.” Here *which* is used, the word *city* being the antecedent, to which it refers.

“The sloth, which is a creature remarkable for inactivity, lives on leaves and the flowers of trees.” Here the sloth, an animal hardly possessing sensation or life, is expressed by *which*.

The rule here given for the use of these pronouns is not uniformly observed, several good writers occasionally applying them indifferently to inferior ani-

mals, without any determinate principle of discrimination. It would be better, however, were this rule universally followed; and if such modes of expression as “frequented by that fowl, *whom* nature has taught,” were entirely repudiated.

Priestley, whose doctrine on this subject seems nearly to coincide with ours, has even objected to the application of the pronoun *who* to children, because this pronoun conveys an idea of persons possessing reason and reflection, of which mere children are incapable. He, therefore, disapproves of Cadogan’s phraseology, when he says, “a child *who*.”

That is applied indiscriminately to things animate and inanimate, and admits no variation.

The pronouns *who*, *which*, and *that*, are sometimes resolvable into *and he*, *and she*, and *it*. Mr. Harris, indeed, has said, that the pronoun *qui* (who) may be always resolved into *et ille*, *a*, *ud*, (*and he*, *and she*, and *it*.) This opinion, however, is not perfectly correct; for it is thus resolvable in those examples only, in which the relative clause does not limit or modify the meaning of the antecedent. If I say, “Man who is born of a woman is of few days and full of trouble,” the relative clause is not restrictive; I may, therefore, resolve the pronoun, and say, “Man is of few days, and he is born of woman.” “Light is a body, which moves with great velocity,” is resolvable into “Light is a body, and it moves with great velocity.” But when the relative clause limits the meaning of the antecedent, the relative is clearly

not thus resolvable. "Virgil was the only epic poet, among the Romans, who can be compared to Homer." The signification of the antecedent is here restricted by the relative clause; we cannot, therefore, by resolution say, "Virgil was the only epic poet among the Romans, and he can be compared to Homer;" for the former of these propositions is not true, nor is the sentiment, which it conveys, accordant with the meaning of the author. *q. d. August.*

The pronoun *what*, if not employed interrogatively, is equivalent to *that which*; and is applicable to inanimate things only, as, "I believe what I see," or, "that which I see."

What admits no variation.

The relative pronouns *who*, *which*, are often used interrogatively, and are, therefore, in such cases considered as interrogatives. When thus employed, it is the opinion of the author of the British Grammar, that they still retain their relative character. "The only difference," says he, "is this, that the relative refers to an antecedent and definite subject, and the interrogative to something subsequent and unknown." The example which he adduces in support of his opinion is the following: "Who first seduced them to that foul revolt?" "The very question," says he, "supposes a seducer, to which, though unknown, the pronoun *who* has a reference." Answer, "The infernal serpent." He continues. "Here, in the answer, we have the subject, which was indefinite, ascertained; so that the *who* in the inter-

rogation is as much a relative, as if it had been said originally, without any interrogation at all, "It was the infernal serpent who seduced them." Others adopt an opinion diametrically opposite, contending that *who* and *which* are properly interrogatives, and that even, when used as relatives, they still retain their interrogative character. This theory a few examples will sufficiently illustrate.

"The man, who?" (which man?) his character follows, "has no music in himself."

"The city, which? (what city?) Romulus built was called Rome."

"Happy the man, whose cautious feet."

"Happy that man, who? his (whose) cautious feet."

"Light is a body, which? (body) moves with great velocity."

Of these two theories I have no hesitation in adopting the former. My reasons are these. The intention of language is to communicate our sentiments; to express what we think, feel, perceive, or desire. Hence its general character is indicative or assertive. "I believe," "I wish," "I see," are affirmative sentences; and whatever variety of forms the phraseology may assume, they are all strictly significant of assertion, and all resolvable into the language of affirmation. "Go," "teach," "read," are equivalent to, "I desire you to go," "to teach," "to read." "Have you finished your task?" means, when the sentiment is fully expressed, "I desire to know, whether you have finished

your task." Ellipses of this kind are natural. They spring from an eagerness to impart to the vehicle of our thoughts a degree of celerity, suited to the promptitude, with which the mind conceives them. Vehemence or passion, impatient of delay, uniformly resorts to them. The assertive form of expression I therefore conceive to be the parent, whence every other is derived, and to which it is reducible. If this be the case, no interrogative, conceived purely as such, can claim so early an origin as definite or affirmative terms. Hence we may conclude, that *who, which, when, where*, were at first used as relatives, and came afterwards, by implication, to denote interrogations.

Again, we know that the meaning of an expression is frequently collected, not so much from the strict import of the terms, as from the tone or manner, in which it is delivered. If I say, "he did it," the sentence is affirmative; yet, by the tone of voice or manner of the speaker, this affirmative sentence may denote an interrogation. Thus, "he did it?" by an elevation of the voice, or the mode of notation, may be rendered equivalent to "did he do it?" "Who did it" is in like manner an affirmative clause; but it is obvious that this form of expression, like the other now aduced, may be likewise employed to denote an interrogation, thus, "Who did it?" And it is evident, that, if the ellipsis be supplied, the sentence would read thus, "I want to know who did it?" The preceding clause, however, is sufficiently supplied by the manner of the speaker. An ellipsis of this kind seems

to be involved in every interrogation. If I say, "did he do it?" it is equivalent to "tell me, if he did it?" Accordingly we find that the Latins, in such interrogations, employed only the latter clause; for *an* (whether), which is termed an interrogative, is, in fact, nothing but the Greek *an*, synonymous with *si* (if) among the Latins. "*An fecit*," did he do it? is therefore strictly equivalent to "*si fecit*," if he did it, the former clause, "tell me," being understood, and its import supplied by the manner of the speaker, or the mode of notation.

Besides, let any person ask himself what idea he annexes to the word *who*, considered as an interrogative, and I am persuaded he will be sensible that he cannot form any distinct conception of its import.

I am inclined therefore to think that interrogatives are strictly relatives; and that these relatives, by the aid of voice, gesture, or some explanatory circumstance, answer the purpose of interrogation.

In using these pronouns interrogatively, it is to be observed, that *who* and *which* are each applied to persons, which is not the case when they are employed as relatives. This difference, however, is to be observed, that when the pronoun *which* is used interrogatively and applied to persons, it is generally, if not always, understood that the character of the individual, who is the object of inquiry, is in presence of the inquirer, or is in some degree known. *Who* is more indefinite. If I say, "which is the man?" I mean "who of those now before me?" or of those

who have been described? Agreeably to this notion, we say, "which of *the* two," not "who of the two," was guilty of this crime?

If I say, "who is the man that will dare to affirm?" it implies that I am entirely a stranger to him, and that I even doubt his existence. "Which is the man?" not only implies his existence, but also that the aggregate of individuals, whence the selection is made, is known to me.

What is also used interrogatively, and is employed in introducing questions, whether the subject be persons or things, as, "What man is that?" "What book is this?" When no substantive is subjoined, it is then wholly indefinite, as "What is man, that thou art mindful of him?" When we inquire, therefore, into the character of any person, and not for the individual himself, it is to be remembered, that we employ this pronoun, and not *who* or *which*.

There seems to be the same difference between *who* and *what* definite, as between *who* and *which*. If I say, "what man will dare to affirm this?" and "which man will dare?" &c., it is obvious that the former interrogatory is more indefinite than the latter, the one implying a total ignorance of the individual, and some doubt of his existence; the other, that he is one of a number in some degree known to the inquirer.

When any defining clause is subjoined, either may be used, as "What, or which man among you, having a hundred sheep, and losing one, would not leave the ninety and nine?"

The pronoun *whether* is equivalent to “which of the two.” It is the Teutonic word *wether*, bearing the same relation to *wer*, “who” or “which,” as *either* does to *ein*, “one,” and *neither*, *newether*, to *nie* or *nehein*, “none.”

This word, though now generally employed or considered as a conjunction, is in truth reducible to the class of words which we are now examining, and is precisely synonymous with *uter*, *tra*, *trum*, of the Latins. “Whether is easier to say?”—*Bible*.

Here *whether* is truly a pronoun, and is the nominative to the following verb.

“Whether is greater, the gold or the temple?”—*Ibid*.

In these examples, *whether* is precisely the same with “which of the two.” It seems now to be giving place to the word *which*, as the comparative, when two things are compared, is often supplanted by the superlative. Thus we often say, when speaking of two, “which is the best,” instead of “whether is better.” The Latins almost uniformly observed the distinction: —“*Uter dignior, quis dignissimus.*”—*Quint*.

The pronoun *it* is used indefinitely, and applied to persons or things.

Dr. Johnson has objected to the use of this pronoun in those examples, wherein the pronouns of the first or second persons are employed; and Dr. Lowth has censured it, when referring to a plural number, as in the following example:

“’Tis these, that give the great Atrides spoils.”—*Pope*.

I concur, however, with the learned author of the *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, who regards the objections of these critics as, in this instance, of no weight. For when a question is asked, the subject of which is totally unknown, there must be some indefinite word employed to denote the subject of the interrogation. The word which we use for this purpose is *it*, as, "Who is it?" "What is it?" This phraseology is established by universal usage, and is therefore unexceptionable. This being the case, there can be no impropriety in repeating in the answer the indefinite term employed in the question. We may therefore reply, "It is I," "It is he," "It is she."

Now, if the term be admitted in questions and answers where the subject may be either male or female, and of the first, second, or third person, it surely is admissible in those cases also where the subject is in the plural number. Nay, to use in the answer any other word to express the subject than that, by which it is signified in the question, would be in all cases, if not productive of ambiguity, at least less precise. "Who is it?" says a master to his servant, hearing a voice in the hall. "It is the gentlemen who called yesterday," replies the servant. Who sees not that "they are the gentlemen" would be an answer less accordant with the terms of the question, and would less clearly show that "the gentlemen," and "the subject of inquiry," both being denoted by one term, are one and the same? Had the master known, that it was the voice of a gentle-

man, and that there were more than one, and had he accordingly said, "Who are they?" the answer would have properly been "They are the gentlemen." But when the question is "Who is it?" I apprehend the only apposite answer is, "It is the gentlemen," the identity of the terms (*it* being repeated) clearly evincing an identity of subject in the question and in the answer; in other words, that the subject of the inquiry, and the subject of the answer, are one and the same.

I conclude with observing, that, though I have here considered the word *that* as a pronoun, there can be no question, that in its import it is precisely the same with the demonstrative *that*, which has been already explained. "The house that you built is burned," is resolvable thus, "The house is burned, you built that."

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE ADJECTIVE.

AN adjective has been defined by most grammarians to be “that part of speech which signifies an accident, quality, or property of a thing.” This definition appears to me to be somewhat defective and incorrect: for the adjective does not express the quality simply, but the quality, or property, as conjoined with a substance; or, as grammarians have termed it, *in concreto*. Thus, when we say “good man,” *goodness* is the name of the quality, and *good* is the adjective expressing that quality, as conjoined with the subject *man*. Accordingly, every adjective is resolvable into the name of the thing implied, and any term of reference or conjunction, as *of*, *with*. Thus “a prudent man” is equivalent to “a man with” or “join prudence,” or to “a man of prudence.” An adjective, therefore, is that part of speech which denotes any substance or attribute, not by itself, but as conjoined with a subject, or pertaining to its character. This conjunction is generally marked by changing the termination of the simple name of the substantive or attribute, as, *fool*, *foolish*, *wax*, *waxen*. Sometimes no change is made; and the simple name of the substance, or attribute, is

prefixed to the name of the subject, as, *sea-fowl*, *race-horse*, *corn-field*. In writing these, and similar expressions, the conjunction is sometimes marked by a hyphen, as *sea-fowl*, *river-fish*, *wine-vessel*.

As every appellative denotes the whole of a genus or species, the intention and effect of the adjective is, by limiting the generic meaning of the substantive, to specify what part of the genus or species is the subject of discourse. If I say "man," the term is universal: it embraces the species. If I say "a man," the expression is indefinite, being applicable to any individual of the kind. If I say "a good man," I confine the term to an individual distinguished by goodness. Here *man* expresses the substance; and *good* the quality *in concreto*. Sometimes, on the contrary, the substantive is the general name of the quality or property; and the adjective modifies or determines its degree, as, *wisdom*, *little wisdom*. Let us take another example. The word *stone* is applicable to a whole species of substances. If I say *round stone*, I confine the meaning of the substantive to that part of the genus, which is distinguished by roundness. Here the substantive denotes the matter, or substance, in general, and the adjective limits its signification, by expressing the form. Sometimes the converse takes place, as *golden globe*. Here the substantive is the generic name of a certain figure; and the adjective, by expressing the matter, confines that figure to the substance of gold.

Some grammarians have denominated this part of

speech by the name of adjective noun ; to others this designation appears inadmissible. The latter observe, that neither is the adjective the name of any thing, nor is it in English variable, like the substantive. They allow, that in Greek and Latin, the designation in question is, in some degree, justifiable, because, though the noun and adjective differ essentially in office, in these languages, they agree in form ; but in our language they deem it a singular impropriety*.

* Mr. Tooke contends, that this part of speech is properly termed adjective noun, and "that it is altogether as much the name of a thing, as the noun substantive." Names and designations necessarily influence our conceptions of the things, which they represent. It is therefore desirable, that in every art or science, not only should no term be employed, which may convey to the reader or hearer an incorrect conception of the thing signified, but that every term should assist him in forming a just idea of the object, which it expresses. Now, I concur with Mr. Tooke in thinking, that the adjective is by no means a necessary part of speech. I agree with him also in opinion, that, in a certain sense, all words are nouns or names. But, as this latter doctrine seems directly repugnant to the concurrent theories of critics and grammarians, it is necessary to explain, in what sense the opinion of Mr. Tooke requires to be understood ; and in presenting the reader with this explanation, I shall briefly state the objections which will naturally offer themselves against the justness of this theory. "*Gold, and brass, and silk, is each of them,*" says Mr. Tooke, "the name of a thing, and denotes a substance. If, then, I say, *a gold-ring, a brass-tube, a silk-string* ; here are the substantives *adjective posita*, yet names of things, and denoting substances." It may be contended, however, that these are not substantives, but adjectives, and are the same as *golden, brazen, silken*. He proceeds : "If again I say, *a golden ring, a brazen tube, a silken string*, do *gold, and brass, and silk*, cease to be the names of things, and cease to denote substances, because, instead

I have said, that the adjective denotes a substance, quality, or property, "as pertaining," or *in concreto*.

of coupling them with *ring*, *tube*, and *string*, by a hyphen thus (-) I couple them to the same words, by adding the termination *en*?" It may be answered, they do not cease to imply the substances, but they are no longer names of those substances. *Hard* implies hardness, but it is not the name of that quality. *Atheniensis* implies *Athenæ*, but it is not the name of the city, any more than *belonging to Athens* can be called its name. He observes: "If it were true, that adjectives were not the names of things, there could be no attribution by adjectives; for you cannot attribute nothing." This conclusion may be disputed. An adjective may imply a substance, quality, or property, though it is not the name of it. *Cereus*, "waxen," implies *cera*, "wax," but it is the latter only which is strictly the name of the substance. *Pertaining to wax*, *made of wax*, are not surely names of the thing itself. Every attributive, whether verb or adjective, must imply an attribute; but it is not therefore the name of that attribute. *Juvenescit*, "he waxes young," expresses an attribute, but we should not call *juvenescit* the name of the attribute.

It may be asked, what is the difference between *caput hominis*, "a man's head," and *caput humanum*, "a human head." If *hominis*, "man's," be deemed a noun, why should not *humanum*, "human," be deemed a noun also? It may be answered, that *hominis* does, in fact, perform the office of an adjective, expressing not only the individual, but conjunction also: and that Mr. Wallis assigns to the English genitive the name of adjective. Besides, does not Mr. Tooke himself maintain "that case, gender, and number, are no parts of the noun?" and does it not hence follow, that the real nouns are not *hominis* but *homo*, not *man's* but *man*? for such certainly is their form when divested of those circumstances, which, according to Mr. Tooke, make no part of them. If the doctrine, therefore, of the learned author be correct, and if the real noun exclude gender, case, and number, as any part of it, neither *hominis* nor *humanum*, *man's* nor *human*, can, with consistency, be called nouns.

But let Mr. Tooke's argument be applied to the verb, the *ροημα*, which he justly considers as an essential part of speech. "If verbs were not the names of things, there could be no attri-

Now, it is to be observed, that substances do not admit degrees of *more* or *less*, in regard to their essen-

bution by verbs, for we cannot attribute nothing." Are we then to call *sapit*, *vivit*, *legit*, names? If so, we have nothing but names; and to this conclusion Mr. Tooke fairly brings the discussion: for he says, that all words are names.

Having thus submitted to the reader the doctrine of this sagacious critic, with the objections, which naturally present themselves, I proceed to observe, that the controversy appears to me to be, in a great degree, a mere verbal dispute. It is agreed on both sides, that the adjective expresses a substance, quality, or property; but, while it is affirmed by some critics, it is denied by others, that it is the name of the thing signified. The metaphysician considers words merely as signs of thought, while the grammarian regards chiefly their changes by inflexion: and hence arises that perplexity, in which the classification of words has been, and still continues to be, involved. Now, it is evident that every word must be the sign of some sensation, idea, or perception. It must express some substance or some attribute: and in this sense all words may be regarded as names. Sometimes we have the name of the thing simply, as *person*. Sometimes we have an accessary idea combined with the simple sign, as "possession," "conjunction," "action," and so forth, as *personal*, *personally*, *personify*. This accessary circumstance, we have reason to believe, was originally denoted by a distinct word, significant of the idea intended; and that this word was, in the progress of language, abbreviated and incorporated with the primary term, in the form of what we now term an affix or prefix. Thus *frigus*, *frigidus*, *friget*, all denote the same primary idea, involving the name of that quality, or of that sensation, which we term *cold*. *Frigus* is the name of the thing simply; *frigidus* expresses the quality, *in concreto*, or conjunction. Considering, therefore, all words as names, it may be regarded as a complex name, expressing two distinct ideas, that of the quality, and that of conjunction. *Friget* (the subject being understood) may be regarded as a name still more complex, involving, first, the name of the quality; secondly, the name of conjunction; thirdly, the sign of affirmation, as either expressed by an appropriate name, or constructively implied, equivalent to the three words, *est cum frigore*. According then to this meta-

tial character. "A wooden table" cannot be more or less wooden. "An iron bar" cannot be more or less

physical view of the subject, we have, first, *nomen simplex*, the simple name; secondly, *nomen adjectivum* or *nomen duplex*, the name of the thing, with that of conjunction; thirdly, *nomen affirmativum*, the name of the thing affirmed to be conjoined.

The simple question now is, whether all words, not even the verb excepted, should be called nouns; or whether we shall assign them such appellations as may indicate the leading circumstances, by which they are distinguished. The latter appears to me to be the only mode which the grammarian, as the teacher of an art, can successfully adopt. Considering the subject in this light, I am inclined to say with Mr. Harris, that the adjective, as implying some substance or attribute, not *per se*, but *in conjunction*, or *as pertaining*, is more nearly allied to the verb than to the noun; and that though the verb and the adjective may, in common with the noun, denote the thing, they cannot strictly be called its name. To say that *foolish* and *folly* are each names of the same quality would, I apprehend, lead to nothing but perplexity and error.

It is true, if we are to confine the term noun to the simple name of the subject, we shall exclude the genitive singular from all right to this appellation; for it denotes, not the subject simply, but the subject *in conjunction*—the inflexion being equivalent to "belonging to." This indeed is an inconsistency, which can in no way be removed, unless by adopting the opinion of Wallis, who assigns no cases to English nouns, and considers *man's*, *king's*, &c. to be adjectives. And were we to adopt Mr. Tooke's definition of our adjective, and say, "It is the *name of a thing* which is directed to be joined to another *name of a thing*," it will follow, that *king's*, *man's*, are adjectives. In short, if the question be confined to the English language, we must, in order to remove all inconsistency, either deny the appellation of *noun* to the adjective, and, with Wallis, call the genitive case an adjective; or we must first call *man's*, *king's*, &c. adjectives; secondly, we must term *happy*, *extravagant*, *mercenary*, &c. nouns, though they are not names; and thirdly, we must assign the appellation of noun to the verb itself.

From this view of the subject the reader will perceive that the

such. In these cases, the adjective, as I have already remarked, by expressing the matter, limits the form to one species of substance. The same observation is applicable to the converse circumstance, in which the form strictly limits the matter, as “triangular board.” Here it is obvious, that the substance limited to one form by the term *triangular*, cannot be more or less triangular. But this is not the case with qualities or properties, which may exist in different substances, in different degrees. And, as it is sometimes necessary to express the existence of a quality, as greater or less in one substance than another, hence arises the utility of some form of expression to denote these relative degrees of its existence. It is in this case only, that the termination of the adjective admits variation; and then it is said to be in a state of comparison.

In all qualities susceptible of intension or remission, the number of degrees, from the lowest to the highest, may be accounted infinite. Hardness, for example, gravity, magnitude, genius, wisdom, folly, are severally diversified by an infinitude of gradations, which it would elude the capacity of any language

whole controversy depends on the meaning, which we annex to the term *noun*. If by this term we denote simply the thing itself, without any accessory circumstance, then nothing can be called a noun but the name in its simple form. If to the term *noun* we assign a more extensive signification, as implying not only the thing itself simply and absolutely, but also any accessory idea, as, conjunction, action, passion, and so forth, then it follows, that all words may be termed names.

to discriminate. To denote these degrees is, therefore, utterly impracticable as it is wholly unnecessary.

In English, as in most other languages, we employ two variations: the one to denote simple excess, or a greater degree of the quality than that, which is expressed by the adjective itself; and the other to denote the greatest excess. Thus, if I compare wood with stone, as possessing the quality of hardness, I say, "wood is hard," "stone is harder." If I compare these with iron, I say, "wood is hard," "stone harder," "iron the hardest." Thus, in truth, there are only two degrees of comparison, viz. the comparative and the superlative, the positive expressing the quality simply and absolutely.

The comparative is formed by adding *er* to the positive, if it end with a consonant; or the letter *r*, if it end with a vowel; as, *soft, softer; safe, safer*.

The superlative is formed by adding *est*, or *st*, as, *soft, softest; safe, safest* *.

* The Saxons formed their comparative by *er* or *ere*, *ar* or *ære*, *er*, *or*, *ur*, *yr*, and their superlative by *ast*, *aste*, *est*, *ist*, *ost*, *ust*, *yst*. Now *ær* means *before*; hence the English words *ere* and *erst*. Thus, in Saxon, *rihtwisere* means "righteous before," "just before," or "more than." The suffix is equivalent to the Latin *præ*, and the Hebrew preposition *min*, signifying also *before*, the only difference being this, that what is a suffix to the Saxon adjective is in Hebrew a prefix to the consequent subject of comparison, and that in Latin the preposition following the positive stands alone.

Mr. Bosworth, in his "Elements of Anglo-Saxon Grammar," a work displaying sound philological principles, has remarked, that the Gothic superlative in *ista* bears an obvious resemblance to some of the Greek superlatives, as *ἀριστος*, *καλλιστος*, *βραδιστος*.

Some adjectives are compared irregularly, as,

<i>Pos.</i>	<i>Comp.</i>	<i>Super.</i>
Good	Better	Best
Bad or Evil	Worse	Worst
Little	Less	Least
Much	More	Most
Many	More	Most
Near	Nearer	Nearest or next
Late	Later	Latest or last.

The comparative degree is frequently expressed by the word *more*, and the superlative by *most*, as,

<i>Pos.</i>	<i>Comp.</i>	<i>Super.</i>
Hard	More hard	Most hard.

Monosyllabic adjectives are generally compared by annexing *r* or *er*, *st* or *est*; adjectives of two or more syllables by *more* and *most*, as, *strong*, *stronger*, *strongest*; *certain*, *more certain*, *most certain*.

Dissyllabic adjectives in *y* form an exception to this rule, as, *happy*, *happier*, *happiest*.

Adjectives of two syllables ending in *le*, after a mute, are also excepted, as, *able*, *abler*, *ablest*.

Euphony seems here to be generally consulted, and the ear may be allowed perhaps to furnish the best rule.

Some form their superlative by adding *most* to the comparative, as, *nether*, *nethermost*; *lower*, *lowermost*; *under*, *undermost*: others by adding *most* either to the positive or comparative, as, *hind*, *hindmost* or

hindermost; *up*, *upmost* or *uppermost*. From *in* we have *inmost* and *innermost* *.

Besides this definite and direct kind of comparison, there is another, which may be termed indefinite or indirect, expressed by the intensive words *too*, *very*, *exceedingly*, &c. as *too good*, *very hard*, *exceedingly great*.

When the word *very*, or any other of the same import, is put before the positive, it is called by some writers the superlative of eminence, to distinguish it from the other superlative, which has been already mentioned, and is called the superlative of comparison. Thus, *very hard* is termed the superlative of eminence; *most hard*, or *hardest*, the superlative of comparison.

I have said that the comparative denotes simple excess, and the superlative the greatest. It is not, however, to be hence inferred, that the comparative may not be employed in expressing the same pre-eminence or inferiority with the superlative. If I say, "Of all acquirements virtue is the most valuable," I may also convey the same sentiment by saying, "Virtue is more valuable than every other acquirement." If it be asked, what then is the difference between the comparative and superlative? I answer,

1st. That the superlative expresses the absolutely highest or lowest degree of the quality, as, when we say, "O God most high;" or the greatest or least

* *Up* and *in* are now used as adverbs and prepositions.

degree, in relation merely to the subjects of comparison, thus expressing a superiority of excess above the comparative, as when I say, "In estimating the worth of these human attainments, learning, prudence, and virtue, it cannot be denied that learning is valuable, that prudence is more valuable, but that virtue is the most valuable." The comparative expresses merely simple excess, but never the highest or lowest degree of the quality. This distinction is, perhaps, the most precise, and the most worthy of attention.

I observe, however, that the sentiment in the last example may be expressed by the comparative, but not simply, or by itself; thus, "Learning is valuable, prudence more valuable, and virtue more valuable still," the word *still* implying a continued gradation. Were this word suppressed, the sentence would imply that prudence and virtue are each more valuable than learning, but would assert no superiority of virtue to prudence. The same sentiment may likewise be expressed by combining the two first, and marking simply the excess of the third, thus, "virtue is better than both."

2dly. When we express the superiority or inferiority of one of two things, or of two aggregates, we almost always use the comparative. Thus, speaking of Cæsar and Cato, I say, "Cato was the more virtuous, Cæsar the more eloquent;" or of two brothers, we say "John was the elder."

In such cases the superlative is sometimes em-

ployed, as, "the best of the two," instead of "the better of the two." The former phraseology, however, is more consonant to established usage, and is in every case to be preferred. "Whether is it easier to say, 'take up thy bed and walk,' or to say, 'thy sins are forgiven thee,' that is, which of the two is easier," not "easiest," the simple excess of one thing above another being here denoted.

3dly. When we use the superlative, we always compare one thing, or an aggregate number of things, with the class to which they belong, or to which we refer them; whereas, when we use the comparative, except in the case just mentioned, the things compared either belong, or are conceived as belonging, to different classes, being placed in opposition to each other. Thus, in comparing Socrates, who was an Athenian, with the other Athenians, we say, "Socrates was the wisest of the Athenians;" that is, "of," "out of," or "of the class of Athenians." Hence in Latin the superlative often takes the preposition *ex* (out of) to denote that the object compared belongs to the order of things, with which it is compared; the comparative very rarely.

Now the same sentiment may be expressed by the comparative; but then the *Athenians* and *Socrates*, though belonging to one species, are conceived as mutually opposed, and referred to different places, whereas the superlative refers them to one common aggregate. Thus, if we employ the com-

parative, we say, "Socrates was wiser than any other Athenian."

Agreeably to the observation now made, we cannot say, "Cicero was more eloquent than the Romans," or "than any Roman;" because Cicero was himself a Roman, one of the class with which he is compared, and could not therefore be more eloquent than himself. As the objects compared belong, therefore, to one class, and are not two individuals, nor two aggregates, the comparative cannot be employed, unless by placing them in opposition, or referring them to different places, as "Cicero was more eloquent, than any other Roman." Here the word *other* denotes that opposition, that diversity of place or species, which in all cases, but the one already mentioned, is essentially implied in the use of the comparative.

I have observed already, that when the superlative is employed, the things compared are referred to one aggregate; and that when the comparative is used, they are contradistinguished by a different reference. This distinction obtains uniformly, unless when we compare only two individuals, or two classes, both referred to one aggregate, as "the elder of the Catos," "of these two nations (speaking of the Greeks and Romans) the latter were the more warlike." In such examples as these, the comparative, while it retains its own distinctive character, denoting simple excess, partakes also of the nature of the superlative, **the**

objects compared being referred by the preposition to one and the same aggregate. But as the superlative is always followed by *of*, and the comparative, in every case except the one now mentioned, followed by *than*, some writers say, “the eldest of the two,” “the latter were the most warlike.” This phraseology, however conformable to the generally distinguished usage of the comparative and superlative, is repugnant to the characteristic power of those degrees, by which one denotes simple excess, while the other heightens or lessens the quality to its highest or lowest degree.

From the preceding remarks will appear the impropriety of saying, “Jacob loved Joseph more than all his children *.” Joseph being one of his children, the sentiment expressed involves an absurdity: it should be “more than all his other children.” “In the beginning of the 16th century, Spain is said to have possessed a thousand merchant ships, a number probably far superior to that of any nation in Europe in that age.” (Robertson’s *America*.) It should be, “that of any other nation in Europe:” for Spain, being one of the European nations, she could not possess a number superior to her own. The comparative required the terms to be contrasted by the word *other*.

* This phraseology is Hebraistic—“more than all his children” is the literal translation of the original, מכל-בניו prae omnibus filiis, seu, magis omnibus filiis suis.

“Adam,
The comeliest of men since born
His sons. The fairest of her daughters Eve.”—*Milton*.

“Adam,” the antecedent subject of comparison, is here improperly referred to the aggregate of “men since born.” To this aggregate he cannot be said to belong, not having been “born,” nor being reducible to the class of “his own sons.” Eve also is referred to a species, of which she was no part. In neither of these comparisons can the second term include the first; yet the preposition refers them to one class. Such phraseologies as these, though not ungrammatical, involve an absurdity, and should therefore be dismissed.

Adjectives, whose signification does not admit intension or remission, cannot be compared. Among these are to be reckoned, 1st, All words expressive of figure, as *circular, square, triangular, perpendicular, straight*; for it is obvious, that if a body or figure be triangular, or square, or circular, it cannot be more or less so. It is either circular or not circular; triangular, or not triangular; straight, or not straight. If the affirmative be the case, gradation from more or less, or conversely, is impossible; if the negative be true, then the attributes, denoted by these adjectives, do not belong to it; and therefore the epithets *circular, triangular, straight, &c.* are inapplicable. Hence such expressions as these, “place the staff more erect,” “make the field more triangular,” are highly im-

proper. We should say, "set the staff erect," "make the field triangular."

2dly, All adjectives, whose signification, in their simple form, implies the highest or lowest possible degree, admit not comparison, as, *chief*, *supreme*, *universal*, *perfect*, *extreme*, &c. Hume, speaking of enthusiasm, says (Essays, vol. i. p. 72.) "it begets the most extreme resolutions." *Extreme* implies the farthest, or the greatest possible; and cannot admit intension.

I am aware that usage may be pleaded in favour of "*more, and most universal, more, and most perfect.*" This usage, however, is not such as will sanction the former of these phraseologies; for good writers generally avoid it. Besides, there is no necessity for resorting to this mode of expression, as we have an attributive appropriate to the idea intended: thus, instead of saying, "literature is more universal in England than America," we should say, "literature is more general." It is almost unnecessary to observe, that literature in England is either universal, or it is not: if the former be true, it cannot be more than universal; if the latter, the term is inapplicable. The word *general* does not comprise the whole; it admits intension and remission; the adjective *universal* implies totality. A general rule admits exceptions; a universal rule embraces every particular.

The expression "*more perfect*" is, in strictness of speech, equally exceptionable; usage, however, has

given it a sanction, which we dare hardly controvert. It has been proposed, indeed, to avoid this and similar improprieties, by giving the phraseology a negative, or indirect form. Thus, instead of saying, "a time-keeper is a more perfect machine than a watch," it has been proposed to say, "a time-keeper is a less imperfect machine than a watch." This phraseology is logically correct, perfection being predicable of neither the one thing nor the other; it might likewise, in many cases, be adopted with propriety. In the language of passion, however, and in the colourings of imagination, such expressions would be exanimate and intolerable. A lover, expatiating with rapture on the beauty and perfection of his mistress, would hardly call her, "*the least imperfect of her sex.*"

In all languages, indeed, examples are to be found of adjectives being compared, whose signification admits neither intension nor remission. It would be easy to assign several reasons for this, did the discussion belong to the province of the grammarian*. Suffice it to say, that such phraseologies should never be admitted, where the language will furnish correct, and equally apposite, expressions.

I observe also, that as those adjectives, whose signification cannot be heightened or lessened, admit not

* See a valuable little volume on English Grammar, by Mr. Grant. The "Institutes of Latin Grammar," by the same author, we would recommend to the attention of every classical student.

comparison, so, for the same reason, they exclude all intensive words. The expressions *so universal*, *so extreme*, and such like, are therefore improper. The former is indeed common enough; but it is easy to see, as it has been already remarked, that whatever is universal cannot be increased or diminished; and that what is less than universal, cannot be characterized by that epithet. The phrase *so universal* implies a gradation in universality, and that something is less so than another; which is evidently impossible.

It has been questioned, whether *prior*, *superior*, *ulterior*, *exterior*, and several others, which have the form of the Latin comparative, should be deemed comparatives. I am inclined to think, they ought not, for these reasons, 1st, They have not the form of the English comparative; 2dly, They are never followed by *than*, which uniformly accompanies the English comparative, when the subjects are opposed to each other, or referred to different classes; 3dly, It is not to be conceived, that every adjective, which implies comparison, is therefore a comparative or superlative, otherwise *preferable* (better than) *previous* (prior to) might be deemed comparatives; 4thly, Many of these have truly a positive meaning, not implying an excess of the quality, but merely the quality, as opposed to its contrary. The *interior* means simply the *inside*, as opposed to the *exterior* or *outside*; the *anterior*, “the one before,” opposed to *posterior*, “the one behind.”

I dismiss this article with observing, that the signi-

fication of the positive is sometimes lessened by the termination *ish* ; as, *white, whitish* ; *black, blackish*. Johnson remarks, that the adjective in this form may be considered as in a state of comparison ; it may properly be called a diminutive.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE VERB.

A VERB has been defined to be “that part of speech, which signifies to be, to do, or to suffer;” or more correctly, “that part of speech, which predicates some action, passion, or state of its subject,” as, “I strike,” “I am wounded,” “I stand.” Its essence consists in affirmation, and by this property it is distinguished from every other part of speech. The adjective expresses an accident, quality, or property of a thing *in concreto*; that is, when joined to the name of a substance, it expresses that substance, as accompanied by some attribute: in other words, it limits a generic name, confining it to that part of the kind, which possesses the character, which the attributive specifies; but it affirms nothing. Thus, if we say, “*a wise man*,” which is equivalent to “a man with,” or “join wisdom,” there is no affirmation; an individual is singled from a species, under the character of wisdom, but nothing is asserted of this individual. If we say, “the man is wise,” there is something affirmed of the man, and the affirmation is expressed by *is*. If the attribute and the assertion be combined in the expression, as in Latin *vir sapit*, it is obvious

that the essence of the verb consists, not in denoting the attribute wisdom, but in affirming that quality, as belonging to the subject ; for, if you cancel the assertion, the verb is immediately converted into an adjective, and the expression becomes *vir sapiens*, a wise man.

The simplest of all verbs is that which the Greeks call a verb of existence, namely, the verb *to be*. This verb frequently denotes pure affirmation, as, “ God is good ;” where the verb, or *copula*, as it has been termed, serves to predicate of the Deity, the attribute denoted by the following word. Hence, as it expresses mere affirmation, the Latins call it a substantive verb, in contradistinction to those verbs which, with an attribute, denote assertion, and were called by some grammarians adjective verbs.

Sometimes it predicates pure or absolute existence, as, “ God is,” that is, “ God *exists*.” In the following example it occurs in both senses. “ We believe that thou art, and that thou art the rewarder of them, who diligently seek thee.”

As nouns denote the subjects of our discourse, so verbs predicate their accidents, or properties. The former are the names of things, the latter what we say concerning them. These two, therefore, must be the only essential parts of speech ; for to mental communication nothing else can be indispensably requisite, than to name the subject of our thoughts, and to express our sentiments of its attributes or properties. And, as the verb essentially expresses affirmation,

without which there could be no communication of sentiment, it has been hence considered as the principal part of speech, and was therefore called, by the ancient grammarians, *verb*, or *the word*, by way of eminence. The noun, however, is unquestionably of earlier origin. To assign names to surrounding objects would be a matter of the first necessity: the next step would be to express their most common actions, or states of being. This indeed is the order of nature—the progress of intellect.

Mr. Tooke observes, that “the verb does not imply any assertion, and that no single word can.” “Till one single thing,” says he, “can be found to be a couple, one single word cannot make an assertion or affirmation; for there is joining in that operation, and there can be no junction of one thing.” This theory he illustrates by the tense *ibo*, which he resolves thus:

<i>English</i>	Hi *	Wol.	Ich
<i>Latin</i>	I	Vol.	O
<i>Greek</i>	I	Βουλ	Εω.

The first of each triad are the simple verbs, equivalent to *go*. The second are the verbs *Wol*, *Vol*, *Βουλ*, denoting *will*. The third are the pronouns of the first person. Whatever opinion may be formed respecting the truth of this analysis, its ingenuity will not be questioned. There are two objections, however, by which its justness may possibly be controverted. The first is, if the personal pronouns are contained, as Mr.

* *I*, *hi*, *hie*, “to go,” he considers to be from *I-εβαι*, the Greek verb; and hence to be derived the Latin verb *I-re*, “to go,” “to hie.”

Tooke says, in the Greek and Latin terminations of the three persons of their verbs, why is the pronoun repeated with the verb? If the *o* in *volo* be an abbreviated suffix for *ego*, why do we redundantly say *ego volo*? Now, in answer to this objection, it might be observed, were we disposed to indulge in mere hypothesis, that the involution of the pronoun may have eluded the attention of the Latins; or, if this explanation should be deemed too improbable, it may be supposed that usage, against whose decree there is no appeal, may have established the repetition of the pronoun at the expense of strict propriety. One thing particularly deserves attention, that the pronoun was seldom or never used, unless in cases where emphasis was implied, or an antithesis of persons was to be strongly marked. But without resorting to conjectures, which may be deemed vague and unsatisfactory, we may appeal to a fact which is decisive of the point in question. I have already observed, that in the Hebrew language we can distinctly mark the pronouns suffixed to the verb; yet we find the Hebrew writers repeating the pronouns even in cases where no emphasis is intended. Thus, in Gen. xlviii. 22. *Ve-ani nathatti*, “and I have given;” Job xix. 25. *Ve ani iadahgti*, “and I knew;” Deut. ix. 2. *attah iadahgh-ta, ve-atta shamahgh ta*, “thou knowest, and thou hast heard.” In these examples, the pronoun is both incorporated with the verb and repeated by itself. Whatever may be the abstract propriety of this phraseology, its existence in Hebrew is sufficient to obviate the objection proposed.

Again, it may be urged, if the pronoun *ego* be suffixed to the verb, why do not all the tenses in the first person singular end in *o*? This second objection may also be partly, if not entirely, removed. The Latin language appears to be a commixture of Greek and one of the northern languages. This commixture will account for the first person singular sometimes ending in *o* in imitation of the Greeks, and at other times in *m*, in imitation of the Celts. The present tense of the Gaelic, a dialect of the Celtic, proceeds thus: *sgriobh-aim*, "I write," *sgriobh-air*, *sgriobh-aidh*, *sgriobh-amoid*, *sgriobh-aoidhesi*, *sgriobh-aidhsion*. Here, as Whiter observes, we have something resembling the Latin verb *scribo*: and it is to be remarked, that the first person singular ends in *m*, which the Romans most probably adopted as one of their verbal terminations. And could we prosecute the inquiry, and investigate the structure of the Greek and Celtic tenses themselves, we should doubtless find, that they involve, along with the radical word, one or more terms expressing the accessory ideas of action, passion, state, person, time, and so forth. The same theory, we are persuaded, may be applied to all languages in which the tenses are formed by variety of termination.

Nothing, I conceive, can be more evident, than that the inflexions of nouns and verbs, how inexplicable soever they may now prove, were not originally the result of systematic art, but were separate terms, significant of the circumstances intended, and after-

wards, by celerity of pronunciation, coalesced with the words of which they now form the terminations.

It has been observed, that the essence of the verb consists in affirmation. This theory, I have remarked, is controverted by Mr. Tooke. It must be obvious, however, from the preceding observations, that the difference between the opinion of this eminent philologist, and that which is here delivered, is more apparent than real. For Mr. Tooke will not deny, that an affirmation is implied in *ibo*; he merely observes, that every assertion requires “a couple of terms.” Now it is of little moment to the point in question whether the two terms be incorporated in one, as in *lego*, or remain separate, as “I read.” In either case the verb affirms something of its nominative, whether that nominative appear in a simple, or in a compound state. Sometimes the affirmation is expressed by a separate and appropriate sign, as *ille est dives*, “he is rich:” and the verb of existence (*to be*) is supposed, by several critics and philologists, to have been coeval with the earliest infancy of language. In English, the affirmation, and also the action, are frequently denoted, simply by the junction of the name of the attribute with the nominative of the subject, whether noun or pronoun. Thus, if we say, “my will,” “the children’s will,” there is no affirmation implied, and the term *will* is considered as a mere name. But if we say, “I will,” “the children will,” it becomes invested with a different character, and affirms the volition to belong to the subject. Thus

also, "the hero's might," "the hero might," "my ken" (my knowledge or ability), "I ken," *I can*, or *I am able*; "my love," "I love." Mr. Tooke observes, that when we say "I love," there is an ellipsis of the word *do*. This appears to me a probable opinion, though not entirely unobjectionable. For though we find the auxiliary more frequently used in old English than in modern compositions, yet it does not occur so frequently as, according to this hypothesis, we should naturally expect. Mr. Tooke indeed admits the fact; but observes, that Chaucer had less occasion to use it, because in his time the distinguishing terminations of the verb still remained, though they were not constantly employed. Now I find, as Mr. Tyrwhit remarks, that Chaucer seldom uses the word *do* as an auxiliary, even in those cases where the verb and the noun are identical. This circumstance might lead us to infer that the English present was derived from the Saxon, by dropping the termination, as *ic lufige*, *I love*; the affirmation and the action being sufficiently obvious from the construction, and that it was originally optional to say either "I love," or "I do love." Be that as it may, the assertion expressed by "I do," equivalent to "I act," appears clearly to be signified by the junction of the nominative pronoun with the sign of action. Whether a note of affirmation was at first separately employed, and afterwards involved in the verbal termination, or whether the affirmation be merely inferred and not signified, this is certain, that it is by

the verb, and the verb only, that we can express affirmation.

As every subject of discourse must be spoken of as either doing or suffering something, either acting or acted upon ; or as neither doing nor suffering ; hence verbs have been divided by all grammarians into active, passive, and neuter.

The verb active denotes that the subject of discourse is doing something, as, *I write* ; the passive verb, that the subject suffers, or is acted upon, as, *the book is burned* ; and the neuter denotes neither the one nor the other, but expresses merely the state, posture, or condition of the subject, as unaffected by any thing else, as. *I sit, I sleep, I stand*.

Action, energy, or motion may either be confined to the agent, or pass from him to something extrinsic. Hence active verbs have been divided into transitive and intransitive. An active transitive verb denotes that kind of action by which the agent affects something foreign to himself, or which passes from the agent to something without him, as, *to beat a drum, to whip a horse, to kill a dog*. *Beat, whip, kill*, are active transitive verbs ; and it is the characteristic of these verbs that they admit a noun after them, denoting the subject of the action.

An active intransitive verb denotes that species of action or energy, which passes not from the agent to any thing else ; that is, it expresses what has been termed immanent energy. Hence an intransitive verb does not admit a noun after it, there being no

extrinsic subject or object affected by the action. Thus, *I run, I walk, the horse gallops*, are examples of active intransitive verbs *.

Webster, in his Dissertations on the English Language, delivers it as his opinion, that the division of verbs into active, passive, and neuter is incorrect; and that the only accurate distribution is into transitive and intransitive. "Is not a man," says he, "passive in hearing? yet hearing is called an active verb."

It is doubtless true, that *to hear*, and many other verbs, commonly called active, denote chiefly, perhaps, the effect of an extrinsic or foreign act. But whether we view the matter as a question either in metaphysics or in grammar, we shall perceive but little impropriety in adopting the common distinction. For, though the verb *to hear* denotes, perhaps, chiefly, that a certain impression is made on the mind, through the auditory organ, yet even here the mind is not entirely passive, as, were this the place for such a discussion, it would be easy to prove. *I see, I hear, I feel, I perceive*, denote not only the sensation in which we are passive, but also a perception, to which the consent or activity of the mind is unquestionably essential. Hence these verbs have, in all languages, been denominated active. But if the term transitive be the only correct name, it may be

* Intransitive verbs sometimes are used transitively, as, when we say, "to walk the horse," "to dance the child." They also admit a noun of their own signification, as, "to run a race."

asked, why does Mr. Webster call this verb by that appellation? He would answer, I doubt not, "because something passes from the agent to something else." What then is that something which passes? I am afraid Mr. Webster would have difficulty in answering this question, so as to justify the term transitive, without admitting the verb to be active. For, if it be not an act, an energy, or some operation of the mind, what is it, or how can it pass from one to another? The truth is, this objection of Mr. Webster to the term active in such cases, is founded neither on metaphysical nor grammatical principles; for, by an active transitive verb is meant, that which admits a noun as its regimen; and, for the purposes of grammar, this name is sufficiently correct. If the point in question be metaphysically considered, it would be easy to demonstrate that, though in sensation the mind be passive, in perception it is active.

I would here observe, in passing, that there are many verbs neuter and intransitive, which, followed by a preposition, may be truly considered as active transitive verbs. These have been denominated, by the learned Dr. Campbell, compound active verbs. *To laugh*, for example, is a neuter verb; it cannot therefore admit a passive voice, as, "*I am laughed.*" *To laugh at* may be considered as an active transitive verb; for it not only admits an objective case after it, in the active voice, but is likewise construed as a passive verb, as, "*I am laughed at.*" Here an

obvious analogy obtains between these two and the verbs *rideo*, *derideo*, in Latin ; the former of which is a neuter, and the latter an active verb. Nor, as the same ingenious writer observes, does it matter whether the preposition be prefixed to the simple verb, as in Latin, in order to form the active verb, or be put after, and detached, as is the case in English. The only grammatical criterion in our language between an active and a neuter verb is this ; if the verb admits an objective case after it, either with or without a preposition, to express the subject or object of the energy, the verb may be grammatically considered as a compound active verb ; for thus construed it has a passive voice. If the verb does not thus admit an objective case, it must be considered grammatically as neuter or intransitive, and has no passive voice. *To smile* is a neuter verb ; it cannot, therefore, be followed by an objective case, nor be construed as a passive verb. We cannot say, *she smiled him*, or *he was smiled*. *To smile on*, according to the principle now proposed, is a compound active verb ; we therefore say, *she smiled on him*. *He was smiled on by fortune in every undertaking**.

As all things exist in time, and whatever is predicable of any subject must be predicated as either past, present, or future, every action, energy, or state of being, coming under one or other of these predi-

* Conformably to general opinion I here consider the English language as having a passive voice. How far this opinion is well founded shall be the subject of future inquiry.

caments, hence arises the utility of tenses, to express the times, or relative order of their existence. In regard to the number of these tenses *, necessary to render a language complete, grammarians have been somewhat divided in opinion.

In our language we have two simple tenses, the present and the preterperfect †. The latter is ge-

* Mr. Bosworth seems to think, that the word *tense* is derived from the Latin *tensus*, "used to denote that extension or inflexion of the word, by which difference in time is implied, or difference in action is signified." I am rather inclined to consider it as derived from the French *tems* or *temps*, and that from *tempus*.

† "Some," says Dr. Beattie, "will not allow any thing to be a tense, but what, in one inflected word, expresses an affirmation with time; for, that those parts of the verb are not properly called tenses, which assume that appearance, by means of auxiliary words. At this rate, in English, we should have two tenses only, the present and the past in the active verb, and in the passive no tenses at all. But this is a needless nicety; and, if adopted, would introduce confusion into the grammatical art. If *amaveram* be a tense, why should not *amatus fueram*? If *I heard* be a tense, *I did hear*, *I have heard*, and *I shall hear*, must be equally entitled to that appellation."

How simplicity can introduce confusion I am unable to comprehend, unless we are to affirm that the introduction of Greek and Latin names, to express nonentities in our language, is necessary to illustrate the grammar, and simplify the study of the language to the English scholar. But the author's theory seems at variance with itself. He admits, that "we have no cases in English, except the addition of *s* in the genitive," whence we may infer, that he considers inflexion as essential to a case. Now, if those only be cases, which are formed by inflexion, those only should, grammatically, be deemed tenses, which are formed in the same manner. When he asks, therefore, if *amaveram* be a tense, why should not *amatus fueram* be a tense also? the answer on his own principles is sufficiently obvious, namely,

nerally formed by adding *d* or *ed* to the present, as, *love, loved; fear, feared*. That the suffix here is a

because the one is formed by inflexion, the other by combination. And, I would ask, if *king's* be a genitive case, why, according to his theory, is not *of a king* entitled to the same appellation? I apprehend the answer he must give, consistently with his opinion respecting cases, will sufficiently explain why *amaveram*, and *I heard*, are tenses, while *amatus fueram*, and *I had heard*, are not.

Nay further, if it be needless nicety to admit those only as tenses, which are formed by inflexion, is it not equally a needless nicety to admit those cases only, which are formed by varying the termination? And if confusion be introduced by denying *I had heard* to be a tense, why does not the learned author simplify the doctrine of English nouns, by giving them six cases, *a king, of a king, to or for a king, a king, O king, with, from, in or by a king*? This surely would be to perplex, not to simplify. In short, the inconsistency of those grammarians, who deny that to be a case, which is not formed by inflexion, yet would load us with moods and tenses, not formed by change of termination, is so palpable, as to require neither illustration nor argument to expose it. If these authors would admit, that we have as many cases in English, as there exist relations expressed by prepositions, then, indeed, though they might overwhelm us with the number, we should at least acknowledge the consistency of their theory. But to adopt the principle of inflexion in one case, and reject it in another, precisely parallel, involves an inconsistency which must excite amazement. *Nil fuit sic unquam impar sibi*. Why do not these gentlemen favour us with a dual number, with a middle voice, and with an optative mood? Nay, as they are so fond of tenses, as to lament, that we rob them of all but two, why do they not enrich us with a first and second aorist, and a paulo post future? and, if this should not suffice, they will find in Hebrew a rich supply of verbal forms. We should then have *kal* and *niphhal*, *pihhal* and *pyhhal*, *hiphhal* and *hophhal*, *hithpahhel* and *hothpahhel*, and numerous other species and designations. What a wonderful acquisition this would be to our stock of moods, tenses, and voices!

contraction for *did*, as Mr. Tooke supposes, I can easily imagine ; thus, *fear*, *fear-did*, *feared*, or *did*

One of these grammarians, indeed, reverencing the old maxim *est modus in rebus*, observes, that “it is necessary to set bounds to this business, so as not to occasion obscurity and perplexity, when we mean to be simple and perspicuous.” This is so far good ; because, though it vindicates the impropriety, it modestly would confine it within decent bounds. But surely it cannot be necessary to remind this writer, that when the boundary between right and wrong, propriety and impropriety, is once passed, it is extremely difficult to prescribe limits to the transgression ; and that arbitrary distinctions, resting on no other foundation than prejudice or fashion, must ever be vague, questionable, and capricious. These are truths of which, I am persuaded, the author to whom I allude needs not to be reminded. But it may be necessary to impress on his attention another truth equally incontestable, that no authority, how respectable soever, can sanction inconsistency ; and that great names, though they may be honoured by ignorance and credulity with the most obsequious homage, will never pass with the intelligent reader, either for demonstration or for argument. This author, in defence of his theory of cases and tenses, observes, “that the proper form of a tense, in the Greek and Latin languages, is certainly that which it has in the grammars of these languages.” On what evidence is this assumption founded ? Here is exhibited a *petitio principii*, too palpable to escape the detection of the most inattentive reader. He proceeds. “But in the Greek and Latin grammars we uniformly find that some of the tenses are formed by variations of the principal verb, and others by the addition of helping verbs.” It is answered that the admission of these forms in Greek and Latin grammars, is a question of mere expediency, and nowise affects the doctrine, for which we contend, any more than the admission of six cases in all the Latin declensions affects the doctrine of cases ; though in no one declension have all the cases dissimilar terminations. This position it would be easy to demonstrate : it would be easy likewise to show why, notwithstanding this occasional identity of termination, six cases are admitted in all the declensions ; but the subject is foreign to our present purpose. It is important, however, to observe, what has

fear; but the question returns, whence comes the termination *ed* in *doed*, from which *did* itself is con-

escaped the notice of the author, that the principle, on which the admission just mentioned may be expedient in a Latin grammar, has no existence whatever in the English language.

"It is therefore," he continues, "indisputable, that the principal, or the participle, and an auxiliary, constitute a regular tense in the Greek and Latin languages." This, as I have remarked, is a palpable *petitio principii*. It is to say, that because *amatus fueram* is a tense, therefore, "I had been loved" is a tense also. The author forgets, that the premises must be true, to render the conclusion legitimate. He forgets, that a circular argument is a mere sophism, because it assumes as true, what it is intended to prove. Whether *amatus fueram* be or be not a tense, is the very point in question; and so far am I from admitting the affirmative as unquestionable, that I contend, it has no more claim to the designation of tense, than *εσομαι τετυφως*—no more claim than *amandum est mihi*, *amari oportet*, or *amandus sum*, have to be called moods. Here I must request the reader to bear in mind the necessary distinction between the grammar of a language, and its capacity of expression.

In answer to the objection of inconsistency, in admitting tenses, where there is no inflexion, yet rejecting cases, where there is no change of termination, the author says, "that such a mode of declension cannot apply to our language." But why can it not apply? Why not give as English cases, *to a king, of a king, from a king, with a king, by a king, at a king, about a king, &c. &c.*? The mode is certainly applicable, whatever may be the consequences of that application. A case surely is as easily formed by a noun and preposition, as a tense by a participle and auxiliary. But, the author observes, "the English language would then have a much greater number of cases, than the Greek and Latin languages." And why not? Is the number of cases in English, or any other language, to be limited by the number in Greek or Latin? or does the author mean to say, that there is any peculiar propriety in the number five or six? The author, to be consistent with himself, ought to acknowledge as many cases, as there are prepositions to be found in the English language. This, it may be said, would encumber our grammar, and embarrass the learner.

tracted. This query seems to have escaped the attention of the learned author*.

This is, indeed, an argument against the expediency of the application, but not against the practicability of the principle in question. Besides, it may be asked, why does the author confine his love of simplification to cases? Why not extend it to tenses also? Why maintain, that inflexion only makes a case, and that a tense is formed without inflexion? Why dismiss one encumbrance, and admit another?

The author observes, that "from grammarians, who form their ideas and *make* their decisions respecting this part of grammar, on the principles and construction of languages, which in these points do not suit the peculiar nature of our own, but differ considerably from it, we may naturally expect grammatical schemes that are neither perspicuous nor consistent, and which will tend more to perplex than inform the learner." Had I been reprehending the author's own practice, I should have employed nearly the same language. How these observations, certainly judicious and correct, can be reconciled with the doctrine of the writer himself, I am utterly at a loss to conceive. His ideas of consistency and simplicity are to me incomprehensible. He rejects *prepositional* cases for the sake of simplicity, and he admits various moods and tenses, equally foreign to the genius of our language, in order to avoid perplexity. Surely this is not a "consistent scheme." Nay, he tells us, "that on the principle of imitating other languages in names and forms (I beseech the reader to mark the words), without a correspondence in nature

* Mr. Gilchrist, in his "Philosophic Etymology," represents the terminations *ath, eth, ad, ed, et, en, an*, as conjunctives, equivalent to the sign +, denoting *add*, or *join*, (see p. 162). In another part of the same work, he considers *did* to be *do* doubled, as *dedi* from the Latin *do*, which he believes to be the very same word with our *do*. Repetition, he observes, is a mode of expressing complete action. Hence we have *do, do-ed, dede, did*, in English. This explanation is ingenious, and furnishes a probable account of the origin of the word *did*, which he remarks was formerly spelled *dede*.

Actions and states of being may be predicated as either certain or contingent, free or necessary, possible or impossible, obligatory or optional; in short, as they may take place in a variety of ways,

and idiom, we might adopt a number of declensions, as well as a variety of cases for English substantives: but," he adds, "this variety does not at all correspond with the idiom of our language." After this observation, argument surely becomes unnecessary.

I have here, the reader will perceive, assailed the author's doctrine merely on the ground of inconsistency. It is liable, however, to objections of a more serious nature; and were I not apprehensive that I have already exhausted the patience of the reader, I should now proceed to state these objections. There is one observation, however, which I feel it necessary to make. The author remarks, that to take the tenses as they are commonly received, and endeavour to ascertain their nature and their differences, "is a much more useful exercise, as well as a more proper, for a work of this kind, than to raise, as might be easily raised, new theories on the subject." If the author by this intends to insinuate that our doctrine is new, he errs egregiously. For Wallis, one of the oldest, and certainly one of the best of our English grammarians, duly attentive to the simplicity of that language whose grammar he was exhibiting, assigned only two tenses to the English verb. He says *Nos duo tantum habemus tempora, Præsens et Præteritum*; and on this simple principle his explanation of the verb proceeds. In the preface to his grammar, he censures his few predecessors for violating the simplicity of the English language, by the introduction of names and rules foreign to the English idiom. *Cur hujus modi, casuum, generum, modorum, temporumque fictam et in eptam plane congeriem introducamus citra omnem necessitatem, aut in ipsa lingua fundamentum, nulla ratio suadet.* And so little was he aware that the introduction of technical names for things, which have no existence, facilitates the acquisition of any art or science, that he affirms it in regard to the subject before us to be the cause of great confusion and perplexity. *Quæ (inutilia præcepta) a lingua nostra sunt prorsus aliena, adeoque confusionem potius et obscuritatem pariunt, quam explicationi inserviunt.*

they may be spoken of, as diversified in their modes of production. Hence arises another accident of verbs, called a mood, expressing the mode or manner of existence. These modes are, in some languages, partly expressed by inflexions, partly by auxiliary verbs, or words significant of the modal diversity. In English there is only one mood, namely, the indicative. The Greeks and Romans expressed by inflexions the most common modes of action or existence, as conditionality, power, contingency, certainty, liberty, and duty. In our language they are denoted by auxiliary verbs.

The English verb has only one voice, namely, the active. Dr. Lowth, and most other grammarians, have assigned it two voices, active and passive. Lowth has, in this instance, not only violated the simplicity of our language, but has also advanced an opinion inconsistent with his own principles. For, if he has justly excluded from the number of cases in nouns, and moods in verbs, those which are not formed by inflexion but by the addition of prepositions and auxiliary verbs, there is equal reason for rejecting a passive voice, if it be not formed by variety of termination. Were I to ask him why he denies *from a king* to be an ablative case, or *I may love* to be the potential mood, he would answer, and very truly, that those only can be justly regarded as cases or moods which, by a different form of the noun or verb, express a different relation or a different mode of existence. If this answer be satisfactory,

there can be no good reason for assigning to our language a passive voice, when that voice is formed not by inflexion, but by an auxiliary verb. *Doceor* is truly a passive voice; but *I am taught* cannot, without impropriety, be considered as such. Besides, as it is justly observed by Dr. Ash, our author, when he parses the clause "I am well pleased," tells us that *am* is the indicative mood, present tense, of the verb *to be*; and *pleased*, the passive participle of the verb *to please*. Now, in parsing, every word should be considered as a distinct part of speech; whether, therefore, we admit *pleased* to be a passive participle or not (for this point I shall afterwards examine), it is obvious that on the principle now laid down, and acknowledged by Dr. Lowth, *am pleased* is not a present passive, nor has the author himself parsed it in this manner. Into such inconsistencies do our grammarians run, from a propensity to force the grammar of our language into a conformity with the structure of Greek and Latin.

The same reasoning will also account for my assigning to English verbs no more than, two tenses and one mood. For, if we consider the matter not metaphysically but grammatically, and regard those only as moods which are diversified by inflexion (and, as Lowth himself observes, as far as grammar is concerned, there can be no others), we find that our language has only one mood and two tenses.

This doctrine, in respect to the cases, is very generally admitted. For, though the Greeks and Romans

expressed the different relations by variety of inflexion, which they termed cases, it does not follow that we are to acknowledge the same number of cases as they had, when these relations are expressed in English, not by inflexions, but by prepositions or words significant of these relations. The Latins would not have acknowledged *absque fructu*, without fruit, as forming a seventh case, though they acknowledged *fructu*, by fruit, as making an ablative or sixth case. And why? because the latter only was formed by inflexion. For this reason, I consider giving the name of dative case to the combination of words *to a king*, or of ablative case to the expression *from a king*, to be a palpable impropriety. Our language knows no such cases; nor would an Englishman, unacquainted with Greek or Latin, ever dream of these cases, though perfectly master of his own language.

In the same manner it may be asked, what could lead him to distinguish a diversity of moods, or a plurality of voices, where there is no variety of termination to discriminate them? The distinction of circumstances, respecting the modes of existence, he expresses by words significant of these accidents; but he would no more dream of giving these forms of expression the name of moods, than he would be disposed to call *from a king* by the name of *casus ablativus*, or *permit me to go* the first person singular of the imperative mood. If, indeed, he were somewhat acquainted with Latin, he might, in the

true spirit of modern grammarians, contend that *let me go*, or *permit me to go*, is truly the first person singular of the imperative mood; assigning as a reason for this assertion, that such is the designation of *eam* in Latin. With the most correct knowledge, however, of his own language only, he could never be seduced into this absurdity. A little reflection indeed might teach him, that even *eam* in Latin is an elliptical expression for *sine ut eam*, the word *eam* itself denoting neither entreaty nor command.

In truth, we may as reasonably contend that our language has all the tenses which are to be found in Greek and Latin, because, by the aid of auxiliaries and definitives, we contrive to express what they denoted by one word, as to contend that we have a potential, an optative or imperative mood, or a passive voice; because by auxiliaries or variety of arrangement we can express the circumstances of power, liberty, duty, passion, &c. No grammarian has yet gone so far as to affirm that we have in English a *paulo post future*, because our language, by definitives or auxiliaries, is capable of expressing that time. Or, what should we think of that person's discernment, who should contend that the Latins had an optative mood because *utinam legeres* signifies "I wish you would read." It is equally absurd to say that we have an imperfect, preterpluperfect, or future tenses; or that we have all the Greek varieties of mood, and two voices, because by the aid of auxiliary words and definitive terms we contrive to ex-

press these accidents, times, or states of being. I consider, therefore, that we have no more cases, moods, tenses, or voices in our language, as far as its grammar, not its capacity of expression, is concerned, than we have variety of termination to denote these different accessory ideas.

As the terminations of verbs in most languages are varied by tense and mood, so are they also varied according as the subject is of the first, second, or third person. Thus, in the only two tenses that we have in English, namely, the present and the preter-perfect tenses, the second person singular of each is formed from the first, by adding *st* or *est*, as *I love, thou lovest, I loved, thou lovedst*; and the third person singular of the present is formed by adding *s*, or the syllable *eth* or *th* to the first, as *love, loves, or loveth, read, reads, or readeth*. These are the only variations which our verbs admit, in concordance with the person of the nominative singular. The three persons plural are always the same with the first person singular.

Before I proceed to the conjugation of verbs in general, I shall first explain the manner in which the auxiliaries are conjugated. Of these the most extensively useful is the verb *to be*, denoting simple affirmation, or expressing existence. The next is that which signifies action, namely, the verb *to do*. The third is the verb *to have*, implying possession. The others are, *shall, will, may, can, &c.* I begin with the verb *to be*.

Indicative Mood.

Present Tense.

* <i>Sing.</i>	I am	Thou art	He, she, or it is
<i>Plur.</i>	We are	Ye or you are	They are.

Preterite.

<i>Sing.</i>	I was	Thou wast†	He was
<i>Plur.</i>	We were	Ye or you were	They were.

* I be	Thou beest	He, she, or it be
We be	Ye or you be	They be

from the Saxon,

Ic beo	Thu beest	He beeth
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are obsolete, unless followed by a concessive term. Thus, instead of saying, "Many there *be*, that go in thereat," we should now say, "Many there *are*." For "to whom all hearts *be* open," we should now write, "to whom all hearts *are* open." We find them however used with the conjunctions *if* and *though*; thus, "If this *be* my notion of a great part of that high science, divinity, you will *be* so civil, as to imagine, I lay no mighty stress upon the rest."—*Pope*. That this was his notion the author had previously declared; the introductory clause, therefore, is clearly affirmative, and is the same as if he had said, "As this is my notion." "Although she *be* abundantly grateful to all her protectors, yet I observe your name most often in her mouth."—*Swift*. "The paper, although it *be* written with spirit, yet would have scarce cleared a shilling."—*Swift*. In the two last sentences the meaning is affirmative; nothing conditional or contingent being implied.

In the following examples, it expresses doubt or contingency. "If thou *be* the son of God, cast thyself down;" *i. e.* "shouldst be." "If I *be* in difficulty, I will ask your aid;" *i. e.* "If I should be."

† Though the authority of Milton, Dryden, Pope, and Swift, can be pleaded in favour of *wert*, as the second person singular of this tense, I am inclined to agree with Lowth, that in conformity to analogy, as well as the practice of the best ancient writers, it would be better to confine *wert* to the imperfect conditional.

Imperfect Conditional.

<i>Sing.</i>	I were	Thou wert	He were
<i>Plur.</i>	We were	Ye or you were	They were.

Infinitive.

To be.

It may seem inconsistent with the opinion which I have delivered concerning moods, to assign an infinitive to this verb; and the existence of this infinitive may appear, perhaps, a sufficient refutation of that opinion. I shall, therefore, briefly repeat what I have said, and offer a few additional observations.

I have remarked that the first care of men, in a rude and infant state, would be to assign names to surrounding objects; and that the noun, in the natural order of things, must have been the first part of speech. Their inventive powers would next be employed to express the most common energies or states of being, such as are denoted by the verbs *to do*, *to be*, *to suffer*. Hence, by the help of these combined with a noun, they might express the energy or state of that thing, of which the noun was the name. Thus, I shall suppose, that they assigned the word *plant*, as the name of a vegetable set in the ground. To express the act of setting it, they would say, *do plant*, that is, *act plant*. The letters *d* and *t* being nearly allied, it is easy to conceive how the word *do*, by a variation very natural and common to all languages, might be changed into *to*; and thus

the word *to* prefixed to a noun would express the correspondent energy or action.

In what light then are we to consider the phrase *to plant*, termed an infinitive, or to what class of words is it reducible? Previously to my answering this question, it is necessary to remind the reader, that a verb joined to a noun forms a sentence; that affirmation is essential to the character of a verb; and that, for this reason, and this only, it has been pre-eminently distinguished by the name of verb, or the word. Destroy this characteristic, and it is immediately confounded with the adjective, or the participle. It is its power of predication only, which constitutes it a distinct part of speech, and discriminates it from every other. *Vir sapit*, and *vir est sapiens*, are equivalent expressions. Cancel the assertion, and the verb is lost. The expression becomes *vir sapiens*, “a wise man.” This opinion, I am persuaded, requires only to be examined to be universally adopted. If this be the case, the infinitive, which affirms nothing, cannot, without impropriety, be deemed a verb. It expresses merely an action, passion, or state abstractedly. Hence many grammarians have justly considered it as no part of the verb; and, in the languages of Greece and Rome, the infinitive was employed like a common substantive, having frequently an adjective joined with it, and subject to the government of verbs and prepositions. This opinion has been lately controverted by a writer of considerable eminence as a Latin

scholar. But, after examining the memoir with attention, I take upon me to affirm that not a single example can be produced wherein the infinitive, as used by the Greeks and Romans, might not be supplied by the substitution of a noun. Wherefore, admitting the established principle, *voces valent significatione*, there cannot exist a doubt that the infinitive, which may in all cases be supplied by a noun, has itself the real character of a noun. And, if the essence of a verb consist in predication, and not, as some think, in implying time in conjunction with an attribute, which is the characteristic of a participle, then the infinitive, as it can predicate nothing, and joined to a substantive makes no sentence, cannot therefore be deemed a verb. When I say, *legere est facile*, "to read is easy," it is obvious that there is only one sentence in each of these expressions. But if *legere* (to read) were a verb as well as *est* (is), then there would be two verbs and also two affirmations, for affirmation is inseparable from a verb. I remark also, that the verbal noun *lectio* (reading) substituted for *legere* (to read) would precisely express the same sentiment. For these reasons I concur decidedly with those grammarians who are so far from considering the infinitive as a distinct mood, that they entirely exclude it from the appellation of verb *.

* If the expression of time with an attribute "be sufficient to make a verb, the participle must be a verb too, because it signifies time also. But the essence of a verb consisting in predication, which is peculiar to it, and incommunicable to all other parts of

It may be asked, what then is it to be called? In answer to this query, I observe, that it matters little what designation be assigned to it, provided its character and office be fully understood. The ancient Latin grammarians, as Priscian informs us, termed it properly enough, *nomen verbi*. "The noun or name of the verb." To proscribe terms, which have been long familiar to us, and, by immemorial possession, have gained an establishment, is always a difficult, and frequently an ungracious task. I shall therefore retain its usual name, having sufficiently guarded the reader against a misconception of its character.

Now, in our language, the infinitive has not even the distinction arising from termination, to entitle it to be ranked in the number of moods; its form being the same with that of the present tense, and probably, both in its termination and its prefix, originally identical. For, if the doctrine just proposed be correct, the word *do* was put before each. To this rule the English language furnishes only one exception, namely, the verb of existence, in which the present indicative is *am*, whereas the infinitive is *to be*. This, however, can scarcely be deemed an exception, when it is considered, that the present indicative of this verb was

speech, and these infinitives never predicating, they cannot be verbs. Again, the essence of a noun consisting in its so subsisting in the understanding, as that it may be the subject of predication, and these infinitives being all capable of so subsisting, they must of necessity be nouns."—*R. Johnson's Gram. Comment.*

originally *be* as well as *am*; though the former be now in a state of obsolescence, or rather entirely obsolete. At the same time, as this is the only verb in which the infinitive differs in form from the present of the indicative, I have judged it necessary to note the exception, and assign the infinitive.

Present part.

Being

Past part.

Been *.

TO DO.

Indicative Mood.

Present.

Sing. I do Thou doest or dost He doeth, doth or
Plur. We do Ye or you do They do. [does

* The variety of form which this verb assumes, clearly shows that it has proceeded from different sources.

Am is from the Anglo-Saxon *eom*, and *is* from the Anglo-Saxon *ys* or *is*: and these have been supposed to have come from the Greek *εμ*, *εσ*.

The derivation of *are* is doubtful. It may, perhaps, have proceeded directly from *er* or *erum* of the Islandic verb, denoting "to be." By Mr. Gilchrist it is considered as "the same with the infinitive termination *are, ere, ire*." Mr. Webb conjectured, that it might have some relation to the Greek *εαρ*, *spring*. Both these explanations appear to us somewhat fanciful.

Art is from the Anglo-Saxon *eart*. "Thou eart," *thou art*.

Was is evidently the Anglo-Saxon *wæs*, and *wast*, *wert*, probably from the Franco-Theatisc, *warst*; and *were* from the Anglo-Saxon *wære*, *wæron*.

Be is from the Anglo-Saxon *Ic beo*, *I am*, which, with the Gaelic verb *bi*, *to be*, Mr. Webb considered to be derived from *βίος*, *life*, as the Latin *fui* from *φύω*, *to grow*. This conjecture he supports by several pertinent quotations. See Mr. Bosworth's "Elements of Anglo-Saxon Grammar," p. 164.

Preterperfect.

<i>Sing.</i> I did	Thou didst	He, she, or it, did *
<i>Plur.</i> We did	Ye or you did	They did.

Participles.

<i>Present</i>	Doing
<i>Past</i>	Done.

TO HAVE.

Indicative Mood.

Present.

<i>Sing.</i> I have	Thou hast	He hath or has
<i>Plur.</i> We have	Ye or you have	They have.

Preterperfect.

<i>Sing.</i> I had	Thou hadst	He had
<i>Plur.</i> We had	Ye or you had	They had.

Participles.

<i>Present</i>	Having
<i>Past</i>	Had.

Liberty is expressed by the verb

MAY.

Indicative Mood.

Present.

<i>Sing.</i> I may	Thou mayest	He may
<i>Plur.</i> We may	Ye or you may	They may †.

* The words *did, hast, hath, has, had, shalt, wilt*, are evidently, as Wallis observes, contracted for *doed, haveth, have, haved, shall'st, will'st*.

† This verb is derived from the Saxon *Magan, posse*, the pre-

Preterperfect.

Sing. I might Thou mightest He might
Plur. We might Ye or you might They might.

Power or ability is expressed by

CAN.

*Indicative Mood.**Present.*

Sing. I can Thou canst He can
Plur. We can Ye or you can They can *.

Preterperfect.

Sing. I could Thou couldst He could
Plur. We could Ye or you could They could.

Futurition and duty are expressed by the verb *shall*, but not each in the three persons.

*Indicative Mood.**Present.*

†*Sing.* I shall Thou shalt He shall
Plur. We shall Ye or you shall They shall.

sent of which is *Ic mæg*, and the preterite *Ic miht*. Hence also *Ic mot*.

“For as the fisshe, if it be drie,
Mote in defeaute of water die.”—*Gower*.

* This verb is derived from *cunnan*, *scire*, *posse*, *sapere*. Hence is derived the verb, “to ken,” or “to know;” or more probably, indeed, they were one and the same word; hence, also, the word *cunning*. “To ken” is still used in Scotland; and in the expression of Shakspeare, “I ken them from afar,” is erroneously considered by some critics to mean, “I see them.”

† This verb is, unquestionably, a derivative from the Saxon

Preterperfect.

<i>Sing.</i> I should	Thou shouldst	He should
<i>Plur.</i> We should	Ye should	They should.

real, *I owe* or *I ought*, and was originally of the same import. *I shall* denoted "it is my duty," and was precisely synonymous with *debeo* in Latin. Chaucer says, "The faith I shall to God;" that is, "the faith I owe to God." "Thou shalt not kill," or "thou oughtest not to kill." In this sense, *shall* is a present tense, and denoted present duty or obligation. But, as all duties and all commands, though present, in respect to their obligation and authority, must be future, in regard to their execution, so by a natural transition, observable in most languages, this word, significant of present duty, came to be a note of future time. I have considered it however as a present tense; 1st, because it originally denoted present time; 2dly, because it still retains the form of a present, preserving thus the same analogy to *should* that *can* does to *could*, *may* to *might*, *will* to *would*; and 3dly, because it is no singular thing to have a verb in the present tense, expressive of future time, commencing from the present moment; for such precisely is the Greek verb $\mu\epsilon\lambda\lambda\omega$ *futurus sum*. Nay, the verb *will* denotes present inclination, yet in some of its persons, like *shall*, expresses futurity. I have considered, therefore, the verb *shall* as a present tense, of which *should* is the preterperfect.

Johnson's explanation of the meaning of this verb is so perspicuous, that as foreigners are apt to mistake its use, I shall here transcribe his words. *I shall love*, "it will be so that I must love," "I am resolved to love." *Shall I love?* "will it be permitted me to love?" "Will it be that I must love?" *Thou shalt love*, "I command thee to love;" "it is permitted thee to love," "it will be, that thou must love." *Shalt thou love?* "Will it be, that thou must love?" "Will it be permitted thee to love?" *He shall love*. "It will be, that he must love." "It is commanded that he love." *Shall he love?* "It is permitted, him to love?" The plural persons follow the signification of the singular.

I transcribe also the same author's explanation of the verb *I will*. *I will come*; "I am willing to come," "I am determined

Volition and futurity are expressed by the verb *to will*.

Present.

<i>Sing.</i>	I will	Thou wilt	He will
<i>Plur.</i>	We will	Ye or you will	They will *.

Preterperfect.

<i>Sing.</i>	I would	Thou wouldst	He would
<i>Plur.</i>	We would	Ye or you would	They would.

Priestley and Lowth, who have in this been followed by most other grammarians, call the tenses,

to come." *Thou wilt come.* "It must be, that thou must come," importing necessity; "or it shall be, that thou shalt come," importing choice. *Wilt thou come?* "Hast thou determined to come?" importing choice. *He will come.* "He is resolved to come;" or "it must be, that he must come," importing choice or necessity.

Brightland's short rule may be of some service, in assisting foreigners to distinguish the use of these two verbs. It is this:

"In the first person simply *shall* foretels :

In *will* a threat, or else a promise, dwells ;

Shall in the second and the third does threat ;

Will simply then foretels the future feat."

In addition to these directions for the use of *shall* and *will*, it is to be observed, that, when the second and third persons are represented as the subjects of their own expressions, or their own thoughts, *shall* foretels, as in the first person, thus, "he says he shall be a loser by this bargain." "Do you suppose you shall go?" "He hoped he should recover," and "he hoped he would recover," are expressions of different import. In the former, the two pronouns necessarily refer to the same person ; in the latter, they do not.

* This verb is derived from the Saxon verb *willan*, *velle*, the preterite of which is *Ic wold*.

may, can, shall, will, absolute tenses; *might, could, should, would*, conditional. That *might, could, should, would*, frequently imply conditionality there can be no question; but I am persuaded that the proper character of these tenses is unconditional affirmation, and for these two reasons:

1st. Their formation seems to indicate that they are preterites indicative, proceeding from their respective presents, in the same manner as *did* from *do*, *had* from *have*, and having therefore the same unconditional meaning. Thus, *I may*, is equivalent to, "I am at liberty;" *I might*, to "I was at liberty;" *I can*, means "I am able;" *I could*, "I was able;" *I will*, "I am willing;" *I would*, "I was willing."

2dly. They are used to express unconditional meaning. If we say, "This might prove fatal to your interest," the assertion of the possibility of the event is as unconditional, as absolute, as, "this may prove fatal to your interest." "This, if you do it, *will* ruin your cause," is precisely equivalent to, "This, were you to do it, *would* ruin your cause," equivalent as far, at least, as the unconditional affirmation of the consequence of a supposed action is involved*. "I may write, if I choose," is not more

* The preterite *would* is frequently employed, like the Latin preterimperfect tense, to denote what is usual or customary. Thus,

Quintilio siquid recitares, Corrige, sodes,
Hoc, aiebat, et hoc: melius te posse negares,
Bis terque expertum frustra; delere jubebat.

absolute than "I might write, if I chose." If I say, "I might have gone to the continent," the expression is as unconditional, as, "I had it in my power," "I was at liberty to go to the continent." "Can you construe Lycophron?" "I cannot now; but once I *could*." "May you do as you please?" "Not now; but once I *might*." Is there any conditionality implied in the latter clause of each of these answers? Not the least. They are unconditionally assertive. The formation of these tenses, therefore, being analogous to that of preterites indicative, and their import in these examples, as in many others, which might be adduced, being unconditional and absolute, I am inclined to consider them as preterites indicative, agreeably to their form, and as properly unconditional in respect to signification. I observe, however, that though *might*, *could*, *would*, *should*, are preterite tenses, they are frequently employed to denote present time*; but in

Si defendere delictum, quam vertere malles,
Nullum ultra verbum, aut operam insumebat inanem.

Horace.

where, the verbs *aiebat*, *jubebat*, *insumebat*, may be translated, "he would say," "he would desire," "he would spend." Thus also in English,

Pleas'd with my admiration, and the fire
His speech struck from me, the old man *would* shake
His years away, and act his young encounters,
Then having show'd his wounds, *he'd* sit him down.

* In Latin the imperfect potential is frequently employed in the same manner to denote present time; thus, *irem si vellem*,

such examples care must be taken that congruity of tense be preserved, and that the subsequent be expressed in the same tense with the antecedent verb. Thus I say, "I may go if I choose," where the liberty and inclination are each expressed as present, or "I might go if I chose," where, though present time be implied, the liberty is expressed by the preterite, and the inclination is denoted by the same tense.

Before I proceed to show how these auxiliary verbs are joined with others, to express the intended accessory ideas, I shall offer a few observations on the participle.

expresses present liberty and inclination. And the same analogy obtains in Latin; for we say either, *tu, si hic sis, aliter sentias*, or *tu, si hic esses, aliter sentires*. In such examples, it is intended to signify either the coexistence of two circumstances, or the one as the immediate consequence of the other. An identity of tense, therefore, best expresses contemporary events.

CHAPTER VI.

A PARTICIPLE is a part of speech derived from a verb, agreeing with its primitive in denoting action, being, or suffering, but differing from it in this, that the participle implies no affirmation *.

There are two participles, the present, ending in *ing*, as *reading* †; and the perfect or past, generally ending in *d* or *ed*, as *heard*, *loved*.

* If it should be said, that the participle may properly be considered as a verb, since it implies an attribute with time, I would ask, whether *affirmation*, the most important of all circumstances, and without which no communication could take place, should be overlooked in our classification of words agreeably to their import, or the offices which they perform. If the verb and participle be referred to one class, the principal part of speech which has been pre-eminently distinguished by the name of verb, or *the word*, is degraded from its rank, and confounded with a species of words which are not even necessary to the communication of thought. Surely, if any circumstance can entitle any sort of words to a distinct reference, it is that of *affirmation*.

If it should be objected that the participle, like the verb, governs a case, I would ask, because *lectio*, *tactio*, and many other substantives are found sometimes joined with an accusative case, were they ever on this account considered as verbs? Besides, if the government of a case be urged as an argument, what becomes of those participles which govern no case? Nay, if the government of a case be deemed the criterion of a verb, what name shall we assign to those verbs which have no regimen at all? If any species of words is to be distinguished from another, the characteristic difference must surely belong, not to part only, but to the whole.

† The termination *ing* is from the Anglo-Saxon *ande*, *ænde*, *ende*, *ind*, *onde*, *unde*, *ynde*, and corresponds to the termination of the Latin gerunds in *andum* and *endum*, expressing continuation, *Amandum*, *Lufiande*, *Loving*.

The present participle denotes the relatively present, or the contemporary continuation of an action, or state of being. If we say, "James was building the house," the participle expresses the continuation of the action, and the verb may be considered as active. If we say, "the house was building, when the wall fell," the participle, the same as in the preceding example, denotes here the continuation of a state of suffering, or being acted upon; and the verb may be considered as passive. This participle, therefore, denoting either action or passion, cannot with propriety be considered, as it has been by some grammarians, as entirely an active participle. Its distinctive and real character is, that in point of time it denotes the relatively present, and may therefore be called the present participle; and, in regard to action or passion, it denotes their continuance or incompleteness; and may therefore be termed imperfect. In respect to time, therefore, it is present; in respect to the action or state of being, it is continued or imperfect. But whether it express action or passion can be ascertained only by inquiring, whether the subject be acting or suffering; and this is a question, which judgment only can decide, the participle itself not determining the point. If we say, "the prisoner was burning," our knowledge of the subject only can enable us to determine whether the prisoner was active or passive; whether he was employing fire to consume, or was himself consuming by fire.

The other participle, ending generally in *ed* or *d*,

has been called by some grammarians the passive participle, in contradistinction to the one which we have now been considering, and which they have termed the active participle. "This participle has been so called," says the author of the British Grammar, "because, joined with the verb *to be*, it forms the passive voice." If the reason here assigned justify its denomination as a passive participle, there exists the same reason for calling it an active participle; for, with the verb *to have*, it forms some of the compound tenses of the active voice. The truth is, that, as those grammarians have erred, who consider the participle in *ing* as an active participle, when it in fact denotes either action or passion, so those on the other hand commit a similar mistake, who regard the participle in *ed* as purely passive. A little attention will suffice to show, that it belongs to neither the one voice, nor the other peculiarly; and that it denotes merely completion or perfection, in contradistinction to the other participle, which expresses imperfection or continuation. If it be true, indeed, that the participle in *ing* does not belong to the active voice only, but expresses merely the continuation of any act, passion, or state of being, analogy would incline us to infer, that the participle in *ed*, which denotes the completion of an act or state of being, cannot belong exclusively to the passive voice; and I conceive, that on inquiry we shall find this to be the case. If I say, "he had concealed a poniard under his coat," the participle here would be considered as active. If I say, "he had a poniard

concealed under his clothes," the participle would be regarded as passive. Does not this prove that this participle is ambiguous, that it properly belongs to neither voice, and that the context only or the arrangement can determine, whether it denote the perfection of an action, or the completion of a passion or state of being? When I say, "Lucretia stabbed herself with a dagger, which she had concealed under her clothes," it is impossible to ascertain whether the participle be active or passive, that is, whether the verb *had* be here merely an auxiliary verb, or be synonymous with the verb *to possess*. If the former be intended, the syntactical collocation is, "she had concealed which (dagger) under her clothes:" if the latter, the grammatical order is, "she had which dagger concealed:" and it requires but little discernment to perceive that "she had concealed a dagger," and "had a dagger concealed," are expressions by no means precisely equivalent.

I need not here remind the classical scholar, that the Latins had two distinct forms of expression, to mark this diversity; the one, *quem abdiderat*, and the other, *quem abditum habebat*. The latter is the phraseology of Livy, describing the suicide of Lucretia. His words, if translated, "which she had concealed," become ambiguous; for this is equally a translation of *quem abdiderat*. It is observable also, that the phrase *quem abdiderat* would not imply, that the dagger was in the possession of Lucretia at the time.

The participle in *ed*, therefore, I consider to be

perfectly analogous to the participle in *ing*, and used like it in either an active or a passive sense, belonging therefore neither to the one voice nor the other exclusively, but denoting the completion of an action or state of being, while the participle in *ing* denotes its continuation.

In exhibiting a paradigm of the conjugation of our verbs, many grammarians have implicitly and servilely copied the Latin grammar, transferring into our language the names both of tenses and moods, which have formally no existence in English. "I may burn," is denominated, by the author of the British Grammar, the present subjunctive; "I might burn," the imperfect subjunctive; "I may have burned," the preterperfect, and so on. This is directly repugnant to the simplicity of our language, and is, in truth, as absurd as it would be to call "we two love," the dual number of the present tense; or "he shall soon be buried," a "paulo post future." Were this principle carried its full length, we should have all the tenses, moods, and numbers, which are to be found in Greek or Latin. It appears to me, that nothing but prejudice or affectation could have prompted our English grammarians to desert the simple structure of their own language, and wantonly to perplex it with technical terms, for things not existing in the language itself.

I purpose, therefore, in exhibiting the conjugation of the English verb, to give the simple tenses, as the only ones belonging to our language; and then show

how, by the aid of other words combined with these, we contrive to express the requisite modifications, and various accessory ideas.

Indicative Present. *Preter.* *Part. Perf.*

Write Wrote Written.

Present Tense.

S. I write Thou writest He writes or writeth.

P. We write Ye or you write They write.

This tense is by some grammarians called the present indefinite; while by others it is considered as either definite or indefinite. When it expresses an action now present, it is termed the present definite, as,

“I write this after a severe illness.”—*Pope's Letters.*

“Saul, why persecutest thou me?”—*Bible.*

“This day begins the woe, others must end.”—*Shakspeare.*

If the proposition expressed be general, or true at all times, this tense is then termed the present indefinite; as, “The wicked flee when God pursueth.”

“Through tatter'd clothes small vices do appear;
Robes and furr'd gowns hide all.”—*Shakspeare.*

Preterperfect.

S. I wrote Thou wrotest He wrote.

P. We wrote Ye or you wrote They wrote.

This tense is indefinite, no particular past time being implied.

These are the only two tenses in our language

formed by varying the termination ; the only two tenses, therefore, which properly belong to it.

Present Progressive, or continued.

S. I am writing Thou art writing He is writing.

P. We are writing You are writing They are writing.

This tense denotes a present action proceeding. In regard to time, it has been termed definite ; and, in respect to action, it differs from the other present in this, that the former has no reference either to the perfection or imperfection of the action ; whereas this denotes that the action is continued and imperfect.

Present Emphatic.

S. I do write Thou dost write He doth or does write.

P. We do write Ye or you do write They do write.

This form of the verb is emphatic, and generally implies doubt or contradiction on the part of the person addressed, to remove which the assertion is enforced by the auxiliary verb. In respect to time and action, it is precisely the same with *I write* —

“You cannot dread an honourable death.”

“I do dread it.”

“Excellent wretch ! perdition seize my soul, but I do love thee.”

Cancel the auxiliary verb, and the expression becomes feeble and spiritless. This is one of those phraseologies, which it would be impossible to render

in a transpositive language. *Di me perdant, quin te amem*, is an expression comparatively exanimate and insipid.

Preterite, Indefinite, and Emphatic.

S. I did write Thou didst write He did write.

P. We did write You did write They did write.

as, "This to me in dreadful secrecy impart they did." The emphasis here, however, may partly arise from the inverted collocation. The following example is therefore more apposite. "I have been told, that you have slighted me, and said, I feared to face my enemy. You surely did not wrong me thus?" "I *did* say so."

This tense is indefinite, in respect both to the time, and the completion of the action.

Preter. Imp. &c. continued.

Sing. I was writing Thou wast writing He was writing.

Plur. We were writing Ye were writing They were writing:

This tense denotes that an action was proceeding, or going on, at a time past either specified or implied, as, "I was writing, when you called."

Preterperfect.

<i>Sing.</i> I have	Thou hast	He has	} written.
<i>Plur.</i> We have	You have	They have	

This tense expresses time as past, and the action as perfect. It is compounded of the present tense of the verb denoting possession, and the perfect par-

tiptle. It signifies a perfect action either newly finished, or in a time, of which there is some part to elapse, or an action whose consequences extend to the present. In short, it clearly refers to present time. This, indeed, the composition of the tense manifestly evinces. Thus, "I have written a letter," means, "I possess at present the finished action of writing a letter." This phraseology, I acknowledge, seems uncouth and inelegant; but, how awkward soever it may appear, the tense is unquestionably thus resolvable.

1st, It expresses an action newly finished, as, "I understand that a messenger has arrived from Paris," that is, "newly," or "just now," arrived.

2dly, An action done in a space of time, part of which is yet to elapse, as, "it has rained all this week," "We have seen strange things this century."

3dly, An action perfected some time ago, but whose consequences extend to the present time; as, "I have wasted my time, and now suffer for my folly."

This tense has been termed, by some grammarians, the perfect indefinite, and "I wrote," the perfect definite. The argument, which they offer for this denomination is, that the latter admits a definitive, to specify the precise time, and the former rejects it. Those, who reason in this manner, seem to me not only chargeable with a perversion of terms, but also to disprove their own theory. For what is meant by a definite term? Not surely that which admits or requires a definitive to give it precision; but that, which of itself is already definite. If, therefore, "I

wrote," not only admits, but even requires the subjunction of a defining term or clause to render the time definite and precise, it cannot surely be itself a definite tense. Besides they appear to me to reason in this case inconsistently with their own principles. For they call, *I am writing*, a definite tense; and why? but because it defines the action to be imperfect, or the time to be relatively present*. But if they reason here, as they do in respect to the preterite tenses, they ought to call this an indefinite tense, because it admits not a definitive clause. They must, therefore, either acknowledge that *I have written*, is a definite tense, and *I wrote*, indefinite; or they must, contrary to their own principles, call *I am writing* indefinite.

Dr. Arthur Browne, in an Essay on the Greek Tenses†, contends, that *I wrote* is the perfect definite, and *I have written* the perfect indefinite. "*I wrote*," says he, "is not intelligible without referring to some precise point of time, *e. g.* When I was in France. Why then does Dr. Beattie say *I wrote* is indefinite, because it refers to no particular past time? No: it is indefinite because the verb in that tense does not define, whether the action be complete, or not complete. And why does he say, *I have written* is definite in respect of time; for it refers to no particular time at which the event happened? Put this example; A says to B, 'I wish you would

* Here I would be understood to reason on their own principles; for the truth is, that each of these tenses admits a definitive.

† See the *Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy*, vol. iii.

write to that man.' '*I have written to him.*' The sense is complete; the expression is not supposed to refer to any particular time, and does not necessarily elicit any farther inquiry. But if B answers, '*I wrote to him,*' he is of course supposed to have in his mind a reference to some particular time, and it naturally calls on A to ask when? Is it not clear then that *I wrote* refers to some particular time, and cannot have been called indefinite, as Dr. Beattie supposes, from its not doing so?"

Dr. Browne's argument is chargeable with inconsistency. He says, that because *I have written* elicits no farther inquiry, and renders the sense complete, it denotes no determinate time; and that *I wrote* refers to a particular time, prompting to farther inquiry. This at least I take to be the scope of his reasoning; for, if it be not from their occasioning, or not occasioning farther interrogation, that he deduces his conclusion concerning the nature of these tenses, his argument seems nothing but pure assertion. Now, so far from calling that a definite tense, which necessarily requires, as he himself states, a defining clause to specify the point of time, I should call it an indefinite tense. He admits that *I wrote* refers to time past in general, and that it requires some farther specification to render the time known, as *I wrote yesterday*. In this case, surely it is not the term *wrote*, but *yesterday*, which defines the precise time; the tense itself expressing nothing but past time in general.

For the same reason if, as he acknowledges, *I have*

written elicits no farther inquiry, it is an argument that the sense is complete, and the time sufficiently understood by the hearer. Besides, is it not somewhat paradoxical to say that a tense, which renders farther explanation unnecessary, and the sense complete, thus satisfying the hearer, is indefinite? and that a tense which does not satisfy the hearer, but renders farther inquiry necessary, is definite? This, to say the least, is somewhat extraordinary.

The observations of Lord Monboddo on this subject are not inapplicable to the point in question: I shall therefore transcribe them.

“There are actions,” says he, “which end in energy, and produce no work which remains after them. What shall we say of such actions? cannot we say I have danced a dance, taken a walk, &c. and how can such actions be said in any sense to be present? My answer is, that the consequences of such actions, respecting the speaker, or some other person or thing, are present, and what these consequences are appears from the tenor of the discourse. ‘I have taken a walk, and am much better for it.’ ‘I have danced a dance, and am inclined to dance no more.’”

The order of nature being maintained, as Mr. Harris observes, by a succession of contrarieties, the termination of one state of things naturally implies the commencement of its contrary. Hence this tense has been employed to denote an attribute the contrary to that, which is expressed by the verb. Thus the Latins used *vixit*, “he hath lived,” to denote “he

is dead :” *fuit Ilium*, “Troy has been,” to signify *Troy is no more*. A similar phraseology obtains in English, thus, “I *have* been young” is equivalent to “now I am old.”

Preter Imperfect.

<i>Sing.</i> I have been	Thou hast been	He has been	} writing.
<i>Plur.</i> We have been	You have been	They have been	

This tense, in respect to time, is the same as the last, but implies the imperfection of the action, and denotes its progression.

Preter Pluperfect.

<i>Sing.</i> I had	Thou hadst	He had	} written.
<i>Plur.</i> We had	Ye or you had	They had	

This tense denotes that an action was perfected before another action was done.

Plusquam Preterite Imperfect.

<i>Sing.</i> I had been	Thou hadst been	He had been	} writing.
<i>Plur.</i> We had been	Ye had been	They had been	

This tense, in respect to time, is more than past, and in respect to action is imperfect. It denotes that an action was going on, or in a state of progression, before another action took place, or before it was perfected, as, “I had been writing before you arrived.”

Future Indefinite.

<i>Sing.</i> I shall	Thou shalt	He shall	} write.
<i>Plur.</i> We shall	Ye or you shall	They shall	

OR

<i>Sing.</i> I will	Thou wilt	He will	} write.
<i>Plur.</i> We will	Ye or you will	They will	

These compound tenses denote the futurity of an action indefinitely, without any reference to its completion. The meaning of the several persons has been already explained.

Future, Imp. Progressive.

I shall or will be	We shall or will be	} writing.
Thou shalt or wilt be	Ye shall or will be	
He shall or will be	They shall or will be	

This tense agrees with the former in respect to time, but differs from it in this, that the former has no reference to the completion of the action, while the latter expresses its imperfection and progression.

Future Perfect.

I shall have	We shall have	} written.
Thou shalt have	Ye shall have	
He shall have	They shall have	

This tense denotes that a future action will be perfected, before the commencement or completion of another action, or before a certain future time; as, "before you can have an answer, I shall have written a second letter." "By the time he shall have arrived, you will have conquered every difficulty." In short, it denotes, that at some future time an action will be perfected.

As it has been a subject of great controversy among grammarians, what tenses should be called definite and what indefinite, I shall now offer a few observations which may serve to illustrate the point in question.

Duration, like space, is continuous and uninterrupted. It is divisible in idea only. It is past or future, merely in respect to some intermediate point, which the mind fixes as the limit between the one and the other. Present time, in truth, does not exist any more than a mathematical line can have breadth, or a mathematical point be composed of parts. This position has, indeed, been controverted by Dr. Beattie; but, in my judgment, without the shadow of philosophical argument*. Harris, Reid, and several others,

* Dr. Beattie observes, "that the fundamental error of those philosophers, who deny the existence of present time is, that they suppose the present instant to have, like a geometrical point, neither parts nor magnitude. But as nothing is, in respect of our senses, a geometrical point (for whatever we see or touch must of necessity have magnitude), so neither is the present, or any other instant, wholly unextended." His argument amounts to this, that as a mathematical point is not an object of sense, nor has any real existence, so neither has a metaphysical instant. It is granted. They are each ideal. But does this prove the author's position, that philosophers have erred in asserting their similarity? or does it evince that no analogy subsists between them? Quite the reverse. The truth is, a geometrical point is purely ideal; it is necessary to the truth of mathematical demonstration, that it be conceived to have no parts. Finding it convenient to represent it to sense, we therefore give it magnitude. A metaphysical instant, or present time, is in like manner ideal; but we find it convenient to assume as present an extended space. The doctor observes, that sense perceives nothing but what is present. It is true; but it should be remembered that not time, but objects which exist in time, are perceived by the senses. It may enable a person to form a correct idea of this matter, if he will ask himself, what he means by present time. If it be the present hour, is it not obvious that part of it is past, and part of it future? If it be the present minute, it is equally clear, that the whole of it

have incontrovertibly proved it. But though present time, philosophically speaking, has no existence, we find it convenient to assume a certain portion of the past and the future, as intermediate spaces between these extremes, and to consider these spaces as present; for example, the present day, the present week, the present year, the present century, though part of these several periods be past, and part to come. We speak of them, however, as present, as "this month," "this year," "this day." Time being thus in its nature continuous, and past and future being merely relative terms, some portion or point of time being conceived where the one begins and the other ends, it is obvious that all tenses indicative of any of these two general divisions must denote relative time, that is, time past or future, in relation to some conceived or assumed space; thus it may be past or future, in

cannot be present at once. Nay, if it be the present vibration of the pendulum, is it not obvious that part of it is performed, and part of it remains to be performed? Nor is it possible to stop in this investigation, till present time, strictly speaking, be proved to have no existence. Did it exist, it must be extended; and if extended, it cannot be present, for past and future must necessarily be included in it. If it should be answered, that this proves time, like matter, infinitely divisible, and that the most tedious process will still leave something capable of division, I reply, that as whatever may be left in the one case must be figure and not a point, so the remainder, in the other, must be a portion of extended time, how minute soever, and not an instant. The process, therefore, must be continued, till we arrive in idea at a point and an instant, incapable of division, being not made up of parts.

respect to the present hour, the present day, the present week.

Again. The term indefinite is applicable either to time or to action. It may, therefore, be the predicate of a tense, denoting either that the precise time is left undetermined, or that the action specified is not signified, as either complete or imperfect. Hence the controversy has been partly verbal. Hence also the contending parties have seemed to differ, while, in fact, they were agreed; and, on the contrary, have seemed to accord, while their opinions were, in truth, mutually repugnant.

Dr. Browne confines the term to action only, and pleads the authority of Mr. Harris in his favour. It is true, indeed, that Mr. Harris calls those tenses definite, which denote the beginning, the middle, or the perfection of an action; but it is obvious, from the most superficial examination of his theory, that he denominates the tenses definite or indefinite, not in respect to action, but to time. When, in the passage from Milton,

“Millions of spiritual creatures walk the earth,
Unseen, both when we wake and when we sleep,”

he considers “*walk*” as indefinite, is it in regard to action? No. “It is,” says he, “because they were walking, not at that instant only, but indefinitely, at any instant whatever.” And when he terms *Thou shalt not kill* an indefinite tense, is it because it has no reference to the completion or the imperfection of

the action? No; it is "because," says he, "this means no particular future time, but is extended indefinitely to every part of time." Besides, if Mr. Harris's and Dr. Browne's ideas coincide, how comes it that the one calls that a definite tense, which the other terms indefinite? This does not look like accordance in sentiment, or in the application of terms. Yet the tenses in such examples as these,

"The wicked flee when God pursueth;"

"Ad poenitendum properat, cito qui judicat;"

"God is good;" "Two and two are four;"

which Harris and Beattie properly call indefinite, Browne terms definite. Nay, he denominates them thus for the very reason, for which the others call them indefinite, namely, because the sentiments are always true, and the time of their existence never perfectly past. So far in respect to Mr. Harris's authority in favour of Browne, when he confines the terms definite and indefinite to action only*.

But I forbear to prosecute this controversy further, or to point out the inaccuracies with which I appre-

* When we say, *God is good*, I would ask Dr. Browne whether the verb be definite or indefinite, whether it denote perfection or imperfection, or have no reference to either. It appears to me, that neither of the terms is in his sense applicable; for that the verb denotes simple affirmation with time; or, if applicable, that the tense is, contrary to his opinion, indefinite, the idea of completion or imperfection being entirely excluded.

hend many writers on this subject are chargeable. I therefore proceed to review and illustrate the doctrine of the tenses, which I have already offered.

The present time being, as I have already observed, an assumed space, and of no definite extent, as it may be either the present minute, the present hour, the present month, the present year, all of which consist of parts, it follows that, as the present time is itself indefinite, having no real existence, but being an arbitrary conception of the mind, the tense significant of that time must be also indefinite. This, I conceive, must be sufficiently evident. Hence the present tense not only admits, but frequently requires the definitive *now* to limit the interval between past and future, or to note the precise point of time.

Time past and time future are conceived as infinitely more extended than the present. The tenses, therefore, significant of these two grand divisions of time, are also necessarily indefinite.

Again, an action may be expressed, either as finished, or as proceeding; or it may be the subject of affirmation, without any reference to either of these states. In English, to denote the continuation of the action we employ the present or imperfect participle; and to denote its completion we use the preterite or perfect participle. When neither is implied, the tenses, significant of the three divisions of time, without any regard to the action as complete or imperfect, are uniformly employed.

The tenses, therefore, indefinite as to time and action are these :

<i>The Present</i>	I write
<i>The Preterite</i>	I wrote
<i>The Future</i>	I shall write.

The six following compound tenses are equally indefinite in point of time ; but they denote either the completion, or the progress of the action, and in this respect are definite.

Its progress,
 I am writing
 I was writing
 I shall be writing.

Its perfection, as
 I have written
 I had written
 I shall have written.

I write	I am writing	I have written.
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The first is indefinite as to time and action. If I say, " I write," it is impossible to ascertain by the mere expression, whether be signified, " I write now," " I write daily," or, " I am a writer in general." It is the concomitant circumstances only, either expressed or understood, which can determine, what part of the present time is implied. When Pope

introduces a letter to lady M. W. Montague, with these words, "I write this after a severe illness," is it the tense which marks the time, or is it not the date of the letter, with which the writing is understood to be contemporary? If you and I should see a person writing, and either of us should say, "he writes," the proposition would be particular, and time present with the speaker's observation would be understood: but, is it not evident, that it is not the tense, which defines the *present now*, but the obvious circumstance of the person's writing at the time? And when the king, in Hamlet, says,

"My words fly up, my thoughts remain below:
Words, without thoughts, never to heaven go,"

what renders the two first propositions particular, or confines the tenses to the time then present, while the last proposition is universally true, and the tense indefinite? Nothing, I conceive, but the circumstances of the speaker. Nay, does it not frequently happen, that we must subjoin the word *now* to this tense, in order to define the point of time? Did the tense of itself note the precise time, this definitive would in no case be necessary. If I say, "apples are ripe," the proposition considered, independently on adventitious circumstances, is general and indefinite. The time may be defined by adding a specific clause, as, "in the month of October;" or, if nothing be subjoined, the ellipsis is supplied either by the previous conversation, or in some other way,

and the hearer understands, "are *now* ripe." This tense, therefore, I consider as indefinite in point of time. That it is indefinite in regard to action, there can be no question.

"*I am writing.*" This tense also is indefinite in respect to time. It derives its character as a tense from the verb *am*, which implies affirmation with time, either *now*, *generally*, or *always*. Mr. Harris calls it the present definite, as I have already remarked ; and in regard to action it is clearly definite. It is this, and this only, which distinguishes it from the other present, *I write*, the latter having no reference to the perfection or imperfection of the action, while *I am writing* denotes its continuation. Hence it is, that the latter is employed to express propositions generally or universally true, the idea of perfection or incompletion being, in such cases, excluded. Thus we say, *The wicked flee, when God pursueth* ; but not, as I conceive with equal propriety, *the wicked are fleeing, when God is pursuing*.

I have written.

As *I am writing* denotes the present continuation of an action, so *I have written* expresses an action completed in a time supposed to be continued to the present, or an action, whose consequences extend to the present time. As a tense, it derives its character from the tense *I have*, significant of present time ; while the perfection of the action is denoted by the perfect participle. But as I have shown that every

tense significant of present time must be, in regard to time, indefinite, so this tense, compounded of the present tense *I have*, must, in this respect, be therefore indefinite.

Lowth, Priestley, Beattie, Harris, and several others have assigned it the name of the preterite definite, and *I wrote* they have termed the preterite indefinite. Browne, and one or two others, have reversed this denomination. Now, that *I wrote* does not of itself define what part of past time is specified, appears to me very evident. This is, indeed, admitted by those, who contend for the definite nature of this tense. Why then do they call it a definite tense? because, they say, it admits a definitive term, by the aid of which it expresses the precise time, as, "I wrote yesterday," "a week ago," "last month;" whereas we cannot say, "I have written yesterday." Now, as I remarked before, this appears to me a perversion of language; for we do not denominate that term *definite*, which requires a definitive to render it precise. Why have the terms *the*, *this*, *that*, been called definitives? Is it because they admit a defining term? or is it not because they limit or define the import of general terms? I concur, therefore, with the author of the article "Aorist," in the "Nouvelle Encyclopedie," when he ridicules a Mr. Demandre for giving the character of definite to a tense, which marks past time indefinitely. This certainly is a perversion of terms.

"When we make use of the auxiliary verb," says

Dr. Priestley, "we have no idea of any certain portion of time intervening between the time of action, and the time of speaking of it; the time of action being some period that extends to the present, as, 'I have this year, this morning, written,' spoken in the same year, the same morning; whereas, speaking of an action done in a period past, we use the preterite tense, and say, 'I wrote,' intimating, that a certain portion of time is past, between the time of action and the time of speaking of it." To the same purpose nearly are the words of the author of the article "Grammar," in the "Encyclopedia Britannica." "*I have written*," says he, "is always joined with a portion of time, which includes the present *now* or *instant*; for otherwise it could not signify, as it always does, the present possession of the finishing of an action. But the aorist, which signifies no such possession, is as constantly joined with a portion of past time, which excludes the present *now* or *instant*. Thus we say, '*I have written* a letter this day,' 'this week,' &c. *but I wrote* a letter yesterday; and to interchange these expressions would be improper."

The explanation which these grammarians have given of the tense *I have written*, appears to me perfectly correct, and I would add, that, though the interval between the time of action and the time of speaking of it may be considerable; yet, if the mind, in consequence of the effect's being extended to the present time, should conceive no time to have intervened, this tense is uniformly employed.

That the aorist excludes the present instant is equally true: but that it is incapable of being joined, as the latter of these grammarians supposes, to a portion of time, part of which is not yet elapsed, is an assertion by no means correct; for I can say, "I wrote to-day," or "this day," as well as "*I have written.*" "I dined to-day," says Swift, "with Mr. Secretary St. John." "I took some good walks in the park to-day." "I walked purely to-day about the park." "I was this morning with Mr. Secretary about some business." Numberless other examples might be produced in which this tense is joined with a portion of time not wholly elapsed.

What then, it may be asked, is the difference between this and the tense, which is termed the preterite definite? I shall endeavour to explain it, though, in doing this, I may be chargeable with repetition.

When an action is done in a time continuous to the present instant, we employ the auxiliary verb. Thus on finishing a letter I say, "I have written my letter," *I possess (now) the finished action of writing a letter.*

Again. When an action is done in a space of time which the mind assumes as present, or when we express our immediate possession of things done in that space, we use the auxiliary verb. "I have this week written several letters." "*I have now the perfection of writing several letters, finished this week* *."

* These phraseologies, as the author last quoted justly observes,

Again : When an action has been done long ago, but the mind is still in possession of its consequences, these having been extended to the present time, unconscious, or regardless of the interval between the time of acting, and the time of speaking, we use the auxiliary verb. Thus, " I, like others, have, in my youth, trifled with my health, and old age now prematurely assails me." In all these cases, there is a clear reference to present time. *I have* must imply present possession, and that the action either as finished or proceeding is present to the speaker. This must be admitted, unless we suppose, that the term *have* has no appropriate or determinate meaning.

On the other hand, the aorist excludes all idea of the present instant. It supposes an interval to have elapsed between the time of the action, and the time of speaking of it ; the action is represented as leaving nothing behind it, which the mind conceives to have any relation to its present circumstances, as, " three days ago I lodged in the Strand."

But, though it unquestionably excludes the present instant, or the moment of speaking, which the verb *have* embraces, yet it does not exclude that portion of present time, which is represented as passing. All that is necessary to the use of this tense is, that the present *now* be excluded, that an interval have elapsed

are harsh to the ear, and appear exceedingly awkward ; but a little attention will suffice to show, that they correctly exhibit the ideas implied by the tense, which we have at present under consideration.

between the time of action, and the time of speaking of it, and that these times shall not appear to be continuous. When Swift says, "it has snowed terribly all night, and is vengeance cold," it is to be observed, that though the former of these events took place in a time making no part of the day then passing, yet its effects extended to that day; he therefore employs the auxiliary verb. When he says, "I have been dining to-day at Lord Mountjoy's, and am come home to study," he, in like manner, connects the two circumstances as continuous.

But, when he says, "it snowed all this morning, and was some inches thick in three or four hours," it is to be observed that, contrary to the opinion of the author * I have quoted, he joins the aorist with a portion of time then conceived as present or passing, but the circumstances, which had taken place, were nowise connected with the time of his writing, or conceived as continuous to the date of his letter. If he had said, "it *has* snowed all this morning, and is now two inches thick," the two times would have appeared as continuous, their events being connected as cause and effect.

I wrote I was writing I had written.

The first of these, as a tense, has been already explained; it remains, therefore, to inquire, whether it be definite or indefinite, in respect to action.

* See Encyc. Brit. Art. Grammar.

I observe then, that a tense may frequently, by inference, denote the perfection of an action, and thus appear to be definite ; though, in its real import, it be significant neither of completion nor imperfection, and therefore, in regard to action, is indefinite. This seems to be the character of the tenses, *I write*, *I wrote*, *I shall write*.

“ Mr. Harris,” says Browne, “ truly calls *I wrote* and *I write* indefinites, although the man *who wrote*, *has written*, that is, the action is perfected, and the man *who writes*, *is writing*, that is, the action is imperfect ; but the perfection and imperfection, though it be implied, not being expressed, not being brought into view (to do which the auxiliary verb is necessary), nor intended to be so, such tenses are properly called indefinites.”

Though I am persuaded that Harris and Browne, though they concur in designing certain tenses indefinite, are in principle by no means agreed, yet the observations of the latter, when he confines the terms to action, appear to me incontrovertible. I would only remark, that it is not the presence of the auxiliary, as Browne conceives, which is necessary to denote the completion of the action, but the introduction of the perfect participle. Nay, I am persuaded, that, as it is the participle in *ing*, and this only, which denotes the progression or continuation of the action, this circumstance in every other phraseology being inferred, not expressed, so I am equally convinced, that it is the perfect participle only, which

denotes the completion of the action ; and that, if any tense, not compounded of this participle, express the same idea, it is by inference, and not directly. According to this view of the matter, a clear and simple analogy subsists among the tenses ; thus,

<i>First class.</i>	<i>Second.</i>	<i>Third.</i>
I write	I am writing	I have written
I wrote	I was writing	I had written
I shall write	I shall be writing	I shall have written.

Now, if the progression or the perfection of an action, as present, past, or future, be all the possible variations, and if these be expressed by the second and third classes, it follows that, if there be any precise distinction between these and the first class, or unless the latter be wholly supernumerary, it differs in this from the second and third, that while *they* express, either that the action is progressive, or that it is complete, the first has no reference to its perfection or imperfection.

I was writing.

This tense, like *I wrote*, is, in point of time, indefinite ; but, in respect to action, it is definite. It denotes that an action was proceeding in a time past, which time must be defined by some circumstance expressed or understood.

I had written.

This, as a tense, derives its character from the preterite of the verb *to have*, implying past posses-

sion. *Had* being an aorist, this tense, in regard to time, must therefore be indefinite. In respect to action it is definite, implying, that the action was finished. As the aorist expresses time past, and by inference the perfection of the action, while the latter circumstance is additionally denoted by the participle, this compound tense is employed to denote, that an action was perfected before another action or event, now also past, took place.

The character of the remaining tenses seems to require no farther explanation. I proceed therefore to consider how we express interrogations, commands, necessity, power, liberty, will, and some other accessory circumstances.

An interrogation is expressed by placing the nominative after the concordant person of the tense; thus, "Thou comest" is an affirmation; "Comest thou?" is an interrogation. If the tense be compound, the nominative is placed after the auxiliary, as, "Dost thou come?" "Hast thou heard?"

A command, exhortation, or entreaty, is expressed by placing the pronoun of the second person after the simple form of the verb; as,

Write thou

Write ye

or

or

Do thou write

Do ye write:

and sometimes by the verb simply, the person being understood; as, *write, run, be, let* *. By the help

* I consider that no language, grammatically examined, has

of the word *let*, which is equivalent to “permit thou,” or “permit ye,” we express the persons of the Latin and Greek imperatives; thus, *let me, let us, let him, let them, write.*

more cases, tenses, or moods, than are formed by inflexion. But, if any person be inclined to call these forms of expression by the name of imperative mood, I have no objection. Only let him be consistent, and call “Dost thou love?” an interrogative mood, adopting also the precative, the requisitive, the optative, the hortative, &c. together with the various cases in nouns, and tenses in verbs, which are formed by prepositions and auxiliary verbs; I should only apprehend, that language would fail him to assign them names.

If it should be asked, “agreeably to your doctrine of the verb, as implying affirmation, what part of speech would you make the verbs in the following sentences, *Depart instantly, improve your time, forgive us our sins?* Will it be said that the verbs in these phrases are assertions?” I should answer that all moods, metaphysically considered, are, in my apprehension, equally indicative. Every possible form of speech can do nothing, but express the sentiment of the speaker, his desire, his wish, his sensation, his perception, his belief, &c. Whatever form, therefore, the expression may assume, it must be resolvable into assertion; and must be considered as expressing, in the person of the speaker, what he desires, wishes, feels, thinks, and so forth. No one surely will deny, that “thou oughtest not to kill,” “thou shalt not kill,” “thou art forbidden to kill,” are affirmations. And are not these expressions so nearly equivalent to “do not kill,” that in Greek and Latin they are rendered indifferently either by *ου φονευσεις*, or *μη φονευε*; *non occides*, or *ne occidito*? If then we say, “kill thou,” will it be contended that, though the prohibition implies an affirmation of the speaker, the command does not? The expression I conceive to be strictly equivalent to “thou shalt kill,” “thou art ordered to kill.” Hence *ave* and *jubeo te avere*, are deemed expressions of the same import. If the question be examined grammatically, or as a subject of pure grammar, I am inclined to think that where there is no variety of termination, there cannot be established a diversity of mood.

Present necessity is denoted by the verb *must*, thus,

I must	Thou must	He must	} write *.
We must	Ye must	They must	

This verb having only one tense, namely, the present, *past necessity* is expressed by the preterite definite of the verb, significant of the thing necessary, as,

I must have	Thou must have, &c.	} written.
We must have	Ye must have, &c.	

Present Liberty.

I may	Thou mayest	He may	} write.
We may	Ye may	They may	

Past Liberty.

I might	Thou mightest	He might	} write.
We might	Ye might	They might	

Or,

I might have	Thou mightest have, &c.	} written.
We might have	Ye might have, &c.	

Present Ability.

I can	Thou canst	He can	} write.
We can	Ye can	They can	

Past Ability.

I could	Thou couldst	He could	} write.
We could	Ye could	They could	

* This verb is derived from the Saxon verb *Ic most*, *ego debeo*.

Or,

I could have	Thou couldst have, &c.	} written.
We could have	Ye could have, &c.	

Could, the preterite of the verb *can*, expressing past power or ability, is, like the tense *might* of the verb *may*, frequently employed to denote present time. Of their denoting past time the following may serve as examples.

“Can you construe Lycophron now? No; but once I could.”

“May you speak your sentiments freely? No; but once I might.”

That they likewise denote present time, I have already adduced sufficient evidence. *Might* and *could*, being frequently used in conjunction with other verbs, to express present time, past liberty and ability are generally denoted by the latter phraseology; thus, “I might have written,” “I could have written.” Some farther observations respecting the nature of these tenses I purpose to make, when I come to consider what has been termed the subjunctive or conjunctive mood.

Present Duty or Obligation.

I ought	Thou oughtest	He ought	} to write.
We ought	Ye ought	They ought	

Past Duty.

I ought	Thou oughtest	He ought	} to have
We ought	Ye ought	They ought	

The same is expressed by the verb *should*. *Ought* being now always considered as a present tense, past duty is expressed by taking the preterite definite of the following verb.

Having shown how most of the common accessory circumstances are signified in our language, I proceed to explain how we express the circumstance of suffering, or being acted upon.

The manner of denoting this in English is simple and easy. All that is necessary is to join the verb *to be* with the present participle, if the state of suffering be imperfect or proceeding; and with the perfect participle, if it be complete; thus,

I am	Thou art	He is	} written.
We are	Ye are	They are	

Preterite.

I was	Thou wast	He was	} written.
We were	Ye were	They were	

I have been	I had been	I shall be	} written.
I may be	I might be	I could be	

If the state be imperfect, the participle in *ing* must be substituted; thus,

The house is building	} Progressive.
The house was building	
The house shall be building	

The house is built	} Perfect.
The house was built	
The house shall be built	

Neuter verbs, expressing neither action nor passion, admit, without altering their signification, either phraseology; thus, *I have arisen*, or *I am arisen*; *I was come*, or *I had come*.

I conclude this part of the subject with a few observations concerning the subjunctive or potential mood.

Various disputes have arisen respecting the existence and the use of this mood; nor is there, perhaps, any other point in grammar, on which respectable authorities are so much divided.

That there is not in English, as in Latin, a potential mood properly so called, appears to me unquestionable. *Amarem* signifies ability or liberty *, involving the verbs *possum* and *licet*, and may therefore be termed a potential mood; but in English these accessory circumstances are denoted by the preterites of the verbs *may* and *can*; as, *I might* or *could love*.

That there is no subjunctive mood we have, I conceive, equal authority to assert. If I say in Latin, *cum cepisset*, “when he had taken,” the verb is

* It belongs not to my province to inquire, how *amarem* came to signify *I might* or *could love*, or whether it be strictly in the potential or the subjunctive mood. I here take it for granted that *amarem* does, without an ellipsis, signify, *I might, could, would, or should love*, implying *licet, possum, volo, debeo*.—See *Johnson's Comment*.

strictly in the subjunctive mode; for, were not the verb subjoined to *cum*, it must have taken the indicative form; but I hesitate not to assert, that no example can be produced in English, where the indicative form is altered *merely* because the verb is preceded by some conjunctive particle. If we say, "though he were rich, he would not despise the poor," *was* is not here turned into *were* because subjoined to *though*; for *though* is joined to the indicative mood, when the sentiment requires it; the verb therefore is not in the subjunctive mood.

In respect to what has been denominated the conditional form of the verb, I observe, that the existence of this form appears to me highly questionable. My reasons are these.

1st, Several of our grammarians have not mentioned it; among these are the celebrated Dr. Wallis, and the author of the British Grammar.

2dly, Those, who admit it, are not agreed concerning its extent. Lowth and Johnson confine it to the present tense, while Priestley extends it to the preterite.

3dly, The example, which Priestley adduces of the conditional preterite, *if thou drew*, with a few others, which might be mentioned, are acknowledged by himself to be so stiff and so harsh, that I am inclined to regard them rather as anomalies, than as constituting an authority for a general rule.

4thly, If then this form be, agreeably to the opinions of Lowth and Johnson, confined to the present

tense, I must say that I have not been able to find a single example, in which the present conditional; as it is termed, is any thing but an ellipsis of the auxiliary verb.

5thly, Those who admit this mood, make it nothing but the plural number of the correspondent indicative tense without variation; as, *I love, thou love, he love, &c.* Now as this is, in fact, the radical form of the verb, or what may be deemed the infinitive, as following an auxiliary, it forms a presumption, that it is truly an infinitive mood, the auxiliary being suppressed.

The opinion here given will, I think, be confirmed by the following examples.

“If he say so, it is well,” *i. e.* “if he shall say so.”

“Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him,” (*Bible*) *i. e.* “though he should slay.”

“Though thou detain me, I will not eat,” (*Ibid.*) *i. e.* “shouldst detain me.”

“If thy brother trespass against thee,” (*Ibid.*) *i. e.* “should trespass.”

“Though he fall, he shall not utterly be cast down,” (*Ibid.*) *i. e.* “though he should fall.”

“Remember, that thou keep holy the sabbath day,” (*Ibid.*) *i. e.* “thou shouldst keep.”

There are a few examples in the use of the auxiliaries *do* and *have*, in which, when the ellipsis is supplied, the expression appears somewhat uncouth; but I am persuaded, that a little attention will show, that these examples form no exception to this theory.

“If now thou do prosper my way.”—*Bible*. It is here obvious, that the event supposed was future; the appropriate term, therefore, to express that idea, is either *shall* or *will*. If the phrase were, “if thou prosper my way,” it would be universally admitted that the auxiliary is suppressed thus, “if thou shalt or wilt prosper my way.” Again, when we say, “if thou do it, I shall be displeased,” it is equally evident that the auxiliary is understood thus, “if thou shalt do it.” Now, if these examples be duly considered, and if the import of the verb *to do*, as formerly explained, be remembered, I think it will appear that the expression is elliptical, and truly proceeds thus, “if thou (shalt) do prosper my way.” The same observations are applicable to Shakspeare’s phraseology, when he says, “if thou do pardon, whosoever pray.” Again; when Hamlet says, “if damned custom have not brazed it so,” it is obvious that the auxiliary verb *may* is understood; for, if the expression be cleared of the negative, the insertion of the auxiliary creates no uncouthness; thus, “if damned custom may have brazed it so.”

I am therefore inclined to think, that the conditional form, unless in the verb *to be**, has no existence in our language.

Though this be not strictly the proper place, I would beg the reader’s attention to a few additional observations.

* Why this verb forms an exception, it would be easy to explain.

Many writers of classic eminence express future and contingent events by the present tense indicative. In colloquial language, or where the other form would render the expression stiff and awkward, this practice cannot justly be reprehended. But where this is not the case, the proper form, in which the note of contingency or futurity is either expressed or understood, is certainly preferable. Thus,

“If thou neglectest, or doest unwillingly, what I command thee, I will rack thee with old cramps.”—*Shakspeare*. Better, I think, “if thou shalt neglect or do.”

“If any member absents himself, he shall forfeit a penny for the use of the club.”—*Spectator*. Better, “if any member absent, or shall absent.”

“If the stage becomes a nursery of folly and impertinence, I shall not be afraid to animadvert upon it.”—*Spectator*. Preferably thus, “if the stage become, or shall become.”

I observe also, that there is something peculiar and deserving attention in the use of the preterite tense*. To illustrate the remark, I shall take the following case. A servant calls on me for a book; if I am uncertain whether I have it or not, I answer, “if the book *be* in my library, or if *I have* the book, your master shall be welcome to it:” but, if I am certain that I have not the book, I say, “if the book *were* in my library, or if I had the book, it should be at

* See Webster's Dissertations, p. 263.

your master's service." Here it is obvious, that when we use the present tense, it implies uncertainty of the fact; and when we use the preterite, it implies a negation of its existence. Thus also, a person at night would say to his friend, "if it *rain*, you shall not go," being uncertain at the time whether it did or did not rain; but if, on looking out, he perceived it did not rain, he would then say, "if it *rained*, you should not go," intimating that it did not rain.

"Nay, and the villains march wide between the legs, as if they had gyves on."—*Shakspeare*. Where *as if they had* implies that "they had not."

In the same manner, if I say, "I will go, if I can," my ability is expressed as uncertain, and its dependent event left undetermined. But if I say, "I would go, if I could," my inability is expressly implied, and the dependent event excluded. Thus also, when it is said, "if I may, I will accompany you to the theatre," the liberty is expressed as doubtful; but when it is said, "if I might, I would accompany you," the liberty is represented as not existing.

In thus expressing the negation of the attribute, the conjunction is often omitted, and the order inverted; thus, "if I had the book," or "had I the book." "Were I Alexander," said Parmenio, "I would accept this offer," or "if I were Alexander I would accept." *Were* is frequently used for *would be*, and *had* for *would have*; as, "it *were* injustice to deny the execution of the law to any individual," that is, "it would be injustice." "Many acts, which

had been blameable in a peaceable government, were employed to detect conspiracies ;” where *had* is put for *would have**.—*Hume’s History of England.*

Ambiguity is frequently created by confounding fact with hypothesis, or making no distinction between dubitative and assertive phraseologies. Thus, if we employ such expressions as these, “if thou knewest,” “though he was learned,” not only to express the certainty of a fact, but likewise to denote a mere hypothesis as opposed to fact, we necessarily render the expression ambiguous. It is by thus confounding things totally distinct, that writers have been betrayed not into ambiguity only, but even into palpable errors. In evidence of this, I give the following example: “Though he were divinely inspired, and spoke therefore as the oracles of God, with supreme authority; though he were endowed with supernatural powers, and could, therefore, have confirmed the truth of what he asserted by miracles; yet, in compliance with the way in which human nature and reasonable creatures are usually wrought upon, he reasoned.”—*Atterbury’s Sermons.*

Here the writer expresses the inspiration and the supernatural powers of Jesus, not as properties or virtues which he really did possess, but which, though not possessing them, he might be supposed to possess. Now, as his intention was to ascribe these virtues to

* A similar phraseology in the use of the pluperfect indicative for the same tense subjunctive, obtains in Latin, as,

“Impulerat ferro Argolicas fœdare latebras.”—*Virgil.*

Jesus, as truly belonging to him, he should have employed the indicative form *was*, and not *were*, as in the following sentence: "though he *was* rich, yet for our sakes he became poor." "Though he *were* rich," would imply the non-existence of the attribute, in other words, "that he was *not* rich."

A very little attention would serve to prevent these ambiguities and errors. If the attribute be conceived as unconditionally certain, the indicative form without ellipsis must be employed, as, "I teach," "I had taught," "I shall teach." If futurity, hypothesis, or uncertainty, be intended, with the concessive term, the auxiliary may be either expressed or understood, as perspicuity may require, and the taste and judgment of the writer may dictate; thus, "if any man teach strange doctrines, he shall be severely rebuked."

—*Bible*. In the former clause, the auxiliary verb *shall* is unnecessary, and is therefore, without impropriety, omitted. "Then hear thou in heaven, and forgive the sin of thy servants and of thy people Israel, that thou teach them the good way wherein they should walk."—*Ibid*. In this example the suppression of the auxiliary verb is somewhat unfavourable to perspicuity, and renders the clause stiff and awkward. It would be better, I think, "thou mayest teach them the good way." Harshness indeed, and the appearance of affectation, should be particularly avoided. Where there is no manifest danger of misconception, the use of the assertive for the dubitative form is far preferable to those starched and pedantic

phraseologies which some writers are fond of exhibiting. For this reason, such expressions as the following appear to me highly offensive: "if thou have determined, we must submit," "unless he have consented, the writing will be void," "if this have been the seat of their original formation," "unless thou shall speak, we cannot determine." The last I consider as truly ungrammatical. In such cases, if the dubitative phraseology should appear to be preferable, the stiffness and affectation here reprehended may frequently be prevented by inserting the note of doubt or contingency.

I observe farther, that the substitution of *as* for *if* when the affirmation is unconditional, will often serve to prevent ambiguity*. Thus, when the ant in the fable says to the grasshopper who had trifled away the summer in singing, "if you sung in summer, dance in winter," as the first clause, taken by itself, leaves the meaning somewhat ambiguous, "as you sung" would be the better expression.

* The Latins used *si* in both cases: and though their poets did not attend to this distinction, their prose writers generally observed it, by joining *si* for *quoniam* with the indicative mood.

IRREGULAR VERBS.

THE general rule for the formation of the preterite tense, and the perfect participle, is to add to the present the syllable *ed*, if the verb end with a consonant, or *d*, if it end with a vowel, as,

Turn, Turned, Turned; Love, Loved, Loved.

Verbs, which depart from this rule, are called irregular, of which I believe the subsequent enumeration to be nearly complete *.

<i>Present.</i>	<i>Preterite.</i>	<i>Perfect Participle.</i>
Abide	Abode	Abode
Am	Was	Been
Arise	Arose	Arisen
Awake	Awoke R.	Awaked
Bake	Baked	Baken R
Bear, to bring forth	Bore or Bare	Born †
Bear, to carry	Bore or Bare	Borne
Beat	Beat	Beaten
Begin	Began	Begun
Become	Became	Become

* Where R is added, the verb follows also the general rule.

† Some have excluded *bore* as the preterite of this verb. We have sufficient authority, however, for admitting it; thus,

“By marrying her who bore me.”—DRYDEN.

<i>Present.</i>	<i>Preterite.</i>	<i>Perfect Participle.</i>
Behold	Beheld	Beheld or be- holden *
Bend	Bent R	Bent R
Bereave	Bereft R	Bereft R
Beseech	Besought	Besought
Bid	Bade or Bid	Bidden
Bind	Bound	Bound
Bite	Bit	Bitten, Bit †
Bleed	Bled	Bled
Blow	Blew	Blown
Break	Broke or Brake	Broken ‡
Breed	Bred	Bred
Bring	Brought	Brought
Build	Built R	Built R §
Burst	Burst	Burst
Buy	Bought	Bought
Can	Could	
Cast	Cast	Cast
Catch	Caught R	Caught R
Chide	Chid	Chidden
Choose	Chose	Chosen

* *Beholden* is obsolescent in this sense.

† “So kept the diamond, and the rogue was bit.”—POPE.

“There was lately a young gentleman bit to the bone.”—

TATLER.

‡ *Brake* seems now obsolescent.

§ Though Johnson has not admitted the regular form of the participle in this verb, I think there is sufficient authority for concurring with Lowth in receiving *builded* as the participle as well as *built*, though it be not in such general use.

|| *Chode*, which occurs twice in the Bible, is now obsolete.

<i>Present.</i>	<i>Preterite.</i>	<i>Perfect Participle.</i>
Cleave, to stick or adhere	Clave R	Cleaved
Cleave, to split	Clove, or clave, or cleft	Cloven, or Cleft
Cling	Clung	Clung
Climb	Clomb R *	Climbed
Clothe	Clad R †	Clad R
Come	Came	Come
Cost	Cost	Cost
Crow	Crew R	Crowed
Creep	Crept	Crept
Cut	Cut	Cut
Dare, to venture	Durst R	Dared
Dare, to challenge, is regular		
Deal	Dealt R	Dealt R
Dig	Dug R	Dug R
Do	Did	Done
Draw	Drew	Drawn
Drive	Drove	Driven
Drink	Drank	Drunk
Dwell	Dwelt R	Dwelt R
Eat	Ate	Eaten
Fall	Fell	Fallen
Feed	Fed	Fed
Feel	Felt	Felt

* Lowth has given *clomb* as the preterite of *climb*. I can find, however, no authority later than Spenser, and am inclined to think it is now obsolete.

† The irregular preterite *clad* is obsolescent.

<i>Present.</i>	<i>Preterite.</i>	<i>Perfect. Participle.</i>
Fight	Fought	Fought
Find	Found	Found
Flee	Fled	Fled
Flie	Flew	Flown
Fling	Flung	Flung
Forget	Forgot	Forgotten
Forgo *		Forgone
Forsake	Forsook	Forsaken
Freeze	Froze	Frozen
Freight	Freighted	Freighted or Fraught †
Get	Gat, or Got	Gotten, or Got
Gild	Gild R	Gilt R
Gird	Girt R	Girt R
Give	Gave	Given
Go	Went	Gone
Grave	Graved	Graven R
Grind	Ground	Ground
Grow	Grew	Grown
Have	Had	Had
Hang ‡	Hung R	Hung R

* I know no example in which the preterite, which analogically would be *forwent*, is to be found. It may be here remarked that this verb, in violation of analogy, is generally spelled *forego*, as if it meant “to go before.” This is equally improper as it would be to write *forebid*, *foresake*, *foreswear*, for *forbid*, *forsake*, *for-swear*.

† *Fraught* is more properly an adjective than participle.

‡ This verb, Lowth says, when employed as an active verb, “may, perhaps, most properly be used in the regular form.” Here the learned author appears to me, if he be not chargeable

<i>Present.</i>	<i>Preterite.</i>	<i>Perfect Participle.</i>
Hear	Heard	Heard
Heave	Hove * R	Hoven R
Help	Helped	Holpen † R
Hew	Hewed	Hewn R
Hide	Hid	Hidden ‡, or Hid
Hit	Hit	Hit
Hold	Held	Holden §, or Held
Hurt	Hurt	Hurt
Keep	Kept	Kept
Kneel	Knelt	Knelt
Knit	Knit, or knitted	Knit, or Knitted
Know	Knew	Known
Lade	Laded	Laden

with error, to have expressed his meaning incorrectly ; for it cannot be disputed that the irregular form of this verb is frequently, and with unquestionable propriety, used in an active sense. Thus we say, “ the servant hung the scales in the cellar ;” and passively, “ the scales were hung by the servant.” I should, therefore, rather say that, when this verb denotes suspension, for the purpose of destroying life, the regular form is far preferable. Thus, “ the man was hanged,” not “ hung.”

* The irregular preterite and participle of this verb are employed in sea language ; but the latter rarely.

† Lowth has given *holpen* as the participle ; it is now obsolescent, if not obsolete. It belonged to the verb *to help*, which has been long out of use.

‡ Several grammarians have rejected *hid* as a participle. It rests, however, on unquestionable authority ; but *hidden* is preferable.

§ *Holden*, which was some years ago obsolescent, is now returning into more general use.

|| *Laden*, like *fraught*, may be deemed an adjective.

<i>Present.</i>	<i>Preterite.</i>	<i>Perfect Participle.</i>
Lay	Laid	Laid *
Lead	Led	Led
Leave	Left	Left
Lend	Lent	Lent
Let	Let	Let
Lie, to lie down	Lay	Lien, or Lain †
Lift	Lifted, or Lift	Lifted, or Lift
Light	Lighted, or Lit ‡	Lighted, or Lit
Load	Loaded	Loaden, or Loaded
Lose	Lost	Lost
Make	Made	Made
May	Might	
Mean	Meant R	Meant R
Meet	Met	Met
Mow	Mowed	Mown § R
Must		
Pay	Paid	Paid
Put	Put	Put

* Priestley, I apprehend, has erred in giving *lain* as the participle of this verb.

† *Lien*, though not so generally used as *lain*, is not destitute of unexceptionable authority. I have, therefore, with Johnson and Lowth, given it as the participle. Murray has omitted it.

‡ Some grammarians have rejected *lit*. It can plead, however, colloquial usage in its favour, and even other authority. "I lit my pipe with the paper."—*Addison*.

§ With Priestley and Lowth, I have given this verb a regular participle; for which, I believe, there is sufficient authority, without adducing the example of Shakspeare. Most other grammarians have rejected it.

<i>Present.</i>	<i>Preterite.</i>	<i>Perfect Participle.</i>
Quit	Quit, or Quitted *	Quit
Read	Read	Read
Rend	Rent	Rent
Ride	Rode, or Rid	Rid †, or Ridden
Rid	Rid	Rid
Ring	Rang, or Rung	Rung
Rise	Rose	Risen
Rive	Rived	Riven
Rot	Rotted	Rotten R
Run	Ran	Run
Saw	Sawed	Sawn R
Say	Said	Said
See	Saw	Seen
Seek	Sought	Sought
Seethe	Seethed, or Sod	Sodden
Sell	Sold	Sold
Send	Sent	Sent
Set	Set	Set
Shake	Shook	Shaken ‡

* *Quitted* is far more generally used as the preterite than *quit*.

† Priestley has rejected *rid*, and Murray *ridden*, as the participle, while Johnson makes *rid* the preterite of *ride*. As *rid* is the present and preterite of another verb, it would, perhaps, be better to dismiss it entirely from the verb *to ride*, and conjugate, with Priestley, *ride, rode, ridden*.

‡ Story, in his grammar, has most unwarrantably asserted, that the participle of this verb should be *shaked*. This word is certainly obsolete, and, I apprehend, was never in general use. I have been able to find only one example of *shaked* as the participle, "A sly and constant knave, not to be shaked."—*Shakespeare*. And two as the preterite, "They shaked their heads."—*Psal. cxi. 25*. "I shaked my head."—*Steele, Spectator, No. IV*.

<i>Present.</i>	<i>Preterite.</i>	<i>Perfect Participle.</i>
Shall	Should	
Shape	Shaped	Shapen R
Shave	Shaved	Shaven R
Shear	Shore	Shorn
Shed	Shed	Shed
Shine	Shone R	Shone R
Shew	Shewed	Shewn
Show	Showed	Shown
Shoe	Shod	Shod
Shoot	Shot	Shot
Shrink	Shrank* or Shrunk	Shrunk
Shred	Shred	Shred
Shut	Shut	Shut
Sing	Sang †, or Sung	Sung
Sink	Sank, or Sunk	Sunk
Sit	Sat	Sitten ‡, or Sat

* Of these preterites, the latter is now more generally used. Our translators of the Bible used the former.

† A. Murray has rejected *sung* as the preterite, and L. Murray has rejected *sang*. Each preterite, however, rests on good authority.

The same observation may be made respecting *sank* and *sunk*.

‡ *Sitten*, though formerly in use, is now obsolescent. Laudable attempts, however, have been made to restore it. "To have sitten on the heads of the apostles."—*Middleton*.

"Soon after the termination of this business, the parliament, which had now *sitten* three years, &c."—*Belsham's Hist.*

"And he would gladly, for the sake of dispatch, have called together the same parliament, which had *sitten* under his father." *Hume*, vol. VI. p. 199.

Respecting the preterites which have *a* or *u*, as *slang*, or *slung*, *sank*, or *sunk*, it would be better were the former only to be used, as the preterite and participle would thus be discriminated.

<i>Present.</i>	<i>Preterite.</i>	<i>Perfect Participle.</i>
Slay	Slew	Slain
Sleep	Slept	Slept
Slide	Slid	Slidden
Sling	Slang, or Slung	Slung
Slink	Slank, or Slunk	Slunk
Slit	Slit R	Slit, or Slitted
Smite	Smote	Smitten
Sow	Sowed	Sown R
Speak	Spoke, or Spake	Spoken
Speed	Sped	Sped
Spend	Spent	Spent
Spill	Spilt R	Spilt R
Spin	Spun, or Span	Spun
Spit	Spat, or Spit	Spitten, or Spit
Split	Split, or Splitted	Split, Splitted
Spread	Spread	Spread
Spring	Sprang, or Sprung	Sprung
Stand	Stood	Stood
Steal	Stole	Stolen
Stick	Stuck	Stuck
Sting	Stung	Stung
Stink	Stank, or Stunk	Stunk
Stride	Strode, or Strid	Stridden
Strike	Struck	Struck, or Stricken
String	Strung	Strung
Strive	Strove	Striven
Strew, or Strow	Strewed, or Strowed }	Strown

<i>Present.</i>	<i>Preterite.</i>	<i>Perfect Participle.</i>
Swear	Swore, or Sware	Sworn
Sweat	Sweat	Sweat
Sweep	Swept	Swept
Swell	Swelled	Swelled, or Swollen
Swim	Swam, or Swum	Swum
Swing	Swang	Swung
Take	Took	Taken
Teach	Taught	Taught
Tear	Tore, or Tare	Torn
Tell	Told	Told
Think	Thought	Thought
Thrive	Throve *	Thriven
Throw	Threw	Thrown
Thrust	Thrust	Thrust
Tread	Trod	Trodden
Wax	Waxed	Waxen R
Wash	Washed	Washed †
Wear	Wore	Worn
Weave	Wove	Woven
Weep	Wept	Wept

* Pope has used the regular form of the preterite :

“In the fat age of pleasure, wealth, and ease,
Sprung the rank weed, and thrived with large increase.”

Essay on Crit.

Horsley, with one or two other writers, have employed the regular participle.

† *Washen* seems obsolescent, if not obsolete. The compound *unwashed* occurs in our translation of the Bible.

<i>Present.</i>	<i>Preterite.</i>	<i>Perfect Participle.</i>
Will	Would	
Win	Won	Won
Wind	Wound R *	Wound
Work	Wrought R	Wrought R
Wring	Wrung R	Wrung
Write	Wrote	Written †
Writhe	Writhed	Writhen

DEFECTIVE VERBS.

THESE, as Lowth observes, are generally not only defective but also irregular, and are chiefly auxiliary verbs.

<i>Present.</i>	<i>Preterite.</i>	<i>Perfect Participle.</i>
Must		
May	Might	
Quoth	Quoth	
Can	Could	
Shall	Should	
Wit ‡, or Wot	Wot	

* Pope, and our translators of the Bible, have used *winded* as the preterite. The other form, however, is in far more general use.

† *Wrote*, as the participle, is generally disused, and likewise *writ*. The latter was used as a preterite by Pope, Swift, and other writers of the same period.

‡ *Wit* is now confined to the phrase *to wit*, or *namely*. It is an abbreviation from the Anglo-Saxon verb *witan*, to know.

<i>Present.</i>	<i>Preterite.</i>	<i>Perfect Participle.</i>
Will *	Would	
Wis †	Wist	
Ought ‡		

* This verb, as an auxiliary, is inflexible; thus we say, "he will go," and "*he wills to go.*"

† This verb, which signifies "to think," or "to imagine," is now obsolete.

‡ This verb is now used as significant of present duty. It was originally the preterite, and the perfect participle of the verb *to owe*; and is corruptedly used in Scotland still to express a past debt. "Apprehending the occasion, I will add a continuance to that happy motion, and besides give you some tribute of the love and duty I long have ought you."—*Spelman*.

"This blood, which men by treason sought
That followed, sir, which to myself I ought."—*Dryden*.

It is now used in the present tense only; and, when past duty or obligation is to be signified, we note, as I formerly mentioned, the past time by the preterite tense of the subsequent verb; thus, "I ought to read," "I ought to have read." The classical scholar knows that the reverse takes place in Latin. *Debeo legere, debui legere*. Cicero, however, though very rarely indeed, uses the preterite of the infinitive, after the preterite tense of this verb.

Murray has told us, that *must* and *ought* have both a present and past signification, and, in proof of this, he adduces the following examples:—"I must own, that I am to blame." "He must have been mistaken." "Speaking things, which they ought not." "These ought ye to have done." This is truly a strange, and, I verily believe, a singular opinion. Its inaccuracy is so manifest, that every reader of discernment must intuitively perceive it. The opinion itself, indeed, is not more surprising, than the ground, on which it is maintained by the author. It surely requires but a moderate portion of sagacity to perceive, that the past time, in the second and fourth examples, is not denoted by *must* and *ought*, but by the expressions, "have been," and "have done." In Latin, as I have just observed, *necessity* and *duty* are expressed as either

OF IMPERSONAL VERBS.

THE distinctive character of impersonal verbs has been a subject of endless dispute among grammarians. Some deny their existence in the learned languages, and others as positively assert it. Some define them to be verbs devoid of the two first persons; but this definition is evidently incorrect: for, as Perizonius and Frischlinus observe, this may be a reason for calling them defective, but not for naming them impersonal verbs. Others have defined them to be verbs, to which no certain person, as the subject, can be prefixed. But with the discussion of this question, as it respects the learned languages, the English grammarian has no concern. I proceed, therefore, to observe, that impersonal verbs, as the name imports, are those which do not admit a person as their no-

present, past, or future, the verbs denoting these having the three correspondent tenses; and the object of the necessity or duty is expressed as contemporary, or relatively present. In English, on the contrary, the two verbs *must* and *ought* having only the present tense, we are obliged to note the past time by employing the preterite tense of the subsequent verb. Thus, *Me ire oportet*, "I ought to go," "I must go." *Me ire oportuit*, "I ought to have gone," "I must have gone." As well may it be affirmed, that the past time is denoted by *ire* and not *oportuit*, as that it is signified by *must* and not by "have gone."

In the time of Wallis, the term *must*, as a preterite tense, was almost obsolete. "*Aliquando*," he remarks, "*sed rarius in præterito dicitur*." And when it was employed as a preterite, it was followed by the present tense. This verb in German has, I understand, a preterite tense.

minative. Their real character seems to be, that they assert the existence of some action or state, but refer it to no particular subject. In English we have very few impersonal verbs. To this denomination, however, may certainly be referred, *it behoveth, it irketh*, equivalent to, *it is the duty, it is painfully wearisome*. That the former of these verbs was once used personally, we have sufficient evidence; and it is not improbable that the latter also was so employed, though I have not been able to find an example of its junction with a person. They are now invariably used as impersonal verbs. We cannot say, *I behove, thou behovest, he behoves; we irk, ye irk, they irk*.

There are one or two others, which have been considered as impersonal verbs, in which the personal pronoun in the objective case is prefixed to the third person singular of the verb, as, *methinks, methought, meseems, meseemed*; analogous to the Latin expressions *me pœnitet, me penituit*. *You thinketh, him liketh, him seemeth*, have long been entirely obsolete. *Meseems* and *meseemed* occur in Sidney, Spenser, and other contemporary writers; but are now universally disused. Addison sometimes says *methoughts*, contrary, I conceive, to all analogy.

CHAPTER VII.

OF ADVERBS.

AN adverb is that part of speech, which is joined to a verb, adjective, or other adverb, to express some circumstance, quality, degree, or manner of its signification; and hence adverbs have been termed attributives of the second order.

“As the attributives hitherto mentioned,” says Mr. Harris, “viz. adjective and verb, denote the attributes of substances, so there is an inferior class of them, which denote the attributes only of attributes. If I say, ‘Cicero was eloquent,’ I ascribe to him the attribute of eloquence simply and absolutely; if I say, ‘he was exceedingly eloquent,’ I affirm an eminent degree of eloquence, the adverb *exceedingly* denoting that degree. If I say, ‘he died, fighting *bravely* for his country,’ the word *bravely* here added to the verb denotes the manner of the action.” An adverb is, therefore, a word joined to a verb, or any attributive, to denote some modification, degree, or circumstance, of the expressed attribute.

Adverbs have been divided into a variety of classes, according to their signification. Some of those which denote

Quality, simply are, Well, ill, bravely, prudently, softly, with innumerable others formed from adjectives and participles.

Certainty or *Affirmation* } Verily, truly, undoubtedly, yea, yes, certainly.

Contingence Perhaps, peradventure, perchance.

Negation Nay, no, not, nowise.

Explaining Namely.

Separation Apart, separately, asunder.

Conjunction Together, generally, universally.

Indication Lo.

Interrogation Why, wherefore, when, how.

Excess or *Pre-eminence* } Very, exceedingly, too, more, better, worse, best, worst.

Defect Almost, nearly, less, least.

Preference Rather, chiefly, especially.

Likeness or *Equality* } So, thus, as, equally.

Unlikeness or *Inequality* } Else, otherwise.

Abatement or *Gradation* } Piecemeal, scarcely, hardly.

To or *in a place* Here, there, where.

To a place, only, Hither, thither, whither.

Towards a place Hitherward, thitherward, whitherward.

From a place Hence, thence, whence.

Time present Now, to-day.

past } Yesterday, before, heretofore, already, hitherto, lately.

<i>future</i>	{ To-morrow, hereafter, presently, immediately, afterwards.
<i>Repetition of times indef.</i>	{ Often, seldom, frequently.
<i>Definitely</i>	Once, twice, thrice, again.
<i>Order</i>	First *, secondly, thirdly, &c.
<i>Quantity</i>	Much, little, enough, sufficiently.

On inquiring into the meaning and etymology of adverbs, it will appear, that most of them are abbreviations or contractions for two or more words. Thus, *bravely*, or “in a brave manner,” is probably derived by abbreviation from *brave-like*, *wisely* from *wise-like*, *happily* from *happy-like* †. Mr. Tooke, indeed, has

* *Firstly* is used by some writers.

† Denominativa terminantur in *lic* vel *lice*, ut *peplie*, *virilis*, *ælic* *legitimus*, *joelic* *marinus* *pyplie* *muliebris*, &c. Hanc terminationem hodie mutavimus in *like* vel *ly* ut in *godlike* vel *godly*. Hickeysii Thes.

The correctness of this explanation has been controverted by Mr. Gilchrist, who contends that, though it may answer in some cases, it will fail “in nine times out of ten.” In the expressions “weekly wages,” “daily labour,” “yearly income,” he observes, that the meaning cannot be, “wages like a week,” “labour like a day,” “income like a year.” He rejects, therefore, this explanation, and considers the termination *lic* to be the same with *lig* in the Latin verb *ligo*, “to tie,” or “join,” and to have the same effect as other conjunctive particles, as, “a friendly part,” “a friend’s part,” “yearly produce,” “year’s produce.” Though a copious induction of examples justifies us in refusing our assent to Mr. Gilchrist’s exaggerated statement, that the derivation proposed by Hickes will fail in nine cases out of ten, we candidly acknowledge; that in many instances it is inadmissible; and that Mr. Gilchrist’s suggestion is ingenious, though it will be found, we apprehend, opposed by the same objection, as he urges against

proved, as I conceive, incontrovertibly, that most of them are either corruptions of other words, or abbreviations of phrases or of sentences. One thing is certain, that the adverb is not an indispensable part of speech, as it serves merely to express in one word what perhaps would otherwise require two or more words. Thus,

Where*	denotes	In what place
Here		In this place
There		In that place
Whither		To what place
Hither		To this place
Thither		To that place.

Hickes's explanation. Nor does it appear to us, that Mr. Gilchrist's argument subverts the doctrine generally received. The termination may have been originally what Hickes supposed, and the principle of analogy may, in time, have introduced similar compositions, when this meaning of the termination ceased to be regarded. Thus the term *candidly*, which we have just now used, was probably introduced, in conformity to *analogy*, with no reference whatever to the meaning of the termination. It may be here also observed, that the import of this term seems inexplicable, on the hypothesis that *ly* is a mere term of conjunction.

* These three adverbs, denoting motion or rest in a place, are frequently employed by us, in imitation of the French, to denote motion to a place, in the same sense with the three following adverbs. It would be better, however, were the distinction observed. The French use *ici* for *here* and *hither*, *là* for *there* and *thither*, *où* for *where* and *whither*.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF PREPOSITIONS.

A PREPOSITION has been defined to be "that part of speech which shows the relation that one thing bears to another." According to Mr. Harris, it is a part of speech, devoid itself of signification, but so formed, as to unite words that are significant, and that refuse to unite or associate of themselves. He has, therefore, compared them to pegs or pins, which serve to unite those parts of the building, which would not, by their own nature, incorporate or coalesce. When one considers the formidable objections, which present themselves to this theory, and that the ingenious author now quoted has, in defence of it, involved himself in palpable contradictions, it becomes matter of surprise, that it should have so long received from grammarians an almost universal and implicit assent. This furnishes one of many examples, how easily error may be imposed and propagated by the authority of a great name. But, though error may be repeatedly transmitted from age to age, unsuspected and unquestioned, it cannot be perpetuated. Mr. Horne Tooke has assailed this theory by irresistible arguments, and demonstrated, that in our language at least, prepositions are significant of ideas, and that, as

far as import is concerned, they do not form a distinct species of words.

It is not, indeed, easy to imagine, that men, in the formation of any language, would invent words insignificant, and to which, singly, they attached no determinate idea ; especially when it is considered, that, in every stage of their existence, from rudeness to civilization, new words would perpetually be wanting to express new ideas. It is not, therefore, probable that, while they were under the necessity of framing new words, to answer the exigences of mental enlargement, and, while these demands on their invention were incessantly recurring, they would, in addition to this, encumber themselves with the idle and unnecessary task of forming new words to express nothing.

But, in truth, Harris himself yields the point, when he says, that prepositions, when compounded, transfuse something of their meaning into the compound ; for they cannot transfuse what they do not contain, nor impart what they do not possess. They must, therefore, be themselves significant words.

But it is not so much their meaning, with which the grammarian is concerned, as their syntactical character, their capacity of affecting other words, or being affected by them. In both these lights, however, I purpose to consider them.

The name of preposition has been assigned to them, because they generally precede their regimen, or the word which they govern. What number of

these words ancient and modern languages contain, has been much disputed; some grammarians determining a greater and some a less number. This, indeed, of itself affords a conclusive proof, that the character of these words has not been clearly understood; for, in the other parts of speech, noun, adjective, and verb, the discriminative circumstances are so evident, that no doubt can arise concerning their classification.

That most of our English prepositions have signification *per se*, and form no distinct species of words, Mr. Tooke has produced incontrovertible evidence; nor is it to be doubted, that a perfect acquaintance with the Northern languages would convince us, that all of them are abbreviations, corruptions, or combinations of other words. A few of Mr. Tooke's examples I shall now present to the reader.

Above, from the Anglo-Saxon *ufa*, high; hence *bufan*, *on bufan*, bove, above.

With, from *withan* to join, of which *with* is the imperative; thus, "*a house with a party wall*," "*a house, join a party wall*;" or it is sometimes the imperative of *wyrthan*, "to be;" hence, *by* and *with* are often synonymous, the former being derived from *beon*, "to be."

Without, from the Saxon preposition *withutan*, *extra*, *sine*, which is properly the imperative of the verb *wyrthan-utan*, "to be out." *With-*

utan, beutan, “without,” “be out,” or “but.”

The Saxon preposition occurs frequently in the writings of Chaucer, and is still used in Scottish poetry *.

From †, is simply the Anglo-Saxon and Gothic noun *frum*, “beginning,” “source,” “origin;” thus, “Figs came *from* Turkey;” that is, Figs came; “the source” or “beginning,” Turkey, to which is opposed the word

To, the same originally as *do*, signifying finishing or completion; thus, “Figs came *from* Turkey *to* England;” “the beginning,” or “source,” Turkey; “the finishing,” or “end,” England.

* For blithesome Sir John Barleycorn
Had sae allur'd them i' the morn,
That, what wi' drams, and mony a horn,
And reaming bicker,
The ferly is, *withouten* scorn,
They wauk'd sae sicker.

Mayne's Siller Gun.

This animated little poem will be read with no common pleasure by every admirer of the Scottish muse. In felicity of description the author is not inferior to Burns, while in delicacy of humour he may claim the superiority.

This preposition is supposed by Mr. Gilchrist to be derived from *forth*, or rather to be a different form of that word. See his “Philosophic Etymology,” a work exhibiting considerable ingenuity and philological knowledge, combined with many fanciful and unphilosophical opinions.

† It is possible that the Greek *απο*, and the Latin *ab* derived from it, had their origin in *אב* *pater, principium*, “author,” or “principle of existence.”

Beneath, is the imperative *be*, compounded with the noun *neath*, of the same import with *neden* in Dutch, *ned* in Danish, *niedere* in German, and *nedre* or *neder* in Swedish, signifying the lower place; hence the astronomical term *Nadir* opposed to *Zenith*. Hence also *nether* and *nethermost*.

Between, “be twain,” “be two,” or “be separated*.”

Before,

Behind,

Beside,

Below,

} Imperative *be*, and the nouns *fore*,
hind, *side*, *low*.

Under, i. e. *on neder*.

Beyond, imperative *be*, and the participle past *goned* of the verb *gan*, “to go;” as, “beyond the place,” i. e. “be passed the place.”

Among, from *gemong*, the preterperfect of the verb *mengan*, to mix, used as a participle, and signifying “mixed.”

Many other examples might be produced from Tooke’s ingenious illustration of his theory; but those, which I have now offered, suffice to prove, that our prepositions, so far from being words insignificant, belong to the class of nouns or verbs either single or compounded.

Besides, if prepositions denote relations, as Harris admits, it is surely absurd to suppose, that they have no meaning; for the relation, whether of propinquity,

* The verb, “to twin,” is still used in Scotland for “to part,” or “separate.”

contiguity, approach, or regress, &c. may be expressed, and apprehended by the mind, though the objects between which the relation subsists be not specified. If I hear the word *with*, I naturally conceive the idea of conjunction; the reverse takes place when I hear *without*. If it be said *a soldier with*, I have the idea of a soldier associated with something else, which association is denoted by *with*. What is conjoined to him I know not, till the object be specified, as, “a soldier *with* a musquet;” but the mere association was before sufficiently expressed, and clearly apprehended. Again, if a person say, “*he threw a glass under*,” I have instantly an idea of a glass, and of inferiority of place, conceiving a glass removed into a situation lower than something else. To ascertain that *something*, I ask, *under what?* and the answer may be, *under the table*. Now, if *under* had no meaning, this question would be insignificant, or rather impossible.

From the examples given, I trust, the young reader sufficiently understands the difference between the doctrine of Harris on this subject, and that of Horne Tooke; nay, I think, he must perceive, that the former is merely a theory, while the latter is supported by reason and fact. The syntax of our prepositions will be afterwards explained. I shall only observe at present, that the words, which are in English considered as prepositions, and joined to the objective case, are these :

Above	Into
About	Near }
After	Nigh }
Against	Of
Among }	Off
Amongst }	Over
Amid }	On }
Amidst }	Upon }
Around }	Since
Round }	Through }
At	Throughout }
Between }	Till }
Betwixt }	Until }
Beyond	To }
Before	Unto }
Behind	Toward }
Beneath	Towards }
Below	Under }
Beside	Underneath }
By	Up
Down	With
For	Within
From	Without
In	

Some of these, though they are commonly joined to an objective case, and may therefore be deemed prepositions, are, notwithstanding, of an equivocal character, resembling the Latin adverbs *procul* and

prope, which govern a case by the ellipsis of a preposition. Thus we say, "near the house" and "near *to* the house," "nigh the park" and "nigh *to* the park," "off the table" and "off *from* the table."

Several are used as adverbs, and also as prepositions, no ellipsis being involved, as, *till, until, after, before*.

There are certain particles, which are never found single or uncompounded, and have therefore been termed inseparable prepositions. Those purely English are, *a, be, fore, mis, un*. The import of these, and of a few separable prepositions when prefixed to other words, I proceed to explain.

A, signifies *on* or *in*, as, *a foot, a shore*, that is, *on foot, on shore*. Webster contends, that it was originally the same with *onē*.

Be, signifies *about*, as, *bestir, besprinkle*, that is, *stir about*; also *for* or *before*, as, *bespeak*, that is, *speak for, or before*.

For, denies, or deprives, as, *bid, forbid, seek, forsake*, i. e. *bid, bid not; seek, not seek*.

Fore, signifies *before*, as, *see, foresee*, that is, *see beforehand*.

Mis, denotes defect or error, as, *take, mistake, o take wrongly; deed, misdeed*, that is, *a wrong or evil deed*.

Over, denotes eminence or superiority, as, *come, overcome*; also excess, as, *hasty, over hasty, or too hasty*.

Out, signifies excess or superiority, as, *do*, *outdo*, *run*, *outrun*, that is, “to surpass in running.”

Un, before an adjective, denotes negation, or privation, as, *worthy*, *unworthy*, or “not worthy.” Before verbs it denotes the undoing or the destroying of the energy or act, expressed by the verb, as, *say*, *unsay*, that is, “affirm,” retract the “affirmation.”

Up, denotes motion upwards, as, *start*, *upstart*, rest in a higher place, as, *hold*, *uphold*; sometimes subversion, as, *set*, *upset*.

With, signifies *against*, as, *stand*, *withstand*, that is, “stand against, or resist.”

The Latin prepositions used in the composition of English words are these, *ab* or *abs*, *ad*, *ante*, *con*, *circum*, *contra*, *de*, *di*, *dis*, *e* or *ex*, *extra*, *in*, *inter*, *intro*, *ob*, *per*, *post*, *præ*, *pro*, *præter*, *re*, *retro*, *se*, *sub*, *subter*, *super*, *trans*.

A, *ab*, *abs*, signify *from* or *away*, as, *to abstract*, that is, “to draw away.”

Ad, signifies *to* or *at*, as, *to adhere*, that is, “to stick to.”

Ante, means *before*, as, *antecedent*, that is, “going before.”

Circum, round, *about*, as, *circumnavigate*, or “sail round.”

Con, *com*, *co*, *col*, signify *together*, as, *convoke*,

or “call together,” *co-operate*, or “work together,” *colleague*, “joined together.”

Contra, *against*, as, *contradict*, or “speak against.”

De, signifies *down*, as, *deject*, or “throw down.”

Di, *dis*, *asunder*, as, *distract*, or “draw asunder.”

E, *ex*, *out of*, as, *egress*, or “going out,” *eject*, or “throw out,” *exclude*, or “shut out.”

Extra, *beyond*, as *extraordinary*, or “beyond the ordinary or usual course.”

In, before an adjective, like *un*, denotes privation, as, *active*, *inactive*, or “not active;” before a verb, it has its simple meaning.

Inter, *between*, as, *intervene*, or “come between,” interpose, or “put between.”

Intro, *to within*, as, *introduce*, or “lead in.”

Ob, denotes opposition, as, *obstacle*, that is, “something standing in opposition,” “an impediment.”

Per, *through*, or *thoroughly*, as, *perfect*, or “thoroughly done,” to *perforate*, or “to bore through.”

Post, *after*, as, *postscript*, or “written after,” that is, after the letter.

Præ, *before*, as, *prefix*, or “fix before.”

Pro, *forth*, or *forwards*, as, *promote*, or “move forwards.”

Præter, *past*, or *beyond*, as, *preternatural*, or “beyond the course of nature.”

Re, *again*, or *back*, as, *retake*, or “take back.”

Retro, backwards, as, *retrograde*, or “going backwards.”

Se, apart, or *without*, as, *to secrete*, “to put aside,” or “to hide,” *secure*, “without care or apprehension.”

Subter, under, as, *subterfluous*, or “flowing under.”

Super, above, or over, as, *superscribe*, or “write above, or over.”

Trans, over, from one place to another, as, *transport*, that is, “carry over.”

The Greek prepositions and particles compounded with English words are, *a*, *amphi*, *anti*, *hyper*, *hypo*, *meta*, *peri*, *syn*.

A, signifies privation, as, *anonymous*, or “without a name.”

Amphi, both, or the two, as, *amphibious*, “having both lives,” that is, “on land and on water.”

Anti, against, as, *anti-covenant*, *anti-jacobin*, that is, “an opponent of the covenanters,” “an enemy to the jacobins.”

Hyper, over and above, as, *hypercritical*, or “over,” that is, “too critical.”

Hypo, under, implying concealment or disguise, as, *hypocrite*, “one dissembling his real character.”

Meta denotes change or transmutation, as, *to metamorphose*, or “to change the shape.”

Para denotes sometimes propinquity or similarity, and sometimes contrariety. It is equivalent to the Latin terms *juxta* and *præter*, as, “to

paraphrase," παραφραζειν, *juxta alterius orationem loqui*; "to speak the meaning of another." *Paradox*, "beyond," or "contrary to, general opinion," or "common belief."

Peri, round about, as, *periphrasis*, that is, "circumlocution."

Syn, together, as, *synod*, "a meeting," or "coming together," *sympathy*, or "feeling together."

CHAPTER IX

OF CONJUNCTIONS.

A CONJUNCTION has been defined to be “that part of speech which connects words and sentences together.”

Mr. Ruddiman, and several other grammarians, have asserted, that conjunctions never connect words, but sentences. This is evidently a mistake; for if I say, “a man of wisdom and virtue is a perfect character,” it implies not “that a man of wisdom is a perfect character, and a man of virtue a perfect character,” but “a man who combines wisdom and virtue.” The farther discussion of this question, however, I shall at present postpone, as it will form a subject of future inquiry.

Conjunctions have been distributed, according to their significations, into different classes :

<i>Copulative,</i>	And, also, but (but).
<i>Disjunctive,</i>	Either, or.
<i>Concessive,</i>	Though, although, albeit, yet.
<i>Adversative,</i>	But, however.
<i>Exclusive,</i>	Neither, nor.
<i>Causal,</i>	For, that, because, since.

<i>Illative,</i>	Therefore, wherefore, then.
<i>Conditional,</i>	If.
<i>Exceptive,</i>	Unless.

This distribution of the conjunctions I have given, in conformity to general usage, that the reader may be acquainted with the common terms by which conjunctions have been denominated, if these terms should occur to him in the course of reading. In respect to the real import, and genuine character of these words, I decidedly adopt the theory of Mr. Tooke, which considers conjunctions as no distinct species of words, but as belonging to the class of attributives, or as abbreviations for two or more significant words.

Agreeably to his theory, *and* is an abbreviation for *anad*, the imperative of *ananad*, “to add,” or “to accumulate;” as, “two and two make four;” that is, “two, add two, make four.” *Either* is evidently an adjective expressive of “one of two;” thus, “it is either day or night,” that is, “one of the two, day or night.” It is derived from the Saxon *ægther*, equivalent to *uterque*, “each*.”

* That the Saxon word *ægther* signified *each*, is sufficiently evident from a variety of examples; and the adjective *either* has continued to be used in that sense by reputable writers. Lowth, who, I apprehend, did not advert to its primitive signification, condemns the use of it as equivalent to *each*: and notwithstanding its original import, I agree with him in thinking, that it is much better to confine its meaning to “one of two.” The reason will be assigned hereafter.

Or is a contraction for *other*, a Saxon and English adjective equivalent to *alius* or *alter*, and denotes diversity, either of name or of subject. Hence *or* is sometimes a perfect disjunctive, as when it expresses contrariety or opposition of things; and sometimes a subdisjunctive, when it denotes simply a diversity in name. Thus, when we say, "It is either even or odd," *or* is a perfect disjunctive, the two attributives being directly contrary, and admitting no medium. If I say, "Paris or Alexander;" (these being names of the same individual) or if I say, "Gravity or weight," "Logic, or the art of reasoning," *or* in these examples is a subdisjunctive or an explicative, as it serves to define the meaning of the preceding term, or as it expresses the equivalence of two terms. The Latins express the former by *aut*, *vel*, and the latter by *seu* or *sive*. In the following sentence both conjunctions are exemplified, "Give me *either* the black or the white;" *i. e.* "Give me one of the two—the black—other, the white."

To these are opposed *neither*, *nor*, as, "Give me *neither* poverty *nor* riches;" *i. e.* "Give me not one of the two, poverty—nor, *i. e.* not the other, riches."

Though is the same as *thaf*, an imperative from *thafan*, to allow, and is in some parts of the country pronounced *thof*; as, "Though he should speak truth, I would not believe him;" *i. e.* "allow or grant, what? he should speak truth," or "allow his speaking truth, I would not believe him."

But, from *beutan*, the imperative of *beon utan*, to

be out, is the same as *without* or *unless*, there being no difference between these in respect to meaning. Grammarians, however, in conformity to the distinction between *nisi* and *sine*, have called *but* a conjunction, and *without* a preposition. *But*, therefore, being a word signifying exception or exclusion, I have not termed it an "adversative," as most grammarians have, but an "exceptive." In this sense it is synonymous with *præter*, *preterquam*, or *nisi*; thus, "I saw nobody but John," *i. e.* "unless," or "except John."

But, from *bot*, the imperative of *botan*, to *boot* or *superadd*, has a very different meaning. This word was originally written *bot*, and was thus distinguished from *but* *. They are now written alike, which tends to create confusion. The meaning of this word is, "add," or "moreover." This interpretation is confirmed by the probable derivation and meaning of synonymous words in other languages. Thus, the French *mais* (but) is from *majus* or *magis*, "more," or "in addition;" the Italian *ma*, the Spanish *mas*, and the Dutch *maar*, are from the same etymon, signifying "more." And it is not improbable, that *adsit* (be it present, or be it added) by contraction became *ast* and *at*; thus, *adsit*, *adst*, *ast*, *at*. In this sense, *but* is synonymous with *at*, *autem*, *cæterum*, "moreover," or "in addition."

It is justly observed by Mr. Tooke, that *bot* or *but* allays or mitigates a good or a bad precedent, by the

* *Bot* ser that Virgil standis *but* compare.—Gavin Douglass.

addition of something; for *botan* means “to superadd,” “to supply,” “to atone for,” “to compensate,” “to add something more,” “to make amends,” or “make up deficiency.” Thus,

“Once did I lay an ambush for your life,
A trespass, that doth vex my grieved soul,
But (bot) ere I last received the sacrament
I did confess” ————— *Richard II.*

“Add (this) ere I last received.”

When *but* means *be out*, or *without*, it should, says Mr. Tooke, be preceded by a negative; thus, instead of saying, “I saw but John,” which means, “I saw John be out,” we should say, “I saw none but John,” *i. e.* “none, John be out,” or “had John been out,” or “John being excluded.” This, observes the ingenious author, is one of the most faulty ellipses in our language, and could never have obtained, but through the utter ignorance of the meaning of the word *but* (bot).

Yet, from the imperative of *getan*, “to get.”

Still, from *stell* or *steall*, the imperative of *stellan*, *ponere*, “to suppose.”

Horne Tooke observing that these words, like *if* and *an* *, are synonymous, accounts for their equival-

* *An* occurs frequently for *if* in the earliest English writers. Bacon frequently uses it in this sense. “Fortune is to be honoured and respected, *an* it be but for her daughters, Confidence and Reputation.” “And certainly it is the nature of extreme self-lovers, as they will set their house on fire, *an* it were, but to

ence by supposing them to be derived from verbs of the same import. His mode of derivation, however, appears at first hearing to be incorrect, the meaning of the conjunctions having little or no affinity to that of the verbs. Mr. Tooke himself does not seem perfectly satisfied with its truth. Both these conjunctions are synonymous with “notwithstanding,” “nevertheless,” terms, the obvious meaning of which does not accord with verbs denoting “to get,” or “to suppose.” I am inclined, however, to think that Tooke’s conjecture is founded in truth. If I say, “he was learned, yet modest,” it may be expressed, “he was learned, notwithstanding this, or this being granted, even thus, or *be it so (licet ita esset)* he was modest;” where the general incompatibility between learning and modesty is conceived, not expressed, the expression denoting merely the combination of the qualities in the individual mentioned. *Notwithstanding* indirectly marks the repugnance, by signifying that the one quality did not prevent the co-existence of the other; *yet* or *still* supposes the incompatibility to be sufficiently known. This derivation is rendered the more probable, as the word *though* (*thof, grant*) may be substituted to express the same idea, as “*though* (grant) he was learned, he was modest,”

roast their eggs.”—*Bacon’s Essays, Civ. and Mor.* In the folio edition, printed in 1740, it is improperly spelled *and*. *An* for *if* is still retained in our address to royalty, *An’t please your majesty*: and in Scotland is in general use.

which is equivalent to, “he was learned, yet (this granted) he was modest.” Hence many repeat the concessive term, and say, “*though* he was learned, *yet* he was modest.”

Unless. There can be no doubt that this exceptive conjunction is properly *onles*, the imperative of the verb *onlesan*, to dismiss; thus, “you cannot be saved *unless* you believe;” *i. e.* “dismiss your believing, and you cannot be saved,” or “you cannot be saved, your believing being dismissed.”

Lest is contracted for *lesed*, the participle of the same verb, *onlesan* or *lesan*, signifying “dismissed;” as, “Young men should take care to avoid bad company, *lest* their morals be corrupted, and their reputation ruined;” that is, “Young men should take care to avoid bad company, *lest* (this being dismissed, or omitted) their morals be corrupted,” &c.

That is evidently in all cases an adjective, or, as some consider it, a demonstrative pronoun; as, “They say, *that* the king is arrived;” “They say that (thing) the king is arrived.”

Whether is an adjective, denoting “which of two;” thus, “Whether he live or die;” that is, “Which of the two things, he live, or die.”

As is the same with *es*, a German article meaning *it*, *that*, or *which*.

So is *sa* or *so*, a Gothic article of the same import.

Than, which Mr. Tooke does not seem to have noticed, is supposed to be a compound of the defini-

tive *tha*, and the additive termination *en*, thus, *tha en*, *thænne*, *then*, and now spelled *than*.

These few examples will serve to explain Mr. Tooke's theory on this subject; and I am persuaded, that the further we investigate the etymology and real import of conjunctions, the more probable it will appear that they are all nouns or attributives, some belonging to kindred languages, and others compounds or abbreviations in our own. I am persuaded also, that from a general review of this subject, it must be evident that adverbs, prepositions, and conjunctions, form no distinct species of words, and that they are all reducible to the class either of nouns or attributives, if their original character and real import be considered. But, as many of them are derived from obsolete words in our own language, or from words in kindred languages, the radical meanings of which are, therefore, either obscure, or generally unknown; and as the syntactical use of several of them has undergone a change, it can be no impropriety, nay, it is even convenient, to regard them not in their original character, but their present use. When the radical word still remains, the case is different. Thus *except* is by some considered as a preposition; but as the verb *to except* is still in use, *except* may, and indeed should, be considered as the imperative of the verb. But in parsing, to say that the word *unless* is the imperative of the verb *onlesan*, to dismiss, that verb belonging to a different language,

would serve only to perplex and to confound. For this reason, though I perfectly concur with Mr. Tooke as to the proper and original import of these words, I have distributed them under the customary heads of prepositions, adverbs, and conjunctions.

CHAPTER X.

OF INTERJECTIONS.

AN interjection has been defined to be, “that part of speech which denotes some affection or emotion of the mind.” It is clearly not a necessary part of speech; for, as Tooke observes, interjections are not to be found in books of history, philosophy, or religion: they occur in novels only, or dramatic compositions. Some of these are entirely instinctive and mechanical, as, *ha! ha! ha!* sounds common to all men, when agitated with laughter. These physical emissions of sound have no more claim to be called parts of speech than the neighing of a horse, or the lowing of a cow. There are others which seem arbitrary, and are expressive of some emotion, not simply by the articulation, but by the accompanying voice or gesture. Grief, for example, is expressed in English by the word *ah!* or *oh!* in Latin by *oi, ei!* and in Greek by *oi, oi, ai, ai!* Here the sounds are not instinctive, or purely mechanical, as in laughing; but the accompanying tone of voice, which is the same in all men, under the influence of the same emotion, indicates clearly the feeling or passion of the speaker. Others, which have been deemed interjections, are, in truth, verbs or nouns, employed in the rapidity of

thought and expression, and under the influence of strong emotion, to denote, what would otherwise require more words to express; as, *strange!* for *it is strange*; *adieu*, for *I recommend you to God*; *shame*, for *it is shame*; *welcome*, for *you are welcome*.

The words, which have been considered by our English grammarians as interjections, are the following, expressive of

1. *Joy*, as Hey, Io.
2. *Grief*, Ah, alas, alack.
3. *Wonder*, Vah! hah! aha!
4. *Aversion*, Tush, pish, pshaw, foh, fie, pugh.
5. *Laughter*, Ha, ha, ha.
6. *Desire of attention*, Hark, lo, halloo, hem, hip.
7. *Languor*, Heigh ho.
8. *Desire of silence*, Hush, hist, mum.
9. *Deliberation*, Hum.
10. *Exultation*, Huzza.
11. *Pain*, O! ho!
12. *Taking leave*, Adieu.
13. *Greeting*, Welcome.

PART II.

SYNTAX.

SYNTAX is the arrangement of words in sentences or phrases, agreeably to established usage, or to the received rules of concord and government.

Sentences are either simple or complex.

A simple sentence consists of only one member, containing therefore but one subject, and one finite verb, as, "Alexander the Great is said to have wept."

A complex sentence consists of two or more members, as, "Alexander, when he had conquered the world, is said to have wept, because there were not other worlds to subdue."

Complex sentences are divided into members ; and these, if complex, are subdivided into clauses, as, "The ox knoweth his owner | and the ass his master's crib || but Israel doth not know | my people doth not consider." This complex sentence has two members, each of which contains two clauses.

When a member of a complex sentence is simple, it is called indifferently a member, or a clause ; as, "I have called ; but ye have refused." The two

parts, into which this sentence divides itself, are termed each either a member or a clause.

When a complex sentence is so framed, that the meaning is suspended till the whole be finished, it is called a period ; otherwise the sentence is said to be loose. The following sentence is an example of a period : “ If Hannibal had not wintered at Capua, by which circumstance his troops were enervated, but had, on the contrary, after the battle of Cannæ, proceeded to Rome, it is not improbable that the great city would have fallen.”

The criterion of a period is, that you cannot stop before you reach the end of the sentence, otherwise the sentence is incomplete. The following is an example of a loose sentence. “ One party had given their whole attention, during several years, to the project of enriching themselves, and impoverishing the rest of the nation ; and by these and other means of establishing their dominion, under the government, and with the favour of a family, who were foreigners : and therefore might believe, they were established on the throne, by the good-will and strength of this party alone.” In this sentence you may stop at the words *themselves*, *nation*, *dominion*, *government*, or *foreigners* ; and these pauses will severally complete the construction, and conclude perfect sentences. Thus in a period, the dependence of the members is reciprocal ; in a loose sentence, the preceding are not necessarily dependent on the subsequent members ; whereas the following entirely de-

pend on those which are antecedent. The former possesses more strength, and greater majesty; hence it is adapted to the graver subjects of history, philosophy, and religion. The latter is less artificial, and approaches nearer to the style of conversation; hence it is suited to the gayer and more familiar subjects of tales, dialogues, and epistolary correspondence.

Concord is the agreement of one word with another, in case, gender, number, or person; thus, "I love." Here *I* is the pronoun singular of the first person, and the verb is likewise in the first person, and singular number; they agree therefore in number and person.

Government is the power, which one word hath over another in determining its state; thus, "he wounded us." In this sentence, *wounded* is an active transitive verb, and governs the pronoun in the objective case.

CHAPTER I.

OF CONCORD.

RULE I.—A verb agrees with its nominative in number and person, as,

We teach

He learns

where *we* and *teach* are each plural, and of the first person ; *he* and *learns* are each singular, and of the third person.

Note 1.—This rule is violated in such examples as these, “*I likes*,” “*thou loves*,” “*he need*,” “*you was*.” In reference to the last example, the reader should observe, that *you* is plural, whether it relate to only one individual or to more, and ought therefore to be joined with a plural verb. It is no argument to say, that when we address a single person, we should use a verb singular ; for were this plea admissible, we ought to say, “*you wast*,” for *wast* is the second person singular, and not “*you was*,” for *was* is the first or third. Besides, no one says, “*you is*,” or “*you art*,” but “*you are*.”

Note 2.—The nominative to a verb is known by putting the question, Who? or What? to the verb, as, *I read* ; Who reads? Ans. *I*.

Note 3.—The infinitive often supplies the place of a nominative to a verb, thus, “*To excel in every*

laudable pursuit should be the aim of every one." What should be the aim? Ans. "To excel."

Note 4.—*As*, considered now, as a conjunction, but being, in its primitive signification, equivalent to *it*, *that*, or *which*, likewise supplies the place of a nominative, thus, "As far as regards his interest, he will be sufficiently careful not to offend." Some grammarians suppose *it* to be understood.

Note 5.—A verb is frequently construed with a whole clause as its nominative, thus, "His being at enmity with Cæsar was the cause of perpetual discord;" where, *his being at enmity*, the subject of the affirmation, forms the nominative to the verb.

Note 6.—The nominative, when the verb expresses command or entreaty, is often suppressed, as, "speak" for "speak thou," "honour the king" for "honour ye the king."

Note 7.—A noun singular, used for a plural, is joined to a plural verb, as, "Ten *sail* of the line *were* descried at a distance." It has been already observed, that the plural termination is sometimes suppressed, as, "ten thousand," "three brace," "four pair."

Note 8.—Priestley has said, that, when the particle *there* is prefixed to a verb singular, a plural noun may follow, "without a very sensible impropriety." But, if there be an impropriety at all, why should the phraseology be adopted? His example is this, "There necessarily follows from thence these plain and unquestionable consequences." Nothing, we apprehend, can justify this violation of analogy. It should

be, "follow." Would Dr. Priestley have said, "There *is* men who never reason?"

Note 9.—The nominative generally precedes the verb, and is, in some examples, known by nothing but its place. This arrangement, however, is sometimes altered, and the verb placed before the nominative.

1st, Where the sentence is interrogative, as, "Does wealth make men happy?" Here the nominative *wealth* follows the auxiliary: "wealth does" would denote affirmation. "Stands Scotland where it did?" Here also the nominative follows the verb, to denote interrogation*.

2dly, In expressing commands or requests, as, "go thou," "read ye."

3dly, When a supposition is elliptically expressed, the conditional particle *if* being understood, as, "Were I Alexander," said Parmenio, "I would accept the offer," where "were I" is equivalent to "if I were."

4thly, After the introductory word *there*, as, "There was a man sent by God, whose name was John." "There are many who have the wisdom to prefer virtue to every other acquirement." This ar-

* This phraseology has been censured by Buchanan and the author of the *British Grammar*; but, as I apprehend, without the shadow of authority. To ask a question with a principal verb, as, *burns he*, the latter affirms to be a barbarism. To disprove the assertion, I shall only, in addition to the one quoted from *Macbeth*, produce these examples. "Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me?"—*Bible*. "Died he not in bed?"—*Shakspeare*. "Or flies the javelin swifter to its mark?"—*Ib*. "And live there men who slight immortal fame?"—*Pope*.

rangement is preferable to “a man was sent,” “many are,” &c. ; and, as a general rule, I observe, that this collocation is not only proper but requisite, when a sentiment of importance is to be introduced to the hearer’s particular attention.

5thly, When the speaker is under the influence of vehement emotion, or when vivacity and force are to be imparted to the expression, the nominative energetically follows the verb, as, “Great is Diana of the Ephesians.” Alter the arrangement, saying, “Diana of the Ephesians is great,” and you efface the signature of impetuosity, and render the expression frigid and unaffecting. “Blessed is he, that cometh in the name of the Lord.” “He is blessed” would convert, as Campbell judiciously observes, a fervid exclamation into a cold aphorism. “Fallen, fallen is Babylon, that great city.” The energy of the last expression arises partly, I acknowledge, from the *epijouxis* or reduplication*.

6thly, The auxiliary verb is placed before the nominative, when the sentence or member begins with *nor* or *neither*, as, “Nor *did we* doubt that rectitude of conduct would eventually prove itself the best policy.” Thus also is placed the principal verb, as, “Nor left he in the city a soul alive.”

Besides the cases now enumerated, in which the verb should precede the nominative, there are several

* Our translators, as the judicious critic last quoted observes, have totally enervated the strength of the original, which runs thus, *επεσε, επεσε Βαβυλων η πολις η μεγαλη*, and which they have rendered, “Babylon is fallen, is fallen, that great city.”

others not easily reducible to any precise rule. In general, however, it may be remarked, that the place of the nominative depends, in some degree, on its connexion with other parts of the sentence. “Hence appears the impossibility, that this undertaking should be carried on in a monarchy.” *Impossibility* being here in sense closely connected with the following words, this arrangement is preferable to that in the original. Hume says, “Hence the impossibility appears, that this undertaking should be carried on in a monarchy.”

Priestley has said, that nouns, whose form is plural, but signification singular, require a singular verb, as, “Mathematics is a useful study.” This observation, however, is not justified by general usage, reputable writers being in this case much divided. (See p. 26.)

RULE II.—Two or more substantives singular, denoting different things, being equivalent to a plural, take a plural verb: or, when two or more substantives singular are collectively subjects of discourse, they require a plural verb, and plural representatives, as, “Cato and Cicero *were* learned men; and *they* loved *their* country.”

Note 1.—This rule is violated in such examples as this, “I do not think, that leisure of life and tranquillity of mind, which fortune and your own wisdom *has* given you, could be better employed.”—*Swift*.

Note 2.—It was customary with the writers of antiquity, when the substantives were nearly synonymous, to employ a verb singular, as, *mens, ratio et consilium in senibus est*, “understanding, reason, and prudence *is* in old men.” In imitation of these, some English authors have, in similar instances, employed a verb singular. I concur, however, with L. Murray in disapproving this phraseology. For either the terms are synonymous, or they are not. If their equivalence be admitted, all but one are redundant, and there is only one subject of discourse; only one term should therefore be retained, and a verb singular be joined with it. If they be not equivalent, there are as many distinct ideas as there are terms, and a plurality of subjects require a plural verb.

This observation, however, requires some limitation. It occasionally happens that one subject is represented by two names, neither of which singly would express it with sufficient strength. In such cases, the two nouns *may* take a verb singular; and if the noun singular should be in juxtaposition with the verb, the singular number *should be* used; as, “Why is dust and ashes proud?”—*Ecclesiasticus*, chap. 10.

Note 3.—In such expressions as the following, it has been doubted, whether the verb should be in the singular, or in the plural number: “Every officer and soldier claim a superiority in regard to other individuals.”—*De Lolme on the British Constitution*. Here, I conceive, the phraseology is correct. Such an expression as “every officer and soldier claims” might signify one individual under two different desig-

nations. Whether we should say "Every officer, and every soldier, claim," is a point more particularly questioned. We often hear correct speakers say in common conversation, "Every clergyman, and every physician, is by education a gentleman;" and there seems to be more ease, as well as more precision, in this, than in the other mode of expression. It is unquestionably, however, more agreeable to analogy to say "are gentlemen."

Note 4.—It is not necessary, that the subjects of discourse be connected, or associated by conjunctions: it is sufficient, if the terms form a plurality of subjects to a common predicate, whether with or without any connexive word, as, "Honour, justice, religion itself, were derided and blasphemed by these profligate wretches*." In this example the copulative is omitted. "The king, with the lords and commons, constitute an excellent form of government." Here the connexive word is not a conjunction but a preposition; and though *the lords and commons* be properly in the objective case, and *the king* therefore the only nominative to the verb, yet as the three subjects collectively constitute the government, the verb without impropriety is put in the plural number. This phraseology, though not strictly consonant with the rules of concord, frequently obtains both in an-

* The ellipsis of the copulative, in such examples, was termed by the ancients *asyndeton*; and this deviation from the established rules of syntax they referred to a grammatical figure termed *syllipsis indirecta*, or "indirect comprehension of several singulars under one plural," opposed to the *syllipsis directa*, or that expressed by a copulative.

cient and modern languages: in some cases indeed it seems preferable to the syntactical form of expression.

Note 5.—Where comparison is expressed or implied, and not combination, the verb should be singular; thus, “Cæsar, as well as Cicero, *was* remarkable for eloquence.”

“As she laughed out, until her back,
As well as sides, *was* like to crack.”—*Hudibras*.

Note 6.—When the nominatives are of different persons, the first person is preferred to the second, and the second to the third. In other words, *I and you*, *I and he*, are sylleptically the same as *we*; *you and he* the same as *ye*. This observation, however, is scarcely necessary, as the verb plural admits no personal inflexion: it can be useful only in determining what pronoun should be the representative of the terms collectively, as, “he and I shared it between *us*.”

Note 7.—In the learned languages the pronoun of the first person is deemed more worthy than that of the second, and the second than that of the third; and hence arises the syllepsis of persons which obtains in Greek and Latin. But, though we admit the figure in English, we do not precisely adopt the arrangement of the Latins; for though, like them, we place the pronoun of the second person before that of the third, we modestly place the pronoun of the first person after those of the second and third. Thus,

where a Roman would say, *si tu et Tullia valetis, ego et Cicero valemus*, we should say, "If you and Tullia are well, Cicero and I are well."

RULE III.—When of two or more substantives singular, one exclusively is the subject of discourse, a verb singular is required, as, "John, James, or Andrew, intends to accompany you;" that is, one of the three, but not more than one.

Note.—When the predicate is to be applied to the different subjects, though they be disjoined by the conjunction, they may be followed by a plural verb. "Neither you, nor I, are in fault." This is the usual form of expression. If we consider *neither* in its proper character, as a pronoun, we should say, "neither you, nor I, is in fault;" *neither* being the nominative to the verb. The former, however, is the common phraseology, and is analogous to the Latin idiom. "Quando nec gnatus, nec hic, mihi quicquam obtemperant."—*Ter. Hec.* "Id neque ego, neque tu, fecimus."—*Id.* "Num Lælius, aut qui Duxit ab oppressa meritum Carthagine nomen, Ingenio offensi?"—*Hor.*

RULE IV.—Nouns of number, or collective nouns, may have a singular or plural verb, thus,

“ My people *do* not consider,”

“ My people *does* not consider.”

This licence, however, as Priestley observes, is not entirely arbitrary. If the term immediately suggest the idea of number, the verb is preferably made plural; but, if it suggest the idea of a whole or unity, it should be singular. Thus it seems harsh and unnatural to say, “ In France the peasantry *goes* bare-foot, and the middle sort *makes* use of wooden shoes.” It would be better to say, “ the peasantry *go*”—“ the middle sort *make*,” because the idea is that of number. On the contrary, there is something incongruous and unnatural in these expressions, “ The court of Rome *were* not without solicitude—The house of commons *were* of small weight—Stephen’s party *were* entirely broken up.”—*Hume*.

RULE V.—The adjectives *this* and *that* agree with their substantives in number, as,

This man

These men

That woman

Those women

All other adjectives are inflexible, as,

Good man

Good men.

Note 1.—This rule is violated in such expressions as these, which too frequently occur, “ *These* kind of people.” “ *Those* sort of goods.”

Note 2.—The substantive, with which the adjectives

tive is connected, is ascertained by putting the question, who, or what? to the adjective, as, "a ripe apple." What is ripe? Ans. "the apple."

Note 3.—Every adjective has a substantive, either expressed or understood, as, "the just shall live by faith," *i. e.* "the just man," "few were present," *i. e.* "few persons."

Note 4.—The adjective is generally placed immediately before the substantive, as, "a learned man," "a chaste woman."

Exc. 1.—When the adjective is closely connected with some other word, by which its meaning is modified or explained, as, "a man loyal to his prince," where the attributive *loyal* is closely connected with the following words.

Exc. 2.—When the verb *to be* expresses simple affirmation, as, "thou art good;" or when any other verb serves as a mere copula to unite the predicate with its subject, as, "he seems courageous," "it looks strange."

Exc. 3.—For the sake of harmony, as, "Hail! bard divine."

Exc. 4.—When there are more adjectives than one connected with the substantive, as, "a man wise, valiant, and good."

Exc. 5.—Adjectives denoting extent, whether of space or of time, are put after the clause expressing the measure, as, "a wall ten feet high," "a child three years old," "a speech an hour long."

Note 5.—It has been doubted, whether the cardinal should precede or follow the ordinal numeral. Atterbury says, in one of his letters to Pope, “Not but that the four first lines are good.” We conceive the expression to be quite correct, though the other form, namely, “the first four,” be often employed to denote the same conception. There is no contrast intended between these four and any other four, otherwise he should have said, “The first four.”

Note 6.—*Each* is employed to denote two things taken separately, and is therefore used as singular *. *Either* is also singular, and implies only one of two; as, *take either*, that is, “the one or the other, but not both.” *Both* is a plural adjective, and denotes the two collectively.

Note 7.—*Every* is an adjective singular, applied to more than two subjects taken individually, and comprehends them all. It is sometimes joined to a plural noun, when the things are conceived as forming one aggregate, as, *every twelve years*, *i. e.* “every period of twelve years.”

Note 8.—*All* is an adjective either singular or plural, denoting the whole, whether quantity or number, as, “all men are mortal.” “Six days shalt thou labour and do all thy work.”

Note 9.—*Much* is an adjective of quantity, and of the singular number, as, “much fruit.” *Many*

* It is sometimes used for *every*, and applied to more than two.

an adjective of number, and therefore plural, as, "many men." This word, however, is sometimes construed with a noun singular, as,

"Many a poor man's son would have lain still."—*Shakspeare*.

Note 10.—*More*, as the comparative of *much*, is singular, denoting a greater quantity; as the comparative of *many*, it is plural, and signifies a greater number, as, *more fruit*, or "a greater quantity," *more men*, or "a greater number."

Note 11.—*Enough* is an adjective singular, and denotes quantity, as "bread enough;" *enow* denotes number, as, "books enow."

Note 12.—The correlative word to the adjective *such*, is *as* and not *who*. There is an impropriety in saying, with Mr. Addison, "Such, who are lovers of mankind," instead of "Such as," or "Those who."

Note 13.—The superlative degree is followed by *of*, and also the comparative, when selection is implied, as, "Hector was the bravest of the Trojans." "Africanus was the greater of the (two) Scipios." When opposition is signified, the comparative is followed by *than*, as, "Wisdom is better than wealth."

Note 14.—There is an ambiguity in the adjective *no*, against which it is necessary to guard, and which Priestley seems to think that it is impossible to avoid in any language. Thus, if we say, "No laws are better than the English," it may mean either, that the absence of all law is better than the English laws, or that no code of jurisprudence is superior to

the English. If the latter be the meaning intended, the ambiguity is removed by saying, "There are no laws better than the English." If the former is the sentiment to be expressed, we might say, "The absence of all law is preferable to the English system."

Note 15.—Adjectives are sometimes improperly used for adverbs, as *indifferent well*, *extreme bad*, for *indifferently well*, *extremely bad*. An example of this error is also found in the following sentence. "He was interrogated relative to that circumstance." *Relative* is an adjective, and must have a substantive expressed or understood; the question is then, what, or who was relative? The answer, according to the rules of construction, should be *he*. This however is not the meaning. The word ought to be *relatively*.

I am somewhat, however, inclined to think, that our grammarians have been hypercritical, if not chargeable with error, in condemning such expressions as these, *exceeding great*, *exceeding strong*. This phraseology, I apprehend, has been reprobated, partly because not conformable to the Latin idiom, and partly because such expressions as these, *excessive good*, *extreme dear*, *excellent well*, are justly repudiated. Neither of these, however, can be deemed a sufficient reason for condemning this phraseology. For when it is said, "His strength was exceeding great," may not the expression be considered as elliptical, the word *exceeding* being construed as a participle, thus, "his strength was exceeding," or "surpassing great strength," that is, "his strength

exceeded great strength *." So Shakspeare says, "it was passing strange," *i. e.* "it was more than strange," or "it surpassed strange." I admit, at the same time, that *exceedingly strong*, *exceedingly good*, are the preferable phraseologies.

RULE VI.—The article *a* or *an* is joined to nouns of the singular number only, or nouns denoting a plurality of things in one aggregate, as,

A man An army A thousand A few.

* In the vulgar translation of the Bible, this mode of expression frequently occurs, thus,

"I am thy exceeding great reward."

"I will make thee exceeding fruitful."

Wallis's admission of this phraseology proves it to have been good English, when he wrote, or that, in his opinion at least, it was unobjectionable. His translation of *vir summe sapiens*, is, "a man exceeding wise." This, and similar, modes of expression, appear to have been in his time very common, thus,

"Although he was exceeding wealthy."—*Peers*.

"He was moreover extraordinary courteous."—*Ibid*.

"The Athenians were extreme apprehensive of his growing power."—*Tullie*.

And in our version of the Bible we find a few such expressions as the following :

"The house, I am to build, shall be *wonderful great*."

Addison likewise often uses the phrase "exceeding great," and Swift, less pardonably, writes "extreme unwilling," "extreme good."

Note 1.—To distinguish between the use of *a* and *an*, it is usually given as a general rule that *a* be placed before consonants and *h* aspirated, and *an* before vowels and *h* not aspirated, as, *a table, a hat, an oak, an heir*. This rule is defective, for we say, *a youth, a yeoman, a woman, a eunuch*. Sheridan, therefore, in his *Preface to Swift*, has very properly remarked that all words beginning with *u*, when it has the diphthongal sound of *eu*, should be preceded by *a* not *an*. In addition to this it may be observed, that *a* is admitted before the simple sound of *u*, followed by another vowel sound, as, such *a one, a woman*. If the sound of *one* be analysed, we shall find it resolvable into *oo-un* or *won*, as some writers on pronunciation have expressed it, and *woman* into *oo-umman*. I would also add, that *a* is used before the diphthongal sound of *eu*, in whatsoever manner that sound may be noted, as, *a use, a eunuch, a youth*, and uniformly before *y* and *w*.

Note 2.—*A* is employed to express one individual of a species without determining who or which; *the* denotes some particular individual or individuals; thus, “a book” means any book, “the book” some particular book; and when both articles are omitted the whole class is signified, as, “man is born unto trouble,” *i. e.* “all men.” Hobbes errs against this rule when he says, “God Almighty has given reason to *a* man, to be a light unto him.” The article should be suppressed. Pope commits a similar error when he writes,

“ Who breaks a butterfly upon *a* wheel.”

It is not any wheel, that he meant to express, but a known instrument of torture, or “ the wheel.”

The article *a* serves to distinguish between two subjects compared with each other, and two subjects compared with a third. “ He is the author of two works of a different character.” If the writer meant to say that he was the author of two works of a different character from that of one previously mentioned, the expression would be correct. But he intended to signify a dissimilarity between the two productions. He should, therefore, have omitted the article, and said, “ of different character, or of different characters.”

Note 3.—The indefinite article, though generally placed before the adjective, as, “ a good man,” is put after the adjective *such*; and where these words of comparison occur, *as*, *so*, *too*, *how*, its place is between the adjective and substantive, thus, “ such a gift is too small a reward for so great a service.” When the order is inverted, this rule is not observed, as, “ a reward so small,” “ a service so great.” The definite article is likewise placed before the adjective, as, “ the great king.” *All* is the only adjective which precedes the article. “ All the servants,” “ all the money.”

Note 4.—Pronouns and proper names do not admit the definite article, themselves sufficiently determining the subject of discourse; thus we cannot say, *the I*, *the Alexander*. If we employ the definite

article with a proper name, an ellipsis is involved ; thus, if I say, *he commands the Cæsar*, I mean, he commands the ship called “Cæsar.”

Note 5.—The definite article is used to distinguish the explicative from the determinative sense. The omission of the article, when the sense is restricted, creates ambiguity. For this reason the following sentence is faulty ; “All words, which are signs of complex ideas, furnish matter of mistake.”—*Bolingbroke*. Here the clause, “which are signs of complex ideas,” is not explicative, but restrictive ; for all words are not signs of complex ideas. It should, therefore, be “all the,” or “all those words, which are signs of complex ideas, furnish matter of mistake.”

“In all cases of prescription, the universal practice of judges is to direct juries by analogy to the Statute of Limitations, to decide against incorporeal rights, which for many years have been relinquished.”—*Erskine on the Rights of Juries*. This sentence is chargeable at once with ambiguity and error. In the first place, it is doubtful whether a regard to this analogy governs the directions of the judge, or is to rule the decision of the jury. 2dly, By the omission of the definite article, or the word *those* before the antecedent, he has rendered the relative clause explicative, instead of being restrictive. For, as all incorporeal rights are not abolished, he should have said, “against those incorporeal rights.”

There are certain cases, indeed, in which the antecedent clause admits the definite article, though the relative clause be not restrictive, thus,

“Blest are the pure, whose hearts are clean
From the defiling power of sin.”

Here the relative clause is merely explanatory, yet the antecedent admits the article. Thus also, in the following sentence, “my goodness extendeth not to thee, but to the saints, and the excellent ones, in whom is all my delight.” The relative clause is not intended to limit the meaning of the antecedent terms, and yet they admit the definite article. In all examples, therefore, like these, where the explanatory meaning admits the article, it is necessary, for the sake of perspicuity, to mark the determinative sense by the emphatic words *that* or *those*. Thus had the clause been determinative in the latter of these examples, it would have been necessary to say, “those saints, and those excellent ones, in whom is my delight.”

Note 6.—The definite article is likewise used to distinguish between things which are individually different, but have one generic name, and things which are, in truth, one and the same, but are characterized by several qualities. For example, if I should say, “the red and blue vestments were most admired,” it may be doubtful whether I mean that the union of red and blue in the same vestments was

most admired, or that the red and the blue vestments were both more admired than the rest. In strictness of speech, the former is the only proper meaning of the words, though the latter sentiment be often thus expressed. If the latter be intended, we should say, "the red vestments and the blue," or "the red and the blue vestments," where the article is repeated. If I say, "the red and blue vestments," it is obvious that only one subject is expressed, namely, "vestments," characterized by two qualities, "redness" and "blueness," as combined in the subject. Here the subject is one; its qualities are plural. If I say, "the red vestments and the blue," or "the red and the blue vestments," the subjects are plural, expressed, however, by one generic name, *vestments*.

In the same manner, if we say, "the ecclesiastical and secular powers concurred in this measure," the expression is ambiguous, as far as language can render it such. The reader's knowledge, as Dr. Campbell observes, may prevent his mistaking it; but, if such modes of expression be admitted, where the sense is clear, they may inadvertently be imitated in cases, where the meaning would be obscure, if not entirely misunderstood. The error might have been avoided, either by repeating the substantive, or by subjoining the substantive to the first adjective, and prefixing the articles to both adjectives; or by placing the substantives after both adjectives, the article being prefixed in the same manner; thus, "the ecclesiastical powers, and the secular powers," or better "the

ecclesiastical powers, and the secular,” or “the ecclesiastical, and the secular powers.” The repetition of the article shows, that the second adjective is not an additional epithet to the same subject, but belongs to a subject totally different, though expressed by the same generic name. “The lords spiritual and temporal,” is a phraseology objectionable on the same principle, though now so long sanctioned by usage, that we dare hardly question its propriety. The subjects are different, though they have but one generic name. It should therefore be, “the spiritual and the temporal lords.”

On the contrary, when two or more adjectives belong as epithets to one and the same thing, the other arrangement is to be preferred. Thus, “the high and mighty states.” Here both epithets belong to one subject. “The states high and mighty,” would convey the same idea.

Where the article is not used, the place of the substantive ought to show, whether both adjectives belong to the same thing, or to different things having the same generic name. “Like an householder, who bringeth out of his treasure things new and old.” This arrangement is faulty; both epithets cannot belong to the same subject. It should be, “new things and old.”

If both adjectives belong to one and the same subject, the substantive ought either to precede both adjectives, or to follow both, the article being uniformly omitted before the second adjective, whether

prefixed to the substantive before the first, or suppressed. If, on the contrary, they belong to different subjects, with the same name, the substantive ought to follow the first adjective, and may be either repeated after the second, or understood; or it should follow both adjectives, the article being prefixed to each of them.

Note 7.—The omission, or the insertion of the indefinite article, in some instances, nearly reverses the meaning; thus,

“Ah, little think the gay, licentious proud.”—*Thomson*.

Here *little* is equivalent to “not much,” or rather by a common trope it denotes *not at all*. Locke says, “I leave him to reconcile these contradictions, which may be plentifully found in him by any one, who reads with but a little attention.” Here, on the contrary, where the indefinite article is inserted, “a little” means “not none,” or “some.”

In like manner, when it is said, “Strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, and few there be that find it:” *few* is opposed to *many*. Thus also, “*Many* are called, but *few* are chosen.” But when it is said, “Tarry a few days, till thy brother’s fury turn,” *a few* is here equivalent to *some*, not as opposed to *many*, but as opposed to *not none*. If we say, “*few* accompanied the prince,” we seem to diminish the number, and represent it as inconsiderable, as if we said, “not many,” or “fewer than expectation:” if we say, *a few*, we seem to amplify;—we represent the

number as not unworthy of attention, or as equal, at least, if not superior to expectation. In short, if the article be inserted, the clause is equivalent to a double negative, and thus it serves to amplify; if the article be suppressed, the expression has either a diminutive or a negative import.

Note 8.—The indefinite article has, sometimes, the meaning of *every* or *each*; thus, “they cost five shillings a dozen,” that is, “every dozen.”

“What makes all doctrines plain and clear?
About two hundred pounds a year.”—*Hudibras*.

that is, “every year.”

Note 9.—There is a particular use of this article, which merits attention, as ambiguity may thus, in many cases, be avoided. In denoting comparison, when the article is suppressed before the second term, the latter, though it may be an appellative, assumes the character of an attributive, and becomes the predicate of the subject, or first term. If, on the contrary, the second term be prefaced with the article, it continues an appellative, and forms the other subject of comparison. In the former case, the subject, as possessing different qualities in various degrees, is compared with itself; in the latter, it is compared with something else.

Thus, if we say, “he is a better soldier than scholar,” the article is suppressed before the second term, and the expression is equivalent to, “he is more warlike than learned,” or “he possesses the

qualities, which form the soldier, in a greater degree than those, which constitute the scholar." If we say, "he would make a better soldier, than *a* scholar," here the article is prefixed to the second term; this term, therefore, retains the character of an appellative, and forms the second subject of comparison. The meaning accordingly is, "he would make a better soldier, than a scholar would make;" that is, "he has more of the constituent qualities of a soldier, than are to be found in any literary man."

Pope commits a similar error, when, in one of his letters to Atterbury, he says, "You thought me not a worse man, than poet." This strictly means "a worse man than a poet is;" whereas he intended to say, that his moral qualities were not inferior to his poetical genius. He should have said, "a worse man, than poet."

These two phraseologies are frequently confounded, which seldom fails to create ambiguity. Baker erroneously considers them as equivalent, and prefers that, in which the article is omitted before the second substantive. When there are two subjects with one predicate, the article should be inserted; but when there is one subject with two predicates, it should be omitted.

Note 10.—Perspicuity in like manner requires, that, when an additional epithet or description of the same subject is intended, the definite article should not be employed. It is by an attention to this rule, that we clearly distinguish between subject

and predicate. For this reason, the following sentence appears to me faulty: "The apostle James, the son of Zebedee, and the brother of St. John, would be declared the apostle of the Britons."—*Henry's History of Britain*. It should be rather, "and brother of St. John." When a diversity of persons, or a change of subject is intended to be expressed, the definite article is necessarily employed, as, "Cincinnatus the dictator, and the master of horse, marched against the Æqui." The definite article before the latter appellative marks the diversity of subject, and clearly shows that two persons are designed. Were the article omitted, the expression would imply, that the dictator, and the master of horse, were one and the same individual.

RULE VII.—Substantives signifying the same thing agree in case, thus, "I, George the Third, king of Great Britain, defender of the faith." The words *I, George, king, defender*, are all considered as the nominative case. "The chief of the princes, *he* who defied the bravest of the enemy, was assassinated by a dastardly villain:" where the pronoun *he* agrees in case with the preceding term *chief*. This rule, however, may be deemed unnecessary, as all such expressions are elliptical; thus, "the chief of the princes was assassinated," "he was assassinated."

“He was the son of the Rev. Dr. West, perhaps *him* who published Pindar at Oxford.”—*Johnson’s Life of West*. That is, “the son of him.” Were the pronoun in the nominative case, it would refer to the son, and not the father, and thus convey a very different meaning.

Note 1.—As proper names are, by the trope antonomasia, frequently used for appellatives, as when we say, “the Socrates of the present age,” where *Socrates* is equivalent to “the wisest man,” so also appellatives have frequently the meaning and force of attributives. Thus, if we say, “he is a soldier,” it means either that he is by profession a soldier, or that he possesses all the qualities of a military man, whether professionally a soldier or not. According to the former acceptation of the term, it is a mere appellative; agreeably to the latter, it has the force of an attributive.

Note 2.—Two or more substantives in concordance, and forming one complex name, or a name and title, have the plural termination annexed to the last only, as, “*the two miss Louisa Howards, the two miss Thomsons.*” Analogy, Dr. Priestley observes, would plead in favour of another construction, and lead us to say, *the two misses Thomson, the two misses Louisa Howard*; “for, if the ellipsis were supplied, we should say, the two young ladies of the

name of Thomson, and this construction, he adds, he has somewhere met with."

The latter form of expression, it is true, occasionally occurs; but general usage, and, I am rather inclined to think, analogy likewise, decide in favour of the former; for, with a few exceptions, and these not parallel to the examples now given*, we almost uniformly, in complex names, confine the inflexion to the last substantive. Some proofs of this we shall afterwards have an opportunity of offering. I would also observe, in passing, that ellipsis and analogy are different principles, and should be carefully distinguished.

RULE VIII.—One substantive governs another, signifying a different thing, in the genitive, as,

The tyrant's rage. The apostle's feet.

Note 1.—This rule takes place when property, possession, or the general relation, by which one thing appertains to another, is implied.

Note 2.—It may be considered as violated in such examples as these, "Longinus his Treatise on the Sublime."—*Addison*. "Christ his sake."—*Common Prayer*.

* We say, indeed, "Messrs. Thomson;" but we seldom or never say, "the two Messrs. Thomson," but "the two Mr. Thomsons."

Note 3.—Substantives govern not only nouns, but likewise pronouns, as, “its strength,” “his reward.”

Note 4.—This case is generally resolvable into the objective with the preposition *of*, as, “the king’s sceptre,” or “the sceptre of the king;” “his head,” or, “the head of him.” I have said *generally*, for it is not *always* thus resolvable. For example, the Christian sabbath is sometimes named “the Lord’s day,” but “the day of the Lord” conveys a different idea, and denotes “the day of judgment.”

Note 5.—The latter, or governing substantive, is frequently understood, as, “the king will come to St. James’s to-morrow,” that is, “St. James’s palace.” “I found him at the stationer’s,” that is, “the stationer’s shop,” or “the stationer’s house.”

Note 6.—When a single subject is expressed as the common property of two or more persons, the last only takes the sign of the genitive, as, “this is John, William, and Richard’s house,” that is, “this is the house of John, William, and Richard.” But, when several subjects are implied, as severally belonging to various individuals, the names of the individuals are all expressed in the genitive case, as, “these are John’s, William’s, and Richard’s houses.” In such examples as these, the use of the genitive involves an ambiguity, which it is sometimes difficult to prevent. Thus, if we say, agreeably to the first observation in this note, “Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob’s posterity “were carried captive to Babylon,” one unacquainted

with the history of these patriarchs might be at a loss to determine whether “the patriarch Abraham,” “the patriarch Isaac,” and “the posterity of Jacob,” were carried captive; in other words, whether there be three subjects of discourse, namely, *Abraham, Isaac, and the posterity of Jacob*, or only one subject, *the posterity of these patriarchs*. Nor will the insertion of the preposition in all cases prevent the ambiguity. For, in the example before us, were the word “descendants” substituted for “posterity,” and the phrase to proceed thus, “the descendants of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob,” an ignorant reader might be led to suppose that not one generation of descendants, but three distinct generations of these three individuals were carried into captivity. If we say, “the posterity of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,” the expression appears to me liable to the same misconstruction with the one first mentioned. If we say, “the common posterity of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, were carried captive to Babylon,” all ambiguity of expression is prevented.

Instead also of saying, “John, William, and Richard’s house,” I should prefer “a house belonging in common to John, William, and Richard.” This expression, though laborious and heavy, is preferable to the inelegance and harshness of three inflected substantives, while it removes the ambiguity, which might in some cases be occasioned by withholding the inflexion from the two first substantives. Where neatness and perspicuity cannot possibly be com-

bined, it will not be questioned which we ought to prefer. I observe also, that though such phraseologies as this, "John's, William's, and Richard's houses," be perfectly consonant with syntactical propriety, and strictly analogous to the established phraseology, "his, Richard's, and my houses," yet, as there appears something uncouth in the former expression, it would be better to say, "the houses belonging in common, or severally (as the meaning may be) to John, William, and Richard."

Note 7.—When a name is complex, that is, consisting of more terms than one, the last only admits the sign of the genitive, as, "Julius Cæsar's Commentaries," "John the Baptist's head," "for Herodias' sake, his brother Philip's wife."

Note 8.—When a short explanatory term is subjoined to a name, it matters little to which the inflexion be annexed, as, "I left the parcel at Mr. Johnson, the bookseller's," or "at Mr. Johnson's, the bookseller." But, if the explanatory term be complex, or if there are more explanatory terms than one, the sign of the genitive must be affixed to the name, or first substantive, thus, "I left the book at Johnson's, a respectable bookseller, a worthy man, and an old friend." In the same manner we should say, "this psalm is David's, the king, priest, and prophet of the people," and not "this psalm is David, the king, priest, and prophet of the people's."

Note 9.—In some cases we employ both the genitive and a preposition, as, "this is a friend of the

king's," elliptically, for "this is a friend of the king's friends." We say also, "this is a friend of the king." These forms of expression, however, though in many cases equivalent, sometimes imply different ideas. Thus, if I say, "this is a picture of my friend," it means, "this is an image, likeness, or representation of my friend." If I say, "this is a picture of my friend's," it means, "this picture belongs to my friend."

As the double genitive involves an ellipsis, and implies part of a whole, or one of a plurality of subjects, I think the use of it should be avoided, unless in cases where this plurality may be implied. Thus we may say, "a kinsman of the traitor's waited on him yesterday," it being implied that the traitor had several or many kinsmen. The expression is equivalent to "a kinsman of the traitor's kinsmen." But, if the subject possessed were singular, or the only one of the kind, I should recommend the use of the simple genitive; thus, if he had only one house, I should say, "this is the house of the traitor," or "this is the traitor's house;" but not "this is a house of the traitor's."

Note 10.—The recurrence of the analytical expression, and likewise of the simple genitive, should be carefully avoided. Thus, there is something inelegant and offensive in the following sentence, "the severity of the distress of the son of the king touched the nation." Much better, "the severe distress of the king's son touched the nation."

Note 11.—There is sometimes an abrupt vulgarity, or uncouthness, in the use of the simple genitive. Thus, in “the army’s name,” “the commons’ vote,” “the lords’ house,” expressions of Mr. Hume, there is a manifest want of dignity and of elegance. Much better, “the name of the army,” “the vote of the commons,” “the house of lords.”

RULE IX.—Pronouns agree with their antecedents, or the nouns which they represent, in gender, number, and person, as, “They respected Cato and his party,” where *Cato* is singular and masculine, and *his* agrees with it in gender and number. “He addressed you and me, and desired *us* to follow him,” where *us* sylleptically represents the two persons. “Thou, who writest.” Here the antecedent *thou* being a person, the relative *who* not *which* is employed. The antecedent also being of the second person, and singular number, the relative is considered as of the same character, and is therefore followed by the verb in the second person and singular number. “Vice, which no man practises with impunity, proved his destruction.” Here the antecedent *vice* not being a person, the pronoun *which*, of the neuter gender, is therefore employed. “The rivers, which

flow into the sea.” Here also the antecedent not being a person, the relative is *which*. It is also considered as in the plural number; and, as all substantives are joined to the third person, *which*, the representative of *rivers*, is joined to the third person plural of the verb.

Note 1.—This rule is transgressed in the following examples: “Beware of false prophets, *which* come to you in sheep’s clothing.” “The fruit tree bearing fruit after *his* kind.” “There was indeed in our destinies such a conformity, as seldom is found in *that* of two persons in the same age.” Here *that*, referring to *destinies*, is put for *those*. “The crown had it in *their* power to give such rewards as they thought proper.”—*Parliamentary Debates*.

Note 2.—The relative should be placed as near as possible to the antecedent, otherwise ambiguity is sometimes occasioned.

Note 3.—In the earlier editions of Murray’s Grammar, we find the following rule. “When the relative is preceded by two nominatives of different persons, it may agree in person with either, as, ‘I am the man who commands you,’ or ‘I am the man who command you.’” The rule here given is erroneous. The construction is by no means arbitrary. If we say, “I am the man who commands you,” the relative clause, with the antecedent *man*, form the predicate; and the sentence is equivalent to “I am your commander.” If we say, “I am the man

who command you," *the man* simply is the predicate, and *I who command you* the subject; thus, "I who command you," or "I your commander am the man." This error, sufficiently obvious to every discerning reader, I pointed out in the former edition of this Treatise. Murray's rule, as it stood, is clearly repugnant to perspicuity, and syntactical correctness.

In the last edition of his Grammar, and, I believe, in every edition posterior to the publication of "The Etymology and Syntax," the rule is altered; but whether from a disinclination to expunge a rule, which he had once delivered,—a disinclination perhaps accompanied with a belief, that it might be corrected with little prejudice to its original form, or from what other motive he has left it in its present state, I will not presume to determine; but in the alteration, which he has introduced, he appears to me to have consulted neither usefulness nor perspicuity. He says, "When the relative is preceded by two nominatives of different persons, it *may* agree in person with either." So far he has transcribed the former rule; but he adds, "according to the sense." Now it cannot be questioned, and the learner needs not to be informed, that the relative *may* agree with either. If, after having taught the learner, that a Latin adjective *must* agree with its substantive, we were to add, as a distinct rule, that it *may* agree with either of two substantives, according to the sense, I apprehend, we should be chargeable with vain repetition, or with extreme inattention to correctness and

precision. For what would our rule imply? Clearly nothing more, than that the adjective is capable of agreeing with the substantive to which it belongs; and of this capacity no scholar, who had learned to decline an adjective, could possibly be ignorant; or it might convey some idea, that the concord is optional. Now, is it not certain, that the adjective must agree with its proper substantive, namely, that whose meaning it is intended to modify, and no other? The relative, in like manner, *must* agree with that antecedent, and that only, whose representative it is in the relative clause. There is nothing arbitrary in either the one case, or the other.

Perhaps it may be answered that, though the former part of the altered rule leaves the concord as it first stood, discretionary, the latter confines the agreement of the relative to its proper antecedent. But why this apparent contrariety? Why is that represented as arbitrary, which is determined by the sense? This, however, is not the only objection; for it may be affirmed, without hesitation, that the rule, thus considered, is completely superfluous. For the learner has been already told, that the relative agrees with the antecedent in gender, number, and person. And can the antecedent be any other, than that which the sense indicates? And what does this rule teach? Precisely the same thing. The rule, therefore, is either calculated to mislead by representing as arbitrary what is fixed and determinate, or it is purely a rule of supererogation. As it stood

originally it gave some new information; but that information was erroneous: as it stands now, it is either indefinite, or it is useless.

The scholar may require an admonition, when there are two antecedents of different persons, to be careful in referring the relative to its proper antecedent; but to tell him that it may agree with the one, or the other, according to the sense, is to tell him nothing, or tell him that, which he already knows. In the examples just now adduced, the termination of the verb, by indicating the person of the relative, clearly shows the antecedent; but, where the substantives are of the same person, and the verb cannot therefore by its termination indicate the antecedent, ambiguity should be precluded by the mode of arrangement. Thus, "He is the hero who did it," and "He who did it is the hero." In the former, *he* is the subject, and the *hero who did it* the predicate; and in the latter, *he who did it* is the subject, and the *hero* the predicate.

Note 4.—The relative, instead of referring to any particular word as its antecedent, sometimes refers to a whole clause, thus, "the bill was rejected by the lords, which excited no small degree of jealousy and discontent," that is, "which thing," namely, the rejection of the bill.

Note 5.—The antecedent pronoun of the third person is often suppressed, when no particular emphasis is implied; as, "Who steals my purse, steals trash," *i. e.* "he," or "the man, who." "Whom he

would he slew; whom he would he kept," *Bible*; *i. e.* "Those whom he would." "Whosoever committeth sin, is the servant of sin." In this example the antecedent *he*, and nominative to the principal verb, is understood.

Priestley has remarked that the pronouns *whoever* and *whosoever* have sometimes a double construction. He gives the two following examples. "Elizabeth publicly threatened that she would have the head of whoever had advised it."—*Hume*. "He offered a great recompense to whomsoever would help him to a sight of him."—*Hume*. Though the learned author seems to admit both these modes of construction, we apprehend, that only one of them is grammatical. It has been just now observed that the antecedent is often understood to the relative *who*, and to the compounds *whoever* and *whosoever*. If the antecedent be supplied, it will be found that the construction is not arbitrary, as Priestley supposes, but definite and fixed. The first sentence is correct. "She would have the head of him, or them, whoever had advised," the relative being the nominative to the verb. "He offered a great recompense to him, or them, whosoever should help him." *Whomsoever* is a solecism: though close to the preposition *to*, it is not under its government. (*See the following rules.*)

RULE X.—If no nominative intervene between the relative and the verb, the relative shall be the nominative to the verb, as,

“Solomon, who was the son of David, built the temple of Jerusalem.” Here *who* is the nominative to the verb *was*.

RULE XI.—But, if a nominative intervene between the relative and the verb, the relative shall be under the government of the preposition going before, or the noun or verb following, as, “God, whom we worship, is the Lord, by whose gift we live, and by whom all things were made.” In the first relative clause, where *we* is the intervening nominative, the relative is in the objective case, and governed by the verb following: in the second clause, where the intervening nominative is likewise *we*, the relative is in the genitive case, and governed by the noun following, thus, “by whose gift,” or “by the gift of whom;” and in the third clause, where *things* is the intervening nominative, the relative is in the objective case, and governed by the preposition.

Note 1.—The case of the relative may always be ascertained by repeating the antecedent, and arranging the clause in the natural order, thus, “the city, which is called Rome, was founded by Romulus,” *i. e.* “the city, which city is called Rome.” The

antecedent repeated is the nominative to the verb *is*, *which* therefore agrees with it in case. "God, who sees all things, will punish the wicked," *i. e.* "God, which God sees all things," the relative therefore is the nominative to the verb *sees*, that is, it is in the same case in which the antecedent would be put, if again expressed. "Solomon, whom David loved, was the wisest of princes." Here, if we arrange the relative clause in the natural order, beginning with the nominative and the verb, it will run thus, "David loved whom," an expression analogous to "David loved him," or "David loved which Solomon." Many solecisms in the construction of the relative would be easily avoided, by a little attention to the natural arrangement. Thus instead of committing the error involved in the following examples, "The philosopher, who he saw to be a man of profound knowledge," "'Twas my brother, who you met with," "I was a stranger to the person, who I spoke to," we should be led by the natural order to the correct phraseology; "he saw whom," "you met with whom," "I spoke to whom." It is to be observed, however, that, though the personal pronouns, when under the government of a verb, may either precede or follow it, the relative in the same state of government must invariably go before it.

Note 2.—The relatives *who* and *which* are often understood, especially in colloquial language. "The friend I visited yesterday is dead to-day," *i. e.* "the friend whom I visited yesterday is dead to-day."

Note 3.—There are a few cases, which are considered by some distinguished critics and grammarians, as requiring the use of *that* in preference to the pronouns *who* and *which*.

1st, After superlatives the pronoun *that* is generally used, as, “The wisest man, that ever lived, is liable to error.”

2dly, After the word *same*, *that* is generally used, as, “he is the same man, that you saw yesterday.” But, if a preposition should precede the relative; one of the other two pronouns must be employed, the pronoun *that* not admitting a preposition prefixed to it, as, “he is the same man, with whom you were acquainted.” It is remarkable, however, that, when the arrangement is somewhat changed, the word *that* admits the preposition, as, “he is the same man, that you were acquainted with.”

3dly, *That* is used after *who*, taken interrogatively, as, “Who, that has the spirit of a man, would suffer himself to be thus degraded?”

4thly, When persons and things are referred to, as, “the *men* and *things*, *that* he hath studied, have not contributed to the improvement of his morals.”

RULE XII.—An active transitive verb governs the accusative or objective case, as,

“He teaches me.”

“We honour him.”

Note 1.—As examples of transgression against

this rule, we may adduce the following: “*Who* do I love so much?”—*Shakspeare*. “*Who* should I meet the other day, but my old friend?”—*Spectator*. “Those, *who* he thought true to his party.”—*Clarendon*.

Note 2.—As substantives have no objective case, the subject or object of the energy or affection is distinguished by its place, which is after the verb, as, “Achilles slew Hector,” where *Achilles*, the agent, precedes, and *Hector*, the subject of the action, follows the verb. Reverse this order, and the meaning is reversed, as, “Hector slew Achilles.” Where the proper arrangement is not observed, ambiguity or misconstruction is frequently produced. Thus, when Pope says, *Odyss. xix.*

“And thus the son the fervent sire address’d,”

it may be asked, did the son address the sire, or the sire address the son? A little attention would have prevented the ambiguity. If the sire addressed the son, the line should run thus,

“And thus his son the fervent sire address’d.”

If the son addressed the sire,

“And thus the son his fervent sire address’d.”

Note 3.—An active intransitive verb sometimes governs the objective case of a noun, of the same or a kindred signification, as, “Let us run the race, which is set before us.” “If any man see his brother

sin a sin, which is not unto death.”—*Bible*. The latter verb, however, though thus used, must not be employed in a transitive sense. It is an error, therefore, to say, “What have I sinned?”—*Bible*. It should be “How?” or “In what?” Some intransitive verbs also, when used in a reflex sense, are joined to an objective case, as, “Then having shown his wounds, he’d sit him down.”—*Home’s Douglas*. This is a poetic licence, which, in a prose writer, would not be tolerated, unless in colloquial and very familiar language.

Note 4.—The objective case should not, if possible, be separated from its verb. This rule is violated in the following sentence: “Becket could not better discover, than by attacking so powerful an interest, his resolution to maintain,” &c.—*Hume*. The regimen is here unnecessarily, and very inelegantly, separated from its verb.

RULE XIII.—Verbs signifying to ask, teach, offer, promise, pay, tell, allow, deny, and some others of like signification, are sometimes, especially in colloquial language, followed in the passive voice by an objective case.

Note 1.—This rule seems to have escaped the attention of all our English grammarians, except Priestley, who observes, “that in some familiar phrases, the subject and object of our affirmation seem to be transposed.” This idiom, except in a

very few instances, is not to be found in Latin, though it occurs pretty often in Greek: it therefore particularly merits the attention of the junior Latin scholar, lest in his Anglo-Latin translations it should betray him into an egregious solecism. "He allowed me great liberty," turned passively, in concurrence with the Latin idiom, "great liberty was allowed me." But we say also in English, "I was allowed great liberty." "He promised (to) me a ship in five days," passively, "a ship was promised me," and "I was promised *her* in five days." "She would not accept the jewels, though they were offered to her by her mother," or "though she was offered *them* by her mother."

Note 2.—After verbs of *giving*, *telling*, *sending*, *promising*, *offering*, and others of like signification, the thing is very generally placed before the person. In the time of Swift and Addison this rule was not uniformly observed. We find authors of that period saying indiscriminately, "Give it us," and "Give us it;" "Tell him it," and "Tell it him;" "He promised me it," and "He promised it me." In Scotland these two modes of expression still obtain. In England they are now reduced under one general rule. We say, "Give it me," "Tell it him," "He sent it us."

RULE XIV.—The verb *to be* has the same case after it as it has before it, thus denoting that the subjects are identical, or that the one

term is the predicate of the other, as, “It is he,” “you believed it to be him.” In the former example, *it* is the nominative to the verb, the nominative case *he* therefore follows the verb. In the latter, *it* is the regimen of the verb *believed*, the verb *to be* is therefore followed by the objective case.

Note 1.—This rule is violated in such examples as “it is *me*,” “it was *him*,” “I believed it to be *he*,” “*whom* do men say that I am?” In the last example, the natural arrangement is, “men say that I am *whom*,” where, contrary to the rule, the nominative *I* precedes, and the objective case *whom* follows the verb.

Note 2.—Priestley has asked, “Who would not say, ‘If it be *me*,’ rather than ‘If it be *I*?’” Our ears are certainly more familiar with the former than with the latter phraseology, and those, who consult the ear only, may prefer it: but, where no advantage is gained by a departure from analogy, every deviation is at once idle and reprehensible.

Note 3.—The verb *to be* is called by logicians the *copula*, as connecting the subject with the predicate. Thus, when we say, “he is wise,” “they are learned,” *he* and *they* are the subjects; *wise* and *learned* the predicates. Now, it particularly deserves the attention of the classical scholar, that in English almost any verb may be used as a *copula*. This circumstance is the more worthy of his notice, as a conformity

to the Latin idiom may lead him to reject expressions, which are unexceptionable, and to adopt others not strictly correct *. Thus we say, "it tastes good," "he strikes hard," "I remember right," "he feels sick," "we came late," "they rise early," "he drinks deep." I am aware that the words *late*, *early*, are in such examples considered as adverbs. It appears to me they are adjectives,—that the idiom is truly English, and that all these expressions are perfectly analogous.

RULE XV.—When two verbs come together, the attribute signified by the one verb being the subject or object of the action, energy, or affection expressed by the other, the former is governed in the infinitive mood, as, "he taught me to read," "I know him to be."

Note 1.—The infinitive thus frequently supplies the place of an objective case after the verb, as it often stands for a nominative before it, as, "he loves to study," or "he loves study."

Note 2.—In such examples as, "I read to learn," where the latter phrase, though in the same form as *to study*, in the preceding example, has, notwithstanding, a different meaning, and cannot be resolved like it into "I read learning," in such examples, as

* Horne Tooke observes, that Lowth has rejected much good English: and it is to be apprehended, that the classical scholar is too prone to condemn in his own language whatever accords not with the Latin idiom.

Tooke justly observes, the preposition *for* denoting the object, and equivalent to *pour* in French, is understood, as, “I read *for* to learn.” Our southern neighbours, indeed, in these examples, never omit the causal term; and Trusler has not improperly observed, that, when the verb does not express the certain and immediate effect, but something remote and contingent, the words *in order to*, which are nearly equivalent to *for*, may be pertinently introduced, as, “in order to acquire fame, men encounter the greatest dangers.”

Note 3.—The verbs to *bid*, *dare*, *need*, *make*, *see*, *hear*, *feel*, *let*, are not followed by the sign of the infinitive, as, “He bade me go,” “I saw him do it.” It is to be observed, however, that in the language of scripture the verb “to make” is often followed by *to*, as, “He maketh his son *to* rise.” The verb “to dare,” for “to challenge,” or “to defy,” is also construed with *to*, “I dare thee but *to* breathe upon my love.”—*Shakspeare*.

Note 4.—Nouns, adjectives, and participles, are often followed by an infinitive, as, “your *desire to improve* will ultimately contribute to your happiness.” “Good men are *desirous to do* good.”

Note 5.—As the proper tense of the subsequent or secondary verb has, in certain cases, been a subject of dispute, it may be necessary to observe, that, when the simple attribute, or merely the primary idea expressed by the subsequent verb, is intended to be signified, it should then be put in the present tense:

but when the idea of perfection or completion is combined with the primary idea, the subsequent verb should have that form, which is termed the perfect of the infinitive. Or, perhaps, this rule may, more intelligibly to the scholar, though less correctly, be thus expressed, that when the action or state, denoted by the subsequent verb, is contemporary with that of the primary verb, then the secondary verb must be put in the present tense; but when action or state is prior to that expressed by the secondary verb, the latter must be put in the preterite tense. Usage, indeed, and the opinions of grammarians, are divided on this subject. But when nothing but usage can be pleaded in favour of one phraseology, and when reason concurs with usage to recommend another, it will not be questioned that the latter deserves the preference. Thus, we should say, "I expected to see you," and not "I expected to have seen you;" because either the expectation and the seeing must be regarded as contemporary, or the former must be considered as prior to the latter. But why, it may be asked, must the seeing be considered as contemporary with the expectation? Might not the former have been anterior to the latter? This is certainly possible; I may see a friend before I expect him. But though the sight, abstractly considered, may precede the expectation, it cannot possibly, as an object of expectation, be prior to it. The idea involves absurdity, equal and analogous to the assertion, that the paper, on which I write, existed as an

object of my perception, previously to my perceiving it. Agreeably to the second form of the rule here given, we find that the Latins very generally used the present of the infinitive, to express an action or state contemporary with the attribute of the primary verb. Thus, *dixit me scribere*, "he said that I wrote," or "was writing," that is, at the time of his saying so, *Dixit me scripsisse*, "he said that I had written."

I have observed, that, when the simple attribute denoted by the subsequent verb is implied, we should use the present of the infinitive. This phraseology should not only be used in all cases, where contemporary actions or states are to be signified, but may also be sometimes employed, where the secondary verb denotes something posterior to what is implied by the first. For though in no instance, where the simple action or state is to be expressed, should we use the sign of past or future time, yet for obvious reasons we may, and often do employ the present infinitive, or simple name, to denote what is future, when the primary verb necessarily implies the futurity of its object. Thus, instead of saying, "he promised that he would pay," where the constructive sign of futurity is used, to denote the posteriority of the payment, we often say, "he promised to pay," employing the present tense, synonymous with the simple name, as, "he promised payment." The Latins also, though they almost universally, unless in colloquial language, preferred the former mode of expression, sometimes

adopted the latter, as, *denegavit se dare*.—*Plaut. Jursurandum pollicitus est dare*.—*Id.* “He refused to give,” “he promised to give,” or “he promised giving,” the secondary verb expressing the act simply; and the time being necessarily implied.

Note 6.—The infinitive mood is sometimes used in an absolute or independent sense, as, “to speak the truth, we are all liable to error.” “Not to trespass on your time, I will briefly explain the whole affair,” that is, “that I may speak,” “that I may not trespass.”

RULE XVI.—Participles are construed as the verbs, to which they belong, as,

“*Teaching us to deny ungodliness.*”

Note 1.—The imperfect participle is frequently used like a substantive, and is, in such examples, of the same import with the infinitive of the verb; as, “they love reading,” *i. e.* “they love to read.” In some examples it becomes a real noun, and has a plural number, as, *the outgoings of the morning*.

Note 2.—Lowth contends that, when the imperfect participle of a transitive verb is not preceded by the definite article, it properly governs the objective case, and is analogous to the Latin gerund, as, “much advantage will be derived from observing this rule;” in which example, *this rule* is the regimen of the participle *observing*; and that, when the definite article precedes the participle, it becomes then a pure noun, and, therefore, cannot have the regimen of a verb.

He therefore condemns this expression, "by the sending them the light of thy holy spirit." Some of our grammarians consider Lowth, in this instance, as fastidiously critical; but to me he appears chargeable with error. Let us examine the reasons, which the author adduces in support of his opinion.

In this inquiry, the first and most pertinent question is, does usage justify the opinion of the author? He acknowledges the contrary: he even admits that there is not a single writer, who does not violate this rule. Were it necessary, indeed, after this concession, it would be easy to evince, that not only our translators of the Bible, whose authority surely is of great weight, but also other writers of the highest eminence, employ the phraseology which he condemns.

Again. Does the distinction, which he wishes to establish, favour perspicuity? The very reverse appears to me to be the case; for he admits an identity of sense in two distinct phraseologies, which are, incontestably, in many instances, susceptible of different meanings. And, though this ambiguity may not be involved in every example, we have surely good reason for repudiating a phraseology which may, in any instance, be liable to misconstruction. We are to prescribe, not what may be perspicuous in some instances, but what must be intelligible in all.

Lowth says, that we may express the sentiment, either by inserting the article before the participle and the preposition after it, or by the omission of both; in other words, that these phraseologies are equivalent. Thus, according to him, we may say

either, “*by sending* his Son into the world,” or “by the sending *of* his Son.” Here, perhaps, the meaning is sufficiently clear, whichever of these forms of expression be adopted. But let us take another example, as, “he expressed the pleasure he had, in hearing the philosopher.” Now, according to Lowth, we may also say, “he expressed the pleasure he had, in the hearing of the philosopher.” Is there no difference of sentiment here? Are these expressions equivalent? The contrary must be obvious to the most inattentive reader. According to the former phraseology, the philosopher was heard; he is represented as passive; agreeably to the latter, he was active—he heard.

Again. “When the Lord saw it, he abhorred them, because of the provoking of his sons and daughters.” Our translators have correctly exhibited the sentiment. The sons and daughters had given offence; they had provoked the Deity. But, if Lowth’s opinion be correct, the expression might be, “because of provoking his sons and daughters;” a phrase which evidently conveys a very different idea.

Again. When it is said, “at the hearing of the ear, they will believe,” is this expression convertible, without violating the sense, into, “at hearing the ear they will believe?” Many more examples might be produced to prove, that these phraseologies, which Lowth considers of the same import, are by no means equivalent. It appears then, that perspicuity is not consulted by adopting this rule.

Again. He considers the participle, with a preposition before it, as correspondent to the Latin gerund, and therefore governing an objective case; but the participle preceded by an article, he considers as a substantive, and therefore incapable of any regimen. Now, as the author reasons from one language to another, we may pertinently ask, is not the Latin gerund a noun, a verbal substantive, not only having the form, and the inflexions of a noun, but governed like it, by nouns, adjectives, verbs, and prepositions, itself likewise governing the case of its verb? This position, were this the place for it, we could easily prove, notwithstanding the objections, which Scioppius, Vossius, with some other grammarians, have alleged against it. Nay, whatever theory be adopted respecting the nature of the gerund, there cannot exist a doubt, that, in the early ages of Roman literature, the verbal nouns in *io* governed an accusative, like the verbs whence they were derived. *Quid tibi curatio est hanc rem*, is one example from Plautus out of many, which might be produced*. That the supines also were, in truth, substantives admitting a regimen, is equally clear: *Difficile dictu* was originally *difficile in dictu*; and *misit oratum opem*, *misit ad oratum opem*. Nor can the structure of the future infinitive passive be so satisfactorily resolved, notwithstanding a few repugnant examples, as on this

* See Johnson's Comm. p. 352, and Seyer on the Latin Verb, p. 174. To the arguments there offered, many others might be added.

supposition : *Dixit libros lectum iri* is resolved into *dixit (id) iri ad lectum libros*, where *libros* is the regimen of the verbal noun *lectum*.

Thus it is evident, that the Latin gerunds, supines, and verbal nouns in *io*, though in form and inflexion substantives, governed an accusative case. It matters not, indeed, to the point in question, what was the practice of the ancients in this respect ; nor should I, therefore, have dwelt so long on this subject, did I not conceive, that the very authority, to which Dr. Lowth seems to appeal, militates against him ; and that the very language, to which in this, as in most other cases, he strives to assimilate ours, had nouns governing cases, like the verbs from which they came.

From the preceding observations, I think it must appear, that the rule, given by Dr. Lowth, is neither sanctioned by general usage, nor friendly to perspicuity ; while the violation of it is perfectly reconcileable with the practice of the Roman writers, if their authority can, in this question, be deemed of any value.

Having attempted to prove the invalidity of Lowth's argument, and the impropriety of his rule, as establishing an identity of meaning, where a difference must exist, I would submit to the candid and judicious critic the following remarks.

The participle in *ing* has either an active or passive signification ; its import must, therefore, be determined by the judgment of the reader, or by explanatory adjections. Whatever, then, is calculated to remove all

misconstruction, and to render its import clear and unequivocal, merits attention. Consistently, then, with some of the examples already adduced, I am inclined to suggest, that, when the noun, connected with the participle, is active or doing something, the preposition should be inserted, as, “in the hearing of the philosopher,” that is, *the philosopher hearing*; and that, when the noun represents the subject of an action, or what is suffering, the preposition should be omitted, as, “in hearing the philosopher,” or *the philosopher being heard*. An attention to this rule will, I conceive, in most cases prevent ambiguity.

If it should be said, that I have admitted Lowth’s phraseologies, I answer, it is true; but with this difference, that he considers them as equivalent, and I as diametrically opposite. I observe, likewise, that, though I prefer the suppression of the article when the participle is not followed by *of*, and its insertion, when it is followed by the preposition, it is not because I perceive any impropriety in the other phraseology, but because, since the publication of Lowth’s Grammar, it has been less employed; and because also it less forcibly marks the distinction, which I have recommended. That it has the sanction of good authority, is unquestionable; and that it is not inconsistent with analogy will still further appear from the following note.

Note 3.—The participle in *ing* is construed like a noun, governing the genitive case, and, at the same time, having the regimen of its proper verb, as,

“Much depends on Richard’s observing the rule, and error will be the consequence of his neglecting it.” In this example, the words *Richard’s* and *his* are in the genitive case, governed by the participles *observing* and *neglecting*, while these participles, having here every character of a noun, admit the objective case. This form of expression has been received as unexceptionable; the following phraseology, however, has been censured, though, in truth, precisely analogous to the one now exemplified; “Much depends on the rule’s being observed, and error will be the consequence of its being neglected.” “Here,” said a certain writer, “is a noun with a pronoun representing it, each in the possessive case, that is, under the government of another noun, but without any other noun to govern it; for *being observed*, and *being neglected*, are not nouns, nor can you supply the place of the possessive case by the preposition *of*, before the noun or pronoun.”

I concur with Dr. Campbell, who has examined this objection, in thinking, that the expression is not only sanctioned by good usage, but is also agreeable to analogy, and preventive of circumlocution. The objector, indeed, does not seem to have been aware, that his opinion is at variance with itself; and that the reason, which he assigns for rejecting this phraseology, would, with equal force, conclude against another mode of expression, which he himself approves. For he would have no objection to say, “Much depends on his observing the rule, and error

will be the consequence of neglecting it." Now let us try, whether this sentence be not liable to the same objection as the other. In the former, he says, you cannot possibly supply the place of the possessive case, by the preposition *of* before the noun or pronoun. This is true; for it would not be English to say, "Much depends on the being observed of the rule; and error will be the consequence of the being neglected of it." But will his own approved phraseology admit this? Let us see; "Much depends on the observing of him of the rule, and error will be the consequence of the neglecting of him of it." Were the example simpler, the argument would be equally strong; as, "Much depends on your pupil's composing, but more on his reading frequently." This sentence the author alluded to would have approved. Let us try if it can be resolved by *of*, "Much depends on the composing of your pupil, but more on the reading of him frequently."

The author's argument, then, if it prove any thing, proves too much; it cannot, therefore, have any weight.

In addition to these observations, I would remark, that the writer's argument involves another inconsistency. He admits, that the participle in *ing* may be thus construed; for he approves the phrases, "his observing the rule," and "his neglecting it." Why then does he reject "his being" and "its being?" for the past or perfect participle's *observed* and *neglected* have no share in the government, *rule's* and

it's being under the regimen of the participle in *ing*. In fact, then, the phrase seems no more objectionable than "his being a great man did not make him a happy man;" which our author would admit to be wholly unexceptionable.

Some late writers, reasoning doubtless on a principle similar to that, the absurdity of which we have been attempting to expose, have discarded a phraseology which appears unobjectionable, and substituted one which seems less correct. Many writers, instead of saying, "his being smitten with the love of Orestilla was the cause of his murdering his son," would say, "he being smitten with the love of Orestilla was the cause." This seems to me an idle affectation of the Latin idiom, less precise than the common mode of expression, and less consonant with the genius of our language. For, ask what was the cause; and, according to this phraseology, the answer must be *he*; whereas the meaning is, that not *he*, but *his being smitten*, was the cause of his murder.

"This jealousy accounts for Hall charging the Duke of Gloucester with the murder of Prince Edward." "This," says Mr. Baker, "very justly, is, in my opinion, a very uncouth way of speaking, though much used by ignorant people, and often affected by those who are not ignorant." The writer should have said, "for Hall's charging." "His words being applicable to the common mistake of our age induce me to transcribe them." Here I

agree with the same writer in thinking, that it would be better to consider *words* as in the genitive case plural, governed by the participle, as *Hall's* in the preceding example, and join *his words' being applicable*, equivalent to *the applicability of his words*, with the verb singular ; thus, "his words' being applicable to the common mistake of our age, induces me to transcribe them." A ridiculous partiality in favour of the Latin idiom, which in this case is not so correct as our own, not exhibiting the sentiment with equal precision, has given birth to this phraseology, which in many cases conveys not the intended idea. For, as Priestley remarks, if it is said, "What think you of my horse's running to-day?" it is implied, that the horse did actually run. If it is said, "What think you of my horse running to-day?" it is intended to ask, whether it be proper for my horse to run to-day. This distinction, though frequently neglected, deserves attention ; for it is obvious, that ambiguity may arise from using the latter only of these phraseologies, to express both meanings.

Note 4.—This participle is sometimes used absolutely, in the same manner as the infinitive mood, as, "This conduct, *viewing it in the most favourable light*, reflects discredit on his character." Here the participle is made absolute, and is equivalent to the infinitive in that state, as, "to view it in the most favourable light." Both these modes of expression are resolvable, either by the hypothetical, or the per-

fective conjunctions; thus, "if we view it in the most favourable light." "To confess the truth, I have no merit in the case;" *i. e.* "that I may confess."

RULE XVII.—A noun or pronoun joined to a participle, its case being dependent on no word in the sentence, is put in the nominative.

Note 1.—This rule will be perfectly understood by the classical scholar, when we say, that the absolute case in English is the nominative. Thus, "We being exceedingly tossed the next day, they lightened the ship." The pronoun of the first person, joined to the participle *being*, is neither the nominative to any verb, nor is it connected with any word, of which it can be the regimen. It is therefore put in the nominative case.

Note 2.—This rule is violated in such examples as the following, "Solomon made as wise proverbs as any body has done, *him* only excepted, who was a much wiser man than Solomon."—*Tillotson*.

"For only in destroying I find ease
To my relentless thoughts; and, *him* destroy'd
Or wot to what may work his utter loss,
For whom all this was made, all this will soon
Follow."—*Milton*.

This seems to be the only example in which the poet has transgressed this rule; and in several in-

stances, in which he has observed it, Bentley would erroneously substitute the objective case.

RULE XVIII.—Prepositions are joined with the objective case, or govern nouns and pronouns in the accusative, as, “he ran to me,” “he was loved by us.”

Note 1.—This rule is violated in such expressions as these, “Who servest thou under?” “Who do you speak to?” for the syntactical arrangement is, “thou servest under who?” “thou speakest to who?” instead of “under whom?” “to whom?”

Note 2.—The preposition is frequently separated from its regimen, as, “Horace is an author, whom I am much delighted with,” *i. e.* “with whom I am much delighted.”

Note 3.—The prepositions *to* and *for* are often understood, as, “he gave me a book,” “he told me the news:” *i. e.* “he gave to me,” “he told to me.”

Lowth has, indeed, observed, that in such examples, the pronouns *me*, *thee*, &c. may be considered to be in the dative case, as, in truth, they are in Saxon the datives of their respective pronouns, and in their form include *to*, as, “woe is to me.” This phrase, he observes, is pure Saxon, the same as “wae is me,” in which *me* is a dative case.

The preposition *by* is also, in a few colloquial expressions, omitted, as, “he went across the bridge,”

“he crossed the bridge,” for “he crossed (the river) by the bridge.”

Note 4.—A preposition, following a verb, constituting with it what has been termed a compound active verb, is sometimes suppressed. We say, “he hoped for a reward,” “you wondered at his courage.” Addison, Steele, and Johnson, with several other reputable writers, say, “It is to be hoped,” instead of “to be hoped for ;” and Johnson very generally says, “It is not to be wondered,” for “not to be wondered at.” The latter form of expression seems to have been adopted, in order to avoid the abrupt and inelegant conclusion of the clause, especially when followed by the word *that*.

Note 5.—The prepositions *in*, *on*, *for* and *from*, are often understood before nouns of time and place ; thus, “this day,” “next month,” “last year,” are often used elliptically for, “on this day,” “in next month,” “in last year.” We say also, “He was banished England,” *i. e.* “*from* England.”

Care, however, should be taken that the omission create no ambiguity. If we say, “He was deaf some years before he died,” referring to a temporary deafness, and a point of time at which it occurred, the expression is not improper, though the meaning might be more clearly expressed ; but, if we intend to signify a continued deafness, we ought to say “for,” or “during some years.”

Note 6.—The preposition is improperly omitted in the following line of Pope’s :

“ And virgins smiled at what they blush'd before.”

It should be, according to the rules of syntax, “ smiled at what they blushed at before,” both verbs requiring *at* after them, thus, “ they smiled at that, at which they blushed before.”

Note 7.—Prepositions should be placed as near as possible to each of the words, whose relation they express. The following sentence from Hume is, in this respect, faulty: “ The ignorance of the age in mechanical arts, rendered the progress very slow of this new invention.” It should be, “ the progress of this new invention.” The following sentence from Johnson is, for the same reason, chargeable with faulty arrangement: “ The country first dawned, that illuminated the world, and beyond which the arts cannot be traced of civil society or domestic life.”—*Rasselas*. It should be, “ the arts of civil society or domestic life cannot be traced.” Priestley has censured the following clause from Harris, “ being in no sense capable of either intension or remission.” If it be considered, however, that the word *either* properly means “ the one or the other,” and in truth denotes the subject, being, therefore, in strict propriety the regimen of the preposition, the arrangement of Harris, though now not so common as the other, will not appear exceptionable. Nay, whatever may be the future decision of usage, that great arbitress of all language (for at present she is divided), Harris’s arrangement seems more conformable to the strict meaning of the words, as well as to

Priestley's own rule, than that, which the latter recommends; thus, "capable of either (*i. e.* of the one or of the other), intension, or remission."

RULE XIX.—Adverbs have no government.

Note 1.—They are sometimes improperly used for adjectives, as, "After those wars, of which they hoped for a soon and prosperous issue."—*Sidney*. "A soon issue" is not English; an adverb cannot agree with a substantive; it should be "a speedy and prosperous issue." Such expressions likewise as the following, though not destitute of authority, are exceedingly inelegant, and irreconcilable with analogy: "the then ministry," for "the ministry of that time;" "the above discourse," for "the preceding discourse."

Note 2.—They are sometimes used like substantives, as, "a little while," for "in a little time," or "for a little time." "Worth while," "some how," "any how," "any where," are examples of the same kind.

Note 3.—The adverbs *whence*, *thence*, *hence*, are equivalent to "from which place," "from that place," "from this place;" *from whence*, *from thence*, *from hence*, are therefore chargeable with redundancy.

Note 4.—*Never* is sometimes erroneously used for *ever*, as, "they might be extirpated, were they never so many." It should be, "ever so many," *i. e.* "how

many soever." "Who will not hearken to the voice of the charmer, charming *never* so sweetly." It should be, "*ever* so sweetly;" *i. e.* "however sweetly," or "how sweetly soever."

Note 5.—*Ever* is likewise sometimes improperly used for *never*, as, "I seldom or ever see him now." It should be, "seldom or *never*," the speaker intending to say, "that rarely, or rather at no time, does he see him now;" not "rarely," or "at any time."

Note 6.—Priestley remarks, that the French always place their adverbs immediately after their verbs, which order, he observes, by no means suits the English idiom. "His government gave courage to the English barons to carry farther their opposition."—*Hume*. It would be better, "to carry their opposition farther." "Edward obtained a dispensation from his oath, which the barons had compelled Gaveston to take, that he would abjure for ever the realm;" better "the realm for ever."

Note 7.—The adverb is generally placed between the auxiliary verb and the participle, as, "this is perfectly understood." When there are more auxiliaries than one, the same author observes, that the adverb should be placed after the first. This rule, however, is by no means universally followed; for many of our best writers employ a different arrangement, and, I think, with great propriety; as, "this will be perfectly understood," where the adverb follows both auxiliaries. The place of the adverb may, in general, be ascertained, by considering what word

it is intended to qualify : and, in the last example, it should be closely connected with *understood*. But more on this subject in the following note.

Note 8.—The adverb, as its name imports, is generally placed close to the word, which it modifies or affects : its force, therefore, very much depends upon its position. Inattention to the proper collocation of adverbs is frequently the cause of much obscurity and misconception. To this inattention we may ascribe the ambiguity in the following sentence : “He was not honoured with this reward, but with the approbation of the people.” This sentence may imply, either that he was honoured with this reward, not without the approbation of the people ; or that he was not honoured with this reward, but was honoured with the approbation of the people. The latter is the meaning intended. It should therefore be, “he was honoured, not with this reward, but with the approbation of the people.” By this arrangement the sentiment is correctly exhibited—the two subjects, reward and approbation, are perspicuously contrasted, and while the former is negatived, the latter is affirmed*.

* The propriety of this collocation of the *negative* will be more evident, if we attend to the two very different meanings of the word *but*. According to the former construction of the sentence, *but* is the imperative of *beutan*, “to be out,” and is synonymous with *unless* or *except* ; thus, “but with the approbation,” or *except* with the approbation. According to the latter construction, it is properly *bot*, the imperative of *botan*, “to add.” Thus, “he was honoured not with (*i. e.* exclude or except) this reward, but (add) with the approbation of the people.”

Note 9.—Lowth observes that “the adverb should be for the most part placed before adjectives, and after verbs;” thus, “he was excessively modest,” “he fought bravely.” This is, indeed, the general arrangement; but it admits many exceptions. In no case are writers so apt to err as in the position of the word *only*. Its place, in my opinion, is after the substantive to which it refers, or which it exclusively implies, and before the attributive. In the following sentence of Steele’s, the collocation is faulty. “The bridegroom sits with an aspect which intimates his thoughts were not only entertained with the joys with which he was surrounded, but also with a noble gratitude, and divine pleasure.” This collocation of the two adverbs implies that his thoughts were something more than entertained: whereas it is the author’s intention to say, that his thoughts were entertained with something more than joys. The sentence, therefore, should proceed thus. “The bridegroom sits with an aspect, which intimates, that his thoughts were entertained not with the joys only, with which he was surrounded, but also with a noble gratitude and divine pleasure *.”

* It is to be observed that a different collocation is sometimes admissible without any risk of ambiguity, especially when the clause is negative. Thus we may say, “His thoughts were entertained with not only,” *i. e.* “with not one thing,” viz. “the joys” with which he was surrounded; or, “not only with the joys; but (*but* or *add*) a noble gratitude and divine pleasure.”

Usage in common conversation, and in familiar language, inclines to this arrangement, and many of our best writers frequently adopt it.

When Addison says (*Spec.* No. 412), "By greatness I do not only mean the bulk of any single object, but the largeness of a whole view," the question naturally occurs, what does he more than mean? It is evident that, agreeably to this arrangement, the adverb refers to *mean*, exclusively of all other attributes or actions, and being prefaced by a negative, implies "that he does something more than mean." In this criticism I concur with Blair, who has expressed his disapprobation of this arrangement.

Had he, as the same author observes, placed the adverb after *bulk*, it would have still been wrong. For if he had said, "I do not mean the bulk only," then the adverb, following a noun substantive, must refer to it exclusively of every other, and the clause being negative, the question would be, what does he mean more than the bulk? Is it the colour, the beauty, or what else?

Now, as Mr. Addison intended to say that he did not mean one thing, the word *only* should have followed the name of that thing, whether its designation was simple or complex. He should, therefore, have said, "the bulk of any single object only, but the largeness of a whole view." According to this arrangement, the word *only* refers, as it ought, to "the bulk of any single object" as one idea; and the question occurs, what does he mean more than the bulk of any single object? to which the answer follows, "the largeness of a whole view." It may, however, at the same time be observed that, consistently

with the practice of some of our best writers, who place the adverb before its subject, there seems no impropriety here in saying, "I do not mean only," *i. e.* "one thing," "the bulk of a single object, but the largeness of a whole view."

"The perfidious voice of flattery reminded him," says Gibbon, "that by exploits of the same nature, by the defeat of the Nemean lion, and the slaughter of the wild boar of Erymanthus, the Grecian Hercules had acquired a place among the gods, and an immortal memory among men." "*They only* forgot to observe that, in the first ages of society, a successful war against savage animals is one of the most beneficial labours of heroism." In the beginning of the latter sentence the adverb *only* is misplaced. As it stands the meaning is that they were the only persons who forgot: it should be "*only* they forgot to observe;" *i. e.* "one thing they forgot," namely, "to observe." To this erroneous collocation in Gibbon, I shall oppose a similar example from Pope, in which the adverb is correctly placed. In a letter to Hughes, speaking of the compliments which this gentleman had paid to him on his translation of Homer, he acquaints him, that he should be ashamed to attempt returning these compliments; one thing, however, he would observe, namely, that he esteemed Mr. Hughes too much not to be pleased with the compliments, which he had received from him. His words, therefore, are, "I should be ashamed to offer at saying any of those civil things, in return to your obliging

compliments, in regard to my translation of Homer : *only* I have too great a value for you not to be pleased with them ;” where the word *only* introduces the clause, and is equivalent to “ one thing is true,” or “ thus much (*tantum*), I say, I have too great a value,” &c. Here it is obvious that the adverb, as it precedes the pronoun, does not refer to it ; and that Mr. Pope’s collocation of it is perfectly correct, to express the sentiment, which he intended. Had he said, “ I only,” the adverb would have referred to the pronoun, and implied that he was the only person who valued. Had he intended to say, that he merely entertained an esteem for him, but could not manifest it, then the presence of the auxiliary would have been necessary, and he would have expressed himself thus, “ I do only entertain too great an esteem for you ;” that is, “ I do only (one thing) entertain too great an esteem.” Had he said, “ I have only too great a value for you,” it would be properly opposed to, “ and not too little.” Had he said, “ I have too great a value only,” then *value* would be contrasted with some other sentiment, as when one says, he “ has wealth only, but not virtue,” for example, or any other acquirement. As a violation of this rule, I adduce also the following expression of a reviewer. “ We only discharge our duty to the public ;” a declaration which, strictly interpreted, means “ we are the only persons who discharge.” It should be, “ we do only (one thing) discharge our duty,” for the writer intended to say, that he did no-

thing but discharge his duty to the public*. In justification of such inaccuracies, it is impertinent to plead, that a little attention will prevent misconception. It is the business of every author to guard his reader, as far as the language in which he writes will permit, from the possibility of misconstruction, and to render that attention to the language unnecessary. Quintilian's maxim cannot be too often repeated to those who, by such apologies, attempt to defend any avoidable ambiguity†.

The following sentence is justly censured by Blair, and also by Baker, in his "Remarks." "Theism," says Shaftesbury, "can only be opposed to polytheism or atheism." He ought to have said, observes Baker, "Theism can be opposed only to polytheism or atheism." Dr. Blair concurs in opinion with the remarker. I am inclined, however, to differ from both ; and think, that the sentence should run thus: "Theism can be opposed to polytheism only, or atheism ;" where the adverb *only* refers to the noun immediately preceding, and is understood to the other, implying, that these two systems of belief are the only creeds to which theism can be opposed. If this be not the proper arrangement, it is obvious, that no definite rule can be given on the subject. For, if

* The omission of the auxiliary in such examples tends much to produce ambiguity : for, as the adverb, when placed between the noun and the attributive, may qualify either the former or the latter, perspicuity requires the insertion of the auxiliary.

† Non ut intelligere possit, sed ne omnino possit non intelligere, curandum.

the adverb may be placed either before or after the substantive, to which it refers, then precision becomes impossible, and we may say, "*he only*," or "*only he*," to express the same sentiment ; which collocations, I have already shown, denote ideas materially different. But, if there be a definite and precise rule for the position of this word, and if the sense be different, according to the collocation of the adverb, then I think it will appear, that it ought to be subjoined to the substantive or pronoun, to which it refers ; and this opinion is supported by the authority of Blair himself, in the examples which I have just now adduced. For why, unless on this principle, does he contend that the word *only* should be placed after *the bulk of a single object* ? If the adverb then be, in this example, rightly placed after the substantive, or complex name, to which it refers, it ought to have the same position assigned to it in every similar instance. That the adverb, in the last example, refers to "polytheism," there can be no question ; it should therefore follow, and not precede it.

I am well aware, that many examples may be produced, wherein, with an arrangement different from that here recommended, the sense would, notwithstanding, be perfectly clear ; and, perhaps, Blair's collocation, in the last example, may be adduced as an instance. But when a rule, conducive to perspicuity, is once established, every unnecessary deviation

from it should be studiously avoided, or, at least, not wantonly adopted.

The sentence, as it stands in Shaftesbury, implies, that theism is capable of nothing, but of being opposed to polytheism, or atheism: "Theism can only, (one thing namely) be opposed to polytheism or atheism;" where it is evident that *only* refers to *be opposed*, agreeably to the rule now given. In the same manner, if I say, "he was only great," it is implied, that he was nothing but great, the adverb being placed before the attributive, to which it refers. Hence the question naturally is, what was he not besides? The answer may be, "not good," "not wise," "not learned." Were the adverb placed after the pronoun, it would imply, that "he was the only person who was great*."

* In this, and similar examples, the word *only* has been generally considered as an adjective, equivalent to *solus*. Thus, if we say, *ille solum erat dives*, it means, "he was only rich," or "he was nothing but rich." If we say, *ille solus erat dives*, it means, "he only," or "he alone was rich." In the latter example, the word *only* has been termed an adjective. It is from the equivalence of the words *only* and *alone*, in such examples as the latter, that several writers have employed them, as if, in all cases, synonymous. They are, by no means, however, of the same import. Thus, if we say, "virtue alone is true nobility," it means, "virtue singly, or by itself, is true nobility;" if we say, "virtue only is true nobility," it implies, that nothing but virtue is true nobility. The expressions, therefore, are not equivalent. Both sentiments are conveyed in the following passage:

— Nobilitas sola est atque unica virtus.—*Juvenal*, Sat. viii.

The same observations are applicable to the collocation of the nu-

I am perfectly aware, that the rule here given will not, in all cases, preclude ambiguity; but whenever it becomes doubtful, whether the adverb is intended to affect the preceding substantive, or the following attributive, a different form of expression may be adopted, and the use of the auxiliary, along with the principal verb, will, in many instances, ensure perspicuity. This expedient, however, cannot always be employed. If we say, "The manufacturer only was prosperous," it may be uncertain, whether the adverb is to restrict the predicate "prosperous" to the manufacturer, implying, that he was the only prosperous man, or to the verb expressing past time, signifying that he was then, but is not now prosperous. If the former be the meaning intended, we may say, "he was the only prosperous man;" if the latter, we may say, "the manufacturer was once," or "was then, the only prosperous man."

It would have contributed much to perspicuity, if authors had adopted one uniform practice, placing the adverb constantly, either before or after its subject, whether a substantive or an attributive*. But,

meral term *first*, as equivalent either to *primus* or *primum*; and also to the position of many other words, which are used adjectively and adverbially. The classical scholar needs not to be informed, that *Annibal primus*, and *Annibal primum*—*Alpes transiit*, are not expressions mutually convertible.

* Addison, Pope, Swift, Steele, and Johnson very generally place the adverb before the attributive, to which it refers, and very often also before the substantive. "What he said, was only to commend my prudence."—*Addison*. "He did not pretend to extirpate French music, but only to cultivate and civilise it."—

where usage is so divided, and where the adoption of a new and general rule would be now liable to insuperable objections, all that can be successfully attempted is, in accommodation to existing circumstances, to reduce the evil within narrow limits, if we cannot, by any precise rule, entirely remove it. With this view we would recommend, that, when the adverb refers not to a word, but to a sentence or clause, it be placed at the beginning of that sentence or clause; where it refers to a predicate, it precede the predicated term; and when it has a reference to a subject, it follow its name or description. An observation,

Addison. "I was only scribbling."—*Johnson*. "Not only the thought, but the language is majestic."—*Addison*. "Known only to those, who enjoy."—*Johnson*. "Lay the blame only on themselves."—*Johnson*. "Witty only by the help of speech."—*Steele*.

Our translators of the Bible have almost uniformly observed the same collocation in respect to the predicate; but have, with few or no deviations, preferred a different arrangement in regard to the subject, placing the adverb after, and not before it. It is in conformity to their practice, that we have recommended the rule here given. From the following examples, to which many more might be added, it will appear, that when the adverb referred to a sentence, they made it the introductory word; when it affected an attributive, they placed the adverb before it; and when it referred to a substantive, or the name of a subject, they put the adverb after it. "Only take heed to thyself." "Only he shall not go in unto the vail." "Only thou shalt not number the tribe of Levi." . . . "The thoughts of his heart are only evil." "Thou shalt be only oppressed." "They might only touch the hem of his garment." . . . "None followed David, but Judah only." "He only of Jeroboam shall come to the grave." "Against thee only have I sinned." "Take nothing for your journey, but a staff only." "David did that only, which was right." "They only shall be delivered." "This only have I found." "If in this life only we have hope."

however, already made, may be here repeated, namely, that in the last case, a different collocation may often be adopted without the risk of ambiguity, and even with advantage to the structure of the sentence.

Note 10.—Adverbs, as Lowth observes, are generally placed before the adjective to which they refer. This rule, however, admits a few exceptions. The adverb *enough* is always placed after its adjective, as, “the reward was small enough.” The proper position of this adverb, indeed, seems to be immediately after the adjective; it is frequently, however, placed at some distance from it, as, “a large house enough.” Usage is, indeed, somewhat divided on this point, Mr. Baker, and a few others, pleading for the following arrangement, “a large enough house.” The former collocation, however, seems far the more general; and is recommended by that rule, by which the substantive and adjective should be placed in juxta-position, or as near as possible to each other. The latter is defended by the principle, that the qualifying adverb should be placed close to the adjective, whose signification it modifies. This collocation is generally, however, pronounced a Scotticism; but it is not peculiar to Scotch writers.

RULE XX.—Conjunctions have no government.

Note 1.—In giving this rule, I differ from all other grammarians, who have erroneously, as I conceive,

assigned them a regimen. Some conjunctions, says Lowth, govern the indicative, and some the subjunctive mood. This I affirm without hesitation to be a great mistake; for not a single example, I venture to assert, can be produced, in which the verb is divested of its indicative form, in consequence of its being subjoined to any conjunction. The Latins had a form of the verb, which they properly enough denominated the subjunctive mood; because, where the meaning was unconditionally assertive, they employed this form, if the clause was preceded by some particular conjunctive or adverbial term. Thus, when they said, *adeo benevolus erat, ut omnes eum amarent*, "he was so benevolent, that all men loved him," though the assertion, in the latter clause, be evidently unconditional, as the English shows, they changed the indicative into another form, because the verb is preceded by the conjunction *ut*. No similar example can be produced in English.

Lowth informs us, that, when hypothesis, conditionality, or contingency is implied, the mood should be subjunctive; if certainty, or something determinate and absolute be signified, the verb should be indicative. Now surely, if the sense require a form different from the indicative, the verb cannot be said to be under the government of the conjunction; for the verb assumes that form, not because preceded by the conjunctive term, or because it is under its government, but because the sentiment to be expressed requires that phraseology. Whether the conditional,

or what Lowth terms the subjunctive, be a distinct form of the verb, or only an elliptical mode of expression, we have already inquired. See p. 177.

Note 2.—Mr. Harris says, that the chief difference between prepositions and conjunctions is, that the former couple words, and the latter sentences. This opinion is erroneous; for conjunctions frequently couple words, as in the following example: “A man of wisdom and virtue is a perfect character.” Here it is not implied, that “a man of wisdom is a perfect character; but a man of wisdom combined with virtue, or a man of wisdom and virtue.” That conjunctions, indeed, do not couple at all, in that sense at least, in which grammarians have understood the term, Mr. Tooke seems to have incontestably proved. That they sometimes couple sentences, or that instances may be produced, in which Harris’s definition will appear correct, the following example will serve as an evidence. “You, and I, and John rode to town,” *i. e.* “you rode,” “and I rode,” “and John rode.” But to assert, that this is their distinctive property, is to affirm what may be disproved by numberless examples. If we say, “two and two are four.” Are two four, and two four? “A B, B C, and C A, form a triangle.” Is A B a triangle? or B C? or C A? “John and Mary are a handsome couple.” Is John a couple? and Mary a couple? The common theory, therefore, is false; nor is it to be doubted, that conjunctions are, in respect to signification, and were originally in regard to their regimen, verbs, or words

compounded of nouns and attributives. In explaining them, however, I divided them, as the reader may remember, into the several classes of adversative, concessive, conditional, &c. This I did, not only in conformity to general usage, and that he might not be a stranger to the names assigned to them; but likewise for this reason, that, though they originally formed no distinct species of words, but were either verbs, or compounds of nouns and verbs, they have now assumed another character, and are construed in a different manner. It is necessary, however, that he should be acquainted not only with their present use, but also with their primitive import, and classification.

How these words were degraded from their original rank, and deemed insignificant, while some, perhaps, lost their syntactical power, is a matter, I conceive, of no difficult inquiry. For, when the verbs, to which any of these words belonged, became obsolete, the words themselves, thus separated from their parent stock, and stripped of that consequence and authority, which they thence derived, their extraction becoming daily more dubious, and their original value more obscure, sunk by degrees into inferior note, and at last dwindled into comparative insignificance. Besides, many of them, doubtless, were transplanted into our language without the *radices*; their etymology, therefore, being little known, their primitive character, and real import, would soon be involved in increasing darkness.

It is to be considered also, that those, who have dispensed the laws of grammar in our language, or assumed the office of critics, have been generally such as, though perhaps sufficiently conversant in Greek and Latin, were entirely unacquainted with the northern languages. Accustomed, therefore, to render the conjunctions and prepositions in Greek or Latin, by synonymous English words, and unacquainted with the true character of these vernacular terms, their *etymons* being obsolete, or having never been used in our language, it is easy to conceive how they would naturally assign to the English words the same character and the same name, which were affixed to the synonymous Latin terms. Nay, this has been so much the case, that we have ascribed an ambiguous character to several English words, referring them now to one class, then to another, merely because they agree in signification with certain Greek and Latin terms, which have been severally referred by classical grammarians to different orders. That the word *whether* has uniformly, in our language, the same import, and the same character, denoting "which of the two," there can be no doubt; yet, because this word answers sometimes to *an*, *anne*, *num*, and sometimes to *uter*, grammarians and lexicographers have accounted it both a conjunction and a pronoun. *Utrum* in Latin has shared the same fate. So far, indeed, has this spirit been carried, that we will not admit *except*, *according*, *concerning*, *respecting*, with many similar terms, to be verbs

or participles, because *præter*, *secundum*, *de*, are prepositions. It is from this propensity to assimilate ours with the Latin language, that all these errors have arisen.

That the words now termed prepositions and conjunctions were originally verbs, or nouns, or compounds of these, Tooke has, in my judgment, incontrovertibly proved. This being admitted, it appears to me highly probable, that they were primitively construed as such, joined either with the nominative or the objective case, as the verbs had either a transitive or intransitive meaning; and that they were followed by either single words, or clauses. This, however, is merely conjecture, founded indeed in the nature of the words, but not supported by any evidence. In process of time, in consequence of that assimilation, which naturally takes place between a living language and a dead one, much read, much written, and much admired, these words, when their origin became obscure, would, as I have remarked, be divested of their primitive character, and be considered as belonging to those classes, to which the synonymous Latin words were referred. Hence their regimen would likewise undergo a change. It would appear awkward and vicious to say now, "I saw nobody but he;" it is not improbable, however, that the mode of expression was originally, "I saw nobody, be out he," *i. e.* "he be out." But I am now indulging in conjecture, the very error which chiefly has misled us in our grammatical researches. One

thing, however, is certain, that several words, which were originally employed as prepositions or conjunctions indifferently, have now acquired a more fixed character, and are used but seldom in a double capacity. Of this the word *without* is an example. Thus, it was not unusual to say, “without you go, I will not,” where the term of exclusion, though in truth a preposition prefixed to a clause, was considered as a conjunction synonymous with *nisi*. This usage, unless in conversation, is now almost entirely relinquished; and the term *without* is now generally employed as a preposition, being prefixed to single words. It is likewise certain that in respect to signification there is no difference between conjunctions and prepositions, *vide neminem nisi eum*, is equivalent to *vidi neminem præter eum*. In like manner, “I saw nobody but him,” is synonymous with “I saw nobody beside him;” in which examples the conjunctions *nisi* and *but* are perfectly synonymous with *præter* and *beside*, which are termed prepositions.

It may be asked, if then prepositions and conjunctions be alike verbs, or nouns, or compounds of these, and if many prepositions and conjunctions be in point of meaning identical, what forms the ground of distinction between them? It is simply this, that the former are prefixed to single words only, as nouns and pronouns, or to clauses involving an infinitive mood*, the infinitive being strictly the name of the

* In colloquial language, but chiefly among the vulgar, prepositions are prefixed to verbs indicative.

verb; and that they have a regimen; while the latter are prefixed to clauses, and have no regimen. This is the only distinction between prepositions and conjunctions as discriminated in modern use. Their original character is sufficiently established by Mr. Tooke.

I have said that some of these words have, in our language, an ambiguous character, being employed both as prepositions and conjunctions. Of this the word *than* is an example. Priestley seems to consider it as a preposition, and pleads in favour of the following expression, “you are taller than him,” not “taller than he.” “Since it is allowed,” says the doctor, “that the oblique case should follow prepositions, and since the comparative degree of an adjective, and the particle *than*, have certainly between them the force of a preposition, expressing the relation of one word to another, they ought to require the oblique case of the pronoun following, so that, *greater than me* will be more grammatical than *greater than I*.” Here I cannot concur with the learned author. The same argument would prove that *major quam me*, would be more grammatical than *major quam ego*; a conclusion which is opposed by universal authority. The truth is *than* must be either a conjunction, or a preposition, or both. If a conjunction, it can have no government, any more than the Latin *quam*; unless we confound the distinction which has been just now explained, and is universally admitted, namely, that conjunctions are

distinguished from prepositions, by their having no government. If it be a preposition, no argument is necessary to prove that it may be joined with an objective case; for such is the distinguishing character of prepositions. If it be either a preposition, or a conjunction, it follows, that it may be construed either with or without a regimen. Lowth, with greater propriety, considers it as a conjunction; and Campbell, in his "Rhetoric," recommends this usage as the only means of preventing that ambiguity, which necessarily arises from the employment of this word as a preposition only. For, if we use it as a preposition, we should say, "I love you better than him," whether it be meant "I love you better than I love him," or "I love you better than he does." By using it as a conjunction, the ambiguity is prevented. For, if the former sentiment be implied, we say, "I love you better than him;" *i. e.* "than I love him;" if the latter, we say, "I love you better than he;" *i. e.* "than he loves you." Whatever may have been the original character or syntax of this word, since usage is now divided, some writers employing it as a conjunction, and others as a preposition, the grammarian may, consistently with his duty, plead for that usage only, which prevents ambiguity.

The rule here recommended is generally violated when *than* is joined with the relative pronoun, as, "Alfred, than whom a greater king never reigned." "Beelzebub, than whom, Satan excepted, none higher sat." Salmon has attempted to account for this al-

most universal phraseology, by saying, that the expression is elliptical, being the same as, “than compared with whom.” This explanation is forced and unnatural. It is likewise unnecessary. The simple fact is, that the word *than* was formerly used as a preposition, and, I believe, more frequently than it is now. Hence, doubtless, arose this phraseology.

RULE XXI.—Derivatives are generally construed like their primitives; as, “it was a happy thing *for* this country, that the Pretender was defeated;” or “happily *for* this country the Pretender was defeated.” Thus also, “to compare *with*,” and “in comparison *with* riches.”—“To depend *on*,” and his “dependence *on* the court.”

RULE XXII.—One negative destroys another; or two negatives are equivalent to an affirmative; as, “nor have I no money, which I can spare;” that is, “I have money, which I can spare.”—“Nor was the king unacquainted with his designs;” that is, “he was acquainted.”

Note 1.—Here our language accords with the Latin. In Greek and French, two negatives render the negation stronger.

Note 2.—This rule is violated in such examples as this, “Nor is danger ever apprehended in such a go-

vernment, no more than we commonly apprehend danger from thunder or earthquakes." It should be, *any more.*

RULE XXIII.—Interjections are joined with the objective case of the pronoun of the first person, and with the nominative of the pronoun of the second, as, "ah me," "oh me," "ah thou wretch," "O thou who dwellest."

Syntax being that part of grammar, which teaches rules not only for the concord and government, but also for the order of words in clauses and sentences, I shall subjoin the few following brief directions for the guidance of the scholar, respecting arrangement.

1st, The collocation should never invert the natural order of events, or violate the principles of reason and metaphysical propriety. It is obvious, for example, that no person can write, who cannot read. The ability to do the former necessarily implies a capacity to do the latter. It is preposterous, therefore, to say with Addison, "There will be few in the next generation, who will not at least be able to write and read." He should have said, "to read and write." "He was the son of a mother, who had nursed him with maternal tenderness, and had born him in an hour of the deepest affliction." The natural order of events should have dictated the reverse

arrangement. There would be a manifest impropriety in saying "Our father is well, and alive;" the former state necessarily implying the latter. In the following passage, however, it is perhaps excusable, the answers particularly corresponding to the questions. Joseph says to his brothers, "Is your father well? The old man, of whom ye spake, is he yet alive?" They answer, "Thy servant, our father, is in good health; he is yet alive." This error was termed by the ancient grammarians *hysteron proteron*; and though not so palpably, as in the preceding examples, it occurs much more frequently, than an inattentive reader is apt to imagine.

2d, The English language admits but few inflexions, and therefore little or no room for variety of arrangement. The connexion of one word with another is not to be perceived, as in Greek and Latin, by correspondence of termination, but by relative position. This renders it indispensably necessary, that those words, which are intimately related by sense one to another, should be closely connected by collocation. "The cunning of Hannibal was too powerful for the Pergamenians, who by the same kind of stratagem had frequently obtained great victories at land." The relative here, by its position, must be understood as referring to the Pergamenians; whereas it is intended to refer to Hannibal. The relative clause therefore should have followed the name of the Carthaginian. "His picture, in distemper, of calumny, borrowed from the description of one

painted by Apelles, was supposed to be a satire on that cardinal.”—*Walpole*. The error here is obvious. He should have said, “His picture of calumny.” “It is folly to pretend to arm ourselves against the accidents of life, by heaping up treasures, which nothing can protect us against, but the good providence of our heavenly Father.”—*Sherlock*. Here the grammatical antecedent is *treasures*; but it is intended to be *accidents*. The relative is removed from its proper subject.

3d, As the converse of the preceding rule, it may be observed, that those words should be separated, which in juxta-position may, at first sight, or first hearing, possibly convey a meaning, which the speaker or writer does not intend. “I like a well-bred man, who is never disposed to mortify or to offend, praised both sorts of food.” As the two introductory words are capable of two meanings, would it not be better to say, “Like a well bred man . . . I praised both sorts of food.” I am aware, that the other collocation is preferable, where a particular stress is to be laid on the principal subject; but ambiguity is an error, which should be studiously avoided, and the meaning should not be left to the determination of a comma.

4th, From the preceding rules, it follows as a corollary, that no clause should be so placed in a sentence, as to be referable either to what precedes, or what follows. “The knight, seeing his habitation reduced to so small a compass, and himself in a

manner shut out of his own house, *on the death of his mother*, ordered all the apartments to be flung open." The clause in italics is ambiguously placed.

5th, When each of two arrangements is equally favourable to perspicuity, and equally consistent with metaphysical propriety, that should be preferred which is the more agreeable to the ear.

6th, Harsh and abrupt cadences should be avoided; and in elevated style, the clauses should swell towards the close of the sentence. This latter rule, however, which requires some limitations, belongs to the province of the rhetorician, rather than to that of the grammarian.

PART III.

CHAPTER I.

HAVING explained and illustrated the etymology and syntax of the English language, as fully as the limits, which I have prescribed to myself, will permit, I would now request the reader's attention to some additional observations.

The grammar of every language is merely a compilation of those general principles, or rules, agreeably to which that language is spoken. When I say, a compilation of rules, I would not be understood to mean, that the rules are first established, and the language afterwards modelled in conformity to these. The very reverse is the fact; language is antecedent to grammar. Words are framed and combined to express sentiment, before the grammarian can enter on his province. His sole business is, not to dictate forms of speech, or to prescribe law to our modes of expression; but, by observing the modes previously established, by remarking their similarities and dissimilarities, his province is to deduce and explain the general principles, and the particular forms, agreeably to which the speakers of that language express them-

selves. The philosopher does not determine, by what laws the physical and moral world should be governed ; but, by the careful observation, and accurate comparison of the various phenomena presented to his view, he deduces and ascertains the general principles, by which the system is regulated. The province of the grammarian seems precisely similar. He is a mere digester and compiler, explaining what *are* the modes of speech, not dictating what they *should be*. He can neither assign to any word a meaning different from that, which custom has annexed to it ; nor can he alter a phraseology, to which universal suffrage has given its sanction. Usage is, in this case, law ; usage *quem penes arbitrium est, et jus et norma loquendi*. If it were now the practice to say, “ I loves,” instead of “ I love,” the former phraseology would rest on the same firm ground, on which the latter now stands ; and “ I love” would be as much a violation of the rules of grammar, or, which is the same thing, of established usage, as “ I loves” is at present. *Regula est, quæ rem, quæ est, breviter enarrat ; non ut ex regula jus sumatur, sed ex jure, quod est, regula fiat.*—*Paul. Leg. 1, de Reg. Jur.*

Having said thus much to prevent misconception, and to define the proper province of the grammarian, I proceed to observe, that this usage, which gives law to language, in order to establish its authority, or to entitle its suffrage to our assent, must be, in the first place, *reputable*.

The vulgar in this, as in every other country, are,

from their want of education, necessarily illiterate. Their native language is known to them no farther, than is requisite for the most common purposes of life. Their ideas are few, and consequently their stock of words poor and scanty. Nay, their poverty, in this respect, is not their only evil. Their narrow competence they abuse and pervert. Some words they misapply, others they corrupt; while many are employed by them, which have no sanction, but provincial or local authority. Hence the language of the vulgar, in one province, is sometimes hardly intelligible in another. Add to this, that debarred by their occupations from study, or generally averse to literary pursuits, they are necessarily strangers to the scientific improvements of a cultivated mind; and are therefore entirely unacquainted with that diction, which concerns the higher attainments of life. Ignorant of any general principles respecting language, to which they may appeal; unable to discriminate between right and wrong; prone therefore to adopt whatever usage casual circumstances may present; it is no wonder, if the language of the vulgar be a mixture of incongruity and error, neither perfectly consistent with itself, nor to themselves universally intelligible. Their usage, therefore, is not the standard, to which we must appeal for decisive authority; a usage so discordant and various, that we may justly apply to it the words of a celebrated critic,

Bellua multorum es capitum; nam quid sequar, aut quem?

The question then is, what is reputable usage? On this subject philologists have been divided. Dr. Campbell appears to me to decide judiciously, when he says, that the usage, to which we must appeal, is not that of the court, or of great men, nor even of authors of profound science, but of those, whose works are esteemed by the public, and who may, therefore, be denominated *reputable* authors. By referring to their practice, he appeals to a standard less equivocal, than if he had resorted to the authority of good writers; for, as he justly observes, there may be various opinions respecting the merits of authors, when there may be no disagreement concerning the rank, which they hold in the estimation of the public; and, because it is the esteem of the public, and not their intrinsic merit (though these go generally hand in hand), that raises them to distinction, and stamps a value on their language. Besides, it is to be observed, that consummate knowledge is not always accompanied with a talent for communicating it: hence the sentiment may be confessedly valuable, while the language is regarded as of no authority.

This usage must be, in the second place, *national*. It must not be confined to this or that province; it must not be the usage of this or that district, the peculiarities of which are always ridiculous, and frequently unintelligible beyond its own limits; but it must be the general language of the country, intelligible every where, and in no place ridiculous. And, though the variety of dialects may collectively form

a greater number of authorities than national usage can boast, taken singly they are much fewer. Those, to use Campbell's apposite similitude, who deviate from the beaten road, may be incomparably more numerous than those who travel in it; yet, into whatever number of by-paths the former may be divided, there may not be found in any one of these tracks so many, as travel in the king's highway.

In the third place, this usage must be *present*. Here it may be asked, what is meant by present usage? Is it the usage of the present year, the present age, or the present century? How is it defined, or by what boundary is it limited? In short, how far may we revert in search of decisive authority? may we go back, for example, as far as Chaucer, or must we stop at the age of Addison?

In determining this matter, the same learned and judicious critic observes, that regard must be had to the species of composition, and the nature of the subject. Poetry is properly allowed a greater latitude than prose; and, therefore, a word, which in prose we should reject as a barbarism, may, with strict propriety, be admitted in verse. Here also there are limits which must not be passed; and, perhaps, any word, which cannot plead the authority of Milton, or of any contemporary or later poet, may be justly regarded as obsolete. In prose, no word, unless the subject be art or science, should be employed, which has been disused for a period greater than the age of man. This is the judgment of the same critic.

Against this answer, indeed, it is possible to raise a thousand cavils; and, perhaps, we shall be reminded of the poet's strictures on the term *ancient* in his days *. One thing, however, is certain, that, though it be difficult to fix a precise limit, where the authority of precedent terminates, and legislative usage commences, or to define with precision the age of man, it must be acknowledged, that there are limits, in respect to usage, which we must not overleap, as there is a certain term, which the life of man cannot surpass.

As there is a period, beyond which precedent in language ceases to have authority; so, on the contrary, the usage of the present day is not implicitly to be adopted. Mankind are fond of novelty; and there is a fashion in language, as there is in dress. Whim, vanity, and affectation, delight in creating new words. Of these, the far greater part soon sink into contempt. They figure for a little, like ephemeral productions, in tales, novels, and fugitive papers; and are shortly consigned to degradation and oblivion. Now, to adopt every new-fangled

* Est vetus, atque probus, centum qui perficit annos,
 Quid? qui deperiit uno mense vel anno;
 Inter quos referendus erit? veteresne potas,
 An quos et præsens, et postera respuat ætas?
 Ille quidem veteres inter ponetur honeste,
 Qui vel mense brevi, vel toto est junior anno.
 Utor permisso, caudæque pilos ut equinæ
 Paullatim vello; et demo unum, demo etiam unum
 Dum cadat elusus ratione ruentis acervi,
 Qui redit ad fastos.

Horace, Ep. I. Lib. 2.

upstart at its birth, would argue not taste, nor judgment, but childish fondness for singularity and novelty. On the contrary, if any of these should maintain its ground, and receive the sanction of reputable usage, to reject it, in this case, would be to resist that authority, to which every critic and grammarian must bow with submission. The term *mob*, for example, was, at its introduction, zealously opposed by Dean Swift. His resistance, however, was ineffectual; and to reject it now would betray prudish affectation, and fruitless perversity. The word *inimical*, previously to the American war, could, I believe, plead, in its favour, only one authority. In some dictionaries, accordingly, it was omitted; and in others stigmatized as a barbarism. It has now obtained a permanent establishment, and is justly admitted by every lexicographer.

“In words, as fashions, the same rule will hold;
 Alike fantastic, if too new or old:
 Be not the first, by whom the new are tried,
 Nor yet the last to lay the old aside.”

Pope's Essay on Criticism.

In short, in this, as in every other question on this subject, perspicuity should be our guide. If the subject be art or science, or if the composition be intended for literary men, then a greater latitude may be allowed, as the reader is supposed to be master of the language, in all its varieties. But, if the subject be accommodated to common capacity, and the composition designed for ordinary readers, the rule now given, not to employ a word, which has been disused

for a period greater than the age of man, will be deemed, I conceive, rational and necessary.

The usage, then, which gives law to language, and which is generally denominated “good usage,” must be *reputable*, *national*, and *present*. It happens, however, that “good usage” is not always uniform in her decisions, and that unquestionable authorities are found for different modes of expression. In such cases, the following canons, proposed by the same author, will be of considerable service, in enabling the reader to decide, to which phraseology the preference is due. These canons I shall give, nearly in the words of the author; and illustrate them, as I proceed, by a few apposite examples, partly his, and partly my own.

CANON I.—When the usage is divided, as to any particular words or phrases, and when one of the expressions is susceptible of a different meaning, while the other admits only one signification, the expression, which is strictly univocal, should be preferred.

For this reason, *ought** for “any thing” is better than *ought*; *scarcely*, as an adverb, better than *scarce*; *by consequence* is preferable to *of consequence*, which signifies also “of importance;” and *exceedingly*, as an adverb, is preferable to *exceeding*.

For the same reason, *to purpose*, for “to intend,”

* The Saxon word is *awiht*, contracted *auht*, *aliquid*.

is better than to *propose*, which signifies also “to lay before,” or “submit to consideration;” and *proposal*, for “a thing offered or proposed,” is better than “proposition,” which denotes also “a position,” or the “affirmation of any principle or maxim.” Thus we say, “he demonstrated Euclid’s *proposition*,” and “he rejected the *proposal* of his friend.”

Agreeably also to this canon, *disposal*, in common language, when a grant, or giving away, is denoted, or when the management of any thing is to be expressed, is preferable to *disposition*, which signifies also *arrangement*, and likewise *temper of mind*; and *exposure*, as the verbal noun from *expose*, is better than *exposition*, the verbal noun of *expound*. We should say, “the exposure of a fault,” and “the exposition of a text.” The analogous words *composure*, from *compose*, and *composition*, from *compound*, or *compose*, have been suffered to retain their distinct significations. “To speak *contemptuously* of a person,” is better than “to speak *contemptibly*,” the latter term meaning generally, “in a contemptible manner,” or “in a manner worthy of contempt,” whereas the former is univocal, and denotes *disrespectfully*, or “in a manner significant of contempt.”

For the same reason, *obvious* for “evident,” is better than *apparent*, which means also “seeming,” as opposed to “real.”

The term *primitive*, as equivalent to *original*, is preferable to *primary*. The latter is synonymous with *principal*, and is opposed to *secondary*; the

former is equivalent to *original*, and is opposed to *derivative*, or *acquired*. I shall illustrate this distinction by a few examples. The words *falsehood* and *lie* agree in expressing the same primary idea, namely, "contrariety to fact;" but they differ in their secondary ideas, the former implying simply "inconsistency with physical truth," the latter being a term of reproach, expressing "a wilful breach of veracity, or of moral truth." *To kill*, and *to murder*, agree also in their primary ideas, both denoting "the deprivation of life;" but they differ in their secondary, the former implying no moral turpitude, the latter denoting an immoral act. From these examples it will appear, that *primary* denotes "what is principal or chief," as opposed to "secondary," or "subordinate."

Primitive is equivalent to *original*; thus we say, the *primitive* meaning of the word *villain*, was "a nearer tenant to the lord of the manor;" custom has altered its signification, and it now denotes "a wicked fellow." Thus the *primary* and the *primitive* meaning of words may be very different; these terms, therefore, ought to be duly discriminated.

Intension for "the act of stretching or straining," is, for the same reason, preferable to *intention*, which signifies also "purpose," or "design." "I am mistaken," is frequently used to denote "I misunderstand," or "I am in error;" but as this expression may also signify, "I am misunderstood," it is better to say, "I mistake."

This canon I would earnestly recommend to the

observance of every writer, who is solicitous to exclude all unnecessary ambiguity, but more emphatically to my junior readers, who are peculiarly prone to the violation of this rule, misled by false notions of elegance and dignity. There prevails at present a foolish and ridiculous, not to say absurd, disposition in some writers to prefer in every instance, with no discrimination, long to short words. They seem to entertain an inveterate antipathy to monosyllabic terms; and disdaining whatever savours of Saxon origin, are incessantly searching after the *sesquipedalia verba* of Greek or Latin extraction, with no regard whatever to precision and perspicuity. Thus many words, which cannot be dismissed without detriment to the language, are falling into disuse, and their places supplied by equivocal and less appropriate terms.

CANON II.—In doubtful cases analogy should be regarded.

For this reason, *contemporary* is better than *co-temporary*, *con* being used before a consonant, and *co* before a vowel; as, *concomitant*, *coeval*.

For the same reason, “*it needs*,” “*he dares*,” “*whether he will or not*,” are better than “*he need*,” “*he dare*,” “*whether he will or no*.” The last of the three phraseologies, here recommended, Priestley thinks exceptionable. To me, as to Campbell, the ellipsis appears evident; thus, “*whether he will, or will not*,” hence “*will not*” seems the only analogical expression.

CANON III.—When expressions are in other respects equal, that should be preferred, which is most agreeable to the ear. This requires no illustration.

CANON IV.—When none of the preceding rules takes place, regard should be had to simplicity. On this ground, “accept,” “approve,” “admit,” are preferable to “accept of,” “approve of,” “admit of.”

I have already observed, that no expression, or mode of speech, can be justified, which is not sanctioned by usage. The converse, however, does not follow, that every phraseology, sanctioned by usage, should be retained; and, in such cases, custom may properly be checked by criticism, whose province it is, not only to remonstrate against the introduction of any word or phraseology, which may be either unnecessary or contrary to analogy, but also to extrude whatever is reprehensible, though in general use. It is by this exercise of her prerogative, that languages are gradually refined and improved; and, were this denied, language would soon become stationary, or more probably would hasten to decline. In exercising this authority, she cannot pretend to degrade instantly any phraseology, which she may deem objectionable; but she may, by repeated remonstrances, gradually effect its dismissal. Her decisions in such cases may be properly regulated by the following canons, as delivered by the same author.

CANON I.—All words and phrases, particularly

harsh, and not absolutely necessary, should be dismissed, as, “shamefacedness,” “unsuccessfulness,” “wrongheadedness.”

CANON II.—When the etymology plainly points to a different signification from what the word bears, propriety and simplicity require its dismissal. For example, the word “beholden,” taken for “obliged,” or the verb “to unloose,” for “to loose,” or “untie,” should be rejected.

CANON III.—When words become obsolete, or are never used, but in particular phrases; they should be repudiated; as they give the style an air of vulgarity and cant, when their general disuse renders them obscure. Of these, “lief,” “dint,” “whit,” “moot,” “pro and con,” furnish examples, as, “I had as lief go,” “by dint of argument,” “not a whit better,” “a moot point,” “it was argued pro and con.” These phraseologies are vulgar, and savour too much of cant, to be admitted in good writing.

CANON IV.—All words and phrases, which analysed grammatically include a solecism, should be dismissed, as, “I had rather go.” The expression should be, “I would,” or “I’d rather go;” and from the latter, the solecism “I had go,” seems by mistake to have arisen, *I’d* being erroneously conceived to be contracted for *I had*, instead of a contraction for *I would*. This is the opinion of Campbell, and to this

opinion I expressed my assent, in the former edition of this Treatise. I acknowledge, however, that it now appears to me not strictly correct; and that Webster has not questioned its accuracy on insufficient grounds. In the phrases adduced by Campbell, such as, "I'd go," "I'd rather stay," we can readily perceive the probability that *I'd* is a contraction for "I would." But in such expressions as "I had like to have been caught," which occur not only in colloquial language, but also in authors of considerable name, it is impossible to admit Campbell's explanation. I must observe also, that the phraseology, which he censures, occurs in some of our earliest writers, and is so frequently found in Pope and Swift, that one is tempted to infer, notwithstanding its solecistic appearance, that it is genuine English. It is difficult, however, nay perhaps impossible, to reconcile it to analogy. Were I to offer conjecture on the subject, I should be inclined to say, that in such phrases as "I had go," *I had* is by a grammatical figure very common in English, put for *I would have*, or *I would possess*, and that the simple name of the act or state, by an ellipsis perhaps of the verbal sign, is subjoined, as the object wished, no regard being had to the completion of the action; in the same manner as we say, I would have *gone*, when we wish the action perfected. But, by whatever authority this phraseology may be recommended, and in whatever way it may be reconciled to the rules of syntax, it has so much the appearance of solecism, that I de-

cidedly prefer with Campbell the unexceptionable form of expression, *I would*. The phrase *I had like* appears to me utterly irreconcilable with any principle of analogy.

CANON V.—All expressions, which, according to the established rules of the language, either have no meaning, or involve a contradiction, or, according to the fair construction of the words, convey a meaning different from the intention of the speaker, should be dismissed. Thus, when a person says, “he sings a good song,” the words strictly imply that “the song is good,” whereas the speaker means to say, “he sings well.” In like manner, when it is said, “this is the best part he acts,” the sentence, according to the strict interpretation of the words, expresses an opinion, not of his manner of acting, but of the part or character which he acts. It should be, “he acts this part best,” or “this is the part which he acts best.” “He plays a good fiddle,” for “he plays well on the fiddle,” is, for the same reason, objectionable.

Of expressions involving a contradiction, the following will serve as an example. “There were four ladies in company, every one prettier than another.” This is impossible. If A was prettier than B, B must have been less pretty than A; but by the expression every one was prettier than another, therefore B was also prettier than A. Such absurdities as this ought surely to be banished from every language.

Of those, which have little or no meaning, Camp-

bell has given as examples, "currying favour," "having a month's mind," "shooting at rovers." Such modes of expression, he justly calls trash, the disgrace of any language.

These canons I have extracted from "Campbell on Rhetoric," a book which I would recommend to the reader's attentive perusal.

I proceed to observe, that to write any language with grammatical purity, implies these three things.

1st, That the words be all of that language.

2dly, That they be construed and arranged, according to the rules of syntax in that language.

3dly, That they be employed in that sense, which usage has annexed to them.

Grammatical purity, therefore, may be violated in three ways.

1st, The words may not be English. This error is called barbarism.

2dly, Their construction may be contrary to the English idiom. This error is termed solecism.

3dly, They may be used in a sense different from their established acceptance. This error is named impropriety*.

The barbarism is an offence against lexicography, by admitting new words, as, "volupty," "connexity," "majestatic," or by using obsolete words, as, "uneath," "erst;" or an offence against etymology, by improper inflexion, as "teached," for "taught," "oxes," for "oxen."

* Deprehendat, quæ barbara, quæ impropria, quæ contra legem loquendi composita.—*Quintil.* lib. i. cap. 5.

The solecism is an offence against the rules of syntax, as, "I reads," "you was."

The impropriety is an offence against lexicography, by mistaking the meaning of words or phrases.

A solecism is regarded by grammarians as a much greater offence than either of the others; because it betrays a greater ignorance of the principles of the language. Rhetorically considered, it is deemed a less trespass; for the rhetorician and grammarian estimate the magnitude of errors by different standards; the former inquiring only how far any error militates against the great purpose of his art—persuasion; the latter, how far it betrays an ignorance of the principles of grammar. Hence with the former, obscurity is the greatest trespass; with the latter, solecism, and that species of barbarism which violates the rules of etymology*.

* In conformity to the example of most of our grammarians, I have employed the term *etymology* in the title of this work, and wherever else it occurs, as denoting that part of grammar, which teaches the inflection of words. In its primitive acceptation, it means an exposition of their derivation, and is still employed in that sense, as well as in the signification, in which it is here used. Some writers have preferred the term *analogy* to express the doctrine of inflection. If the principle of analogy or similitude were confined to inflection, the designation might be proper; but, as this principle extends to the concord, the government, and the collocation, generally termed, the *syntax* of words, it cannot be considered an appropriate name for that part of grammar, which teaches merely inflection, or verbal termination. Analogy is the leading principle, on which every grammatical rule is founded; and those, who have employed the term for etymology, it would be easy to show, have not been observant of strict consistency.

CHAPTER II.

HAVING, in the preceding chapter, explained the nature of that usage which gives law to language ; and having proposed a few rules for the student's direction in cases where usage is divided, and also where her authority may be justly questioned, and checked by criticism ; I intend, in the following pages, to present the young reader with a copious exemplification of the three general species of error against grammatical purity, arranging the examples in the order of the parts of speech.

SECTION I.

THE NOUN.

BARBARISM.

" I RODE in a one horse chay." It ought to be " a one horse chaise." There is no such word as *chay*.

" That this has been the true and proper *acception* of this word, I shall testify by one evidence."—*Hammond*. *Acception* is obsolete, it ought to be *acceptation*.

" Were the workmen to enter into a contrary combination of the same kind, not to accept of a certain

wage.”—*Wealth of Nations*. *Wage* is obsolete; the plural only is used.

“Their alliance was sealed by the nuptial of Henry, with the daughter of the Italian prince.”—*Gibbon*. *Nuptial* has not, I believe, been used as a substantive since the days of Shakspeare, and may be deemed obsolete. The plural *nuptials* is the proper word.

“He showed that he had a full comprehension of the whole of the plan, and of the judicious *adaption* of the parts to the whole.”—*Sheridan’s Life of Swift*. *Adaption* is obsolescent, if not obsolete: *adaptation* is the proper term. *Adaption* is frequently employed by Swift, from whom Sheridan seems to have copied it.

—— “Which even his brother modernists themselves, like ungrates, whisper so loud that it reaches up to the very garret I am now writing in.”—*Swift*. “Ungrate” is a barbarism. “Ingrate” is to be found in some of our English poets as an adjective, and synonymous with “ungrateful;” but “ungrate,” as a substantive, is truly barbarous. Almost equally objectionable is Steele’s use of *stupid* as a substantive plural. “Thou art no longer to drudge in raising the mirth of stupids.”—*Spectator*, No. 468. And also of *ignorant*, “The ignorants of the lower order.”—*Ibid*.

Pope also says, in one of his letters, “We are curious impertinents in the case of futurity.” This employment of the adjective as a noun substantive;

though never sanctioned by general use, is now properly avoided by our most reputable writers. It tends to confusion, where distinction is necessary.

“The Deity dwelleth between the cherubims.” The Hebrews form the plural of masculines by adding *im*; “cherubims,” therefore, is a double plural. “Seraphims,” for the same reason, is faulty. The singular of these words being “cherub” and “seraph,” the plural is either “cherubs” and “seraphs,” or “cherubim” and “seraphim.” Milton has uniformly avoided this mistake, which circumstance Addison, in his criticisms on that author, has overlooked; nay, he has, even with Milton’s correct usage before him, committed the error. “The zeal of the *seraphim*,” says he, “breaks forth in a becoming warmth of sentiments and expressions, as the character which is given of *him*,” &c. Here “seraphim,” a plural noun, is used as singular. It should be, “the zeal of the seraph.”

“Nothing can be more pleasant than to see virtuosoës about a cabinet of medals, descanting upon the value, the rarity, and authenticalness of the several pieces.” *Authenticalness*, though used by Addison, is obsolescent, and may, perhaps, be deemed a barbarism. It may be properly dismissed, as a harsh and unnecessary term.

“He broke off with Lady Gifford, one of his oldest acquaintances in life.”—*Sheridan’s Life of Swift*. *Acquaintances* is now deemed a Scotticism, being almost peculiar to the northern parts of the island.

Johnson, however, did not disclaim it. "A young student from the inns of court, who has often attacked the curate of his father's parish, with such arguments as his acquaintances could furnish."—*Rambler*. We find it also in Steele; thus, "she pays every body their own, and yet makes daily new acquaintances."—*Tatler*, No. 109.

"I am sure, that the farmeress at Bevis would feel emotions of vanity . . . if she knew you gave her the character of a reasonable woman."—*Lord Peterborough to Pope*. This, I believe, is the only passage in which *farmeress* is to be found; but, though it may therefore be pronounced a barbarism, the author could not have expressed himself so clearly and so concisely, in any other way. We every now and then, as Johnson observes, feel the want of a feminine termination.

"The bellowses were broken." The noun, as here inflected, is barbarous. "Bellows" is a plural word, denoting a single instrument, though consisting of two parts. There is, therefore, no such word as "bellowses."

SOLECISM*.

"I have read Horace Art of Poetry." This expression may be deemed solecistical, being a violation

* The reader is requested to observe, that under "solecism," I have included several phraseologies, which, though not consistent with syntactical propriety, may be justly called by the softer name of "inaccuracies."

of that rule, by which one substantive governs another in the genitive. It should be, "Horace's Art of Poetry." "These are ladies ruffles," "this is the kings picture," are errors of the same kind, for "ladies' ruffles," "the king's picture."

"These three great genius's flourished at the same time." Here "genius's," the genitive singular, is improperly used for "geniuses," the nominative plural.

"They have of late, 't is true, reformed, in some measure, the gouty joints and darning work of *whereunto's*, *whereby's*, *thereof's*, *therewith's*, and the rest of this kind."—*Shaftesbury*. Here also the genitive singular is improperly used for the objective case plural. It should be, *whereuntos*, *wherebys*, *thereofs*, *therewiths*.

"Both those people, acute and inquisitive to excess, corrupted the sciences."—*Adams's History of England*.

"Two rival peoples, the Jews and the Samaritans, have preserved separate exemplars of it."—*Geddes's Preface to his Translation of the Bible*. The former of these passages involves a palpable error, the word "people," here equivalent to *nation*, and in the singular number, being joined with *both*, or "the two," a term of plurality. In the latter, this error is avoided, the noun being employed in the plural number. This usage, however, though sanctioned by the authority of our translators of the Bible in

two passages, seems now to be obsolete. *States, tribes, nations*, appear to be preferable.

“I bought a scissars,” “I want a tongs,” “It is a tattered colours,” involve a palpable solecism, the term significant of unity being joined with a plural word. It should be, “a pair of scissars,” “a pair of tongs,” “a pair of colours.”

“They tell us, that the fashion of jumbling fifty things together in a dish was at first introduced, in compliance to a depraved and debauched appetite.”
—*Swift*.

We say, “comply with,” therefore, by Rule xvii. “in compliance with” is the analogical form of expression, and has the sanction of classical usage.

“The fortitude of a man, who brings his will to the obedience of his reason.”—*Steele*. Analogy requires “obedience to.” We say, *obedient to command*: the person obeying is expressed in the genitive, or with the preposition *of*; and the person or thing obeyed with the preposition *to*, as, “a servant’s obedience,” or “the obedience of a servant to the orders of his master.”

“Give attendance to reading, to exhortation, to doctrine.”—*Bible*. “Attendance” and “attention” are verbal nouns, derived from “attend.” When the verb signifies “to regard,” or “to fix the mind upon,” it is followed by *to*, as, “he attends to his studies,” and the verbal noun is “attention,” construed, agreeably to Rule xvii. in the same manner as the verb.

Thus, "he gives attention to his studies." But when "to attend" signifies "to wait on," or "be present at," it is followed by *on*, *upon*, or *at*, and is sometimes used without the preposition.

Thus, "if any minister refused to admit a lecturer recommended to him, he was required to attend *upon* the committee."—*Clarendon*.

"He attended *at* the consecration with becoming gravity."—*Hume*. In this sense the verbal noun is "attendance," and construed like the verb, when it bears this signification. In the sentence, therefore, last quoted, syntax requires, either "attendance at" or "attention to." The latter conveys the meaning of the original.

IMPROPRIETY.

"The observation of the Sabbath is a duty incumbent on every Christian." It should be, "the observance." Both substantives are derived from the verb "to observe." When the verb means "to keep," or "obey," the verbal noun is "observance;" when "to remark," or "to notice," the noun is "observation."

"They make such acquirements, as fit them for useful avocations."—*Staunton's Embassy to China*.

The word *avocation* is frequently, as in the example before us, confounded with *vocation*. By the latter is clearly signified "calling," "trade," "employment," "business," "occupation," and by the

former is meant whatever withdraws, distracts, or diverts us from that business. No two words can be more distinct ; yet we often see them confounded.

“ A supplication of twenty days was decreed to his honour.”—*Henry's History of Britain*. The term *supplication* is in our language confined to what Johnson calls “ petitionary worship,” and always implies request, entreaty, or petition. The Latin term *supplicatio* has a more extensive meaning, and likewise *supplicium*, each denoting not only *prayer*, strictly so called, but also *thanksgiving*. The latter of these should have been employed by the author.

“ Our pleasures are purer, when consecrated by nations, and cherished by the greatest *genii* among men.”—*Blackwell's Mythology*. *Genii* means spirits. (See p. 24.) It ought to be *geniuses*.

I have already remarked (*see* p. 42), that, when the primary idea implied in the masculine and feminine terms, is the chief object of attention, and when the sex does not enter as a matter of consideration, the masculine term should be employed, even when the female is signified. Thus, the Monthly Reviewer, in giving a critique on the poems of Mrs. Grant, says, in allusion to that lady, “ such is the poet's request.” This is strictly proper. He considers her merely as a writer of poetry. But, were we to say, “ as a poet she ought not to choose for her theme the story of Abelard,” we should be chargeable with error. For this would imply, that the story of Abelard is not a

fit subject for a poem,—a sentiment manifestly false. There is no incongruity between the subject and poetry, but between the subject and female delicacy. We ought, therefore, to say, “as a poetess, she ought not to choose for her theme the story of Abelard.”

“It was impossible not to suspect the veracity of this story.” “Veracity” is applicable to persons only, and properly denotes that moral quality or property, which consists in speaking truth, being in its import nearly synonymous with the fashionable, but grossly perverted term, *honour*: it is, therefore, improperly applied to things. It should be “*the truth* of this story.” The former denotes moral, and the latter physical truth. We therefore say “the truth” or “verity of the relation or thing told,” and “the veracity of the relater.”

Pope has entitled a small dissertation, prefixed to his translation of the Iliad, “A View of the Epic Poem,” misled, it is probable, by Bossu’s title of a similar work, “*Traité du Poëme Epique*.” *Poem* denotes the work or thing composed; “the art of making,” which is here intended, is termed *poesy*.

An error similar to this occurs in the following passage: “I apprehend that all the *sophism* which has been or can be employed, will not be sufficient to acquit this system at the tribunal of reason.”—*Bolingbroke*. “Sophism” is properly defined by Johnson, “a fallacious argument;” sophistry means “fal-

lacious reasoning," or "unsound argumentation." The author should have said "all the sophistry," or "all the sophisms."

"The Greek is, doubtless, a language much superior in riches, harmony, and variety to the Latin."—*Campbell's Rhet.* As the properties or qualities of the languages are here particularly compared, I apprehend, that the abstract "richness" would be a more apposite term. "Riches" properly denotes "the things possessed," or "what constitutes the opulence of the owner;" "richness" denotes the state, quality, or property of the individual, as possessed of these. The latter, therefore, appears to me the more appropriate term.

"He felt himself compelled to acknowledge the justice of my remark." The *justness* would, agreeably to Canon 1st, be the preferable word, the former term being confined to persons, and the latter to things.

"The negligence of this leaves us exposed to an uncommon levity in our usual conversation."—*Spectator*. It ought to be "The neglect." "Negligence" implies a habit; "neglect" expresses an act.

"For I am of opinion that it is better a language should not be wholly perfect, than it should be perpetually changing; and we must give over at one time, or at length infallibly change for the worse; as the Romans did when they began to quit their simplicity of style for affected refinements, such as

we meet with in Tacitus, and other authors, which ended, by degrees, in many barbarities." *Barbarity*, in this sense, is obsolescent. The univocal term, *barbarism*, is much preferable.

Gibbon, speaking of the priest, says, "to obtain the acceptation of this guide to salvation, you must faithfully pay him tythes." *Acceptation* in this sense is obsolete, or at least nearly out of use: it should be *favour* or *acceptance*.

"She ought to lessen the extravagant power of the duke and duchess, by taking the disposition of employments into her own hands."—*Swift*. *Disposal*, for reasons already assigned *, is much better.

"The conscience of approving one's self a benefactor to mankind, is the noblest recompense for being so." Conscience is the faculty by which we judge our own conduct. It is here improperly used for "consciousness," or the perception of what passes within ourselves.

"If reason were as plenty as blackberries, I would give no man a reason on compulsion."—*Shakspeare*. Here *plenty*, a substantive, is improperly used for *plentiful*.

"It had a prodigious *quantity* of windows."—*Spence's Excursions*. It should be *number*. This error frequently occurs in common conversation. We hear of "a quantity of people," of "a quantity

* See Canon I, p. 324.

of troops," "a quantity of boys and girls," just as if they were to be measured by the bushel, or weighed in the balance.

"I have the Dublin copy of Gibbon's History." This is a Scotticism for *Dublin edition*; and so palpable, that I should not have mentioned it, were it not found in authors of no contemptible merit.

Robertson, when speaking of the Mexican form of government (Book viith), says, "but the description of their policy and laws is so inaccurate and contradictory, that it is difficult to delineate the form of their constitution with any precision." I should here prefer the appropriate and univocal term *polity*, which denotes merely the form of government; *policy* means rather wisdom or prudence, or the art of governing, which may exist where there is no settled *polity*.

"A letter relative to certain calumnies and misrepresentations which have appeared in the Edinburgh Review, with an exposition of the ignorance of the new critical junto."—Here, agreeably to Canon I (*see* p. 324.), I should prefer *exposure*, as being a word strictly univocal. It would conduce to perspicuity were we to consider *exposition* as the verbal noun of *expound*, and confine it entirely to *explanation*, and *exposure* as the verbal noun of *expose*, signifying the act of setting out, or the state of being set out or exposed.

SECTION II.

THE ADJECTIVE.

BARBARISM.

“INSTEAD of an able man, you desire to have him an insignificant wrangler, opiniatre in discourse, and priding himself on contradicting others.”—*Locke*. *Opiniatre* is a barbarism; it should be *opinionative*.

“And studied lines, and fictious circles draw.”—*Prior*.

The word *fictious* is of *Prior*'s own coining; it is barbarous.

“The punishment that belongs to that great and criminous guilt is the forfeiture of his right and claim to all mercies.”—*Hammond*. *Criminous* is a barbarism.

“Which, even in the most overly view, will appear incompatible with any sort of music.”—*Kames's Elements*. *Overly* is a Scotticism; in England it is now obsolete. The proper term is *cursory* or *superficial*.

“Who should believe, that a man should be a doctor for the cure of bursten children?”—*Steele*. The participle *bursten* is now obsolete.

“Callisthenes, the philosopher, that followed Alex-

ander's court, and hated the king, being asked, how one should become the *famousest* man in the world, answered, by taking away him that is."—*Bacon's Apophth.* The superlative is a barbarism ; it should be, "most famous."

SOLECISM.

"I do not like these kind of men." Here the plural word *these* is joined to a noun singular ; it should be, "this kind." "Those sort," "these kind of things," are gross solecisms.

"Neither do I see it is any crime, farther than ill manners, to differ in opinion from the majority of either, or both houses ; and that ill manners I have often been guilty of."—*Swift's Examiner.* Here is another egregious solecism. He should have said, "those ill manners," or "that species of ill manners."

"The landlord was quite unfurnished of every kind of provision."—*Sheridan's Life of Swift.* We say, "to furnish *with*," not "to furnish *of*." *Furnished* and *unfurnished* are construed in the same manner. It should be, "unfurnished *with*."

"A child of four years old was thus cruelly deserted by its parents." This form of expression frequently occurs, and is an egregious solecism. It should be, "a child four years old," or "aged four years," not "of four years." Those who employ this incorrect phraseology, seem misled by confounding two very different modes of expression, namely, "a

child of four years of age," or "of the age of four years," and "a child four years old." The preposition *of* is requisite in the two first of these forms, but inadmissible in the third. They would not say, "I am of four years old," but "I am four years old;" hence, consistently, they ought to say, "a child four years old." "At ten years old, I was put to a grammar school."—*Steele*. Grammatically this is, "I old at ten years."

"This account is very different *to* what I told you." "I found your affairs had been managed in a different manner *than* what I advised." Both these phraseologies are faulty. It should be in each, "different *from*." The verb "to differ" is construed with *from* before the second object of disparity; the adjective therefore should (by Rule xvii.) be construed in the same manner.

"These words have the same sense of those others." *Same* should be followed with *as*, *with*, or the relatives *who*, *which*, *that*. It ought, therefore, to be, "as those," or "with those," or "have the sense of those others."

"I shall ever depend on your constant friendship, kind memory, and good offices, though I were never to see or hear the effects of them, like the trust we have in benevolent spirits, who, though we never see or hear them, we think are constantly serving and praying for us."—*Pope's Letters to Atterbury*. *Like* can have no grammatical reference to any word in the

sentence but *I*, and this reference is absurd. He should have said, “*as*, or *just as*, we trust in benevolent spirits.”

“This gentleman rallies the best of any man I know.”—*Addison*. The superlative must be followed by *of*, the preposition implying *out of* a plurality, expressed either by a collective noun, or a plural number. But here we have a selection denoted by *of*, and the selection to be made out of one. This is absurd. It should be, “better than any other”—the best of all men—“I know;” “this gentleman, of all my acquaintance, rallies the best;” or “of all my acquaintance, there is no one, who rallies so well, as this gentleman.”

“Besides, those, whose teeth are too rotten to bite, are best, of all others, qualified to revenge that defect with their breath.”—*Preface to A Tale of a Tub*.

“Here,” says Sheridan, “the disjunction of the word *best* from the word *qualified* makes the sentence uncouth, which would run better thus, ‘are, of all others, best qualified.’” So far Mr. Sheridan is right; but he has left uncorrected a very common error. The antecedent subject of comparison is here absurdly referred at once to the same, and to a different aggregate, the word *of* referring it to *others*, to which it is opposed, and to which therefore it cannot, without a contradiction, be said to belong. The sentence, therefore, involves an absurdity: either the word *others* should be expunged, when the sentence will

run thus, "Those, whose teeth are too rotten to bite, are, of all, best qualified to revenge that defect," or, if the word *others* be retained, the clause should be, "are better qualified than all others *."

The phraseology here censured, is admissible in those cases only where a previous comparison has been made. If we say, "To engage a private tutor for a single pupil, is, perhaps, of all others, the least eligible mode of giving literary instruction," (*Barrow on Education*), without making that previous discrimination, which the word *others* implies, we commit an error. But we may say with propriety, "I prefer the mode of education adopted in our public schools; and of all *other modes* to engage a private tutor appears to me the least eligible."

IMPROPRIETY.

"They could easier get them by heart, and retain them in memory."—*Adams's History of England*. Here the adjective is improperly used for the adverb; it ought to be "more easily." Swift commits a similar error, when he says, "Ned explained his text so full and clear," for "so fully and clearly."

* We perceive intuitively the error of Milton, when he calls Adam "the comeliest of men since born," Eve also "the fairest of her daughters," and we laugh, perhaps, when the Cork almanack-maker gravely tells us, "that the principal republics in Europe, are Venice, Holland, and America;" yet the error here reprehended is precisely of the same species, though it passes frequently unnoticed. See p. 101.

“ Thus much, I think, is sufficient to serve, by way of address, to my patrons, the true modern critics, and may very well atone for my past silence, as well as for that, which I am like to observe for the future.”

—*Swift.* *Like*, or *similar*, is here improperly used for *likely*, a word in signification nearly synonymous with *probable*. We say, “ he is likely to do it,” or “ it is probable he will do it.”

“ Charity vaunteth not itself, doth not behave itself unseemly.” Here the adjective *unseemly* is improperly used for the adverb, denoting “ in an unseemly manner.” *Unseemlily* not being in use, the word *indecently* should be substituted.

“ The Romans had no other subsistence but the scanty pillage of a few farms.” *Other* is redundant ; it should be, “ no subsistence but,” or “ no other subsistence than.” In the Saxon language, and the earlier English writers, the word *other* is not uniformly followed by *than*, but sometimes with *but*, *before*, *save*, *except* *, thus, Mark, xii. 32, “ thær an God is, and nis other butan him,” thus rendered in

* It has been already offered as the opinion of the writer, (See p. 65,) that the English word *other* is the Saxon *oðer*, and that this word with the Arabic *ahd*, the Hebrew *had* or *ahad*, the Saxon *oððe*, the Teutonic *odo*, the Swedish *udda*, and probably the Latin *aut*, have all sprung from the same source, or that one of these is the parent of the rest, denoting *unus* or *singulus*, “ one,” or “ one by itself.” Of the origin of the Saxon *other*, Lye has hazarded no opinion. It appears to me to be a comparative from *oððe*. To those who have carefully examined, and have

the Bishops' Translation, "there is one God, and there is none but he," and in the common version, "none other but he." In the book of Common Prayer we have, "thou shalt have no other gods, but me;" and the same form of expression occurs in Addison, Swift, and other contemporary writers. Usage, however, seems of late to have decided almost universally in favour of *than*. This decision is not only consistent with analogy, if the word *other* is to be deemed a comparative, but may also, in some cases, be subservient to perspicuity. *No other but, no other beside, no other except*, are equivalent expressions, and do not perhaps convey precisely the same idea with *none but, no other than*. Thus, if we take an example similar to Baker's, and suppose a person to say, "A called on me this morning," B asks, "No one else?" "No other," answers A, "but my stationer." Here the expression, as Baker remarks, seems strictly proper, the words *no other* having a reference to A. But if the stationer had been the only visitor, he should say, "none but," or "no other *than* the stationer called on me this morning." This is the opinion of Baker. The distinction, which he wishes to establish, is sufficiently evident; but that

approved the theory of Mr. Tooke, it will furnish no valid objection against this opinion, that the word *oððe* is uniformly found in Saxon, signifying *aut*. Such can have little or no difficulty in perceiving, not only from the similarity of the elements, but from the affinity in point of sense, that *had, ahd, aut, oððe, oðeþ, other, or*, are all members of one and the same family.

it is warranted by strict analysis, I do not mean to affirm.

“He has eaten no bread, nor drunk no water, these two days.” *No* is here improperly used for *any*, two negatives making an affirmative: it should be, “nor drunk any water.”

“The servant must have an undeniable character.” *Undeniable* is equivalent to *incontrovertible*, or “not admitting dispute.” An “undeniable character,” therefore, means, a character which cannot be denied or disputed, whether good or bad: it should be, “unexceptionable.”

“But you are too wise to propose to yourselves an object, inadequate to your strength.”—*Watson's Hist. of Philip III.* *Inadequate* means “falling short of due proportion,” and is here improperly used in a sense nearly the reverse. It should be, “to which your strength is inadequate,” or, “superior to your strength.”

“I received a letter to-day from our mutual friend.” I concur with Baker in considering this expression to be incorrect. A may be a friend to B and also to C, and is therefore a friend common to both; but not their mutual friend: for this implies reciprocity between two individuals, or two parties. The individuals may be mutually friends; but one cannot be the mutual friend of the other. Locke more properly says, “I esteem the memory of our common friend.” This is, doubtless, the correct expression; but, as the term *common* may denote “ordinary,” or

“not uncommon,” the word *mutual*, though not proper, may, perhaps, as Baker observes, be tolerated. The superlatives *lowest* and *lowermost*, *highest* and *uppermost*, appear to me to be frequently confounded. Thus we say, “the lowest house in the street,” when we mean the lowest in respect to measurement, from the basement to the top, and also the lowest in regard to position, the inferiority being occasioned by declivity. Now it appears to me, that when we refer to dimension, we should say, *lowest* or *highest*; and when we refer to site or situation, we ought to say, *lowermost* or *uppermost*.

“It was due, perhaps, more to the ignorance of the scholars, than to the knowledge of the masters.” —*Swift*. It should be rather, “it was owing,” or “it is ascribable.” The author had previously been speaking of the first instructors of mankind, and questioning their claim to the title of sages. To say, then, that their right to this title, or that the appellation itself, “was due more to ignorance than to knowledge,” is manifestly improper. Swift, however, was not singular in using the adjective in this sense. Steele, and some other contemporary writers, employed it in the same acceptation. “The calamities of children are due to the negligence of the parents.” —*Spectator*, No. 431. It is now seldom or never employed as equivalent to “owing to,” or “occasioned by.”

“Risible,” “ludicrous,” and “ridiculous,” are frequently confounded. *Risible* denotes merely the

capacity of laughing, and is applied to animals having the faculty of laughter, as, "man is a risible creature." *Ludicrous* is applicable to things exciting laughter simply; *ridiculous* to things exciting laughter with contempt. The tricks of a monkey are *ludicrous*, the whimsies of superstition are *ridiculous*. "The measure of the mid stream for salmon among our forefathers is not less risible."—*Kames's Sketches*. He should have said "ridiculous."

We have already expressed our doubt of the propriety of using the numeral adjective *one*, as referring to a plurality of individuals, denoted by a plural noun. See p. 65. There is something which is not only strange to the ear, but also strikes us as ungrammatical, in saying*, "The Greeks and the Trojans continued the contest; the one were favoured by Juno, the other by Venus." At the same time, it must be acknowledged, that there seems to be an inconsistency in questioning this phraseology, and yet retaining some others, which appear to be analogous to it, and can plead in their defence reputable usage. We say, "The Romans and the Carthaginians contended with each other," and "The English, the Dutch, and the Spaniards disputed, one with another, the sovereignty of the sea." Here *each* and *one* clearly refer to a plurality, expressed by a noun plural. A similar

* In French the article and the adjectives admitting a plural termination, the expression "les uns et les autres" joined to a plural verb is in perfect consistence with analogy. So also, in Latin, are *utrique* and *alteri*, referring to a plurality. But *unus* was never in this sense used as a plural.

example occurs in the following sentence: "As the greatest part of mankind are more affected by things, which strike the senses, than by excellencies, that are discovered by reason and thought, they form very erroneous judgments, when they compare *one* with the other."—*Guardian*. If we inquire, what one? we find the answer to be "things." Here is a manifest incongruity, which might have been prevented, by saying, "one subject with the other," or "when they compare them together." As this construction of *one*, referring to a noun plural, seems irreconcilable with the notion of unity, and may be avoided, it becomes a question, whether this phraseology ought to be imitated. The subject, as far as I know, has not been considered by any of our grammarians.

"That this was the cause of the disaster, was apparent to all." *Apparent* is sometimes used in this sense. The word, however, is equivocal, as it denotes *seeming*, opposed to *real*; and *obvious*, opposed to *doubtful* or *obscure*. "I consider the difference between him and the two authors above mentioned, as more apparent than real."—*Campbell*. Here *apparent* is opposed to *real*; and to this sense it would be right to confine it, as thus all ambiguity would be effectually prevented. "But there soon appeared very apparent reasons for James's partiality."—*Goldsmith*. *Obvious*, or *evident*, would unquestionably be preferable.

"How seldom, then, does it happen, that the mind does not find itself in similar circumstances? Very

rare indeed.”—*Trusler’s Preface to Synon*. The adjective *rare* is here improperly used for the adverb. As the question, indeed, is adverbially proposed, it is somewhat surprising, that the author should answer *adjectively*: it ought to be, “very rarely.”

“No man had ever *less* friends, and more enemies.” *Less* refers to quantity, *fewer* to number; it should be, “*fewer* friends.”

“The mind may insensibly fall off from this relish of virtuous actions, and by degrees exchange that pleasure, which it takes in the performance of its duty, for delights of a much more inferior and unprofitable nature.”—*Addison*. *Inferior* implies comparison, but it is grammatically a positive. When one thing is, in any respect, lower than another, we say, “it is inferior to it;” and if a third thing were still lower, we should say, “it is still more inferior.” But the author is comparing only two subjects; he should therefore have said, “of a much inferior, and more unprofitable nature.” The expression “more preferable,” is for the same reason faulty, unless when two degrees of excess are implied.

The adjectives *agreeable*, *suitable*, *conformable*, *independent*, *consistent*, *relative*, *previous*, *antecedent*, and many others, are often used, where their several derivative adverbs would be more properly employed; as, “he lives *agreeable* to nature,” “he wrote to me *previous* to his coming to town,” “*tolerable* good,” “he acted *conformable* to his promise.” It is worthy of remark, however, that the idiom of

our language is not repugnant to some of these phraseologies; a circumstance which many of our grammarians have overlooked, if we may judge from the severity, with which they have condemned them. If I say, "he acted according to nature," the expression is deemed unobjectionable; but is not *according* a participle, or, perhaps, here more properly a *participial*? "He acted contrary to nature" is also considered as faultless; but is not *contrary* an adjective? Were we to reason on abstract principles, or to adopt what is deemed the preferable phraseology, we should say, "contrarily" and "accordingly to nature." This, however, is not the case. "Contrary to nature," "according to nature," and many similar phraseologies, are admitted as good: why, then, is "conformable to nature," an expression perfectly analogous, so severely condemned? Johnson has, indeed, uselessly enough in my opinion, called *according* a preposition; fearful, however, of error, he adds, it is properly a participle, for it is followed by *to*. *According* is always a participle, as much as *agreeing*, and can be nothing else. Because *secundum* in Latin is termed a preposition, hence some have referred *according* to the same species of words. With equal propriety might *in the power of* be deemed a preposition, because *penes* in Latin is so denominated. Now, if "he acted contrary to nature" and "according to nature" be deemed unexceptionable expressions, with many others of the same kind, which might be adduced, it follows that,

“he acted agreeable,” “conformable,” “suitable to nature,” may plead in their favour these analogous phraseologies. I offer these observations, in order to show that, misled by abstract reasonings, or by the servile imitation of another language, we sometimes hastily condemn, as altogether inadmissible, modes of expression, which are not repugnant to our vernacular idiom. I would not, however, be understood to mean, that the adverb is not, in these cases, much to be preferred, when it can be employed consistently with good usage. For, if we say, “he acts agreeable to the laws of reason,” the question is, who or what is agreeable? the answer, according to the strict construction of the sentence, is *he*; but it is not *he*, but *his mode of acting*, of which the accordance is predicated: *agreeably* is, therefore, the preferable term.

I observe also, that, wherever the adjective is employed to modify the meaning of another adjective, it becomes particularly exceptionable, and can scarcely, indeed, plead aught in its favour, as, “indifferent good,” “tolerable strong,” instead of “indifferently good,” and “tolerably strong.” The following phraseology is extremely inelegant, and is scarcely admissible on any principle of analogy. “Immediately consequent to the victory, Drogheda was invested.” —*Belsham’s History*. What was consequent? Grammatically “Drogheda.”

“No other person, beside my brother, visited me to-day.” Here the speaker means to say that no

person, beside his brother, visited him to-day; but his expression implies two exceptions from *none*, the terms *other* and *beside* each implying one, and can, therefore, be correct on this supposition only, that some one beside his brother had visited him. It should be rather, “no person beside.”

“The old man had, some fifty years ago, been no mean performer on the vielle.”—*Sterne*. This phraseology appears to me very objectionable; and can be proper in no case, except when the date of the period is to be expressed as uncertain. The word *some* should be cancelled. We may say, “I was absent some days,” because the period is indefinite; but to say, “I was absent some five days,” either involves an incongruity, representing a period as at once definite and indefinite; or denotes “some five days or other,” a meaning which the expression is rarely intended to signify.

“Brutus and Aruns killed one another.” It should be, “each other:” “one another” is applied to more than two. “The one the other” would be correct, though inelegant.

“It argued the most extreme vanity.”—*Hume*. *Extreme* is derived from a Latin superlative, and denotes “the farthest,” or “greatest possible:” it cannot, therefore, be compared.

“Of all vices pride is the most universal.” *Universal* is here improperly used for *general*. The meaning of the latter admits intension and remission, and may, therefore, be compared. The former

is an adjective, whose signification cannot be heightened or lessened; it therefore rejects all intensive and diminutive words, as, *so, more, less, least, most*. The expression should be, "Of all vices pride is the most general."

"Tho' learn'd, well bred; and tho' well bred, sincere:
Modestly bold, and humanly severe."—*Pope*.

Human and *humane*, as Dr. Campbell observes, are sometimes confounded. The former properly means "belonging to man;" the latter, "kind and compassionate:" *humanly*, therefore, is improperly, in the couplet now quoted, used for *humanely*.

SECTION III.

THE PRONOUN.

BARBARISM.

PRONOUNS are so few in number, and so simple, that this species of error, in respect to them, can scarcely occur. To this class, however, may perhaps be reduced such as, *his'n, her'n, our'n, your'n, their'n*, for *his own, her own, our own, &c.* or for *his one, her one, &c.*

SOLECISM.

"Who calls?" "'Tis me." This is a violation of

that rule, by which the verb *to be* has the same case after it, that it has before it. It should be, "It is I."

"You were the quarrel," says Petulant in "The Way of the World." Millamant answers, "Me!" For the reason just given, it should be "*I*."

"Spare thou them, O God, which confess their faults." As the relative refers to persons, it should be *who*.

"Nor is mankind so much to blame, in his choice thus determining him."—*Swift*. *Mankind* is a collective noun, and is uniformly considered as plural; *his*, therefore, is a gross solecism.

"By this institution, each legion, to whom a certain portion of auxiliaries was allotted, contained within itself every species of lighter troops, and of missile weapons."—*Gibbon*. It ought to be, *to which*—the pronoun *itself*, which follows, referring to a noun of the neuter gender. *To whom* and *itself* cannot each agree with one common antecedent.

"The seeming importance given to every part of female dress, each of which is committed to the care of a different sylph."—*Essay on the Writings of Pope*. This sentence is ungrammatical. *Each* implying "one of two," or "every one singly of more than two," requires the correlative to be considered as plural; yet the antecedent *part*, to which it refers, is singular. It should be, "all parts of female dress."

"To be sold the stock of Mr. Smith, left off business." This is an ungrammatical and very offensive vulgarism. The verb *left off*, as Baker observes, has

no subject, to which it can grammatically belong. It should be, "who has left off," or "leaving off business." "A. B. lieutenant, *vice* C. D. resigned." Here is a similar error. Is C. D. resigned? or is it the office which has been resigned? An excessive love of brevity gives occasion to such solecisms.

"He was ignorant, the profane historian, of the testimony, which he is compelled to give."—*Gibbon's Decline of the Roman Empire.*

"The youth and inexperience of the prince, he was only fifteen years of age, declined a perilous encounter."—*Ib.*

In the former sentence, *the historian* appears neither as the nominative, nor the regimen to any verb. If it be intended to agree with *he* by apposition, it should have immediately followed the pronoun. If it be designed emphatically, and ironically, to mark the character of the historian, it should have been thrown into the form of a parenthetical exclamation. In the latter sentence a phraseology occurs, which, notwithstanding its frequency in Gibbon, is extremely awkward and inelegant. The fault may be corrected either by throwing the age of the prince into a parenthesis, or, preferably, by the substitution of *who* for *he*.

"Fare thee well" is a phraseology which, though sanctioned by the authority of a celebrated poet, and also by other writers, involves a solecism. The verb is intransitive, and its imperative is *fare thou*. No one would say, "I fare me well," "we fare us well."

"That faction in England, who most powerfully

opposed his arbitrary pretensions.”—*Macaulay*. It ought rather to be, “that faction in England, *which*.” It is justly observed by Priestley, “that a term, which only implies the idea of persons, and expresses them by some circumstance or epithet, will hardly authorize the use of *who*.”

“He was certainly one of the most acute metaphysicians, one of the deepest philosophers, and one of the best critics, and most learned divines, which modern times have produced.”—*Keith on the Life and Writings of Campbell*.

“Moses was the mildest of all men, which were then on the face of the earth.”—*Geddes*.

“Lord Sidney was one of the wisest, and most active governors, whom Ireland had enjoyed for several years.”—*Hume*.

In the two first of these passages, *which* is improperly applied to persons; in the last, the author has avoided this impropriety, and used *whom*. The pronoun *that*, however, is much preferable to *who*, or *which*, after a superlative.

“Such of the Morescoes might remain, who demeaned themselves as Christians.”—*Watson’s Life of Philip III*. *Such* is here improperly followed by *who* instead of *as*. The correlative terms are *those*, *who*, and *such as*.

“It is hard to be conceived, that a set of men could ever be chosen by their contemporaries, to have divine honours paid to them, while numerous persons were alive, who knew their imperfections, and who them-

selves, or their immediate ancestors, might have as fair a pretence, and come in competition with them."

—*Prideaux's Connexions*. The identity of subject, in the relative clauses of this sentence, requires the repetition of the same pronoun. It should be, "who themselves, or whose immediate ancestors."

"If you were here, you would find three or four in the parlour, after dinner, whom, you would say, past their afternoons very agreeably."—*Swift*. The pronoun *whom* should not be under the government of the verb *would say*, having no connexion with it; but should be a nominative to the verb *passed*; thus, "who, you would say, passed their afternoons."

"By these means, that religious princess became acquainted with Athenais, whom she found was the most accomplished woman of her age." *Whom*, for the reason already assigned, should be *who*, being the nominative to the verb *was*. If it were intended to be a regimen to the verb *found*, the sentence should proceed thus, "whom she found to be."

"Solomon was the wisest man, him only excepted, who was much greater and wiser than Solomon." In English the absolute case is the nominative; it should, therefore, be, "he only excepted."

"Who, instead of being useful members of society, they are pests to mankind." Here the verb *are* has two nominatives, *who* and *they*, each representing the same subjects of discourse. One of them is redundant; and by the use of both, the expression be-

comes solecistical, there being no verb to which the relative *who* can be a nominative.

“My banks, they are furnish’d with bees,”

is faulty for the same reason, though here, perhaps, the poetic licence may be pleaded in excuse.

“It is against the laws of the realm, which, as they are preserved and maintained by your majesty’s authority, so we assure ourselves, you will not suffer them to be violated.” *Which* is neither a regimen nor a nominative to any verb; the sentence, therefore, is ungrammatical—*Them* is redundant.

“Whom do men say that I am?” The relative is here in the objective case, though there be no word in the sentence by which it can be governed. In such inverted sentences, it is a good rule for those, who are not well acquainted with the language, to arrange the words in the natural order, beginning with the nominative and the verb, thus, “men say, that I am who,” a sentence precisely analogous to “men say, that I am he,” the verb requiring the same case after it, as before it. Hence it is obvious, that it should be, “Who do men say that I am?”

“Who do you speak to?” It ought to be *whom*, the relative being under the government of the preposition, thus, “To whom do you speak?”

“Who she knew to be dead.”—*Henry’s Hist. of Britain*. Here also the relative should be in the objective case, under the government of the verb,

thus, "whom she knew," or "she knew whom to be dead."

"Than whom, Satan except, none higher sat."—*Milton*.

"The king of dykes, than whom no sluice of mud,
With deeper sable blots the silver flood."—*Pope*.

This phraseology I have already examined. In answer to Mr. Baker's reasons for condemning the phrase, "than whom," Story's observations betray, as I conceive, extreme ignorance, and require correction. "The English," says he, "is strictly good; for the relative *whom* is not in the same case with *sluice*, (which is the nominative to the verb *blots*) but referring to its antecedent, *the king of dykes*, is very properly in the objective case, even though the personal pronoun *he*, if substituted in its place, would be in the nominative."

If Mr. Story conceives, that the relative must agree with its antecedent in case, he labours under an egregious mistake. Every page of English evinces the contrary. Yet, such must be his opinion, or his argument means nothing; for the only reason, which he offers for *whom*, is, that its antecedent is in the objective case. Besides, if *than whom* be admissible, nay proper, he will have difficulty in assigning a good reason, why it should not be also *than him*. But Mr. Story should have known, that, when two nouns are coupled by a conjunction, the latter term is not governed by the conjunction, but is either the nominative to the verb, or is governed by it, or by the pre-

position understood. The sentence proceeds thus, "no sluice of mud blots with deeper sable, than *he* or *who* blots."

"It is no wonder if such a man did not shine at the court of Queen Elizabeth, who was but another name for prudence and economy."—*Hume*. The word *Elizabeth*, as represented in the latter clause, is here a mere word, *nuda vox*, and not the sign of a person; for it is said to be another name for *prudence* and *economy*. Not the person, but the word, is said to be significant of this quality. The pronoun, therefore, should be *which*, not *who*. The sentence, however, even thus corrected, would be inelegant. Better thus, "Queen Elizabeth, whose name was but another word for prudence and economy."

"Be not diverted from thy duty by any idle reflections the silly world may make upon you." Consistency requires either "*your* duty," or "upon *thee*." *Thy* and *your*, a singular and a plural pronoun, each addressed to the same individual, are incongruous.

A similar error occurs in the following passage: "I pray *you*, tarry all night, lodge here, that *thy* heart may be merry."—*Bible*.

"It is more good to fall among crows than flatterers, for these only devour the dead, those the living." The pronoun *this* always refers to the nearer object, *that* to the more remote. This distinction is here reversed. It should be, "those (crows) devour the dead; these (flatterers) the living." I observe also,

in passing, that those adjectives, whose mode of comparison is irregular, are not compared by *more* and *most*. It ought to be, "it is better."

"It is surprising, that this people, so happy in invention, have never penetrated beyond the elements of geometry." It should be *has, this people* being in the singular number. We may say, "people have," the noun being collective, but not "this people have."

"I and you love reading." This is a Latinism, and not accordant with our mode of arrangement. Wolsey was right, when he said "Ego, et rex meus;" but in English we reverse the order. It should be, "you and I." We say also, "he and I," "they and I." *You* always precedes.

"Each of the sexes should keep within its proper bounds, and content themselves with the advantages of their particular districts."—*Addison*. Here the pronoun does not agree with the word to which it refers, the word *each* being singular; whereas *themselves* and *their* are plural. It should be, *itself* and *its*.

A similar error occurs in the following sentence: "Some of our principal public schools have each a grammar of *their* own."—*Barrow on Education*. It ought to be, "each a grammar of *its* own." The expression is elliptical, for "schools have, each (has) a grammar of its own." Thus we say, "Simeon and Levi took each man *his* sword," not *their* swords. —*Gen.* xxxiv. 25.

"Let each esteem other better than themselves."—*Bible*. For the reason just given, it ought to be *himself*.

“So likewise shall my heavenly father do also unto you, if ye from your hearts forgive not every one his brother their trespasses.”—*Bible*. Here is a manifest solecism, the pronoun *their* referring to “his brother,” a singular subject.

“I wonder that such a valiant hero as you should trifle away your time in making war upon women.”—*Essay on the Writings of Pope*. Here the pronoun disagrees in person with the noun, to which it refers, *hero* being of the third person, and *your* of the second. The connexion is, “I wonder that such a valiant hero should trifle away *his* time.”

“The venison, which I received yesterday, and was a present from my friend,” &c. *Which* is here in the objective case, and cannot properly be understood as the nominative to the verb *was*: better, therefore, “and which was a present.” The following sentence is still more faulty: “It was happy for them, that the storm, in which they were, and was so very severe, lasted but a short time.” This is ungrammatical, the verb “was” having no nominative. It should be, “which was.”

“There is not a sovereign state in Europe, but keeps a body of regular troops in their pay.” This expression, to say the least of it, is inelegant and awkward. Better, “its pay.” “Is any nation sensible of the lowness of their own manners?”—*Kames*. *Nation* is here improperly construed as both singular and plural. It should be rather “its own.”

“The treaty he concluded can only be considered

as a temporary submission, and of which he took no care to secure the continuance of it.”—*Dryden*. The redundancy of the words *of it*, renders the sentence somewhat ungrammatical. It should run thus, “the treaty he concluded can only be considered as a temporary submission, of which he took no care to secure the continuance.”

An improper reference occurs in the following sentence: “Unless one be very cautious, he will be liable to be deceived.” *One* here answers to the indefinite word *on* in French, and cannot be represented by any pronoun. It must, therefore, be repeated, thus, “unless one be very cautious, one will be liable to be deceived.”

IMPROPRIETY.

“Give me them books.” Here the substantive pronoun is used adjectively, instead of the demonstrative *those* or *these*. The substantive pronouns, which are, strictly speaking, the only pronouns, cannot be construed as adjectives agreeing with substantives. We cannot say, “it book,” “they books,” “them books,” but “this” or “that book,” “these” or “those books.” The former phraseology may be deemed solecistical.

“Great numbers were killed on either side.”—*Watson’s Philip III*. “The Nile flows down the country above five hundred miles from the tropic of Cancer, and marks on either side the extent of fertility by the measure of its inundation.”—*Gibbon*.

It has been already observed, that the Saxon word *æyther* signifies *each*, as Gen. vii. 2. “Clean animals

thou shalt take by sevens of each kind," *aythres yecyndes*. The English word *either* is sometimes used in the same sense. But, as this is the only word in our language, by which we can express "one of two," "which of the two you please," and as it is generally employed in that sense, perspicuity requires, that it be strictly confined to this signification. For, if *either* be used equivocally, it must, in many cases, be utterly impossible for human ingenuity to ascertain, whether only "one of two," or "both" be intended. In such expressions, for example, as "take either side," "the general ordered his troops to march on either bank," how is the reader or hearer to divine, whether *both sides, both banks, or only one* be signified? By employing *each* to express "both," taken individually, and *either* to denote "one of the two," all ambiguity is removed.

"The Bishop of Clogher intends to call on you this morning, as well as your humble servant, in my return from Chapel Izzard."—*Addison to Swift*. After the writer has spoken of himself in the third person, there is an impropriety in employing the pronoun of the first. Much better "in his return."

"The ends of a divine and human legislator are vastly different."—*Warburton*. From this sentence it would seem, that there is only one subject of discourse, *the ends* belonging to one individual, *a divine and human legislator*. The author intended to express two different subjects, namely, "the objects of a divine," and "the objects of a human legislator."

The demonstrative *those* is omitted. It should be, "the ends of a divine, and those of a human legislator, are vastly different." This error consists in defect, or an improper ellipsis of the pronoun: in the following sentence the error is redundancy. "They both met on a trial of skill." *Both* means "they two," as *ambo* in Latin is equivalent to "*ei duo*." It should therefore be, "both met on a trial of skill."

"These two men (A and B) are both equal in strength." This, says Baker, is nonsense; for these words signify only, that A is equal in strength, and B equal in strength, without implying to whom; so that the word *equal* has nothing to which it refers. "A and B," says he, "are equal in strength," is sense; this means, that they are equal to each other. "A and B are both equal in strength to C," is likewise sense. It signifies, that A is equal to C, and that B likewise is equal to C. Thus Mr. Baker. Now, it appears to me, that, when he admits the expression, "are both equal," as significant of the equality of each, he admits a phraseology, which does not strictly convey that idea. For if we say, "A and B are both equal," it seems to me to imply, that the two individuals are possessed of two attributes or qualities, one of which is here expressed; and in this sense only, as I conceive, is this phraseology correct. Thus we may say, with strict propriety, "A and B are both equal in strength, and superior in judgment, to their contemporaries." Or it may denote, that "they two together, namely, A and B, are equal to C singly." In the former case, *both* is necessarily followed by *and*, which is in

Latin rendered by *et*. Thus “A and B are the two things, (both) *equal in strength*, and (add) *superior in judgment* to their contemporaries.” In the latter case, it is equivalent to *ambo*, expressing two collectively, as, “they two *together* are equal to C, but not *separately*.” I am aware, that the word *both* in English, like *ambo* in Latin, is an ambiguous term, denoting either “the two collectively,” or “the two separately,” and that many examples of the latter usage may be adduced. But that surely cannot be deemed a correct or appropriate term, which, in its strict signification, conveys an idea, different from that intended by the speaker; or which leaves the sentiment in obscurity, and the reader in doubt. The word *each*, substituted for *both*, renders the expression clear and precise, thus, “A and B are each equal to C in strength *.”

An error the reverse of this occurs in the following sentence. “This proves, that the date of each letter must have been nearly coincident.” Coincident with what? Not surely with itself; nor can the date of each letter be coincident with each other. It should be, “that the dates of both letters must have been nearly coincident with each other.”

“It’s great cruelty to torture a poor dumb animal.” Better, *’Tis*, in order to distinguish the contraction from the genitive singular of the pronoun *it*.

“Neither Lady Haversham, nor Miss Mildmay,

* “Utrumque fecisse, dicimus, si et hic et ille fecerit divisim; ambos fecisse dicimus, si duo conjunctim aliquid fecerint.”—*Stephan*. This distinction, however, as the learned critic acknowledges, is not uniformly observed.

will ever believe, but what I have been entirely to blame." The pronoun *what*, equivalent to *that which*, is here improperly used for *that*. This mode of expression still obtains among the lower orders of the people, and is not confined to them in the northern parts of the island. It should be "*that* I have been." The converse of this error occurs in the following passages.

"That all our doings may be ordered by thy governance, to do always that is righteous in thy sight."
—*Book of Common Prayer*.

"For, if there be first a willing mind, it is accepted, according to that a man hath."—*Bible*.

The pronouns *it* and *that* were formerly used as including the relative. "This submission is it implieth them all." "This is it men mean by distributive justice."—*Hobbes*. "To consider advisedly of that is moved."—*Bacon*. This usage is now obsolete. The clauses should therefore proceed thus, "to do always what," or "that, which is righteous." "According to what," or "that, which a man hath."

SECTION IV.

THE VERB.

BARBARISM.

"THUS did the French ambassadors, with great show, of their king's affection, and many sugared words, seek to *addulce* all matters between the two kings."—*Bacon*. The verb "to addulce" is obsolete.

“Do villany, do; since you profess to
Like workmen, I'll example you with thievery.”

Shakspeare.

The verb “to example,” as equivalent to the phrase, “to set an example,” is obsolete; and when used for “to exemplify,” may be deemed obsolescent. “The proof whereof,” says Spencer, in his *State of Ireland*, “I saw sufficiently exampled;” better “exemplified.”

“I called at noon at Mrs. Masham's, who desired me not to let the prophecy be published, for fear of angering the queen.”—*Swift*. The verb “to anger” is almost obsolete. In Scotland, and in the northern part of England, it is still colloquially used; but in written language, of respectable authority, it now rarely occurs. I have met with it once or twice in Swift and Pope; since their time it appears to have been gradually falling into disuse.

“Shall we once more go to fight against our brethren, or shall we surcease?”—*Geddes's Transl.* The verb “to surcease” is obsolete.

“And they and he, upon this incorporation and institution, and onyng of themself into a realme, or-daynyd,” &c.—*Fortescue*. Here we have the participle of the verb “to one,” now obsolete, for “to unite.”

“For it is no power to may alien, and put away; but it is a power to may have, and kepe to himself. So it is no power to may syne, and to do ill, or to may be syke, or wex old, or that a man may hurt himself; for all thees powers comyne of impotencye.”—*Ib.* It has been already observed, that the verb *may* is derived from the Saxon *mægan*, *posse*.—*See*

p. 135. From the passage before us it appears, that in the time of Fortescue (anno 1440) the infinitive "to may," for "to be able," was in use. It has now been long obsolete. In the following passage, it forms what is called a compound tense with the word *shall*, the sign of the infinitive being suppressed. "Wherthorough the parlements schall may do more good in a moneth."—*Ib.* That is, "shall be able to do."

"Wherefor al, that he dothe *owith* to be referryed to his kingdom."—*Ib.* The verb *to owe*, as expressive of duty, is now obsolete. It has been supplanted by *ought*, formerly its preterite tense, and now used as a present. We should now say, "ought to be referred."

"Both these articles were unquestionably true, and could easily have been proven."—*Henry's History of Britain.* "Admitting the charges against the delinquents to be fully proven."—*Belsham's History.* *Proven* is now obsolete, having given place to the regular participle. It is still, however, used in Scotland, and is therefore deemed a Scotticism.

"Methoughts I returned to the great hall, where I had been the morning before." *Methoughts* is barbarous, and also violates analogy, the third person being *thought*, and not *thoughts*.

SOLECISM.

"You was busy, when I called." Here a pronoun plural is joined with a verb in the singular number. It should be, "you were."

"The keeping good company, even the best, is but a less shameful art of losing time. What we here call science and study are little better." *What* is

equivalent to *that which*. It should be *is*, and not *are*; thus, "that, which we call . . . is little better."

"This is one of those highwaymen, that was condemned last sessions." According to the grammatical construction of this sentence, "one of those highwaymen" is the predicate; for the syntactical arrangement is, "This (highwayman), that was condemned last sessions, is one of those highwaymen." But this is not the meaning, which this sentence is in general intended to convey: for it is usually employed to denote, that several highwaymen were condemned, and that this is one of them. The sentence, therefore, thus understood, is ungrammatical; for the antecedent is, in this case, not *one*, but *highwaymen*. The relative, therefore, being plural, should be joined with a plural verb, thus, "This is one of those highwaymen, that *were* condemned last sessions."

"I had went to Lisbon, before you knew, that I had arrived in England." This is an egregious solecism, the auxiliary verb *had*, which requires the perfect participle, being here joined with the preterite tense. It should be, "I had gone."

"He would not fall the trees this season." The verb "to fall" is intransitive, and cannot therefore be followed by an objective case, denoting a thing acted upon. It should be, "he would not fell."

"Let him know, that I shall be over in spring, and that by all means he sells the horses."—*Swift*. Here we have in the latter clause a thing expressed, as done or doing, for a thing commanded. It should be, "that he should sell;" or elliptically, "that he sell."

“It is very probable, that neither of these are the meaning of the text.” Neither, means “not the one, nor the other,” denoting the exclusion of each of two things. It should, therefore, be, “neither *is* the meaning of the text.”

“He was a man, whose vices were very great, and had the art to conceal them from the eyes of the public.” According to the grammatical construction of this sentence, *vices* understood is the nominative to the verb *had*; thus, “whose vices were very great, and whose vices had the art to conceal them.” It should be, “and who had the art to conceal them.”

“At the foot of this hill was soon built such a number of houses, that amounted, to a considerable city.” Here the verb *amounted* has no nominative. To render the sentence grammatical, it should be, “that they amounted,” or “as amounted to a considerable city.”

“It requires more logic, than you possess, to make a man to believe, that prodigality is not a vice.” After the verb “to make,” the sign of the infinitive should be omitted. *See Rule xiii. note 3.*

“He dare not,” “he need not,” may be justly pronounced solecisms, for “he dares,” “he needs.”

“How do your pulse beat?” *Pulse* is a noun singular, and is here ungrammatically joined with a verb plural. It should be, “how *does* your pulse beat?”

“The river had overflown its banks.” *Overflown* is the participle of the verb *to fly*, compounded with *over*. It should be “overflowed,” the participle of “overflow.”

“They that sin rebuke before all.” The pronoun, which should be the regimen of the verb *rebuke*, is here put in the nominative case. It should, therefore, be *them*. The natural order is, “rebuke them, that sin.”

“There are principles innate in man, which ever have, and ever will incline him to this offence.” If the ellipsis be supplied, the sentence will be found to be ungrammatical; thus, “which ever have incline,” and “ever will incline.” It should be, “which ever have inclined, and ever will incline.”

“Nor is it easy to conceive that, in substituting the manners of Persia to those of Rome, he was actuated by vanity.”—*Gibbon*. “Substitute *to*,” is a Latinism. It should be, “substitute *for*.”

“I had rather live in forty Irelands, than under the frequent disquiets of hearing, that you are out of order.”—*Swift's Letters*. “You had better return home without delay.” In both these examples *would* is far preferable, thus, “I would rather live,” “you would better return,” or “you would do better to return.”

“That he had much rather be no king at all, than have heretics for his subjects.”—*Watson's Philip II*. Here is involved the same error. It should be, “he would.”

“The nobility of England consisted only of one duke, four earls, one viscount, and twenty-nine barons, all the nobles of the Lancastrian party having been either killed in battles, or on scaffolds, or had fled into foreign parts.”—*Henry's History*. This

sentence is ungrammatical. The word *nobles* joined to the participle *having* must be regarded as put absolutely, and therefore to the verb *had* there is strictly no nominative. But, even were a nominative introduced, the structure of the sentence would be still highly objectionable, the two last clauses “having been killed,” and “they had fled,” being utterly discordant one with the other. The primary idea to be expressed is the *fewness of the nobility*; this forms the subject of the principal clause. There are two reasons to be assigned for this fewness, *their destruction* and *their flight*; these form the subjects of the two subordinate clauses. Between these two, therefore, there should be the strictest congruity; and in this respect the sentence is faulty. It ought to proceed either thus, “The nobility of England consisted only of one duke, four earls, one viscount, and twenty-nine barons; for all the nobles of the Lancastrian party had either been killed in battles, or on scaffolds, or had fled into foreign parts;” or thus, “all the nobles having been killed, or having fled.” The latter is the preferable form.

“He neglected to profit of this occurrence.” This phraseology occurs frequently in Hume. “To profit of,” is a Gallicism; it ought to be, “to profit *by* this occurrence.”

“The people of England may congratulate *to* themselves, that the nature of our government, and the clemency of our king, secure us.”—*Dryden*. “Congratulate *to*,” is a Latinism. The person congratulated should be in the objective case governed

by the verb ; the subject is preceded by the preposition *on*, as, “ I congratulate you *on* your arrival.”

“ You will arrive to London before the coach.”

“ A priest newly arrived to the north-west parts of Ireland.”—*Swift's Sacr. Test.*

In these examples the verb “ to arrive,” is followed by *to*, instead of *at*, an error which should be carefully avoided. Good writers never construe it with the preposition significant of motion or progression concluded, but with those prepositions which denote propinquity or inclusion, namely, *at* or *in*. Hence also to join this verb with adverbs, expressive of motion to, or towards a place, is improper. We should say, “ he arrived *here, there, where*, not *hither, thither, whither*.”

“ I am the Lord that maketh all things, that stretcheth forth the heavens alone, that spreadeth the earth abroad by myself.” According to the structure of the second and third clauses of this sentence *the Lord* is the antecedent to *that*, which is, therefore, properly joined with the third person of the verbs following, “ maketh,” “ spreadeth ;” but the pronoun of the first person, *myself*, in the last clause, does not accord with this structure ; for as we cannot say, “ he spreadeth the earth by myself,” there being only one agent implied, and where *he* and *myself* are supposed to allude to one person, so we cannot say, “ that (Lord) spreadeth the earth by myself,” but “ by himself,” an identity of person being indispensably requisite. The sentence, therefore, should conclude thus, “ that spreadeth abroad the earth by himself.” If *myself*

be retained, the pronoun *I* must be considered as the antecedent, and the sentence will then run thus: "I am the Lord, that make all things, that stretch forth the heavens alone, that spread abroad the earth by *myself*."

"Thou great first cause, least understood,
Who all my sense confin'd,
To know but this, that thou art good,
And that myself am blind."—*Pope*.

The antecedent to the pronoun *who* is the pronoun of the second person singular. The relative, therefore, being of the same person, should be joined to the second person singular of the verb, namely, "confinedst."

"The executive directory, to prove that they will not reject any means of reconciliation, declares," &c. —*Belsham's Hist.* The nominative is here joined to a verb singular, and at the same time represented by a pronoun plural. The error may be corrected either by the substitution of *it* for *they*, or *declare* instead of *declares*.

"These friendly admonitions of Swift, though they might sometimes produce good effects, in particular cases, when properly timed, yet could they do but little towards eradicating faults."—*Sheridan*. The nominative *admonitions* is connected with no verb, the pronoun *they* being the nominative to the verb *could*. The sentence, therefore, is ungrammatical; nor can the figure *hyperbaton* be here pleaded in excuse, as the simplicity and shortness of the sentence

render it unnecessary. *They* in the third clause should be suppressed.

“This dedication may serve for almost any book, that has, is, or shall be published.”—*Bolingbroke*. *Has* being merely a part of a compound tense, conveys no precise meaning without the rest of the tense. When joined, then, to the participle, here belonging to the three auxiliaries, the sentence proceeds thus, “This dedication may serve for almost any book, that *has* published.” It ought to be “has been,” “is,” or “shall be published.” The following sentence is chargeable with an error of the same kind.

“This part of knowledge has been always growing, and will do so, till the subject be exhausted.” Do what? The auxiliary cannot refer to *been*, for the substantive verb, or verb of existence, does not imply action, nor can we say, “do growing.” It ought to be, “has been growing, and will still be so.”

“All that can be now urged, is the reason of the thing, and this I shall do.”—*Warburton*. Here is a similar incongruity. He should have said, “and this shall be done.”

Some of the preceding errors, with those which follow under this head, may be denominated rather inaccuracies, than solecisms.

“’Twas twenty years and more, that I have known him,” says Pope to Gay, speaking of Congreve’s death. It ought to be, “It is twenty years and more,” the period concluding with the present time, or the time then present. He might have said, “It is now twenty years,” where the adverb *now*, being

obviously admissible, points to present time, and necessarily excludes the preterite tense. Pope says, "'Twas twenty years." When? not surely in some part of the past time, but at the time of writing.

"It *were* well for the insurgents, and fortunate for the king, if the blood, that was now shed, had been thought a sufficient expiation for the offence."—*Goldsmith*. "It *were*," which is equivalent to "it would be," is evidently incongruous with the following tense, "had been thought." It ought to be, as he was speaking of past time, "it would have been," or "it had been, well for the insurgents."

"Was man like his Creator in wisdom and goodness, I should be for allowing this great model."—*Addison*. This form of expression cannot be pronounced entirely repugnant to analogy, the preterite of the auxiliary "to have" being used in a similar sense. But the verb "to be" having a mood appropriate to the expression of conditionality, the author should have said, "Were man like his Creator."

"If you please to employ your thoughts on that subject, you would easily conceive the miserable condition many of us are in."—*Steele*. Here there is obviously an incongruity of tense. It should be either, "if you please to employ, you *will* conceive," or "if it pleased you to employ, you *would* conceive."

"James used to compare him to a cat, who always fell upon her legs."—*Adam's Hist. of England*. Here, the latter clause, which is intended to predicate an attribute of the species, expresses simply a parti-

cular fact; in other words, what is intended to be signified as equally true of all, is here limited to one of the kind. It should be, "always *falls* upon her legs."

"This is the last time I shall ever go to London." This mode of expression, though very common, is certainly improper after the person is gone, and can be proper only before he sets out. The French speak correctly when they say, "*la derniere fois que je vais,*" *i. e.* the last time of my going. We ought to say, "this is the last time I shall be in London."

"He accordingly draws out his forces, and offers battle to Hiero, who immediately accepted it." Consistency requires, that the last verb be in the same tense with the preceding verbs. The actions are described as present; the language is graphical, and that, which has been properly enough denominated the "historical tense" should not be employed. It ought to be, "who immediately accepts it."

"I have lost this game, though I thought I should *have won* it." It ought to be, "though I thought I should *win* it." This is an error of the same kind, as, "I expected to have seen you," "I intended to have written." The preterite time is expressed by the tenses "expected," "intended;" and, how far back soever that expectation or intention may be referred, the seeing or writing must be considered as contemporary, or as soon to follow; but cannot, without absurdity, be considered as anterior. It should be, "I expected to see," "I intended to write." Priestley, in defending the other phraseology, appears

to me to have greatly erred, the expression implying a manifest impossibility. The action, represented as the object of an expectation or intention, and therefore, in respect to these, necessarily future, cannot surely, without gross absurdity, be exhibited as past, or antecedent to these. In the following passage the error seems altogether indefensible. "The most uncultivated Asiatics discover that sensibility, which, from their situation on the globe, we should expect them to have felt."—*Robertson's History of America*. The author expresses himself, as if he referred to a past sensation, while the introductory verb shows, that he alludes to a general fact. The incongruity is obvious. He should have said, "expect them to feel."

"Fierce as he moved, his silver shafts resound."—*Pope*.

Much better, "Fierce as he moves." Congruity of tense is thus preserved; and there is, besides, a peculiar beauty in employing the present, a beauty, of which the preterite is wholly incapable. The former imparts vivacity to the expression; it presents the action, with graphical effect, to the mind of the reader; and thus, by rendering him a spectator of the scene, impresses the imagination, and rouses the feelings with greater energy. Compared to the latter, it is like the pencil of the artist to the pen of the historian.

"Jesus answering said unto him, what wilt thou, that I should do unto thee?" The blind man said unto him: "Lord, that I might receive my sight."

It ought to be, "that I may receive my sight," *I will* being understood; thus, "I will, that I may receive my sight," where the present wish, and the attainment of it, are properly represented as contemporary.

"These things have I spoken unto you, that your joy might be full." Better, "that your joy may be full."

"If an atheist would peruse the volume of nature, he would confess, that there was a God." Universal, or abstract truths, require the present tense; it should be, "that there *is* a God."

"—— impresses us with a feeling, as if refinement was nothing, as if faculties were nothing, as if virtue was nothing, as if all that was sweetest, and all that was highest in human nature, was an idle show."—*Godwin's Life of Chaucer*. This sentence errs at once against elegance and accuracy. The former offence may be partly corrected, by substituting the conditional for the indicative tense, in the hypothetical clauses. But the author's principal error consists in converting a general proposition into a particular fact, by representing that as past, which is always present and immutable. The sentence should proceed thus: "Impresses us with a feeling, as if refinement *were* nothing, as if faculties were nothing, as if virtue *were* nothing, as if all that *is* sweetest, and all that *is* highest in human nature, *were* an idle show."

A similar error occurs in this passage: "He pro-

ceeded to demonstrate, that death *was* not an evil ;” and also in this, “ I have frequently been assured by great ministers, that politics *were* nothing, but common sense.”

“ Tom has wit enough to make him a pleasant companion, *was* it polished by good manners.” As the latter clause is intended to be purely hypothetical, the verb should not be in the indicative mood. “ *Were* it polished,” is the proper expression.

“ He understood the language of Balnibarbi, although it were different from that of this island.” — *Swift’s Voyage to Laputa*. From the phraseology here employed, the reader might naturally infer, that the language of the island, and that of Balnibarbi, were identical ; for a concessive term, as I have already said, when joined to what is called the conjunctive form of the verb, implies pure hypothesis, as contrary to fact ; or, in other words, implies a negation of the attribute expressed. The author’s intention was to signify, that the languages *were not* the same. He should, therefore, have said, “ although it *was* different.”

“ The circumstances were as follows.” Several grammarians and critics have approved this phraseology ; I am inclined, however, to concur with those, who prefer “ as follow.” To justify the former mode of expression, the verb must be considered as impersonal. This, I own, appears to me a very questionable solution of the difficulty ; for I am convinced, that we have no impersonal verbs in English, but such as are uniformly preceded by *it*. We frequently,

indeed, meet with sentences, where verbs occur without a nominative, and in the singular number. These are, by some, considered as impersonal verbs, to which the nominative *it* is understood. I apprehend, however, that, on strict inquiry, some one or other of the preceding words, which are now considered as conjunctions, adverbs, or particles, was originally the nominative; and that it is only since the primitive and real character of these words has been obliterated and lost, that we have found it necessary to inquire for another nominative. Thus, if the word *as* be equivalent to *it*, *that*, or *which**, then it is obvious, that, when we say, “the circumstances were *as follows*,” there is no real ellipsis of the nominative involved, nor, therefore, any ground for asserting the impersonality of the verb, in order to explain the syntax, or construction of the phrase; for the word *as*, equivalent to *it*, *that*, or *which*, is the true nominative. It is evident, then, that this solution of the difficulty must be rejected as false; and that the argument in favour of “as follows,” resting on the supposed impersonality of the verb, and the suppression of the pronoun, is entirely unfounded.

If *as* then be the nominative to the verb, and be synonymous with *it*, *that*, or *which*, it is of importance to determine, whether *as* be a singular, or a plural word; or whether it be either the one, or the

* “The truth is, that *as* is also an article; and however and whenever used in English, means the same as *it*, or *that*, or *which*. In the German, where it still evidently retains its original signification and use (as so also does) it is written *es*.”—*Tooke's Diversions*.

other. That it is construed as singular, there can be no doubt. We say, "his insensibility is such, *as excites* our detestation." That it is also joined to a verb plural is equally certain, thus, "his manners are such *as are* universally pleasing." In the former example, *such as* is equivalent to *that which*, and in the latter to *those which*. If *as*, then, be either singular or plural, and synonymous with *it*, *that*, or *which*, I conceive that, when it refers to a plural antecedent, it must, like *which*, be considered as plural, and joined to a plural verb. Now, it is surely more consonant with analogy to say, "the circumstances were, which follow," than *it follows*, or *that follows*. Besides, when the demonstrative *such* precedes, and is joined to a plural noun, it is universally admitted, that *as* must then be followed by a plural verb. If so, the construction of the word *as* cannot, I apprehend, be in the least degree affected, by the ellipsis of the correlative term. Let us now hear those who adopt the contrary opinion.

Baker prefers the verb singular, and remarks, "that there are instances in our language of verbs in the third person without a nominative case, as, 'he censures her, so far as regards.'" In answer to this it may be observed, that, if the word *as* is to be considered in no other light, than as a conjunctive particle, it is certainly true, that the verb *regards* has no nominative. But I am persuaded, no person who has examined the theory of Mr. Tooke, can entertain a doubt respecting the original and real character of this word. Nay, if we investigate the true

and primitive import of the correspondent Latin terms *ut* and *uti*, we shall find, that these, which are termed adverbs, are, in fact, the pronouns *ὅτι*, *ὅτ'*, and that *quod* (anciently written *quodde*) is nothing else than *καὶ ὅτι*, which, like our word *that*, is sometimes called a conjunction, and sometimes a pronoun. Why the original character and real import of the word *as* have been completely merged in the name of adverb, while the word *that* has been assigned the double character of pronoun and conjunction, it would be easy to show, if the discussion were essential to the question before us. But in answer to Baker's remark, it is sufficient to observe, that *as* means properly *it*, *that*, or *which*.

Campbell adopts the opinion of Baker. "When a verb," says he, "is used impersonally, it ought undoubtedly to be in the singular number, whether the neuter pronoun be expressed, or understood." But a question naturally arises, whence has the author learned that the verb is impersonal? There appears to me to be no more impersonality in the verb, when we say, "it is as follows," than when we say, "it is such, as follows," or "they are such, as follow." If *as* be admitted as the nominative in two of these examples, I can perceive no reason for rejecting it in the third. But here lies, as will presently appear, the author's great error. Unacquainted with the true meaning of the word *as*, he conceived it as incapable of becoming a nominative to a verb, as, *ut* or *uti* is deemed in Latin; and he therefore immediately recurs to *ellipsis*.

“For this reason” (that is, because the verb is impersonal), he proceeds to observe, “analogy as well as usage favour this mode of expression; *The conditions of the agreement were as follows*, and not *as follow*.”

How analogy favours this mode of expression, I am utterly at a loss to conceive. The general rule surely is, that to every verb there shall be a nominative, and that this nominative shall be expressed, unless its presence in some preceding clause shall render the repetition of it unnecessary. But how is it consonant with analogy, that no nominative shall appear; or that the supposed nominative shall not be found in any part of the sentence? This surely is repugnant to analogy.

“A few late writers,” he observes, “have inconsiderately adopted this last form (as follow) through a mistake of the construction.” But, if the verb be not impersonal, the error is his, not theirs. I must observe likewise, that from the manner, in which the author expresses himself, one would naturally infer, that a few writers, either contemporary, or immediately preceding his own time, had inconsiderately introduced a solecism into our language. When he offered this observation, he surely was not aware that Steele and Addison, nearly seventy years before the publication of “*The Philosophy of Rhetoric*,” used the plural form. “The most eminent of the kennel,” says Steele, “are blood hounds, which lead the van, and are *as follow*.”—*Tatler*, No. 62. “The words were *as follow*.”—*Ibid.* No. 104. “The words are *as follow*.”—*Addison, Spectator*, No. 513.

“For the same reason,” continues he, still presuming the verb to be impersonal, “we ought to say, *I shall consider his censures so far only, as concerns my friend’s conduct, not concern.* It is manifest,” he observes, “that the word *conditions* in the first case, and *censures* in the second, cannot serve as nominatives.” This observation demonstrates that the author’s argument is founded in his ignorance of the real character of the word *as*. The most extraordinary part of his reasoning follows. “But,” says he, “if we give either sentence another turn, and instead of *as*, say *such as*, the verb is no longer impersonal. The pronoun *such* is the nominative, whose number is determined by its antecedent. Thus we must say, *they were such as follow; such of his censures only, as concern my friend.*” This is truly an extraordinary assertion. The antecedent correlative term *such* can have no connexion whatever with the subsequent verb, but must agree with the principal subject of discourse. Not only does analogy require this, but the usage of every language with which I am acquainted. If we say, *perseverantia fuit tanta, quantus erat furor. Is est, quem dicimus. Talis est, qualem esse creditis. Illæ erant conditiones, quæ sequuntur*, the antecedent correlative terms *tanta, is, talis, illæ*, have no connexion whatever with the verbs in the subsequent clause, *erat, dicimus, creditis, sequuntur*. The truth of this observation must be sufficiently obvious to every classical scholar.

But to illustrate the extreme inaccuracy of the

learned author's opinion, let us change the correlative terms, and say, "I will consider those censures only, which concern my friend." In this sentence it will not be questioned that *those* and *censures* are in the objective case, under the government of the verb. And can it be doubted, if we say, "I will consider such censures," that *censures* with its concordant adjective are in the same case? It is impossible, I conceive, to make this plainer; but we shall suppose, for the sake of illustration, if this should yet be deemed necessary, the example in question to be thus rendered in Latin, *eas tantum reprehensiones perpendam, quæ ad amicum meum attinent*. Now, what should we think of his classical attainments who should contend that *eas* or *reprehensiones* is the nominative to the verb? If we revert then to the original terms, and say, "I will consider such of his censures as concern my friend," by what rule of grammar, by what principle of analysis, can we suppose *such* to be the nominative to the verb? For let me ask, what is he to consider? Is it not *such censures*? And are we, contrary to every principle of English grammar, to represent the object or subject after an active verb, as in the nominative case? The absurdity is too monstrous for a moment's consideration. The very argument, therefore, by which the author defends his doctrine is founded in error, and involves an absurdity. Murray, as usual, adopts the opinion of Campbell.

If it should be inquired how *as*, an adverb or a conjunctive particle, can be the nominative to a verb,

it may be answered, that to whatever order of words we reduce this term, it was evidently at first what we denominate a pronoun; and that it still so far retains its primitive character as to supply the place of a nominative. It is of little moment by what designation it be called, if its character and real import are well understood, any more than it can be of consequence whether we call *that* a conjunction or a pronoun, provided we know, that it is truly and essentially the same word in the same meaning wherever it occurs. I would observe also, though my limits will not permit me to illustrate the principle, that those, who disapprove the verb singular in the examples in question, may notwithstanding admit it in such expressions as *so far as*, *so long as*, and all similar phraseologies.

“To illustrate, and often to correct him, I have meditated Tacitus, examined Suetonius, and consulted the following moderns.”—*Gibbon*. *To meditate*, when a regimen is assigned to it, as here, means *to plot*, *to contrive*, as “he meditated designs against the state.” When it signifies *to ponder*, or *to reflect seriously*, it should be followed by the preposition *on*, as “he meditates *on* the law of God day and night.”

IMPROPRIETY.

“They form a procession to proceed the palanquin of the ambassador.”—*Anderson’s Embassy to China*. Here the verb *to proceed*, or *go forward*, is improperly used for *to precede*, or *to go before*.

“He waved the subject of his greatness.”—*Dryden*.

“To wave” is properly “to move loosely,” and should be distinguished from “to waive,” *i. e.* “to leave” or “to turn from.”—*See Skinner’s Etym.*

“It lays on the table; it laid on the table.” This error is very common, and should be carefully avoided. The verb *to lay* is an active verb; *to lie* is a neuter verb. When the subject of discourse is active, the former is to be used; when the subject is neither active nor passive, the latter ought to be employed. Thus, “he lays down the book,” “he laid down the book,” where the nominative expresses an agent, or a person acting. “The book lies there,” “the book lay there,” where the nominative expresses something, neither active, nor passive. When we hear such expressions as these, “he lays in bed,” “he laid in bed,” a question naturally occurs, what does he lay? what did he lay? This question demonstrates the impropriety of the expressions. The error has originated, partly in an affected delicacy, rejecting the verb “to lie,” as being synonymous with the verb “to tell a falsehood wilfully,” and partly from the identity of the one verb in the present with the other in the preterite tense; thus, “*lay*,” “*laid*,” “*laid* ;” “*lie*,” “*lay*,” “*lain*.”

“The child was overlain.” The participle, for the reason now given, should be *overlaid*.

“It has been my brother you saw in the theatre, and not my cousin.” This use of the preterite definite is, I believe, confined to Scotland, where, in colloquial language, it is very common. The Scots

employ it in those cases, in which an Englishman uses either the preterite indefinite, or the verb signifying necessity. Thus, in the preceding instance, an Englishman would say, "it *must have been* my brother, you saw in the theatre."

"Without having attended to this, we will be at a loss in understanding several passages in the classics."—*Blair's Lectures*. "In the Latin language, there are no two words we would more readily take to be synonymous, than *amare* and *diligere*."—*Ib.* This error occurs frequently in Blair. In the former example it should be *shall*, and in the latter *should*. (See p. 137).

An error, the reverse of this, occurs in the following passage. "There is not a girl in town, but let her have her will, in going to a mask, and she shall dress like a shepherdess."—*Spectator*, No. 9. It should be, *she will*. The author intended to signify mere futurity; instead of which he has expressed a command.

"He *rose* the price of bread last week." Here *rose*, the preterite of the neuter verb *to rise*, and, therefore, unsusceptible of a regimen, is ungrammatically joined with an objective case, instead of *raised*, the preterite of the active verb *to raise*. This error, therefore, involves a solecism, as well as an impropriety.

"Does the price of bread raise this week?" This error is the converse of the former, the active verb being here used instead of the neuter. The ques-

tion, What does it raise? shows the impropriety of the expression. It ought to be, "Does the price of bread rise this week?" These verbs, like the verb *to lay* and *to lie*, are very often confounded in vulgar use.

"It would be injurious to the character of prince Maurice, to suppose, that he would demean himself so far, as to be concerned in those anonymous pamphlets."—*Watson's Philip III.* Here the verb *to demean*, which signifies "to behave," is used as equivalent to the verb *to debase*, or "to degrade." This impropriety is now, I believe, almost entirely confined to Scotland; it has, therefore, been ranked in the number of Scotticisms. "I demean myself" is equivalent to "I behave myself;" and in this sense the author last quoted has, in another passage, very properly used it. "Such of the Morescoes might remain, who, for any considerable time, demeaned themselves as Christians."—*Ibid.*

"Considerable arrears being now resting to the soldiers."—*Ibid.* "Resting," which is equivalent to "being quiet," or "remaining," is, in the sense in which it is here employed, a rank Scotticism: it should be, "due," or "owing."

"The reason will be accounted for hereafter."—*Warburton.* *Accounted for* is here improperly used for *assigned*. "To account for a reason," is "to account for an account."

"But no evidence is admitted in the house of lords, this being a distinct jurisdiction, which differs it con-

siderably from these instances.”—*Blackstone*. The verb *to differ* is a neuter verb, and cannot admit a regimen. The author has improperly used it in an active sense, for “to make to differ.” It should be, “by which it differs,” or, “which makes it differ considerably from these instances *.”

* The error here involved suggests a few observations, which it may be useful to offer, concerning the distinctive character of active and neuter verbs. A neuter verb has been defined to be that, which denotes neither doing nor suffering. An active verb, as its name imports, denotes, that the subject is doing something. Johnson, however, in his Dictionary, gives every active verb the designation of *neuter*, unless followed by an objective case, that is, unless the object or subject of the action be expressed. In the following instances, for example, he considers the verbs as neuter. “’Tis sure, that Henry *reads* ;” “so I *drank* ; and she made the camels *drink* also ;” “if you *plant* where savages are ;” “the priests *teach* for hire ;” “nor feel him where he *struck* ;” “they that *sow* in tears, shall *reap* in joy.” These are a few out of numberless examples, which might be produced. Indeed, Johnson’s idea seems to be, as has been just now observed, that the verb must be regarded as neuter, unless followed by an objective case. This is certainly a great inaccuracy, and tends to introduce perplexity and confusion. The verb surely does not the less denote action, because it expresses it absolutely, or because the subject acted upon is not particularly specified. In the examples now quoted, can it be questioned, when we say *he struck*, that he was active ; or when we say, *they that sow shall reap*, will it be affirmed that *they* are not active ? This would be to confound distinctions not merely acknowledged in theory, and adopted in definition, but also founded in the very nature of things. This matter, I conceive, may be shortly explained, and very easily understood. It is admitted by every grammarian, that an active verb denotes, that the subject is acting, and that a neuter verb signifies, that the subject is neither doing nor suffering. Now, of active verbs there are two kinds, transitive and intransitive. The latter is that which denotes immanent action, or that which does not pass from the agent to any thing else, as *I*

“In order to have this project reduced to practice, there seems to want nothing more, than to put those in mind,” &c.—*Swift*. Here, “to want,” that is, “to need,” “to require,” is improperly used for “to be wanting,” “to be required,” “to be wanted.” It should be, “there seems to be nothing wanting.” The verb *to want* was frequently employed by Pope and Swift in the sense, in which we here find it. Johnson, likewise, in one or two passages, has adopted the same usage, thus, “there had never wanted writers to talk occasionally of Arcadia and Strephon.”—*Life of Phillips*. But in this sense it may now be deemed obsolescent, if not entirely obsolete.

The reader will here permit me to observe, that there is an idiom in our language, respecting the use of active for passive verbs, which seems worthy of attention, and which I do not recollect to have seen

walk, I run. Transitive verbs are such as denote that the action passes from the agent to something acted upon, as, “Hector wounded him,” “Cain slew his brother.” But the subject to which the energy passes, may not always be expressed; the verb, however, is not the less active. Whether we say, “the drummer beats his drum,” or “the drummer beats every day,” it surely will not be contended, that there is less of action implied in the one case than in the other. The reader then is requested to observe, that it is not necessary to the active transitive verb, that the subject acted upon should be expressed. The active verb may predicate of its subject merely the action generally and absolutely, as, “he reads in the morning, and writes in the evening;” or with the action may be expressed the subject or object, as, “he reads Homer in the morning, and writes letters in the evening;” or the object or subject may be implied, and not expressed, as, “the drummer beats at night,” namely, his drum. But in all these cases, the verb is equally active.

remarked by any of our grammarians. In the languages of antiquity, the distinction between active and passive was strictly observed; but in English the active is frequently employed for the passive voice. Of this remarkable idiom numberless examples might be produced; but the few following will suffice. Thus we say, "the sentence *reads* ill," "the wine *drinks* harsh," "the grass *cuts* easily," "the apples *eat* hard," "the drum *beats* to arms," "the metal *works* well." In these examples, the subject clearly is acted upon; the verb, therefore, must be considered as having a passive signification. It is almost unnecessary to observe, that this phraseology should be avoided, whenever it is likely to create ambiguity.

"Lead me forth in thy truth, and learn me."—*Book of Common Prayer*, Psal. xxv. The verb *to learn* formerly denoted, either "to teach," or "to acquire knowledge." In the former sense it is now obsolete. It should therefore be, "lead me forth in thy truth, and *teach* me."

"Prevent us, O Lord, in all our doings by thy most gracious favour."—*Book of Common Prayer*. "He had prevented the hour, because we might have the whole day before us."—*Bacon*. The verb *to prevent*, as signifying "to go before," or "come before," is now obsolete.

"There was no longer any doubt, that the king was determined to wreck his resentment on all concerned."—*Watson's Philip II.*

“They not only wrecked their vengeance on the living, but on the ashes of dead heretics.”—*Henry's Britain*.

Here the verb *to wreck*, or “to destroy, by dashing on rocks,” is improperly used for “to wreak,” or “to discharge.” In the last example the adverbs *not only* are improperly placed. It should be, “they wreaked their vengeance not only,” &c.

“We outrun our present income, not doubting to disburse ourselves out of the profits of some future plan.”—*Addison*. “To disburse,” or “to expend money,” is here improperly used for “to reimburse,” or “to repay.”

“And wrought a great miracle conform to that of the apostles.”—*Bacon*.

“The last is the most simple, and the most perfect, as being conform to the nature of knowledge.”—*Hutton's Investigation*, vol. i. p. 643. *Conform*, here used for *conformable*, is, in this sense, deemed a Scotticism.

SECTION V.

THE ADVERB.

BARBARISM.

“FRIENDSHIP, a rare thing in princes, more rare between princes, that so holily was observed, to the

last of those two excellent men.”—*Sidney on Government*. *Holily* is obsolete.

“Enquire, what be the stones, that do easiliest melt.”—*Bacon*. The adverb *easily* is not compared, —see p. 96. *Easiliest* is, therefore, a barbarism.

“Their wonder, that any man so near Jerusalem, should be a stranger to what had passed there, their acknowledgment to one they met accidentally, that they believed in this prophet,” &c.—*Guardian*. Steele has here used *accidently*, for *accidentally*. The former is a barbarism, and its derivation is repugnant to analogy.

“Uneath may she endure the flinty street,
To tread them with her tender feeling feet.”

Shakspeare.

Uneath is now obsolete, and may therefore be deemed a barbarism.

“In northern clime, a val’rous knight
Did whilom kill his bear in fight,
And wound a fiddler.”—*Hudibras*.

Whilom is now entirely disused. The adverbs *whilere*, *erst*, and perhaps also *anon*, may be ranked in the class of barbarisms.

“And this attention gives ease to the person, because the clothes appear unstudily graceful.”—*Wollstonecraft’s Original Stories*. The word *unstudily* is barbarous, and its mode of derivation contrary to analogy.

SOLECISM.

“Use a little wine for thy stomach’s sake, and

thine often infirmities." *Often*, an adverb, is here improperly used as an adjective, in accordance with the substantive "infirmities." It ought to be "thy frequent infirmities."

"We may cast in such seeds and principles, as we judge most likely to take soonest and deepest root." Here, as in the preceding example, the adverb "soonest" is used as an adjective; for the connexion is "*soonest* root," and "*deepest* root." Now, we cannot say "soon root," the former term being incapable of qualifying the latter; nor can we, therefore, say "*soonest* root." It ought to be "the earliest and the deepest root."

"After these wars, of which they hope for a soon and prosperous issue." *Soon issue* is another example of the same error.

"His lordship inveighed, with severity, against the conduct of the then ministry." Here *then*, the adverb equivalent to *at that time*, is solecistically employed as an adjective, agreeing with *ministry*. This error seems to gain ground; it should therefore be vigilantly opposed, and carefully avoided. "The ministry of that time" would be correct.

"He tells them, that the time should come, that the temple should be graced with the presence of the Messiah." Here *that* is incorrectly used for *when*, *i. e.* "at which time the temple should be graced."

IMPROPRIETY.

"By letters, dated the third of May, we learn that

the West India fleet arrived safely." Here *safely* is improperly used for *safe*. The adverb is equivalent to "in a safe manner;" and when it is said, "that the fleet arrived *safely*," it signifies that the manner of the arrival, rather than the fleet itself, was safe or free from accident. If I say "he carried the parcel as safely as possible," it implies merely his great attention to the manner of carrying it; but this does not infallibly exclude accident; for I may add, "but he unluckily fell," or "he was unfortunately thrown down, and the glass was broken." But if I say, "he carried it as safe as possible," or, "he carried it safe," it implies that it came safe, or escaped all accidents. We should, therefore, say "that the West India fleet arrived safe." In disapproving the expression, "he arrived *safely*," I concur with Baker; but the judicious reader will perceive, that my reason for reprehending it, does not entirely coincide with his. The author's words are these: "If a man says, that he arrived safely, or in a safe manner, he seems to suppose, that there is danger of some mischance in arriving. But what danger is there to be apprehended in the circumstance of arriving? The danger is only during the journey, or voyage; in the arrival there is none at all. The proper way of speaking is, therefore, 'I arrived safe,' that is, 'having escaped all the dangers of the passage.'"

"The poor woman carried them to the person to whom they were directed; and when Lady Cathcart recovered her liberty, she received her diamonds

safely." It should be, "she received her diamonds safe."

Errors like the one on which I have now animadverted, frequently arise from a desire to avoid the opposite mistake; I mean the improper use of the adjective for the adverb.—*See Syntax, Rule V. Note 15.* Hence many, when they employ such phraseologies as I have here exemplified, conceive that they express themselves with the strictest accuracy, thus verifying the poet's observation,

"In vitium ducit culpæ fuga, si caret arte."

In order to avoid this error, it should be remembered, that many English verbs, while they affirm some action, passion, or state of the subject, frequently serve as a copula, connecting the subject with another predicate. This is one of those idioms, in the grammar of our language, which demand the particular attention of the classical scholar. For, though an acquaintance with the learned languages will not seduce him into an improper use of an adjective for the adverb, it may, as in the example now before us, betray him into the converse error. And I am inclined to think, that from a propensity almost irresistible in the classical scholar to assimilate our language with the Latin tongue, our lexicographers have designated many of our words as adverbs, which are strictly adjectives. When it is said, for example, "it goes hard," Johnson considers *hard* as an adverb. Yet when we say, "it goes contrary," he considers

contrary as an adjective. There appears to me to be more of caprice than of reason, more of prejudice than of truth, in this classification. Both words, I am persuaded, belong to one and the same species. Nay, I might venture to assert, that no person, who had studied the principles of the English language, and of that only, would pronounce the one to be an adverb, and the other an adjective. It is to be observed, likewise, that we have the regular adverb *hardly* to express the manner. When we say, "he reasoned concerning the rule," "we argued respecting the fact," "he lives according to nature," is there not something extremely arbitrary and unphilosophical, in calling *concerning* a preposition, *according* a preposition, followed by *to*, but properly a participle, and *respecting* a participle? Are not all the three participles? Yet Johnson has classed them, as I have now mentioned. But the farther illustration of this subject would lead us into a field much too large for the limits of the present treatise. We must therefore revert to our primary observation, in which we cautioned the reader against the improper use of the adjective for the adverb. It should be remembered that, when it is intended to predicate something of the subject, beside the attribute of the verb, the adjective should be employed; but, when it is intended to express merely some modification of the attribute of the verb, we should then use the adverb. The difference may be illustrated by the following examples. When Gustavus says to his troops, "your

limbs tread vigorous and your breasts beat high," he predicates with the act of treading their physical strength; but had he said, "your limbs tread vigorously," it would merely modify their treading, and express an act, not a constitutional habit. The same distinction may be made between saying with Arnoldus in the same play, "the tear rolls graceful down his visage," and "the tear rolls gracefully." The former predicates grace of the tear itself, the latter merely of its rolling. When we say, "he looks sly," we mean he has the look or the appearance of being a sly man; when it is said, "he looks slyly," we signify that he assumes a sly look. When we say "it tastes good," we affirm that the subject is of a good quality, whether the taste be pleasant or unpleasant; if we say "it tastes well," we affirm the taste of it to be pleasant.

"The manner of it is thus." The adverb *thus* means "in this manner." The expression, therefore, amounts to "the manner of it is in this manner." It should be "the manner of it is this," or "this is the manner of it." "This much is certain." Better, "Thus much," or "so much."

"It is a long time since I have been devoted to your interest." *Since* properly means "from the time when," and not "during which time." The expression might be construed into a meaning the reverse of that which is intended, implying that the attachment had ceased for a long time. It should be "it is a long time since I became devoted," or

“it is a long time, that I have been devoted to your interest.”

“It is equally the same.” *Equally* is here redundant; it ought to be, “it is the same.”

“Whenever I call on him, he always inquires for you.” *Whenever* means, “at what time soever,” “always when,” or “as often as;” *always*, therefore, is redundant.

“They will not listen to the voice of the charmer, charm he never so wisely.” *Never* is here improperly used for *ever*. It ought to be, “charm he ever so wisely;” that is, “*however wisely*,” or “*how wisely soever*, he may charm.”

“And even in those characteristical portraits, on which he has lavished all the decorations of his style, he is seldom or ever misled.”—*Stewart's Life of Robertson*. This error is the converse of the former. It ought to be, “seldom or never;” that is, “seldom, or at no time.” “Seldom or ever” is equivalent to “seldom or always,” or to “seldom or at any time,” expressions evidently improper.

“Some years after being released from prison, by reason of his consummate knowledge of civil law, and military affairs, he was soon exalted to the supreme power.” The first clause of this sentence is ambiguous; for the sentence may imply, either that he gained the supremacy, some years after he was released from prison, that period being left indeterminate; or that some years after a time previously mentioned, he was released from prison, and attained

the chief power. The latter being the author's meaning, it ought to be, "some years *afterwards* being released from prison." Another ambiguity is here involved by improper arrangement; for, as the sentence stands, it is somewhat doubtful, whether his consummate knowledge was the cause of his release-ment, or the cause of his elevation. This error, however, belongs more to the rhetorician, than the grammarian. The French term this ambiguity, "*construction louche*," or a *squinting construction*.

The following error consists in wrong collocation: "The Celteberi in Spain borrowed that name from the Celtæ and Iberi, from whom they were jointly descended." Jointly, with whom? It should be, "from whom (the Celtæ and Iberi) jointly they were descended."

"And the Quakers seem to approach nearly the only regular body of Deists in the universe, the literati, or the disciples of Confucius in China."—*Hume's Essays*. The adverb *nearly*, which is synonymous with *almost*, is here improperly used for *near**. It should be, *approach near*.

"This is the Leviathan, from whence the terrible wits of our age are said to borrow their weapons."—*Swift*. *From* is here redundant; *whence*, denoting "from which place."

"An ancient author prophesies from hence."—

* In justice to this respectable sect, it is incumbent on me to observe, that the Quakers are not Deists, nor does their religious creed approach to Deism.

Dryden. Here a similar impropriety is involved. It should be *hence*.

“E’er we can offer our complaints,
Behold him present with his aid.”

E’er, a contraction for *ever*, which is synonymous with *always*, and also *at any time*, is here improperly used for *ere* or *before*.

In the two following passages, there appears to me to be a similar error: “Or ever the silver cord be loosed, or the golden bowl be broken.”—*Bible*. “I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was.”—*Ibid*.

“And, as there is now never a woman in England, I hope, I may talk of women without offence.”—*Steele*.

“He spake never a word.”—*Bible*.

This usage of the word “never,” is now, I believe, entirely confined to the vulgar.

“As for conflagrations and great droughts, they do not merely dispeople and destroy.”—*Bacon*. *Merely* is here used, as it is uniformly by Bacon, and very frequently by Shakspeare, for *entirely*. In this sense it is obsolete; and it now signifies *purely, simply, only, nothing more than*. From inattention to this, the passage, now quoted, has been corrupted in several editions. They have it, “do not merely dispeople, but destroy,” conveying a sentiment, very different from what the author intended.

SECTION VI.

THE PREPOSITION.

SOLECISM.

“WHO do you speak to?” Here the preposition is joined with the nominative, instead of the objective case. It should be, “whom do you speak to?” or “to whom do you speak?” *To who* is a solecism.

“He talked to you and I, of this matter, some days ago.” It should be, “to *you* and *me* ;” that is, “to you, and to me.”

“Now Margaret’s curse is fallen upon our heads,
When she exclaim’d on Hastings, you and I.”

Shakspeare.

It ought to be, “on Hastings, *you* and *me*,” the pronouns being under the government of the preposition understood.

“Neither do I think, that any thing could be more entertaining, than the story of it exactly told, with such observations, and in such a spirit, style, and manner, as you alone are capable of performing it.” This sentence is extremely faulty. “To perform a story” is not English; and the relative clause is ungrammatical, the preposition being omitted. It should be “performing it in,” which would be grammatically correct, but inelegant, as well as improper.

It would be better expressed thus, “in that spirit, style, and manner, in which you alone are capable of narrating it.”

“Notwithstanding of the numerous panegyrics on the ancient English liberty.”—*Hume’s Essays*. The error here in the use of the preposition after *notwithstanding*, is, I believe, peculiar to Scotland. *Notwithstanding* is a compound word of the same import as *not preventing*. The grammatical construction therefore is, “the numerous panegyrics notwithstanding,” that is, “not hindering,” the noun and the participle being in the absolute case. *Of* renders the expression solecistical.

IMPROPRIETY.

“If policy can prevail upon force.”—*Addison*. Here *upon* is improperly used for *over*. *To prevail on*, is “to persuade;” *to prevail over*, is “to overcome.”

“I have set down the names of several gentlemen, who have been robbed in Dublin streets, for these three years past.”—*Swift*. It should be, “within these three years past.” *Swift’s* expression implies, as *Baker* observes, that these gentlemen had been robbed during the whole three years.

“Ye blind guides, who strain at a gnat, and swallow a camel.” In this sentence, the preposition *at* is very improperly used for *out*. It should be, “strain out a gnat;” that is, exclude it from the liquor by straining.

“I have several times inquired of you without any satisfaction.”—*Pope*. We say “inquire of,” when we ask a question; and “inquire for,” or “after,” when we desire to know the circumstances, in which any object is placed. He should have employed the latter expression.

“The greatest masters of critical learning differ among one another.”—*Spectator*. If the ellipsis be supplied, the sentence proceeds thus: “The greatest masters of critical learning differ, one differs among another.” Here the preposition *among*, which implies a number, or a plurality, is joined to a term significant of unity. It ought to be, “from one another;” that is, “one from another,” or “differ among themselves.”

“I intended to wait *of* you this morning.” The preposition *of* is here improperly used for *on*. We say *to wait on*, not *to wait of*.

“He knows nothing *on* it.” This is a vile vulgarity for “he knows nothing *of* it.”

“He is now much altered to the better.” *To* is here improperly used instead of *for*. “Altered to the better,” may, I believe, be deemed a Scotticism. It ought to be, “he is altered for the better.”

Ambiguity is sometimes produced by putting the preposition in an improper place. “A clergyman is, by the militia act, exempted from both serving and contributing.” This, though intended to express a different meaning, strictly implies, that he is not obliged both to serve and to contribute, but does not

exclude his liability to do the one, or the other. If we say, "he is exempted both from serving and contributing," we express an exemption from both.

"Such of my readers, as have a taste of fine writing."—*Addison's Spect.* "To have a taste of a thing," is "to feel how it affects the sensitive or perceptive faculty;" "to have a taste for a thing" is "to relish its agreeable qualities;" "to have a taste in a thing," which is the expression used by Addison in the same paper, is "to have a discriminative judgment in examining the object." The first expression is incorrect, as not conveying his meaning.

Swift, speaking of Marlborough's dismissal from the queen's ministry, as a bad requital of his public services, says, "If a stranger should hear these furious outcries of ingratitude against our general, he would be apt to inquire," &c. One would naturally conclude from the author's expression, that Marlborough, and not the nation, was charged with ingratitude. He should have said, "ingratitude towards our general."

In the use of prepositions, a distinction is properly made between their literal and figurative meaning. "Wit," says Shakspeare, "depends *on* dilatory time." Here the verb is employed figuratively, and the idea involved in the primitive meaning is dismissed.

"From gilded roofs depending lamps display."—*Dryden.*

Here the verb is used in its literal acceptation, denoting "to hang," and is followed, therefore, by *from*.

To the same purpose it has been remarked by Campbell, that the verb “to found,” used literally, is followed by *on* preferably to *in*, as, “the house was founded *on* a rock;” but, when employed metaphorically, is better followed by *in*, as, “dominion is founded in grace.”

“There is no need *for* your assistance.” It should be, “*of* your assistance.” We say, “occasion *for*,” and “need *of*.” *Need for* may likewise be pronounced a Scotticism, as, I believe, this phraseology is seldom or never used by English writers.

“For, what chiefly deters the sons of science and philosophy from reading the Bible, and profiting of that lecture, but the stumbling-block of absolute inspiration?”—*Geddes*. “To profit of” is a Gallicism; it should be, “profiting by.”

SECTION VII.

THE CONJUNCTION.

SOLECISM.

“A SYSTEM of theology, involving such absurdities, can be maintained, I think, by no rational man, much less by so learned a man as him.” Conjunctions having no government, the word *as* ought not to be joined with an objective case. It should be, “so learned a man as *he*,” the verb *is* being understood.

“Tell the cardinal, that I understand poetry better than him.”—*Smollet*. According to the grammatical construction of the latter clause, it means, “I understand poetry better, than I understand him.” This, however, is not the sentiment which the writer intended to convey. The clause should proceed thus, “I understand poetry better than *he* ;” that is, “than *he* understands it.” Those, who contend for the use of *than* as a preposition, and justify the phraseology which is here censured, must at least admit, that to construe *than*, as a preposition, creates ambiguity. Thus, when it is said, “you think him handsomer than *me*,” it would be impossible to determine whether the meaning is, “you think him handsomer than I think him,” or “you think him handsomer than you think me.”

“There is nothing more pleases mankind, as to have others to admire and praise their performances, though they are never so trivial.” Here there are two errors. The comparative *more* is followed by *as*, instead of *than* ; and the adverb *never* is improperly used for *ever*. “How trivial so ever.” It should be, “There is nothing that pleases mankind more, than,” &c.

Conjunctions having no government, the scholar, desirous to avoid error, should carefully observe, whether the predicate be applicable to the two subjects, connected by the conjunction, or to speak more generally, whether the two nouns be dependent on the same verb or preposition, expressed or under-

stood. "The lover got a woman of greater fortune than her he had missed."—*Addison, Guardian*. This sentence, if not acknowledged to be ungrammatical, is at least inelegant. The pronoun should have been introduced. If *than* be considered as having the power of a preposition, the charge of solecism is precluded; but if *than* be a conjunction, he should have said, "than she, whom he had missed." For, as Lowth observes, there is no ellipsis of the verb *got*, so that the pronoun *her* cannot be under its government. The meaning is not, "The lover got a woman of greater fortune, than he got her, whom he missed," for this would be a contradiction, but "of greater fortune, than she was." In like manner in the following passage:

"Nor hope to be myself less miserable,
By what I seek, but *others* to make
Such as *I*."—*Milton*.

Bentley says, that it should be *me*. We concur with Dr. Lowth in rejecting this correction, and approving the expression of Milton. There is no ellipsis of the verb *make*; *others* and *I* are not under the government of the same word. The meaning is not "to make others such, as to make me," but such as "*I am*," the substantive verb being understood.

In the following passage, on the contrary, the ellipsis seems evident, "I found none so fit as *him* to be set in opposition to the father of the renowned city of Rome." It has been contended, that the

author should have said, "as he," and not "as him;" but it appears to me, that the verb *found* is understood in the secondary clause, and that the expression is correct, the sense being, "I found none so fit, as I found him."

In the following passage the two subjects belong to the same verb.

"The sun, upon the calmest sea,
Appears not half so bright as thee."—*Prior*.

It ought to be, "as thou;" that is, "as thou appearest."

"For ever in this humble cell,
Let thee and I, my fair one, dwell."

The second line of the couplet is ungrammatical, the conjunction connecting an objective with a nominative case, or, to speak more correctly, the pronoun of the first person, which should be a regimen to the verb understood, being here in the nominative case. Thus, "let thee," and "let I, my fair one, dwell," instead of "let *thee*, and let *me*."

"Let us make a covenant, I and thou."—*Bible*. The error here, though similar, does not come under precisely the same predicament with the former. The pronoun *us* is very properly in the objective case, after the verb *let*; *I* and *thou* should therefore be in the same case, according to Rule vii. of Syntax. The expression is in fact elliptical, and when completed

proceeds thus, "Let us make a covenant; let me and thee make."

"Though he were a son, yet learned he obedience by the things which he suffered." The first clause is intended to express a fact, not a hypothesis; the verb, therefore, should be in the indicative mood. Conjunctions have no government, either of cases or moods.

IMPROPRIETY.

"If in case he come, all will be well." *If* and *in case* are synonymous, the one meaning "suppose," and the other, "on the supposition." One of them, therefore, is redundant.

"The reason of my desiring to see you was, because I wanted to talk with you." *Because* means "by reason;" the expression, therefore, is chargeable with redundancy. It should be, "that I wanted to talk with you."

"No sooner was the cry of the infant heard, but the old gentleman rushed into the room."—*Martinus Scrib.* The comparative is here improperly followed by *but*, instead of *than*.

"Scarce had the Spirit of Laws made its appearance, than it was attacked." *Than* is employed after comparatives only, and the word *other*. It ought to be "scarce," or, for reasons formerly given, "scarcely had the Spirit of Laws made its appearance, *when* it was attacked," or "no sooner—than."

"The resolution was not the less fixed, that the

secret was as yet communicated to very few, either in the French or English court." This passage from Hume I have not been able to find. Priestley observes, that it involves a Gallicism, the word *that* being used instead of *as*. If the meaning intended be, that some circumstances, previously mentioned, had not shaken the resolution, because the secret was as yet known to few, then Priestley's observation is correct; and the word *as* should be substituted for *that*, to express the cause of the firmness. But, if the author intended to say, that the very partial discovery of the secret had not shaken the resolution, the clause is then perfectly correct. According to the former phraseology, the circumstance subjoined operated as a cause, preventing the resolution from being shaken: according to the latter, it had no effect, or produced no change of the previous determination. In other words, "the less fixed that," implies that the subject of the following clause did not affect that of the preceding; "the less fixed *as*" denotes, that the latter circumstance contributed to the production of the former. As it is obvious, that, in such examples, the definite article may refer either to the antecedent, or the subsequent clause, the distinction, here specified, should, for the sake of perspicuity, be carefully observed*.

* A similar ambiguity sometimes occurs in Latin by the indiscriminate use of *quod*. This may be prevented by employing *quoniam* when the succeeding member of the sentence expresses the cause of the preceding subject. Thus, "Nec consilium eo

“ His donation was the more acceptable, that it was given without solicitation.” That the word *that* is frequently used for *because* cannot be questioned; thus, “ I am glad *that* you have returned safe,” that is, “ *because* you have returned safe.”

“ ’Tis not *that* I love you less
Than when before your feet I lay.”—*Waller*.

Here *that* is equivalent to *because*. English writers, however, after a comparative employ *as* or *because*, to denote, that the circumstance subjoined was the cause of the preceding one. The use of *that* in such examples is accounted a Scotticism; it should, therefore, be, “ his donation was the more acceptable, *as*” or “ *because* it was given without solicitation.”

“ His arguments on this occasion had, it may be presumed, the greater weight, that he had never himself entered within the walls of a playhouse.”—*Stewart’s Life of Robertson*.

“ A mortification, the more severe, that the joint authority of the archduke and the infanta governed the Austrian Netherlands.”—*Thomson’s continuation of Watson’s History*.

These sentences are chargeable with the same error.

minus erat firmum, quoniam secretum cum perpaucis adhuc erat communicatum,” where the *eo* refers to a preceding circumstance “Nec consilium eo minus erat firmum quod,” where the *eo* refers to the subsequent clause. The former phraseology affirms, the latter denies, the influence of the circumstance subjoined.

“On the east and west sides it (America) is washed by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.”—*Robertson*. This mode of expression is incorrect; and, though to the geographer intelligible, it strictly conveys a conception not intended by the author. The copulative joins the two sides, which ought to be separated; and combines the two seas, instead of the two facts, implying, that both sides are washed by the same two oceans. It should be rather, “On the east side it is washed by the Atlantic, and on the west (is washed) by the Pacific ocean.”

“Will it be believed, that the four Gospels are as old, or even older than tradition?”—*Bolingbroke*. Here there is a faulty omission of the particle corresponding to *as*; for the positive and comparative cannot be followed by the same conjunction. It ought to be “as old *as*, or even older *than*, tradition;” or, perhaps, better, “as old as tradition, or even older.”

“The books were to have been sold as this day.” This is a most offensive vulgarism. The conjunction *as* can have no regimen; nor can it be properly used as equivalent to *on*. It ought to be “sold this day, or on this day.”

“It is supposed, that he must have arrived at Paris as yesterday.” This sentence is chargeable with the same error. Construed strictly, it is, “he must have arrived at Paris *as*, or *in like manner as*, he arrived yesterday.”

“The duke had not behaved with that loyalty, as

he ought to have done.” Propriety of correspondence here requires *with that* to be followed by *with which*, instead of *as*. The sentence, even thus corrected, would be still inelegant and clumsy. “The duke had not behaved with becoming loyalty,” would be much better.

“In *the* order *as* they lie in his preface.” This involves a similar impropriety. It should be, “in order *as*,” or “in the order, in which they lie in his preface.”

“No; this is not always the case neither.”—*Beattie*.

“Men come not to the knowledge of ideas which are thought innate, till they come to the use of reason; nor then neither.”—*Locke*.

In old English two negatives denied; hence, perhaps, this phraseology originated. Johnson remarks, that the use of *neither*, after a negative, and at the end of a sentence, though not grammatical, renders the expression more emphatic. Analogy, however, is decidedly in favour of the affirmative term; I, therefore, prefer the word “either.” Were Johnson’s argument admitted, such expressions as these, “I forbade you *not* to go;” “I won’t suffer no such thing;” “He would not have none of my assistance,” might, I apprehend, be justified on the same principle. Those who employ them, doubtless, believe them to be more emphatic, than if they included a single negative.

“This I am the rather disposed to do, that it will serve to illustrate the principles above laid down.” —*Campbell on Rhetoric*. This sentence involves an error, on which I have already animadverted. “*The rather*” should be followed by *as*, not *that*.

“This is another use, that in my opinion contributes rather to make a man learned than wise; and is neither capable of pleasing the understanding or imagination.” Lowth justly observes, that *or* is here improperly used for *nor*, the correlative words being *neither, nor*. In addition to this observation, I remark, that the word *neither* is erroneously placed. To render this collocation of the conjunction correct, there should be another attributive opposed to the word “capable,” as, “neither capable of pleasing the understanding, nor calculated to gratify the imagination.” But, as the author intended to exclude two subjects, these should have been contrasted by the exclusive conjunctions, thus, “is capable of pleasing neither the understanding, nor the imagination.”

A similar error occurs in the following sentence: “Adversity both taught you to think and reason.” —*Steele*. The conjunction, which is, in truth, the adjective *both*, is improperly placed. It should be, “taught you both,” *i. e.* the two things, “to think and reason.”

It has been already observed, that the conjunction *or* is used disjunctively and subdisjunctively, sometimes denoting a diversity of things, and sometimes

merely a difference of names. Hence often arises ambiguity, where the utmost precision of expression is necessary*. When Ruddiman delivers it as a rule, that “verbal adjectives, *or* such as signify an affection of the mind, require the genitive,” I have known the scholar at a loss to understand, whether there be two distinct classes of adjectives here intended, or one class under two designations. The ambiguity might here be avoided, by using *and* or *with* instead of *or*. It may also be prevented in many cases, by more forcibly marking the distinction by the use of *either*. Thus, if we say, “whosoever shall cause, or occasion a disturbance,” it may be doubtful, whether the latter of the two verbs be not designed as explanatory of the former, they, though their meanings be distinct, being often used as synonymous terms. If we say, “shall either cause or occasion,” all doubt is removed. Sometimes ambiguity may be precluded either by the insertion, or the omission, of the article. Thus, if we say, “a peer, or lord of parliament †,” meaning to designate only one individual, or one order, the expression is correct. But, if it be intended to signify two individuals, every peer not being a lord of parliament, and

* In our penal statutes, which should be precisely worded, because they are literally interpreted, much ambiguity frequently arises from the loose and incorrect manner, in which this conjunction is used.

† The issue of a question, respecting a contested election at Rochester, in 1820, depended on the construction of this designation, “a peer, or lord of parliament.”

every lord of parliament not being a peer, we should say, “a peer, or a lord of parliament,” or “either a peer, or lord of parliament.”

Having now endeavoured to explain and illustrate the etymology and syntax of the English language, I cannot dismiss the subject, without earnestly recommending to the classical student to cultivate a critical acquaintance with his native tongue. It is an egregious, but common error, to imagine, that a perfect knowledge of Greek and Latin precludes the necessity of studying the principles of English grammar. The structure of the ancient, and that of modern languages, are very dissimilar. Nay, the peculiar idioms of any language, how like soever in its general principles to any other, must be learned by study, and an attentive perusal of the best writers in that language. Nor can any imputation be more reproachful to the proficient in classical literature, than, with a critical knowledge of Greek and Latin, which are now dead languages, to be superficially acquainted with his native tongue, in which he must think, and speak, and write.

The superiority of Greek and Latin over the English language in respect of harmony, graceful dignity, conciseness, and fluency, will be readily admitted. Our language is, comparatively, harsh and abrupt. It possesses strength, indeed; but unaccompanied with softness, with elegance, or with

majesty. It must be granted also, that the Greek is, perhaps, a more copious, and is certainly a more ductile* and tractable language. But, though in these respects, the English be inferior to the languages of Greece and Rome, yet in preciseness of expression, diversity of sound, facility of communication, and variety of phrase, it may claim the pre-eminence. It would be easy to evince the truth of this assertion, did the limits, which I have prescribed to myself, permit. The fact is, that analogous languages almost necessarily possess a superiority in these respects over those, which are transpositive.

It is to be remembered also, that our language is susceptible of high improvement; and, though its abrupt and rugged nature cannot be entirely changed, much may be done to smooth its asperities and soften its harshness.

As a farther inducement to the study of the English language, I would assure the young reader, that a due attention to accuracy of diction is highly conducive to correctness of thought. For, as it is generally true, that he, whose conceptions are clear, and who is master of his subject, delivers his senti-

* The superior ductility of the Greek, above every other language, must appear from its singular aptitude to form new words by composition or derivation, so as immediately to communicate any new idea. Hence the names of most of our modern discoveries and inventions are of Greek extraction. Thus we have the terms "microscope," "telegraph," "panorama," "odometer," and many others.

ments with ease and perspicuity * ; so it is equally certain, that, as language is not only the vehicle of thought, but also an instrument of invention, if we desire to attain a habit of conceiving clearly and thinking correctly, we must learn to speak and write with accuracy and precision.

It must, at the same time, be remembered, that to give our chief attention to mere phraseology, or to be more solicitous about the accuracy of the diction than the value of the sentiment, is a sure indication of a nerveless and vacant mind. As we estimate a man, not by his garb, but by his intellectual and moral worth, so it is the sentiment itself, not the dress in which it is exhibited, that determines its character, and our opinion of its author.

“ True expression, like th’ unchanging sun,
Clears and improves whate’er it shines upon ;
It gilds all objects, *but it alters none.*”—*Pope.*

In short, the precept of Quintilian should be studiously observed ; “ *curam ergo verborum, rerum volo esse solitudinem.*”—*Inst. Orat. lib. viii.*

* “ Cui lecta potenter erit res,
Nec facundia deseret hunc, nec lucidus ordo.

“ Verbaque provisam rem non invita sequentur.”

Hor. de Art. Poet.

THE END.

LONDON :

PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.

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